Part 1
Defining the Gap between Rich and Poor
1.
The Dual Gaps: An Overview of Theory and Research
Mitchell A. Seligson
The income gap between rich and poor countries has grown dramatically over the past 30 years. In 1950, the average per capita income (in 1980 U.S. dollars) of low-income countries was $164, while the per capita income of the industrialized countries averaged $3,841, yielding an absolute income gap of $3,677. Thirty years later, in 1980, incomes in the poor countries had risen to an average of only $245, while those in the industrialized countries soared to $9,648; the absolute gap in 1980 stood at $9,403. For this period, then, there is clear evidence to support the old adage that âthe rich get richer.â It is not true that the poor get poorer, but that would be a perverse way of looking at these data. A more realistic view of the increases in âwealthâ in the poor countries would show that in this thirty-year period the poor countries increased their incomes by an average of only $2.70 a year, less than what an American might spend for lunch at a neighborhood fast-food stand. And in terms of relative wealth, the poor countries certainly did get poorer; the total income (gross national product or GNP) of the low-income countries declined from 4.3 percent of the income earned by the industrialized countries in 1950 to a mere 2.5 percent by 1980.1
One might suspect that these data do not reflect the general pattern of growth found throughout the world, but are influenced by the disappointing performance of a few âbasket caseâ nations. That suspicion is unfounded. The low-income countries comprise nearly half the worldâs population; more than two billion people live in countries with incomes of less than $400 a year. It is also incorrect to speculate that because some poor countries have recently outperformed the growth rates of the industrialized countries that the gap will soon be narrowed. In Chapter 2, David Morawetz tells us that it could take China, which alone contains some one billion people, 2,900 years to close the gap. Even in the cases of the âmiracle countries,â like South Korea and Taiwan, where growth rates have been twice as high as in the industrialized countries, the gap has doubled.
There is another gap separating rich from poor: within many developing nations there is a growing internal gap between their own rich and poor citizens. Poor people who live in poor countries, therefore, are not only falling further behind the worldâs rich, but are also falling further behind their relatively more affluent countrymen. Moreover, precisely the opposite phenomenon seems to be taking place within the richer countries, where the gap between rich and poor has been narrowing. The worldâs poor, therefore, find themselves in a position of double jeopardy.
The consequences of these widening gaps can be witnessed every day. In the international arena tensions between the âhavesâ and âhave-notsâ dominate debate in United Nations and other international forums. The poor countries demand a âNew International Economic Orderâ (NIEO), which they hope will result in the transfer of wealth away from the rich countries. The industrialized countries, in turn, have responded with foreign aid programs that, by all accounts, can only hope to make a small dent in the problem. Indeed, some argue that foreign aid actually exacerbates the gap (see Chapter 17). Within the developing countries, domestic stability is frequently tenuous at best as victims of the yawning gap between rich and poor (along with their sympathizers) seek redress through violent means. The guerrilla wars that spot the globe may be directed by those with linkages to international movements, but their root causes invariably can be traced to inequality and deprivation, whether relative or absolute.
Thinking and research on the international and domestic gaps between rich and poor has been going through a protracted period of debate that can be traced back to the end of World War II. The war elevated the United States to the position of world leader, and in that position the United States found itself confronted with a Western Europe in ruins. The motivations behind the Marshall Plan for rebuilding Europe are debated to this day, but one thing remains evident and that is that unprecedented amounts of aid were given and the expected results were rapidly forthcoming. War-torn industries were rebuilt, new ones were begun, and economic growth resumed.
The success of rebuilding Europe encouraged many to believe that similar success would meet efforts to stimulate growth in the developing world. More often than not, however, such efforts have failed or fallen far below expectations. Even when programs have been successful and nations seemed well on the way toward rapid growth, they nonetheless continued to fall further and further behind the already wealthy countries. Moreover, growth seemed to be accompanied by a widening income gap within the developing countries.
The authors of this collection present a comprehensive treatment of the thinking that is evolving on the subject of the international and domestic gaps between rich and poor. Their studies are not confined to a single academic discipline or geographic area. Rather, their work reflects a variety of disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, history, psychology, and geography, to mention the principal ones, and they have examined the problems from the viewpoint of a single country or region as well as with a macroanalytic approach. This diversity produced three major perspectives on the gap.
In the first, the widening gap between rich and poor nations is viewed as being principally a cultural problem. Specifically, the cultural values associated with industrialization are seen as foreign to many developing nations, which are deeply attached to more traditional cultural values. Yet the values of punctuality, hard work, achievement, and other âindustrialâ values are keys to unlocking the economic potential of poor countries, according to these scholars. Most adherents of this perspective believe that such values can be inculcated in a population through deliberate effort. Others argue that the values will emerge naturally as the result of a worldwide process of diffusion of values functional for development. This perspective has been incorporated into a more general school of thought focusing on the process called âmodernization.â Development occurs and the international gap is narrowed when a broad set of modern values and institutions are present.
A number of economists, most notably Simon Kuznets, have been associated with the second school of thought, which sees domestic income inequality occurring as an almost inevitable by-product of development. Kuznets traces a path that seems to have been followed quite closely by nations that have become industrialized. The process begins with these nations enjoying relative domestic equality in the distribution of income. The onset of industrialization produces a significant shift in the direction of inequality and creates a widening gap. Once the industrialization process matures, however, the gap is again reduced.
In marked contrast to these two perspectives, which suggest that the phenomena of rich and poor disparity are transitory, there is a third, more recent school of thought that comes to rather different conclusions. The scholars supporting this approachâknown as dependentistasâobserve that the economies of the developing nations have been shaped in response to forces and conditions established by the industrialized nations, and, as a result, their development has been both delayed and dependent. The dependentistas conclude that the failure of poor countries to catch up with the rich ones and the widening internal income gap are both products of the distorted development brought on by dependency relations. A further elaboration on this thinking has emerged in recent years in the form of the âworld-systemâ perspective developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and his followers. According to this group, since the sixteenth century a world capitalist economy has existed, divided geographically (rather than occupationally, as...