Superpower Involvement In The Middle East

Dynamics Of Foreign Policy

Paul Marantz, Blema Steinberg, John Sigler, Shmuel Sandler

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367289195
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000313604
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The contributors to this book offer an explanation of Soviet and U.S. policy in the Middle East by exploring how the superpowers define their goals in the region, the factors that both stimulate and constrain the United States and the Soviet Union in the implementation of their objectives, and how their mutual perceptions influence behavior. The ch

Part 1
The View from Moscow

1
The Soviet View of the Utility of Force in the Third World

S. Ν. MacFarlane

Introduction

Soviet military activism in the Third World since the early 1970s has become a cause of growing concern to Western policy-makers. Soviet and Cuban involvement in Third World conflicts was a significant factor in the slowing and reversal of the process of détente. It affected not only the general atmosphere of East-West relations, but also the progress of arms control negotiations. Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, for example, delayed the conclusion of the SALT II treaty. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the American government to withdraw the treaty from Senate ratification proceedings. In the current phase of tension between the superpowers, one of the more credible avenues to major war is that of escalation from confrontation in areas of the Third World where major interests of the U.S. and the USSR overlap.

The region of the Third World where this prospect is most disturbing is the Middle East. Here Soviet concerns regarding the security of their southern frontier intersect with those of the West regarding continued access to Persian Gulf oil. The Soviet quest for influence in the Arab world (a quest in which they have invested much materiel and prestige) clashes with the American commitment to the survival of Israel. This clash occurs in a region where politics are unpredictable and chronically conflictual. The region's deep-seated animosities, and the commitment of the superpowers to local actors—over whom they have little control and who seek to involve them in local conflicts—have in the past raised the prospect of superpower confrontation and in all likelihood will do so again.

In this context, it becomes important to understand how Soviet policy-makers think about conflict in the Third World and how they perceive their own role in such conflict. This paper addresses several questions:

1. How does Third World conflict impinge upon Soviet interests?

2. What constraints does the USSR face in its use of force in the Third World?

3. What do recent changes in Soviet doctrine and behavior tell us about their evolving perceptions of risk and benefit stemming from the use of force in Third World conflict?

4. How can these changes be explained?

5. What are the policy implications for the West and particularly for the U.S., of evolving Soviet attitudes towards the use of force in the Third World?

5. What does the analysis tell us about the prospects for Soviet use of force in the near and longer term?

It is frequently assumed that whereas there existed prior to the mid-1970s a set of tacit "rules of the game" restraining superpower involvement in the Third World, Soviet behavior in the mid- and late 1970s reflected a change in Soviet attitudes towards the use of force in the Third World, and, as such, a profound challenge to established understandings.' This paper argues that although in the late 1960s and early 1970s there clearly developed a greater Soviet willingness to project force in the Third World—whether directly or in the form of logistical support and supply of allied forces—the Soviet view of the utility of force remains cautious and, with respect to the U.S., risk averse and non-confrontational.

Before beginning the analysis, its parameters need to be defined. For the purposes of this paper, the "Third World" is taken to include Latin America, Africa, and Asia (excluding Japan and the Asian portions of the USSR). Chronologically, although the history of Soviet force projection in the Third World is almost as long as that of communist rule in Russia, this paper focuses on Soviet doctrine and policy during the Brezhnev years.¹

With regard to methodology, this paper relies on official party and military sources in its analysis of Soviet doctrine and on secondary Western sources in its analysis of Soviet military behavior. It concentrates on the direct involvement of Soviet forces and those of its allies in conflict situations in the Third World, rather than on "naval diplomacy" and arms supply and military assistance to Third World states.² Although these latter two types of activity are important to a complete understanding of Soviet military policy in the Third World, it is the intervention of Soviet and proxy forces which most strongly affects East-West relations and raises the prospect of superpower confrontation.

The paper does not deal to any great extent with disagreements within the Soviet elite on power projection in the Third World. No doubt such disagreements exist, and in some contexts consideration of them is important.³ But the focus here in the consideration of doctrine is on official and quasi-official statements. In this area there is little clear evidence of controversy. Moreover, the elaboration of doctrine on a number of the specific issues considered here (for example, the classification of wars) appears to be the exclusive province of a angle group within the Soviet elite, the military. Moreover, our discussion of policy concentrates on patterns in Soviet behavior, that is on outcomes. In this context, the question of pluralism in policy inputs is not directly relevant.

Interests and Constraints

Force projection is one of an array of policy instruments available to Soviet policy-makers in the pursuit of the USSR's interests in the Third World. These interests are of at least three different types. The first pertains most specifically to states along the periphery of the USSR and concerns the security of the Soviet Union. To judge from their behavior at least since World War Π, Soviet policy-makers view the existence of hostile or unstable states along Soviet borders as inimical to external security and internal political stability. In situations where this threat is particularly compelling while constraints on direct Soviet action to eliminate it are weak, the Soviets have used military force to rectify the situation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is perhaps best explicable in these terms. Regional conflict in areas close to Soviet borders not only enhances the perceived threat, but facilitates the Soviet response by providing opportunities or pretexts for involvement.

Soviet security concerns impinge to a lesser extent on states and regions beyond the immediate periphery of the USSR. The U.S. integrates bases and deployment areas in the Third World into its strategic posture vis-à-vis the USSR. In the past, bases in Turkey, Libya, and Morocco, for example, have been used by American strategic bombers. The Indian Ocean is a potential deployment area for American strategic nuclear submarines. Soviet force projection in the Middle East and Indian Ocean zones and in particular its quest for bases along the Indian Ocean littoral as support for a naval presence in that ocean may be seen in part as attempts to reduce or counter this threat.⁴ Moreover, the Indian Ocean and Suez Canal are strategic sea lanes to the USSR in the same sense that the Panama Canal is for the United States. This too gives the USSR a security incentive for military involvement in these areas.

The second interest concerns the competition with the U.S. for influence in states removed from the Soviet periphery. Soviet foreign policy in the Third World since Stalin's death seems to have been strongly affected by the desire to expand Soviet influence and to reduce Western influence in the developing world. To judge from recent official statements, one important element of this competition, from the Soviet perspective, is a desire to be recognized as an equal of the U.S. throughout the globe.⁵ Soviet policy-makers have attempted to use economic instruments to win favor, particularly during the Khrushchev era. However, as the limitations on the Soviet capacity to compete with the West in these terms have become more clear, military assistance has become the dominant vehicle employed by the USSR in this competition. Regional conflict by creating a need for what the USSR has to offer, facilitates the Soviet pursuit of influence in this competition.

The contest for influence with the West is related to a third factor, that of ideology. One should not overestimate the role of ideological commitment in explaining Soviet force projection. Yet it is true nonetheless that the domestic legitimacy of the Soviet leadership is to a degree predicated upon the credibility of its claim to being a revolutionary actor in world politics. The same is true of Moscow's claims to leadership in what is referred to as the "world revolutionary movement." Soviet influence and control over radical forces in world politics depends to some extent on the material and moral support which the USSR renders them. The use of force in Third World conflict is one means of underscoring Soviet status as a revolutionary actor in world politics and gaining influence among groups committed to revolutionary anti-Western action.

In its use of force in pursuit of these interests, the USSR is constrained in a number of ways. The first significant constraint is a physical one. Intervention in Third World conflicts requires specific military capabilities such as long range air and sea transport, naval support for land operations, long range fighter cover, and in-flight refueling capabilities. The USSR has traditionally been a continental Eurasian military power. Its military procurement programme has not historically emphasized such capabilities to the extent that a sea power like the United States does. Though considerable progress has been made in this area since the mid-1960s, Soviet force projection capabilities remain conspicuously inferior in most relevant categories to those of the U.S. This is dear from Table 1. in particular, Soviet carrier-borne aviation is insignificant compared to its American counterpart. The tonnage of the Soviet amphibious fleet is only 24% of that of American amphibious transport. The payload of the Soviet long range air transport fleet is just over one half that of the American Military Airlift Command. Moreover, neither of the relevant Soviet aircraft (the AN22 and the IL76) can refuel in flight. Finally, the AN22, which comprises about 20% of the Soviet long range fleet is a turboprop aircraft while all relevant American aircraft are jet.⁶

Table 1:1 Soviet and American Long Range Force Projection Capabilities (1984)

	USSR	U.S.A.
Long range air transport	280^1	322^5
Amphibious ships	33^2	61^6
Aircraft carriers	3^3	13
Helicopter carriers	2	-^7
Airborne forces	7 divisions^4	1 division
Marines	16,000	196,600

¹Includes military but not civilian IL76 and AN22.

²Includes Ivan Rogov, Rapucher, and Alligator classes.

³One more in trials.

⁴Excludes one division devoted to training. Each division approximately 7,500 men.

⁵Includes C5 and C141, excludes 218 C130.

⁶>Includes Blue Ridge, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Austin, Raleigh, Anchorage, Thomaston, Newport, and Charleston classes.

⁷Included under amphibious category.

Source: IISS, Military Balance, 1984-1985. London, IISS, 1984.

For these reasons, it is only in situations where the risk of military opposition by the U.S. is low that the USSR can safely contemplate interventionary activities. Even in those areas close to the USSR, where this imbalance is less relevant and where in fact the USSR may enjoy military superiority, if the Soviet Union expected serious military resistance (e.g. in the case of a thrust into Iran), Soviet force projection would in all likelihood involve a drawing down of land transport capabilities in other theatres, while Soviet air transport would be susceptible to considerable attrition.⁷ This would affect readiness in more important theatres precisely at a time when the Soviet leadership is likely to be concerned about the consequences of heightened international tension.

The mention of the possibility of American resistance brings us to a second constraint on Soviet force projection. The Soviets, in contemplating combat use of their own forces in the Third World, or for that matter logistical support of allied forces, must consider the risk of confrontation involving the other superpower in which Soviet losses may be sufficiently large to draw into question the value of projected gains from the operation. This constraint is geographically specific, and concerns areas where the Soviets may perceive that American decision-makers consider American vital interests to be threatened by Soviet force projection. From the Soviet policy-makers' point of view, the Third World can in this context be divided into three areas: 1. countries and regions in which one superpower has vital interests while the other does not; 2. countries and regions where vital interests of the two overlap; and 3. countries and regions in which neither side's vital interests are at stake.⁸ The clearest examples of the first type are states along the periphery of one superpower which do not have close ties with the other. Cases in point are Afghanistan and the nations of Central America. The most obvious case of the second is the Middle East and Persian ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• PART 1 THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW
• PART 2 THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON
• PART 3 THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT POWER
• About the Contributors
• Index