Control and Power in Central-local Government Relations

R.A.W. Rhodes

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429872853
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Published in 1999. Originally published in 1981, Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relations set out to provide a re-interpretation of central-local relations in Britain. The book reviewed the (then) existing literature; redefined the subject of intergovernmental relations (IGR); and developed a theory linking IGR to broader issues in the study of British Government. It rapidly became a classic in the study of local government. The link to broader issues what achieved through the power-dependence model and the focus on policy communities. The book underpinned the vast growth in the study of policy networks in British government.

This revised edition includes four new chapters, two of which have been specially written. The new Preface traces the fortunes of the power-dependence model, commenting on and updating the individual chapters. A new part II continues the story. It contains a 1986 essay reviewing criticism of the original model (chapter 6); a 1992 article discussing unresolved issues in the study of policy networks (chapter 7); and a new chapter assessing where we are now in the study of networks. It argues, provocatively, for an ethnographic focus on traditions and narratives; on how individuals construct networks. The book remains essential reading for all students and academics concerned with the study of IGR and policy networks.

PART I
CONTROL AND POWER IN CENTRAL-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

1 Introduction

The subject of central-local relations has been of peripheral interest to social scientists. The topic has been seen as within the province of public administration, with an attendant fixation on the legal-institutional aspects of the relationship. Recently, this situation has been changing. First, central government has become increasingly concerned about its perceived inability to control local authority expenditure. The most obvious manifestation of this concern was the appointment and report of the Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance (1976). Second, there has been a growing realization that, in spite of the many changes in the system of central-local relations over the last decade and a half, there have been virtually no academic studies of either the changes or the way the system actually works (a major research study is Griffith, 1966; on the limited amount of research, see Barker, 1978).

One of the major objectives of this book is to take stock of that research which has been published on central-local relations and to identify some of the possible directions for future research. The review covers the post-war period but, and the qualification is an important one, it is not limited to central-local relations narrowly defined. Perhaps one of the major problems associated with the study of central-local relations is the preoccupation with a narrow range of issues. This book argues that central-local relations is but one facet of a larger system of intergovernmental relations which encompasses both links between the UK government and the so-called peripheral areas of Wales and Northern Ireland and the links between the various central governments and other subnational units of government.

The scope of this review is broader, however, than the system of intergovernmental relations in Britain. Not only has the literature on central-local relations been preoccupied with a limited number of governmental institutions but it has also demonstrated a marked aversion to theory. It will be argued that the study of intergovernmental relations is important not just because it is currently deemed to be a policy problem but because it can illuminate facets of modern government of concern to social scientists. A number of theories of advanced industrial society raise issues of direct relevance to the study of central-local relations. The bulk of this chapter will review, albeit briefly, some of those macro theories capable of informing the study of central-local relations. Subsequent chapters will review in more detail some of the theoretical work on interorganizational analysis and intergovernmental relations which modify these general considerations for application in specific contexts. And the argument linking these, at times, disparate contributions is that the study of intergovernmental relations can only develop if it becomes consciously theoretical and encompasses issues and problems traditionally ignored or eschewed in the literature on central-local relations.

The pleas for theory and for a wider definition of the subject matter than a focus on central-local relations are, of course, easy to make. The problems of developing such a theory are far greater. However, if this review is to identify future areas of research, it is essential to move beyond exhortation and provide a framework for the analysis of intergovernmental relations in Britain. In the absence of such a framework, there is a danger that one compiles a list or shopping bag of ‘interesting’ projects. These projects can have no overall rationale and could bear little relationship to each other. A framework of analysis is essential if such fragmentation is to be avoided.

The justification for a theoretical framework does not lie, however, either in the inadequacies of previous work or in the need to identify a coherent group of projects. It lies in the ability of that framework to identify issues and problems previously ignored, to raise new questions and to provide a distinctive reinterpretation of the subject. The ‘power-dependence’ model of intergovernmental relations developed in this book suggests that these relations are simultaneously rational, ambiguous and confused. In other words, the functional links between national and subnational units of government are rational within a given policy area. Actors in the same policy area at different levels of government share common interests in the development of that policy area. However, the links between policy areas are ambiguous and, when the system is viewed as a whole, as is the case for public expenditure decisions, the pattern of relationships is confused. The framework presented in this book attempts to explain why the system is rational, ambiguous and confused. However, this statement anticipates future chapters. Recently, emphasis has been placed upon the problems associated with central-local relations, especially the failure of central government to control the level of local expenditure (Social Science Research Council, 1979, p.5). In these circumstances, it is particularly important to demonstrate that the study of intergovernmental relations can shed light on matters of more general concern in the social sciences.

The Context of Intergovernmental Relations: Some Theoretical Issues

Phrases such as the ‘contract state’, ‘the new industrial state’, ‘turbulent environments’ and Organized social complexity’ occur with increasing frequency in both academic and more popular literature, along with expressions of concern about the growing lack of accountability in modern government (Smith and Hague, 1971; Jones, 1977; Galbraith, 1972; Emery and Trist, 1965; La Porte, 1974; Toffler, 1971). They have not been missing from interpretations on British government. For example, Tony King (1975, p. 168) has argued: ‘If Britain is becoming harder to govern, it is partly because the number of dependency relationships in which government is involved has increased substantially, and because the incidence of acts of non-compliance by the other participants in these relationships has also increased substantially.’

In a similar vein, Richard Rose has suggested: ‘The growing complexity of government tends to make government over complex, reducing its efficiency and upon occasion, its effectiveness. … Today, the chief policies of government depend for success upon the results of complex processes of interaction that can be influenced but not controlled by government.’

This ‘ungovernability’ or ‘overload’ thesis has been widely discussed and it is not without its problems. As Richard Rose has pointed out, ‘ungovernability’ is a term ‘that is ill-defined, variously defined or never defined at all’ (1978, pp.15, 16, 1). Its status as a theory is similarly elusive. Only limited attention is paid to why governments have increasingly intervened in the economy. Explanations of ungovernability stress the level of electoral expectations, complexity, competition between interest groups, scarcity of resources or some combination of all these factors for explaining policy failure (Brittan, 1975; Douglas, 1976; Scharpf, 1977; Rose, 1978; King, 1975). A more adequate theory would explain why, for example, organized social complexity was a feature of British society in particular and advanced industrial societies in general. In fact, the ‘ungovernability’ thesis draws together in varying mixtures elements from the numerous theories of post-industrial society without explicitly demonstrating its links to that theory (in whatever version) or explicating the causal connections between the selected elements. Or to make the same point a different way, the ungovernability thesis explores the consequences for government of changes in its power and in the distribution of power in society without explaining the causes of those changes. For a broader ranging analysis, it is necessary to turn to theories of ‘corporatism’ and ‘post-industrial society’.

Winkler (1976, p. 103) defines corporatism in the following terms: ‘Corporatism is an economic system in which the state directs and controls predominantly privately-owned business according to four principles: unity, order, nationalism and success/In this definition, control refers to ‘control over the internal decision making of privately owned business’ (ibid., p. 104). To the extent that corporatism stresses the interdependence of government and business, therefore, there is a marked parallel with the relationships between central and local government.

Winkler (1976, p. 117) identifies four structural causes of corporatism: ‘industrial concentration, declining profitability, technological development and international competition’. Corporatism is a response to long-standing basic trends in the British economy. The principles underlying the administration of the corporatist economy are: ‘antinomianism, inquisitorial justice, strategic control, delegated enforcement, mediated enforcement and extralegal power’ (Winkler 1977, p.50). The state avoids formal operating procedures; uses the courts to sustain and restore order and cooperation; regulates national economic performance through control of a few, large organizations; uses private organizations to administer policy; conducts public administration through autonomous, intermediary institutions such as quasi-non-governmental and quasi-governmental organizations (collectively termed ‘quangos’); and uses private coercion in support of public policy (ibid., pp.50-55).

This sketch of corporatist theory indicates its relevance to the study of intergovernmental relations. First, corporatist theory emphasizes the allocation of functions not only between government and industry but also between the various units of government. A key element in the theory can be assessed, therefore, by exploring the efficacy of central control over quangos as compared to local authorities. Apart from administrative and financial economy, Winkler argues that the state resorts to ‘mediated enforcement’ ‘to conceal potentially contentious state activities’. In other words, quangos are ‘indirect, concealed forms of administration’ (ibid., pp.54 and 55). Accordingly, one would predict that quangos were less likely to be called to account for their actions (either by elected representatives or by the electorate) than local authorities. In more general terms, corporatist theory suggests that differences between the different institutional forms of state actions should be analysed. What difference does it make that a service or policy is entrusted to a local authority rather than a quango?

Second, the corporatist state may well view local authorities as means for legitimating its decisions and for coopting potential dissidents; that is, as part of the machinery of delegated enforcement. For example, the creation of the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance enables local authorities to ‘participate’ in making public expenditure decisions. This cooption could be described as a form of social control, a way of defusing opposition to cuts in public expenditure and of turning the opponents of cuts into agents for implementing central government policy. Certainly, corporatist theory raises interesting questions about the roles of the national institutions of local government.

It is possible, of course, to identify additional, specific themes in corporatist theory which could be explored in the context of intergovernmental relations. For example, the relationships between local authorities, the Home Office and the police could be explored in the light of the (alleged) growth in the use of private coercion to support public policy. However, the most interesting feature of corporatist theory is the exploration of changing (and increasing) state power. Winkler (1976, pp. 134-6) argues that the state has some degree of autonomy and then focuses on the causes of the interdependence of government and industry and the consequences of this interdependence for the form, extent and autonomy of state action. The consequences of this focus for the study of intergovernmental relations can be illustrated by a brief examination of local government finance, the study of which typically takes the form of either straightforward descriptions of the system or analyses of changing patterns of grant and expenditure (see, for example, Hepworth, 1976; Boaden, 1971). There have been few analyses of the development of the system and the main preoccupation has been the effects upon local authorities of increasing dependence on central grant (one of the exceptions is G. Rhodes, 1976).

Corporatist theory suggests that central government’s policy on local government finance will be an integral part of its economic policy: that is, just as the principles of corporatist administration are a response to the structural problems of the British economy so changes in local government finance reflect these problems. Moreover, as these problems intensify, so will central government’s attempts to control local finance. Accordingly, there is need for a historical study of local government finance relating changes not only to the specific financial problems of local authorities but also to the fluctuating fortunes of the British economy. Within such a broad study a number of specific issues can be explored. Trends in local government finance could be compared with trends in the financing of other subnational units in order to assess whether the centre’s need to control both the economy and local authorities has led it to bypass local authorities and resort to ‘mediated enforcement’. The analysis could include also changes in the form of financing and explore the extent to which the centre became involved in the budgetary process of subnational units. The changing scope of central government’s involvement in the finance of local government throughout the post-war period provides a setting for the exploration of many of the themes of corporatist theory. And casting the study of local government finance in this form provides a necessary corrective to the concern with the details of the system by emphasizing the evolving form of the system and its relationship to the economic context of British government.

The theory of corporatism does not just assume that there is a growing interdependence between the state and industry, it also attempts to explore the causes of this interdependence and its consequences for the state. It provides an interpretive framework within which the study of intergovernmental relations can be located.

However, there are problems with corporatist theory. As applied to Britain, analysis has been limited to the fields of economic policy and industrial relations. Nor is it clear that the state is able to maintain unity - a key corporatist notion - in these fields. Marsh and Grant argue that the government, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) have not been able to evolve an agreed industrial and economic policy, that there is no basic consensus underpinning the system and that the decisions of the leadership of the CBI and the TUC are not accepted as authoritative by the membership (Marsh and Grant, 1977). And yet these features would seem to be essential for unity in the field of economic policy.

There are also problems with the analysis of the long-term structural changes in the British economy (see, for example, Jessop, 1979) and there are ambiguities in the concept of corporatism. For example, Winkler does not distinguish between state corporatism in which ‘the state plays a directive role in the establishment of class harmony’ and societal corporatism where ‘the representative organisations are autonomous but co-operate with the state and each other because they recognise that they are mutually interdependent’ (Marsh and Grant, 1977, pp. 195-6). And yet such a distinction would seem to be particularly appropriate to an analysis of, for example, the Labour government’s ‘social contract’.

Corporatist theory is, therefore, only one of a number of possible interpretive frameworks for the study of intergovernmental relations. But its major themes command attention. The interdependence of organizations, the power of the state and the broad socioeconomic context of government policy are issues which cannot be ignored. Indeed, they are not the exclusive preserve of corporatist theory.

The theory of ‘post-industrial society’ has appeared in many variants and this profusion no doubt accounts for the popularity and pervasiveness of a number of its central tenets. Daniel Bell defines the concept of post-industrial society as follows:

1 Economic sector: the change from a goods producing to a service economy;

2 Occupational distribution: the pre-eminence of the professional and technical class;

3 Axial principle: the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and of policy formulation for the society;

4 Future orientation: the control of technology and technological assessment;

5 Decision-making: the creation of a new ‘intellectual technology’. (Bell, 1976, p. 14)

These ‘tendencies’ are reflected in, and reinforced by, three major processes in western industrial society:

the transformation of the industrial enterprise by the emergence of managers as controllers of the organisation; the changing composition of the occupational structure by the relative shrinkage of the industrial proletariat and the expansion of a new technical and professional stratum; and the transformation of the political system through the extension of the state bureaucracy and the rise of political technocrats. (Ibid., p.99)

For Bell, ‘the major source of structural change in society … is the change in the character of knowledge’ (ibid., p. 144) and one of the major structural changes is the spread of bureaucracy. ‘In the mid-twentieth century, bureaucracy has become the central problem for all societies’ (p.80) and we live in an ‘organizational society’ where the complex web of organizations provide the ‘locus of one’s life’ (p. 162). The problem is to manage this organized complexity or networks of interdependence and this task is conceptualized in terms of ‘games against nature and games between persons’ (pp.28, 127, 468). The conflict between the professional and populace in the locus of the organization is seen as the distinctive form of conflict of post-industrial society (pp. 128-9). Quite clearly, the theory of post-industrial society treats interorganizational dependence as one of the defining characteristics of the new era.

Obviously, this summary neither does justice to Bell’s argument, although it introduces his major themes, nor reflects the variety of approaches (see also Etzioni, 1968; Touraine, 1974; Vickers, 1972). However, it will suffice for a discussion of the theory’s relevance to the study of intergovernmental relations.

Perhaps the single most suggestive theme in Bell’s analysis concerns changes in the class structure of industrial society and the consequences for the distribution of power. With ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Dedication Page
• List of Figures and Tables
• Preface to the 1981 Publication
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Part I: Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relations
• Part II: From Institutions, To Policy, To Individuals
• References
• Subject Index
• Also by R.A.W. Rhodes