International Society and the De Facto State

Scott Pegg

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367375225
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000708578
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Law
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Originally published in 1998, International Society and the De Facto Society explores the phenomenon of de facto statehood in contemporary international relations. The de facto state is almost the inverse of what Robert Jackson has termed the 'quasi-state'. The quasi-state has an ambassador, a flag, and a seat at the United Nations, but it does not function positively as a viable governing entity. Its limitations though, do not detract from sovereign legitimacy. The de facto state, on the other hand, lacks legitimacy yet effectively controls a given territorial area and provides governmental services to a specific population. The book engages in a birth, life, and death or evolution examination of the de facto state.

1
Introduction

1 Setting the Stage

If one takes 1960 as a convenient shorthand date for the ending of the vast majority of the decolonization process, then it can be argued that the three decades which followed that year were characterized by the greatest level of territorial stability ever seen in the history of international relations. With very few exceptions, the political map of the world’s sovereign states remained unchanged during this period. James Mayall attributes this state of affairs to an ironic historical fate of the once-revolutionary principle of national self-determination which, in its post-World War II variant, has emphasized the sanctity of existing territorial boundaries and ended up ‘attempting to freeze the political map in a way which has never previously been attempted’ (1990, p. 56).

The delegitimization of territorial aggrandizement and the almost religious sanctity placed on existing borders marks a profound change in international relations. Whereas entities once had to demonstrate and maintain a certain level of military, economic, and governmental effectiveness in order to preserve their position in a competitive international system, the post-war era has witnessed the wholesale granting of statehood to large numbers of former colonies with few, if any, demonstrated empirical capabilities. Once acquired, sovereign statehood has become almost impossible to lose. Small and/or weak states which, in earlier eras, would have been carved up, colonized, or swallowed by larger powers, now have a guaranteed existence in international society. In the words of Robert Jackson, ‘once sovereignty is acquired by virtue of independence from colonial rule, then extensive civil strife or breakdown of order or governmental immobility or any other failures are not considered to detract from it’ (1987, p. 531). A lack of empirical viability no longer matters in a world where juridical statehood is underwritten by the new normative structures of international society.

One of the earliest and most influential attempts to analyze this novel situation of normatively-sanctified fixed territorial borders and internationally-guaranteed sovereignty appeared in a World Politics article by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg (1982). In subsequent years, one might view the academic work which built upon Jackson and Rosberg’s original article as branching out into three or four separate, yet interrelated, sub-fields of analysis. Perhaps the most fertile or vibrant area here has been the literature which has grown up around the subject of ‘Third World’ or ‘weak state’ security.¹ While this literature covers a wide range of topics, the security implications of fixed territorial borders and juridically-guaranteed statehood are central to its analysis.

A second main area of focus has been the impact of internationally-maintained sovereign boundaries on economic development. Jeffrey Herbst (1990), for example, notes that

the absence of a truly competitive states system that penalizes military weakness means that even those states that have no other prospects than long-term dependence on international aid will survive in their crippled form for the foreseeable future…. The presence of permanently weak states that will not be eliminated… poses novel development challenges.²

In this regard, Jackson and Rosberg (1986) maintain that juridically-guaranteed statehood has had a profound impact on the development process. Specifically referring to sub-Saharan Africa, these authors do not claim that juridical statehood provides an adequate explanation for economic underdevelopment. They do, however, argue that it ‘is a significant partial explanation that has hitherto gone largely unnoticed’ and that ‘its impact has frequently been more adverse than favourable’,(1986, p. 28).

In some ways, this examination of the impact of fixed territorial borders on the economic prospects of poorer states is merely a unique sub-set of a larger critique of the impact of sovereignty on the global political economy. Charles Beitz (1991), for example, sees the states system’s respect for each state’s exclusive domestic jurisdiction as a kind of collective property right which ‘effectively sanctions the existing international distribution of wealth as well as that of power’.³ Similarly, Michael Barnett and Alexander Wendt view the collective acceptance of sovereignty without any commitment to material equality as constituting ‘a structurally coercive mechanism of decentralized social control that institutionalizes territorial and therefore resource inequalities’ (1992, p. 104).

A third major focus of recent research has been on the international implications of the growing number of ‘collapsed’ or ‘failed’ states. Much of the work in this regard has proceeded from the conventional assumption that these states must and should be reconstituted as viable entities within their existing territorial boundaries; debate in this area has mainly centered around the question of how best to go about this difficult task of state reconstruction.⁴

Finally, the fourth line of inquiry that can be identified is Robert Jackson’s own attempt (1990) to broaden and develop his ideas into a general study of international relations. As Jackson sees it, what is novel about the way international relations is practiced today is not the existence of inequality between the states of the world. Inequality has always been a feature of the states system and there is nothing particularly recent or unique about it. What is distinctive about international relations in the post-1945 era is: 1) how statehood is acquired; and 2) how international society deals with weak and underdeveloped states. In traditional international law, recognition was acquired only after successfully demonstrating the capacity to govern. To acquire sovereignty, one had first to be sovereign: ‘states historically were empirical realities before they were legal personalities’. In the new era, however, ‘rulers can acquire independence solely in virtue of being successors of colonial governments’ (1990, p. 34). Independence need not positively be earned; rather it now comes as a moral entitlement. Factors like a lack of qualified personnel, small territories or populations, questions of economic viability or inadequate military defenses no longer militate against sovereign recognition.

The second novel feature of this new system concerns the ways in which international society deals with its weakest members. States may no longer be deprived of their sovereignty through colonialism, conquest, or partition. The sanctity of existing borders and the international aid regime (albeit as limited as it is) combine to operate as a kind of safety net propping up states which earlier would have fallen prey to the imperial ambitions of other, more successful states.

This ‘new sovereignty game’ thus produces a world characterized by large numbers of ‘quasi-states’: states which are internationally recognized as full juridical equals, possessing the same rights and privileges as any other state, yet which manifestly lack all but the most rudimentary empirical capabilities. In Jackson’s (1990, pp. 27–30) terms, these states possess ‘negative sovereignty’—a formal-legal condition that can be equated with non-intervention and the freedom from outside interference. What they lack is ‘positive sovereignty’—a substantive condition that allows governments actively to function and to deliver political goods and services to their citizens. International society confers and maintains these states’ juridical equality and their negative sovereignty. It does little, however, to assist them in developing their empirical capabilities so they can acquire positive sovereignty. In Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney’s (1995) terminology, these quasi-states are unable to ‘realize’ their sovereignty substantively.

The existence of large numbers of recognized sovereign states that fundamentally lack many of the capabilities traditionally associated with independent statehood brings forward a number of questions. If sovereignty is now granted as a moral right and not earned on the battlefield or through a demonstrated capacity to govern, and if existing state boundaries have acquired such a sanctity so as to ‘freeze’ the political map, then what happens to the various groups who are fundamentally dissatisfied at the way they have been ‘frozen’ off the political map and denied admission to the exclusive club of sovereign states? If scores of existing sovereign states are, as it seems, so manifestly lacking in terms of legitimacy, effectiveness, power, popular support, and the ability to provide governmental services, then what happens when a breakaway state group is able to establish some sort of effective territorial control and demonstrate governance capabilities of the sort that once led to full recognition as an independent sovereign state?

This is not a study of secession or self-determination per se and it is not a general assessment of governmental breakdowns in weak or failed states. My aim is to investigate another facet of the ‘new sovereignty game’ which has not received sufficient attention in the existing literature. This is the ‘de facto state’. In essence, these are entities which feature long-term, effective, and popularly-supported organized political leaderships that provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area. They seek international recognition and view themselves as capable of meeting the obligations of sovereign statehood. They are, however, unable to secure widespread juridical recognition and therefore function outside the boundaries of international legitimacy.

The de facto state can be seen as the flip side of the quasi-state coin. This is not to suggest that for every quasi-state there must be a de facto state; indeed, even the most cursory research would reveal that there are far more quasi-states than there are de facto states—at least in the way that I define them. Rather, it is to suggest that some of the same normative logic in international society that produces quasi-states may also facilitate the creation of something that is more or less their inverse: the de facto state.

The quasi-state’s juridical equality was internationally enfranchised by the existing society of states. Previously, colonialism was predicated on the fact that independence was a question of empirical conditions—levels of development, qualified personnel, military capabilities, national unity, and the like. It was only when the anti-colonial movement succeeded in normatively defeating this intellectual framework and turning independence into a natural right of all dependencies that quasi-states were able to come into being (Jackson, 1993b, pp. 117–125). Once they succeeded in changing the criterion for independence from empirical viability to a categorical moral right of all former dependencies regardless of their assorted lack of qualifications, the international consensus against the dismemberment of existing states or the redrawing of territorial borders served as the foundation which supported the quasi-state regardless of its failings. Even if the government’s writ did not run throughout most of its territory, the juridical existence of the state was guaranteed.

International norms which support existing quasi-states also deny the legitimacy of any would-be challengers. The same logic that supports the quasi-state also prevents the acceptance of other groups regardless of how legitimate their grievances, how broad their popular support, or how effective their governance. Quasi-states and de facto states are thus both children of the new sovereignty regime.

Whereas the quasi-state has recognized territorial borders, a seat at the UN, and the ability to participate in intergovernmental organizations, in many cases it does not effectively control large swathes of its own countryside. Though it seeks recognition, the de facto state, on the other hand, has been denied its seat at the UN and its place at the international table. No matter how long or how effective its territorial control of a given area has been, that control is neither recognized nor is it considered legitimate. The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no matter how effective it is. The quasi-state’s juridical equality is not contingent on any performance criteria. Even if the entire state apparatus has collapsed, the quasi-state (à la Cambodia and Lebanon) will be supported and maintained through international efforts. At times, it may be more of an abstract idea than it is a hard reality. The de facto state, on the other hand, is a functioning reality that is denied legitimacy by the rest of international society.

One way to distinguish between these two very different entities is to conceptualize them in terms of power versus recognition. According to Janice Thomson, ‘if recognition without power capabilities characterizes most contemporary states, cases of power capabilities without recognition exist as well’ (1995, p. 220). Following this terminology, the quasi-state would have recognition and lack power capabilities while the de facto state would have power capabilities but lack recognition.

This distinction can also be conceptualized in terms of authority versus control. Thomson makes the distinction here

Between the claim to exclusive right to make rules (authority) and the capability of enforcing that claim (control)…. Authority… is contingent on recognition; control depends on concrete capabilities to monitor and enforce compliance with the rules that are made under that authority (1995, p. 223).

This is similar to Michael Oakeshott’s (1975) objections to the misuse of the word sovereign: ‘Invoked to specify “authority”, it has been used to specify the “power” which may partner authority in an office of rule….’⁵ In these terms, it is the authority of quasi-states that is so actively supported by the other members of international society. Having that authority, however, does not mean that they will be able to exercise any meaningful degree of control over their jurisdictions. De facto states, on the other hand, despite lacking (recognized) authority are still able to exercise some degree of control through their empirical capabilities.

Finally, another distinction might be made ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Preface to the 2019 reissue of International Society and the De Facto State
• Dedication
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• Contents
• List of Maps
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Chapter 1 Introduction
• Chapter 2 Defining the De Facto State
• Chapter 3 Eritrea Before Independence and Tamil Eelam
• Chapter 4 The Republic of Somaliland and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
• Chapter 5 Macro-Level Factors Implicated in the Birth of De Facto States
• Chapter 6 Micro-Level Factors Implicated in the Birth of De Facto States
• Chapter 7 The De Facto State in International Society
• Chapter 8 Potential Transformations of the De Facto State
• Chapter 9 The De Facto State and International Theory
• Bibliography
• Index