Realpolitik in the American University: Charles A. Beard and the Problem of Academic Repression
Clyde W. Barrow
University of Texas-Rio Grande Valley, USA
Abstract Charles A. Beard resigned from Columbia University on October 8, 1917 at a time when modern universities were emerging as significant institutions in the economic and political development of the United States. Thus, Beardâs highly publicized resignation came at a time when universities were under exceptional scrutiny by economic and political elites, who increasingly viewed higher education institutions as either private corporations which they owned or as extensions of the modern state apparatus. Moreover, Beardâs resignation came after a long string of dismissals, resignations, and censures at American universities that progressive historians have ironically chronicled as a history of the development of academic freedom in the United States. In fact, the early âacademic freedomâ cases were successful acts of academic repression and, in this context, Charles A. Beardâs resignation opened a window onto the realpolitik of American universities, which have never been ivory towers, but have always been fundamentally political institutions, where groups and individuals engage in contests for power, authority, and resources within the framework of even larger social conflicts.
You need only reflect that one of the best ways to get yourself a reputation as a dangerous citizen these days is to go about repeating the very phrases which our founding fathers used in the struggle for independence. (Charles A. Beard)
Between Corporations and the State
Charles A. Beard resigned from Columbia University on October 8, 1917 at a time when modern universities were emerging as significant institutions in the economic and political development of the United States (US).1 While many of Beardâs critics dismissed his resignation as the isolated action of an impetuous professor, Beard resigned at a time when universities were under exceptional scrutiny by economic and political elites, who increasingly viewed higher education institutions as either private corporations which they âownedâ by virtue of their capital investments or as extensions of the modern state apparatus that should implement the decrees of powerful state elites. Indeed, in the same year that Beard resigned, Thorstein Veblen published The Higher Learning in America, which wryly explored âthe immediate and ubiquitous effectâ on faculty of operating higher education institutions as if they were business enterprises.2 Similarly, shortly after Beardâs resignation, Max Weber delivered a lecture to graduate students at Munich University, where he observed that the ivory tower image of American universities was âfictitious,â because colleges and universities were in reality âstate capitalist enterprises, which cannot be managed without very considerable funds.â3
In fact, Charles A. Beardâs resignation from Columbia University was not an isolated event in the larger context of American higher education, and in this sense it was not him personally, nor even his scholarship on the US Constitution (1913), that was under attack by a corporate elite and its political allies, but rather an engaged vision of the political and social sciences was under siege by âexternalâ political forces operating from locations inside the university.4 Beardâs resignation came after a long string of dismissals, resignations, and censures that began with Edward Beemis, Edward A. Ross, and Richard T. Elyâall radical political economistsâat the turn of the twentieth century and culminated with the founding of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) almost exactly one hundred years ago (1915). Ironically, mainstream progressive historians, such as Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metgzer have chronicled these early instances of conflict between faculty, administrators, trustees, and conservative politicians as a history of âthe development of academic freedom in the United States.â5 The truth is that the early âacademic freedomâ cases were actually successful acts of academic repression; while in the midst of World War I patriotic hysteria, the AAUP found itself not only helpless to stem a growing tide of academic repression, but leading members of the organization often colluded with administrators in implementing repressive policies.6 In this context, Charles A. Beardâs resignation turned into a much larger event, because it opened a now well-documented window onto the realpolitik of American universities, which have never been ivory towers, but have always been fundamentally political institutions, where groups and individuals engage in contests for power, authority, and resources within the framework of even larger social conflicts.7
The Problem of Academic Repression
Charles A. Beard is best remembered for his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (1913), which explained the writing and adoption of the US Constitution as the political outcome of a class struggle between capitalistic and agricultural interests in the early Republic.8 According to Beard, capitalistic interests had dominated the constitutional convention of 1787 and, consequently, they authored a founding document that appealed âdirectly and unerringly to identical interests in the country at large.â9 However, it is the bookâs political context, as well as the growing importance of universities in economic and political development, that made the book an intellectual lightning rod. Beardâs book became a powerful weapon in the hands of populists, progressives, liberals, socialists and, later, even communists, who would all cite his book as evidence that the constitution was of the capitalists, by the capitalists, and for the capitalists.10 Thus, against the recent backdrop of the Populist Revolt, the meteoric rise of the Socialist Party in 1912, and later the Russian Revolution of 1917, Beardâs book set off a political firestorm inside and outside academia that made it perhaps the most controversial scholarly work of its time.11
Moreover, Beard was living in a highly charged academic and political atmosphere, where academic freedom, or more properly academic repression, was rapidly becoming a major issue for the American professoriate. By the time Beard published his Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, the problem of academic repression had grown to such proportions that even P.P. Claxton, the US Commissioner of Education, felt compelled to state in his 1915 annual report that:
within the past two or three yearsâŚthere have been so many recurrences of disciplinary action directed by trustees and presidents of prominent institutions against professors reputed to hold unorthodox political, economic, or religious views that the question of academic freedom has become temporarily one of the foremost issues in university administrationâŚ. instructors in the field of economics and political science are at the present time especially in danger.12
Laurence R. Veysey, the renowned historian of higher education, observes that the early cases of academic repression in the US were âa rather accurate reflection of the degree of social alarm felt at any given hour by the more substantial elements in the American population.â13 These cases signaled âseasons of fearâ among the ruling economic and political elite and typically coincided with periods of major labor and social unrest and/or international wars. While the original targets of academic repression dating back to 1894 all had ties to Johns Hopkins University and the school of institutional economics, the battleground for academic freedom shifted to Columbia University around 1912, only a year before Beard published his infamous book on the US Constitution.
Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia Universityâs president, was a leading proponent of a concept of academic freedom that took hold among university administrators and trustees around the turn of the century.14 The basic premise of this managerial concept of academic freedom was its distinction between academic freedom and academic license. Butler claimed that âthe proper freedom of speech of university professorsâ depended on âhabits of self-control, self-direction, and self-ordering,â which was not merely a personal characteristic, but based on the âreasonable presumptionâ that what exists should carry greater moral and intellectual authority than âuntested and untriedâ theories.15
Butler was quite specific about what he meant by untested and untried theories. Academic freedom became academic license at any one of five different points. The first transgression was âirreverenceâ for the religious faith or political convictions of others, which clearly excluded atheism and overtly partisan politics (notwithstanding that he had run for vice-president as a Republican). A second boundary was crossed when professors attempted to contravene âthe laws of natureâ by advocating âall forms of artificial equality.â A third transgression occurred whenever professors took classroom time to express personal opinions on any subject, including those on which the individual was an expert. Another boundary was violated when professors abused the authority of their professional expertise by making public statements about issues of current political controversy, because professors should maintain a clear distinction between their status as experts and those of a demagogue or propagandist. Butler defined a propagandist as anyone who supported socialism, prohibition, cohabitation by unmarried couples, womenâs suffrage, and all things âqueer, odd, unconventionalâ or âotherwise minded,â including all ideas advocated by âfreaks, oddities, revolutionaries.â16 Butlerâs definition of propaganda obviously excluded a wide variety of ideological and political perspectives, but his concept of disciplinary specialization and professional expertise more broadly contravened the interdisciplinary vision of political science that had been articulated at Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University for the last two decades and which Beard came to epitomize in his Economic Interpretation of the Constitution.
Butler claimed that professors are further restricted in their pronouncements by the disciplinary boundaries that define the limits of professional expertise. Thus, for example, an economist has no expertise to talk about political institutions, nor can a political scientist talk about phenomena that rightfully belong to the sociologist (that is, classes), nor can a historian (who specializes in the past) talk about its relevance to contemporary politics. Furthermore, since a professional expert is defined by his command of âfacts,â an expert always confines his teaching to âfactsâ that are generally accepted by others in the field. Thus, academic freedom also becomes academic license when professors go beyond these facts, or when they transgress the boundaries of disciplinary expertise to speculate about untested political, moral, or social arrangements.17 Of course, Beard routinely violated most of these ideological and disciplinary strictures, including an active and open relationship with the Socialist Party until 1917.18
Under the leadership of President Nicholas Murray Butler, the Columbia University board of trustees became particularly aggressive at rooting out the âotherwise minded,â especially on its Faculty of Political Science. It is no coincidence that many of ...