Hegel's Political Philosophy

The Test Case of Constitutional Monarchy

Stephen C. Bosworth

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367420031
• eBook ISBN: 9781000730463
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Originally published in 1991, this volume examines Hegel's political philosophy from the perspective of his argument for constitutional monarchy. It offers an interpretation of Hegelian theory that is relevant for the understanding of modern republican constitutions. Modern republican theories are assessed together with those of Plato, Kant and Marx in order to put Hegel's model to the most rigorous test. The arguments are based on fresh analysis of Hegel's system and on new translations of key passages in Hegel's text.

Chapter One:

THE MODEL CONSTITUTION

Because my model constitution can be seen as derived from Hegel’s philosophical system and yet also departs from his own constitutional theory at certain points, it provides the basis for an intimate test of Hegel’s political philosophy. Thus, the wide ranging comparison offered here will cast a penetrating light into Hegel’s theory of the state. This chapter will first outline the structure of ‘democratic monarchy’ and then consider some of its practical advantages. Later, it will be seen how these are rooted in the more philosophical groundings to be elaborated in the chapters concerned with Plato, Kant, Marx, and, of course, Hegel. Accordingly, in support of the ‘model constitution’, this chapter will largely confine itself to laying some of the descriptive foundations for arguing that,

1) an hereditary head of state is an essential part of the most rational constitution; and that this constitution also,

2) is democratic,

3) is written, and has,

4) a “parliamentary form”,

5) an independent judiciary, headed by a supreme court,

6) a prime minister and council of ministers selected by arrangements similar to those provided by the fundamental law of Germany, namely, the “constructive vote of no confidence” procedure (Articles 63, 67 & 68), and

7) a parliament composed of two houses,

A) the elected chamber is sovereign between general elections,

a) directly with regard to legislative questions, and,

b) indirectly with regard to executive and judicial questions,

B) the non-elected chamber (composed of some hereditary and some life peers) has only an advisory role.

8) The elected house of parliament is chosen by universal adult suffrage by,

9) an electoral system called, ‘associational proportional representation’.

As ‘democratic’, this constitution provides for rule by the ‘majority’ and for each adult to have the effective legal right to participate equally in the making of sovereign state decisions,

a) directly in referenda to decide on any proposed changes to the constitution, and

b) indirectly with regard to legislative, executive, and judicial decisions (through the choice of representatives to the elected assembly).

In the ideal state, the legal right of all adults to vote would be made ‘effective’ by the legislation, policies, and programmes sufficient to remove any of the known obstacles to such political participation, e.g. poverty, intimidation, and ignorance.

While most of the above features do not need much further explanation, several do:

1) the hereditary head of state,

2) the non-elective chamber,

3) the sovereignty of the elected assembly,

4) the ‘constructive vote of no confidence’ procedure, and

5) ‘associational proportional representation’.

Before these are addressed, however, the intended status of the ‘model’ constitution must be made clear. This is especially important in view of what many people might feel are grandiose claims that will be made for democratic monarchy, e.g. ‘most rational’, ‘best workable ideal’,

‘philosophically necessary’. It claims to be established by the most rigorous argument as the best ‘general, prescriptive guide’ for political action. Although it hopes to be conceptually precise in its formulation, of course, its prescriptive implications for every political problem in all the existing countries of the world will rarely be immediately obvious. Even if we were to assume for the moment that it had already been fully established philosophically, I do not expect that this, by itself, would usually tell us exactly how we should conduct ourselves within the problematic of every concrete context. Usually, many additional practical and theoretical difficulties would have to be faced first. Thus, the formulation of operationally precise prescriptions for any empirically concrete state is beyond the scope of this thesis. I do not deny the importance of finding suitable courses of action in these cases, especially for those people directly involved. However, a detailed philosophical consideration of the problems contained even in one such concrete reality would add volumes to this work.¹ More importantly, such an enterprise would draw us into the uncertainties which are unavoidably attached to any action in the world which is partly moved by forces which may not yet be scientifically understood and partly by human wills which are ‘free’ and thus must always remain to some extent unpredictable.²

In one sense, therefore, this book is taking an easy way out. Yet, it seeks to define a model which will address, rather than be undermined by, such uncertainties. A ‘model’ can enjoy this immunity because it is a more abstract entity. It only hopes to offer a general way of coping with these uncertainties. It hopes to be an enduring conception of the ideal constitution. Some such conception is a ‘philosophically necessary’ reference point for the unavoidably uncertain assessment of rival tactics to be applied to any concrete situation. It ought to be a part of every political calculation. While I would argue that such a conception has an intrinsic as well as a practical value, it cannot be denied that most people (even “philosophers” under pressure or in moments of weakness) may act not as a result of such refined considerations but from impulse, feeling, instinct or intuition. The model, therefore, attempts to prescribe the rational goal of political activity with respect to constitutional arrangements. It seeks to formulate a guide to action, not to prescribe operationally precise tactics. Thus ‘democratic monarchy’ hopes to be general, not in the sense of being vague but in the sense of being a clear model which all should add to their probabilistic calculations concerning how they ought to conduct themselves in any given political situation.

With regard to the question of the hereditary head of state, a number of clarifications must be made. The monarch’s constitutional obligation to exercise effective sovereignty in certain circumstances must be explained. He or she may receive this constitutional duty only as a member of the ‘state prerogative council’. One designated member of this council is charged by the model constitution to make the essential sovereign decisions when the elected assembly fails to produce a ‘working majority’. It is this majority which would normally make these decisions. In such times of crisis, the state prerogative council, formally called and chaired by the monarch, would meet in order to advise one of its members on how to exercise one or a combination of four prerogatives:

1) to appoint the prime minister,

2) to appoint a chairperson for the elected assembly,

3) to prorogue or dissolve the elected assembly, or

4) to require that any proposed constitutional changes be first ratified by the electorate in referenda.

Only the last one could be exercised when a ‘working majority’ existed in the elected assembly. The ‘state prerogative council’ would be composed of the following, assuming that none of the relevant offices was vacant. They are listed is order of their priority with regard to the personal exercise of the prerogatives;

a) the ‘governor general’ and the deputy governor general(s),

b) the ‘speaker’ of the elected chamber and deputy speaker(s),

c) the monarch,

d) the ‘leader’ of the non-elected chamber and deputy leaders,

e) (in the absence of a ‘speaker’, the ‘chairperson’ and deputy chairperson(s) of the elected

assembly – whether elected by a mere plurality or appointed by a previous exercise of the prerogative), and

f) (the next adult heir to the throne if invited by the monarch could also participate, but he or she could not personally exercise the prerogatives until he or she inherited the throne).

(1) See Chapter Six.

(2) Ibid.

The practice of consulting one another in the ‘state prerogative council’ would both help the current holder of the prerogatives to think through any proposed courses of action and help to prepare the other men or women who might later be called upon personally to exercise these same constitutional powers. All exercises of the prerogatives by one of the above officials would be formally proclaimed in the name of the state prerogative council, the monarch, and the people. Each of the elected officials on the state prerogative council would be selected, as far as is possible, to have the qualities which Wilson rightly believes they ought to have, namely, to be,

… demonstrably able, representative, accountable, impartial, and capable of legitimate action in the national interest when necessary.¹

Thus, the monarch, personally would have this constitutional right only if the elected officials who would normally also be members of this council and who would have priority were not available for any of the reasons to be elaborated later. Thus, the model’s monarch could have this substantive role as well as remaining the prime symbol of the basic unity of his or her society. Later chapters will argue that the intrinsic qualities of an hereditary head of state makes it the institution best suited to serve as the apex of a society’s symbols of unity. For most every particular state, this unity is complex and incomplete. It is usually a unity of an existing society both with its past and its future, as well as being a unity of its individuals, families, groups, associations, and of its various state functions and organs. The monarch’s many ceremonial functions are meant dramatically and symbolically to affirm this unity.

In any case, no member of the state prerogative council has the right to exercise any of the first three prerogatives unless, because of intense factionalism, the ‘working majority’ in the elected assembly has either evaporated or has failed to materialize in the first place. A ‘working majority’ is present when at least 50% + 1 of the members of the assembly elect the prime minister, continue to give his or her council of ministers votes of confidence when asked, and pass the legislative, self-dissolving, or referenda proposals requested by the council of ministers (i.e. the ‘executive council’). The history of parliamentary systems in the world has clearly shown that such majority support for executive council cannot be taken for granted, even or especially under many of the existing electoral systems. With regard to this problem, it must be noted that the model sovereign assembly is elected by the system to be described shortly: ‘associational proportional representation’. The inclusion of proportional representation may fuel the fear that the model would make majority support for any executive council less likely than it needs to be. Whether such scrupulously democratic representation of the people would, in fact, makes “majority government” more or less likely in the long run is difficult to say. It is a question which is not capable of being settled by philosophical investigation. However, rigorous argument can show that this electoral system is a necessary part of a rational democracy. At the same time, provision must be made for any such potentially destabilizing eventualities. The model constitution’s arrangements for the exercise of the above prerogatives fully address this issue.

With regard to the prerogative to appoint the prime minister when no candidate has secured majority support, the model constitution says that the holder of the prerogative should then appoint the candidate who has the support of a plurality, unless this, in his or her judgment, would threaten the unity of the society more than the appointment of an alternative candidate. With the same consideration in mind, and in the same circumstances, the holder of the prerogative would also have to decide whether to appoint a ‘caretaker’ prime minister, instead, and thus to dissolve the assembly and trigger a new general election. The current holder of the prerogatives ought to have the same consideration in mind if and when an existing prime minister suffers a plurality vote of no confidence, whether he or she had initially received majority support or not. No question of prerogative arises when an existing prime minister is replaced by a different leader elected by a working majority, whether the existing prime minister was initially elected by a majority or merely appointed by prerogative.¹

(1) Edgar Wilson, The Myth of British Monarchy, London, Journeyman Press and Republic, 1989, p.178. Wilson’s discussion of constitutional reforms (Chapter 34) has led me to add the largely elected ‘state prerogative council’ to the original argument. However, my retention of the monarch as an essential member of this council runs against the thrust of his book. Both Wilson and I are ‘democrats’ because we are ‘rationalists’. However, while I argue that a particular sort of limi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Abbreviations
• List of Figures
• Preface
• Introduction
• Chapter One: The Model Constitution
• Chapter Two: Common Republican Arguments
• Chapter Three: From Plato’s Republic to Democratic Monarchy
• Chapter Four: From Kant’s Republicanism to Democratic Monarchy
• Chapter Five: From Marx’s Communal Constitution to Democratic Monarchy
• Chapter Six: Methodology and ‘Philosophical Necessity’
• Chapter Seven: Hegel’s System
• Chapter Eight: Hegel’s Prescription
• Chapter Nine: Hegel’s Necessity
• Chapter Ten: Hegel’s Social Theory
• Chapter Eleven: The Three Moment Structure of Hegel’s State and System
• Chapter Twelve: From Hegel’s Constitutional Monarchy to the Prescriptive Ideal
• Summary
• Selective Bibliography
• Appendix: Literal Translations
• Glossary