Aspects of Rationality

Reflections on What It Means To Be Rational and Whether We Are

Raymond S. Nickerson

• Publisher: Psychology Press
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN: 9781841694870
• eBook ISBN: 9781136676345
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: Cognitive Psychology & Cognition
• Index: Psychology

What does it mean to be rational ? to reason well and effectively? How does rationality, broadly conceived, relate to the knowledge one acquires, the beliefs one forms, the explanations one constructs or appropriates, the judgments and decisions one makes, the values one adopts? What is the character of human reasoning and, in particular, does it t

1	What Is Rationality?
Chapter

Rationality…. is a crucial component of the self-image of the human species, not simply a tool for gaining knowledge or improving our lives and society. Understanding our rationality brings deeper insight into our nature and into whatever special status we possess. (Nozick, 1993, p. xii)

What is rationality? Is it best thought of as a property of individuals? Can it also be a property of groups? Of nations? Of a species? Is rationality a mark of humanity? Does our ability to reason set us apart from other species, as Aristotle claimed? If we are rational, why do we find ourselves so frequently in great difficulties that seem to be largely our own doing?

What is the relationship between rationality and intelligence, or knowledge? How does—how should—rationality constrain beliefs? How does rationality relate to goals, values and affect? To attitudes and motivation? To understanding and wisdom? What constitutes a rational explanation? A rational judgment or decision?

This book is motivated by these and similar questions. For the most part, the specific questions are all subsumed, however, under two generic ones: one normative and one empirical. The first is “What constitutes rationality?” The second is “What is the character of human reasoning, and, in particular, is it rational?”

The normative question has to do with reasoning standards. I assume that most of us view rationality as a worthy goal for human beings and aspire to reason well ourselves. We criticize patterns of thought or behavior that appear to us to be irrational and do not give them the respect that we give to patterns that appear to have the force of sound reason behind them. But what are the criteria by which what is rational can be distinguished from what is not? And from where did they come? What gives them their authority? Can we hope to find an answer to the question of what constitutes rationality that is more than an expression of a specific opinion on the matter? Can we expect to be able to do more than learn what it means to be rational from a particular point of view?

“Rationality” may be used to convey different ideas by different people and by the same people in different contexts. It is safe to assume, too, that some people who use the word would be able to give only a vague explanation of what they mean by it. Inasmuch as words do not have intrinsic meanings, the best we can aspire to is to discover the various connotations that have been given to the word, perhaps to see if usage reflects a high degree of consensus regarding what it should be taken to mean. When, in this book, I speak of the meaning of rationality, I shall have in mind the question of what ideas the term has been used to convey, and that of what people who have thought much about it might or might not agree it should be taken to mean.

The question of how people reason is an empirical one. In attempting to address it, I shall look, among other places, to the results of psychological experimentation. Human reasoning was a major focus of attention in the early days of experimental psychology and, while the subject suffered some neglect in the heyday of behaviorism, it is once again the subject of experimental investigation and has been for several decades. Much has been learned from this research, but with increased knowledge has come a greater appreciation of the complexity of the subject and a keener awareness of how incompletely we understand it still.

The normative question of what it means to be rational and the empirical one of how people reason are not independent, and they have been closely coupled in both philosophical and psychological work. A common motivation for normative studies has been to improve human reasoning by prescribing how it should be done. Empirical investigations of reasoning have often resulted, whether by intention or not, in discovering ways in which human reasoning appears to fail to measure up to specific norms. The findings from these studies raise questions both about the characteristics of human reasoning and about what should be considered normative.

I do not expect to be able to answer definitively either the normative or the empirical question in this book. What I wish to do is to discuss them in a useful way, to consider what various writers have said about them, and to see what light the results of empirical research can shed on them. I will venture opinions and tentative conclusions, and will present my own perspective, which I believe to be consistent with such relevant scientific evidence as there is, but not forced by it. My hope is that readers will find what follows helpful in their own thinking about what constitutes rationality and what it might mean to lead an acceptably rational life.

Is it Rational to…?

In our daily lives we all have a definite idea of what it means to be rational, and, no doubt, we would insist quite strenuously that we have the ability to think and act rationally. However, when we come to the philosopher’s task of pinpointing precisely what makes the thought or action rational—or of discerning general principles upon which rationality operates—the situation gets a bit more difficult. (Levinson, 1988, p. 17)

The question of what constitutes rationality is a disarmingly simple one, but the answer is not simple at all. Like many other concepts that we use more or less effectively in our own thinking and for purposes of communication, we assume we understand what it means until we have occasion to be explicit about it. One way to begin thinking about what constitutes rationality is to consider some specific types of behavior or patterns of thought. Is it rational, for example, to work against one’s own self-interest? To believe uncritically what others say? To fail to discount sunk costs? To play long odds? To discount the future sharply? To behave by rule? These types of questions will motivate much of the discussion in this book. Here I want to linger on them long enough to note that the answers to few, if any, of them are likely to be an unqualified yes or no.

Is it Rational to Work Against One’s Self-interest?

Is it rational to engage willingly in behavior one knows is likely to do one harm? Why, if they are rational, do people do things that are known to be detrimental to their health—smoke, overeat, bake their skin in the sun, toy with addictive drugs? Why do they take unnecessary risks? Is it possible, as Aristotle believed it to be, for one knowingly to act contrary to what one considers best? Or is it the case, as Plato argued, that all such behavior must be attributed to ignorance, because no one deliberately acts contrary to one’s own judgment of what is best?

Sometimes people are unaware of potentially harmful effects of specific behaviors in which they engage. It is clear, however, that awareness of the harmful effects of a particular type of behavior does not guarantee abstinence from it (Schacter, 1982; Stewart & Brook, 1983). There is also the possibility that people generally underestimate risks to themselves individually; they may assume that they are less at risk than other people. One might be less inclined to consider smoking to be an instance of irrational behavior when done by individuals who believe that smoking does not increase the risk of cancer than when done by people who acknowledge the increased risk, but what is one to say about the rationality of the belief itself?

Is it rational to build homes in flood plains, on earthquake faults, or on the sides of mountains subject to mud slides? Is it rational to choose to remain in an area that people have been warned to evacuate because of a predicted hurricane, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or other natural disaster? Many people refused to leave the vicinity of Mt. Saint Helens when warned to do so before its May 1980 eruption (Saarinen, 1980). Can such behavior be considered rational on the part of people who believed the prediction of the coming eruption? What about the people who did not believe the prediction? Was it rational for them to disbelieve it?

People seem to be willing to trade the risk of future problems for the certainty of present pleasures. Such trading can be seen as reasonable in terms of the economics of hedonism if the value of assured present pleasures exceeds the cost of possible consequential future problems weighted by their believed probability of occurrence. But people may misjudge either the magnitude of risks or the probability of their realization. Of particular interest is the possibility that people may tend systematically to overestimate the probability of desired events and underestimate that of events they would like to avoid. If there is such a tendency, should this be considered a manifestation of irrationality?

Why do we fail to do things we believe would be beneficial to us (e.g., get periodic medical examinations, get regular exercise, save money, voluntarily use automobile seat belts)? Here again, the question of greatest interest is why people who genuinely believe that certain actions or behaviors would be good for them fail to do them. And, again, one can construct a plausible answer similar to the one proposed above as to why people do things they consider to be bad for them. They may be willing to accept the risk of a future problem in exchange for avoiding a present inconvenience; but suppose they tend to underestimate the possible seriousness of the future problem or the probability that it will develop. How rational then should we consider their willingness to make such trades to be?

The phenomenon of working against one’s self-interest can be seen not only in the behavior of individuals, but in that of corporate and political entities as well. Why do governments so frequently and independently of place or period pursue policies that are contrary to their own interests? In Tuchman’s (1984) words, “Why do holders of high office so often act contrary to the way reason points and enlightened self interest suggests…. Why…. did the Trojan rulers drag that suspicious looking wooden horse inside their walls despite every reason to suspect the Greek trick? Why did successive ministries of George III insist on coercing rather than conciliating the American Colonies, though repeatedly advised by many counselors that the harm done must be greater than any possible gain? Why did Charles XII and Napoleon and successively Hitler invade Russia despite the disasters incurred by each predecessor….” (p. 4).

Tuchman’s illustrations of governmental folly at various times in history provide food for thought for anyone who would like to understand human reasoning and especially its operation in the complex arena of governmental policy and decision making. For her purposes, Tuchman defines folly as a policy that was perceived as counterproductive in its own time and not merely by hindsight, that was the policy of a group rather than of just an individual ruler and that was adopted even though a peaceful alternative course of action was available. The general question of why people—as individuals, groups, or nations—sometimes behave in ways that are clearly not in their own best interests remains to be explained and its implications for our notions of human rationality understood.

Is it Rational to believe uncritically what others say?

There have long been people who are gullible to the point of being easy prey to others who are able and willing to turn this trait to personal gain. Mackay (1841/1932) describes the crazes that afflicted France and England during the early part of the 18th century for stock-buying schemes into which people put life savings in the hope of becoming wealthy very rapidly. My favorite scheme, which Mackay characterizes as “the most absurd and preposterous of all,” and which showed most completely the utter madness of the people, was entitled “a company for carrying on an undertaking of great advantage, but nobody to know what it is” (p. 55).

“The man of genius who essayed this bold and successful inroad upon public credulity, merely stated in his prospectus that the required capital was half a million, in 5,000 shares of 100 pounds each, deposit 2 pounds per share. Each subscriber, paying his deposit, would be entitled to 100 pounds per annum per share. How this immense profit was to be obtained, he did not condescend to inform them at that time, but promised that in a month full particulars should be duly announced, and a call made for the remaining 98 pounds of the subscription” (p. 55). MacKay reports that this man opened an office in Cornhill for a few hours on a single day, just long enough to relieve the first 500 people who beset his door of 2,000 pounds, whereupon he departed for the Continent, never to be heard from again.

Despite the fact that such fraudulent ventures were condemned by the government and ridiculed by the press, many people were taken in by them. Alas, in this respect, the situation seems little different today. As of the late 1980s and early 1990s Americans were being relieved of an estimated $10 billion to $15 billion annually by scams communicated by telephone (Harris, 1989; Lombino, 1993). Scammer utilization of the Internet can only have increased the annual losses between then and now. Solicitations from total strangers to invest savings in real estate ventures, mining operations, oil exploration, art, new franchises, communication frequency bands, rare coins, windfall money transfers, and countless other schemes for turning a quick and large profit find a sufficiently receptive general public to ensure a flourishing industry.

The willingness to accept without question what other people say, seems clearly irrational; but we cannot question everything that everyone tells us. Both of these extremes seem objectionable on practical, if on no other, grounds. When does it make sense to be skeptical and when not? What distinguishes between reasonable trust that what someone is telling us is true and unreasonable gullibility? Like many questions regarding the nature of rationality, this one suggests the need to recognize that some criteria of rationality must be seen as matters of degree. What should determine precisely how accepting or how skeptical one should be in specific instances is one of the many challenges of understanding what rationality means.

Is it Rational to Fail to Discount Sunk Costs?

“Imagine that you have decided to see a play and pay the admission price of $10.00 per ticket. As you enter the theater, you discover that you have lost the ticket. The seat was not marked, and the ticket cannot be recovered. Would you pay $10.00 for another ticket?” Fifty-four percent of 200 people who were asked this question by Kahneman and Tversky (1984) said no. Another group of 183 was given the following problem: “Imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is $10.00 per ticket. As you enter the theater, you discover that you have lost a $10.00 bill. Would you still pay $10.00 for the ticket for the play?” In this case 88% said yes, and only 12% said no. It appears that people are less willing to spend $10.00 to see a play after having lost a ticket to the play worth that amount than after having lost the same amount of cash. Since the incremental out-of-pocket cost of seeing the play is the same in both cases, should the reluctance to spend the money in the one case coupled with the willingness to do so in the other be seen as evidence of irrationality?

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) attribute this behavior to topical accounting whereby the individual “relates the consequences of possible choices to a reference level that is determined by the context in which the decision arises” (p. 347). The expenditure of an extra $10.00 to replace the lost ticket is accounted as spending $20.00 to see the play, whereas the loss of $10.00 of cash is not so directly associated with theater going and not posted to that account. So purchasing the ticket in this case is not seen as paying double to get into the theater. Suppose this explanation of people’s behavior in this choice situation is essentially correct; should the behavior be considered rational?

Consider a person who develops tennis elbow soon after joining a tennis club, and continues to play in agony because not to do so would be to waste the cost of membership (Thaler, 1980). How should we think of this behavior? One explanation is that payments are more acceptable to people than are deadlosses of the same amounts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). By continuing to play, one is able to perceive the cost of membership as a payment, whereas if one stops playing it would have to be viewed as a loss. But is this distinction a reasonable one; and does it permit us to view the person’s decision to incur the additional cost of pain in order to feel better about the membership expenditure to be a rational one?

Problems of this sort are often discussed under the subject of sunk costs. The prevailing opinion among decision theorists and economists is that decisions about present or future behavior should ignore such costs (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Dawes, 1988; Staw, 1976). Sunk costs are gone, irretrievably and, according to the prevailing view, they are irrelevant to decisions about present or future behavior; such decisions should take into account only those costs that have not yet been incurred and over which one still has some control.

The kind of predicament one can find oneself in if one fails to follow this principle is illustrated by the “dollar auction.” In this game, a dollar bill is auctioned to the highest bidder and, unlike the case of conventional auctions, both the highest and the second-highest bidders must pay the amounts of their last bids (Shubik, 1971). When the bidding starts, say at a few cents, it looks like a good deal to everyone involved, but as the bid price gets closer to $1.00, the situation becomes less attractive to those still bidding. Anyone who drops out risks being the second-highest bidder and losing the amount of his last bid with nothing to show for it. For this reason, the bidding often continues even after the bid exceeds $1.00, and sometimes considerably beyond, so both the highest and second-highest bidder are assured of losing money.

The reasoning that might keep one bidding even when the bid is above $1.00 is easy to imagine. Suppose my last bid was $1.15, someone else topped my bid with $1.16, and no one else is bidding. My choice is to quit, pay my $1.15 and go away and reflect on the injustice of it all, or to increase the bid to $1.17, hoping this bid will take the dollar, thereby leaving me with a loss of 17 cents instead of $1.15 and making me a winner—of sorts. This is a particularly interesting example of how an unwillingness to cut one’s losses—to discount sunk costs—can motivate behavior that ends up increasing those costs without increasing the value of what is realized for the expenditure. It illustrates what is sometimes described as “throwing good money after bad” (Garland, 1990).

Many situations involving sunk costs are considerably more complicated than this one. Decisions regarding what to do about them sometimes involve considerations of commitment, principled behavior, self-image, or other factors in addition to monetary worth. Such considerations have been the bases of arguments against the idea that rationality demands that sunk costs alwa...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. What Is Rationality?
• 2. The Search for Standards of Rationality
• 3. Intelligence and Knowledge
• 4. Beliefs
• 5. Goals, Values, and Affect
• 6. Explanations
• 7. Preference and Judgment
• 8. Decision and Choice
• 9. Understanding and Wisdom
• 10. The Relativity of Rationality
• 11. Conclusions and a View
• References
• Index