The Oau After Twenty Years

Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo, Orobola Fasehun

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367294519
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000304053
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica africana

This book investigates the performance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) since its inception, focusing on four areas of central concern to African states: decolonization, conflict control, development, and human rights. The authors examine the OAU's record against the challenge of apartheid and the OAU's lack of resources and effective sanctions. They make a number of suggestions for enhancing the OAU's future viability and its ability to address the continent's pressing economic and social needs.

1
Introduction

The roots of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was set up in 1963 at a summit meeting of thirty-two African Heads of States and Governments, can be traced back to a major discourse that started in the penultimate days of colonialism on the continent. The debate focused on both the nature and character of future relationships among the independent African states and was expressed within the Pan-African Movement.¹

There were two broad and conflicting schools of thought. The first within this grouping—the “radical school”—advocated immediate political union among the independent states. The second—“the moderates cum-conservatives”—was opposed to political union and called instead for close cooperation in other (i.e., economic, social, cultural, and educational) fields. These conflicting positions on the nature and form that African unity was to take led to the formation of various ideological groupings between 1960 and 1963, reflecting the radical-moderate split within the Pan-African Movement. The most important blocs—institutional expressions of these divisions—were the Brazzaville, the Monrovia, and the Casablanca.² Besides these ideological divisions on the broad issues of unity among the independent states, there were other specific issues like the Congo crisis, the Algerian war of independence, and the status of Mauritania, which sharpened the prevailing differences among the independent African states.

Despite these differences, diplomatic moves were made during this period by the “uncommitted” or “neutral” African states, most notably Ethiopia, to bring about a reconciliation of the different ideological blocs within the Pan-African Movement. Their main objective was to call a conference of all independent states with a view to creating a Pan-African organisation that would accommodate and moderate the disparate positions on African unity.

The Addis Ababa Conference, May 1963

A number of propitious factors helped to make this conciliatory diplomatic initiative by the neutrals a success. First, with the formal independence of Algeria in 1962, the question of whether Algerian nationalists should be seated at pan-continental meetings (a very divisive issue in the past) was effectively resolved. Second, there was a lull in the tensions and conflict in the Congo following the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961. Although some African states remained hostile to the new authorities in that country, by the end of 1962 such opposition was not as strong as it had been while Lumumba was alive. And third, it was becoming apparent that the factional politics that had plagued Pan-Africanism since the late 1950s could not be allowed to continue to debilitate the Movement much further. Many African leaders had come to think that it was in Africa’s interest to meet and resolve outstanding differences once and for all. Thus, the way was paved for the May 1963 African heads of state summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The summit itself was preceded by a meeting of Foreign Ministers on May 15. These ministers grouped themselves into two committees: a political committee and another charged with preparing a draft charter. After much deliberation, they made the following recommendations for the heads of state to consider: (1) machinery should be established to prepare a “Master Charter” to which all African states would subscribe under a continental organisation; (2) money and material support should be provided to the liberation movements; (3) there should be concerted efforts among the independent states in the areas of economics, health, science and culture; and (4) the heads of states should look into the possibility of establishing an African Common Market.

Emperor Haile Selassie opened the subsequent summit on May 22 with a call to the heads of state to eliminate colonialism and white minority governments from the continent. On the crucial and controversial issue of unity, the Ethiopian monarch opined that “the union we seek can only come gradually as day-to-day progress which we achieve carries us slowly but inexorably along this course.”³ He appealed to his colleagues not to delay the adoption of a charter. The African leaders then took turns professing their commitment to African unity and chorused the litany of opposition to colonialism. So, on 023 May 1963, the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity was duly signed by the assembled African leaders.

The Charter of the OAU

The Charter of the OAU reflected the victory of the moderates over the radicals in the debate about the nature and form of post-independence inter-state relations on the continent. The Charter does not depart radically from traditional intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations (UN), whose Charter had a pervasive influence on the African leadership. For instance, in the Preamble of the OAU Charter African leaders state that they are “persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights … provided a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among states.”

The OAU Charter contains the various collective concerns of the African leaders: continental decolonisation, security problems and economic development. The Preamble acknowledges the need to promote understanding among the African peoples as well as cooperation among the independent states. To achieve these objectives, the African leaders recognised that “conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained” within the continent. In that regard, they expressed their determination “to safeguard and consolidate our hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neocolonialism in all its forms.” An awareness of the negative impact of the forces of disunity among their ranks, particularly since 1960, caused African leaders explicitly to express the desire “that all African states should henceforth unite” and “to decide to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions.”

Objectives of the OAU

All international governmental institutions preface their constitutions with a general statement of purposes. These purposes reflect the broad consensus of the constituent members and the ideal goals of the organisation. In this sense, the OAU is a characteristic interstate institution. However, the content of the preamble is rather distinctive in this case. There are three broad identifiable purposes in the OAU Charter. First the primary goal is the promotion of the unity and solidarity of the continent. This purpose was inserted in order to continue the search for unity which had eluded African states since the first wave of independence. By making African unity a goal that is to be pursued continuously member states of the Organisation sought to enhance their resistance to neo-colonial manipulation of interstate differences, i.e. to combine sovereignty with security. Second, unity is closely linked with another core purpose: defense of sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. Given the fragility of many African states and the disintegrative trend which had so soon manifested itself in the former Congo (now Zaire) the insertion of this purpose is clearly understandable. Another reason for inserting this clause is to forestall irredentia, subversion and future imperialist designs by the bigger African states. Finally, the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states was intended to pre-empt foreign intervention in Africa from outside the continent.

Third, a final broad purpose was the eradication of “all forms of colonialism from Africa.” There are many reasons for the inclusion of this goal. For many African states, security is seen to be indivisible. Moreover, the unity, solidarity, and territorial integrity of member states will be difficult to achieve whilst large and strategic sections of the continent remain under colonial or white minority regimes. Besides, colonialism subjugated Africans and created in them a feeling of inferiority. For many Africans, therefore, anti-colonialism was seen to be a moral crusade and a prerequisite for the realisation of the African personality, let alone the 8ine qua non for development.

Principles of the OAU

A statement of the purposes of the OAU Charter is followed by the principles in Article III. The principles set out the guidelines for interstate conduct and fortify the purposes stated in Article II.

The most fundamental principle is the sovereign equality of all member states—a typical claim of international organisations and laws. The equality referred to is that of legal status; it does not refer to size, power and resources. Indeed the OAU, like the UN, tacitly recognises inequality in assessing members’ contributions to the annual budget. Thus while Nigeria was asked for 6.99 percent of the budget or US$153,290.70 in 1976, Central African Republic was assessed at 1.47 percent or $32,237.10. Besides, the OAU has often selected Nigeria to serve on many mediation panels. This is a recognition by the Organisation of Nigeria’s influence within the continent as well as its importance in world affairs, despite Nigeria’s formal equality with all other members.

Three other principles—(1) non-interference in the internal affairs of states; (2) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of members; and 3) condemnation of subversion activities—are interrelated and are meant to reinforce each other. These principles reflect the concerns of the moderate states over the alleged promotion and support of subversive activities by more radical states. In actual fact, member states have not consistently adhered to these principles. Two examples will suffice. First, Ghana under Nkrumah was accused of funding the efforts to overthrow violently moderate regimes, particularly the government of Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast. And second, Libya has also been accused by Gambia of masterminding the abortive July 1981 coup.

Many of the above principles could not be realised in a situation of conflictful ambiance. To preempt as well as to manage conflicts, the OAU articulated rules of conduct to govern interstate differences. Member states are enjoined to settle their disputes peacefully by internationally sanctioned procedures; i.e. by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. However, as with all the other principles member states have occasionally ignored this one. Thus, Ethiopia and Somalia went to war in 1977 over disputed Ogaden. Similarly, Algeria and Morocco fought over the Tindouf region in 1963–64.

The list of principles concludes with the affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all ideological blocs. This principle is an attempt to prevent a spillover of the East-West cold war conflict into the continent. Nonalignment is, however, merely rhetorical. For many African states, including the seemingly radical socialist ones, borrow developmental paths that are either capitalist or socialist. Besides, nearly all African states have close trade, aid, cultural and technical links with their former metropoles. These have compromised their nonalignment in practice.

From the above introduction to features and principles of the Charter it is obvious that the rules enunciated by African states are quite broad. Indeed, they were deliberately made so in order to appeal to the spectrum of ideological factions within the Pan-African movement. We shall, in the rest of the book, examine in greater detail the impact of these Charter provisions on the ability of the OAU to respond to the demands of its members since it was created in 1963.

Structure and Organs of the OAU

In order to accomplish the objectives of the Organisation, four major institutions were created. These are the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat, and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The Assembly of African Heads of State and Government

At the apex of the OAU is the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government (AHG), which is composed of African Presidents, and Prime Ministers or their representatives. This is the supreme supervisory and decision-making organ of the Organisation. Its annual summits offer the opportunity for debating practically all issues of relevance to Africa constrained only by Charter limitations. The AHG is the most democratic and open of all Pan-African institutions; its members are not only equal—each has just one vote—they are also allowed to say whatever they feel during the summit meetings.

The authority of the OAU Assembly is on paper rather wide. The Charter states that the Assembly has the right to “discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonising the general policy of the Organisation.” So, at first sight, it appears that the AHG, like the United Nations General Assembly, has the power to discuss the numerous and comprehensive issues touched upon by the Charter. This is, however, hardly the case, because of a basic legal and political contradiction: the power to “discuss matters of common concern to Africa” is hampered by a contrary Charter prohibition, namely “non-interference in the internal affairs of states.” This means that any member state may prevent the discussion of any issue that may embarrass it. In practice, this provision has severely limited the Assembly’s power. Besides, the OAU Charter does not have the equivalent of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which empowers the world body to discuss issues which are perceived as threats to peace and security. A second and perhaps more important limitation on the powers of the AHG is the fact that its decisions are not enforceable. Unlike the UN, the OAU Charter does not contain any sanctions provisions. Consequently, its decisions are mere recommendations which member states may choose to obey or ignore at will.

Decision-making in the Assembly is by vote, although much is made of consensual solution to problems. The resolutions of the Assembly are “determined by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Organisation.” However, procedural matters are exempt; they require only a simple majority. To reflect its “Africanness,” annual meetings of the OAU are held in various African capitals. Emergency meetings are held in Addis Ababa upon the request of any member state and if such request is approved by two-thirds of the total membership of the OAU.⁴

Though not stated in the Charter itself—a virtually unchangeable document—the Assembly has institutionalized certain practices which have become part of its political procedure. For instance, there has emerged the practice of making the host head of state the chairman of the OAU until the following summit. This position of chairman is, however, titular, lacking in any putative executive authority. Nonetheless, the prestige of being Africa’s spokes person for a year has lured many heads of ministates to seek to host the OAU’s annual conference. In the past, some African states opposed to particular regimes have tried to prevent the leaders of such regimes from hosting the summit and thus becoming chair of the Organisation. For example, some states opposed to former Ugandan leader. Idi Amin, did try to block his hosting of the summit in 1975 and thus his subsequent elevation to the OAU chairmanship. However, these states, led by Tanzania and strongly supported by Zambia and Mozambique, failed in their effort to prevent Amin from being OAU Chairman for 1975–76. This failure of Tanzania stems not so much from OAU love for Idi Amin but rather from the Organisation’s dogmatic adherence to convention.⁵

When the Assembly meets, it performs one or more of the functions assigned to it by the Charter. The most comprehensive of these is its review function. The AHG reviews the structure and functions of any organ created under the Charter. Through this power of review, the Assembly can modify or eliminate any organ it wishes. In this way, it can amend the Charter informally without going through the long process of amendment. The AHG’s power of review has been used in the past to eliminate the Commission of Mediation, Arbitration and Conciliation, which was replaced by more informal “executive” actions.

A second function relates to the Assembly’s power over its own membership. The Charter empowers it to admit new members. The only qualification is that an applicant must be an “independent sovereign African state.” And although it is not explicitly stated, it can safely be assumed that such an applicant state must generally agree with the principles of the Organisation. The Assembly through a simple majority may de...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 INTRODUCTION
• 2 DECOLONISATION
• 3 THE OAU AND AFRICAN CONFLICTS
• 4 OAU AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
• 5 THE OAU AND HUMAN RIGHTS
• 6 CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE OAU—ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE
• APPENDIXES
• ABBREVIATIONS
• INDEX