Contemporary China's Diplomacy

Xing Qu, Longbiao Zhong

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138855069
• eBook ISBN: 9781317519331
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

With the second-largest economy and rapidly growing military strength, China is now an emerging regional and global super power, which makes it confronted with a sudden increase in opportunities, pressures and conflicts in terms of international issues.

This book gives a comprehensive and systematic introduction to the development of China's diplomatic strategies since 1980s, which have been changed approximately every ten years to cope with the complicated and changing international situations. In 1980s, China took "non-alignment" to create a solid external environment for the reform and opening-up which had just been initiated. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, upheaval in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War in 1990s, China adopted the principle of "keeping a low profile and making some contributions", to adhere to the road of socialism while avoid making enemies. Nowadays, due to the continuous enhancement of national power and international status, China replaces "making some contributions" with "making positive actions", to get more actively involved in international affairs.

This book will be a valuable reference for studies in China's diplomacy and international relations. Readers interested in contemporary China will also be attracted by it.

1 Adjustment of China’s foreign policy in a new era

With the evolution of world history and differentiation and restructure of international political powers, great changes have gradually taken place on the theme of the times. China has also obtained better cognition of international issues. In the early 1980s, China made adjustments to its own foreign policies featured with “neither building alliance nor establishing strategic relationship with any power or bloc of powers” and “never judging political relationship by ideology”. This is the most important adjustment in China’s foreign policy since the foundation of New China. It is not simply an emergent measure to cope with changes in the objective situation, but rather an initiative action taken based on experience and lessons of positive and negative aspects of China’s foreign policy since the foundation and a more profound understanding on what kind of diplomatic strategy is most conducive to the national interests of China. Such an adjustment is not a tactical one in the short term but a strategic one in the long run, including the adjustment in specific foreign relations, national policies as well as instructive ideology of diplomatic strategies.

I Background of adjustment: further subjective cognition and changeable objective situation

A Deng Xiaoping’s new judgment on era themes

1 Themes of times before the 1980s: war and revolution

It was a key period of the evolution of the international situation before and after Deng Xiaoping, as the core of the second generation of central leading collective of the Communist Party of China appeared on the scene. How to analyze the main contradiction whereof was of great importance for China to decide its diplomatic strategies. In the first half of the 1970s, Mao Zedong’s basic analysis of the international situation was as follows: the world witnessed a fierce contention for world hegemony by the two superpowers, which might lead to a looming World War and a turbulent situation, just as the ancient Chinese proverb said, “the rising wind forebodes a coming storm”. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is the most dangerous source of war. Concerning these reasons, an effective measure for maintenance of world peace is to establish a most extensive international anti-hegemony United Front to disrupt the deployment of superpowers. In such a historical context, the theme of that time was defined as war and revolution, as the popular words of that time put, “the war shall cause the revolution, or the revolution shall stop the war”.

2 Deng Xiaoping: peace and development are new themes of the times

Deng Xiaoping’s views of the world war were based on the adherence to the theory of Two Points, namely, “to be oriented to peace, but based on fighting capacity”. On one aspect, as Deng Xiaoping was clearly aware of the possibility of outbreak of world war, he put forward that world war “may break out any day. We must on no account waste time”¹ and “should also prepare for the possibility that some countries may want to fight a big war, and soon”.² On the other hand, he also believed that it was possible to fight for a long-term peace. Even in the late 1970s, the most intense period of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, Deng Xiaoping repeatedly emphasized:

It is possible that we may gain some additional time free of war. Applying Comrade Mao Zedong’s strategy of differentiating the Three Worlds and following his line in foreign affairs, we can contribute our share to the international struggle against hegemonism. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not yet finished its global strategic deployment. And the global strategy of the United States, after its defeat in Southeast Asia, has shifted to the defensive – the United States isn’t ready to fight a world war yet either. Therefore, it is possible to win a delay in the outbreak of war.³

In the 1980s, the strategic situation between the United States and the Soviet Union was changed, and so was the world political balance. Deng Xiaoping timely captured it and made a new judgment on the situation of war and peace, namely, the factors of peace exceed that of war. He pointed out: “We are by no means pessimists. We simply want to point out that the danger of war exists. We have said that while the factors bringing about war have increased, the factors for preventing war are also growing”.⁴ Such conclusion by Deng Xiaoping was based on a comprehensive analysis of situations in the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Western Europe, China and other countries in the third world. His analysis of the United States and the Soviet Union was detailed as follows:

Only the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are in a position to launch world war. But neither dares do so yet. First, these two countries have atomic bombs and many conventional weapons and the military strength to destroy each other. They cannot exterminate mankind, but I am afraid they can cause untold destruction. Therefore, neither dares to be the first to launch a war. Second, these two countries are striving for global strategic deployment but have suffered setbacks and met with failures, so neither dares to start a war.⁵

The analysis of the third world clearly shows the growth of peace strength as follows: “The Third World countries, including China, hope for national development, and war will bring them nothing good. The growing strength of the Third World – and of the most populous country, China, in particular – is an important factor for world peace”.⁶ and “The stronger China grows, the better the chances are for preserving world peace”. The analysis of the second world also indicates that peace is hopeful with the explanation as: “The forces for peace also include developed countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union. If a world war breaks out, they will not let themselves be dragged into it”.⁷ “The Japanese people do not want war, nor do the people of Europe”.⁸

After making such analysis, Deng Xiaoping pointed out:

Thus we can conclude that it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that there is hope of maintaining world peace. In short, after analyzing the general trends in the world and the environment around us, we have changed our view that the danger of war is imminent.⁹

During the time of making objective analysis of the fluctuation tendency of world war and peace, he noted that the basis of analyzing features of the times in the past had changed and new factors had emerged. For example, the independence and emancipation of people in colonial and semi-colonial societies had nearly been completed; and economy and technology in world competition had been in a prominent positon with the booming of a new technical revolution in the world. This meant that the theme of the times had turned into peace and development. Deng Xiaoping also indicated:

The two really great issues confronting the world today, issues of global strategic significance, are: first, peace, and second, economic development. The first involves East-West relations, while the second involves North-South relations. In short, countries in the East, West, North and South are all involved, but the North-South relations are the key question,¹⁰

and “We find many other problems too, but none of them has the same overall, global, strategic significance as these two”.¹¹ Thanks to the changes in the theme of the times, the leaders of China had new ideas about diplomatic strategies.

B Further subjective cognition

1 Alliance strategy’s advantages and disadvantages

Further subjective cognition refers to intensified awareness of the diplomatic fighting form of setting up alliance or establishing strategic relation against the third party. We cannot lump together whether to make an alliance is the best choice for the interests of the nation. In fact, it is advisable to make concrete analysis of a country’s military security situation at that time. If a country is facing urgent and realistic threats from invasions, it is a must and necessary to set up alliances with relevant countries.

However, the way of setting up alliance has its drawbacks. In light of the principle of balance between rights and obligations, if one alliance party has the obligation to provide aid to another party being attacked or threatened, the former also has the right to know the decisions of the latter on major issues. Article IV of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in 1950 stipulated that, “all major international issues of common interest related to the Soviet Union and China shall be negotiated by both sides”,¹² which clearly reflects the attitude of the Soviet Union. In fact, after the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, one of the accusations of China by the Soviet Union was China’s “insisting refusal to perform the Article IV”. For instance,

China concealed its intention to bombard Taiwan Strait Island in 1958, failed to inform of the government of the Soviet Union its intent of carrying out military actions against India and did not mention the Sino-US negotiations held since 1955, as well as took the same approach in a series of other related issues.¹³

As for the relevant parties of alliance, once they decide to take part in the strategic alliance, each side will be entitled to take what it needs but have to undertake the obligations at the same time, and such obligations might impede the full implementation of the independent foreign policy of all allied parties to some extent. In the case of confrontation with formidable enemies, national security shall be identified as the first priority, and such impediment might be taken as the price paid for the interest of national security. To judge whether the price is worth paying depends on whether the analysis of the national security situation is in line with the actual situation.

2 One Line strategy does not adapt to the new theme of the times

The relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany tended to alleviation. In the early 1970s, the Soviet Union and the United States reached a series of strategic agreements for arms limitation. Since “the CSCE” (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), actively advocated by the Soviet Union Soviet, came to common consensus on the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, Occidental-Oriental relations was eased. However, regional conflicts gradually increased. Under the circumstance that the fundamental situation of the confrontation between the East and the West was unchanged, these regional conflicts inevitably accompanied the contending for world domination of both powers. It is proper for China to reveal the essence of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the USA and point out that such struggle endangers world peace. However, it is inappropriate to assert that a world war is bound to break out or even estimate the timetable for it.

In response to the analysis on the situation of international war and peace, first, we need to determine the location of the source of war. The analysis at that time showed that the Soviet Union was the most dangerous source of war. Since “a new world war is imminent” and the Soviet Union is “the most dangerous source of war”, “to set up a united international front of anti-hegemony” against the Soviet Union was naturally the only correct strategic choice. It was out of such consideration that Mao Zedong directly transferred the idea of One Line and One Bloc to Henry Kissinger. When Hua Guofeng acted as Premier of China, such strategic thoughts were valued more in Chinese diplomacy. It was marked by the publication of the new constitution in 1978, providing the establishment of the most extensive United Front against a new world war, with the expression of “social imperialism” put forward before “imperialism”, which meant that the Soviet Union was placed before the United States of America.

The key link of the One Line strategy was to establish a strategic relationship in the western world led by the United States against the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union imminently started a world war, such strategy would be undoubtedly correct. However, the facts proved that China’s estimate of world war and the peace situation at that time was too pessimistic. Although the United States wantonly exaggerated the danger of war from the Soviet Union, it had no intention at all to put China, under the leadership of the Communist Party, as a true ally. The contradiction between the two communist countries of the Soviet Union and China, in the USA’s eyes, was just where the western countries can reap profits. China sought to establish a military-strategic relationship with the western countries, but the United States thought of it as China asking for help from the United States and utilized it to recklessly promote its own hegemony in Sino-US bilateral relations and world politics. Such phenomenon developed to the extent out of tolerance in the early 1980s. It made China recognize that, in the pattern of basic balance between both superpowers, which struggled for hegemony that might endanger world peace, if China, a power with certain strength, set up strategic alliance with either party, China would possibly break the balance and contribute to a hegemonic tendency for such party. China, as a peaceful power independent from both superpowers, was important for the maintenance of world peace. Both would restrain themselves in handling relations with China due to worry about pushing China to the opposite side. Further subjective cognition would make the Chinese government subjectively sense the need to adjust its foreign policies.

C Changes in objective situation

1 Great changes in objective situation

First, after the three decades of efforts since the founding of New China, China’s national strength was greatly enhanced, as was the national security environment. To focus on building a real peaceful situation became possible. The Communist Party of China shifted its focus on national work to the four-modernizations in the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, which depends on a long-term peaceful international environment. Diplomacy should serve such general objective.

Second, the strategic situation in the United States and the Soviet Union underwent an evolvement from the Soviet Union in offensiveness and the United States in defensiveness into the balance of offensive and defensive positions between both countries. The Soviet Union was dragged into Afghanistan, unable to advance or retreat, being forced into a passive position. Vietnam, supported by the Soviet Union, was in the same predicament in communication with Kampuchea. However, the United States succeeded once and again in Central America, especially in Grenada and Nicaragua. In the Middle East, Israel, under the support of the United States, frequently attacked Palestine. The United States also claimed military plans, including MX missiles and neutron bombs, in the arms races against the Soviet Union, making the Soviet Union hard to cope with. Strategic stalemate appeared in the United States–Soviet Union competition. If China continued to implement One Line strategy, the United States would reap more profits from it.

Finally, certain deviations in the implementation of One Line strategy developed to the point that it must be corrected. Such deviations were mainly embodied in two aspects: first, China over-emphasized the danger of world wars, which in a sense caused an inclination that China tended to lose the banner of peace. The Pacifist Movement in Western Europe was simply denounced as “appeasement” thought and “disarmament” was totally denied. Of particular note, the proposal of removing “the maintenance of world peace” from the Constitution,¹⁴ the national fundamental law of China, affected the image of China in peace safeguarding. Second, China set up the relation of friend or foe with other third world countries depending on their closeness with the Soviet Union, and made its policies toward them depending on their attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Noteworthily, some of these countries took the attitudes of opposing the Soviet Union just because of anti-communism and anti-socialism, with nothing in common with the united anti-hegemony for prevention of outbreak of wars h...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword to the Chinese edition
• 1 Adjustment of China’s foreign policy in a new era
• 2 Resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao
• 3 Calm response to diplomatic challenges from upheaval in the USSR and Eastern Europe
• 4 Building a new across-century partnership
• 5 New concept of China’s diplomacy at a new stage in the new century
• 6 Great relations between the great powers in the new century
• 7 Establishing a geostrategic base in neighboring areas in the new century
• 8 Strengthening solidarity and cooperation with developing countries
• 9 Active participation in multilateral diplomacy in the new century
• Index