The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II

Economy, Society and Military Power

Martin Kahn

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9780367873738
• eBook ISBN:
  9781317403968
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

World War II was the largest and most devastating war in modern history with far-reaching consequences. The single most important campaign was the Soviet–German war, which consumed the lion share of Germany's military resources. In contrast to the tone in German and Anglo-American precampaign assessments, the USSR ws able to repulse the invasion after huge losses and turn the table on Germany and her minor Axis allies.

This book examines how the two most important Western Allies in World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom, assessed the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union in 1939–1945. Since the USSR was the single most important military contributor to the Allied victory in Europe, and the main target of Germany's military strength, these assessments are of paramount importance in order to understand how the Anglo-Americans perceived the overall war situation and adjusted their own war effort in accordance with it. Utilising a wide range of documents produced by the Anglo-Americans during and shortly before World War II, this book explores why Soviet strength was underestimated, and how the Soviet economic system, Soviet society and military capabilities were viewed by Western Government observers.

The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II is a fascinating read for those in academia studying economic history, international economics and security studies, especially areas on military and strategic.

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Abbreviations
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Anglo-American assessments in a wider context
• 3. The Soviet Union and the West: The pre-war experience and international Great Power politics before World War II
• 4. From the guarantee to Poland to the Molotov-Ribbentropp pact
• 5. US pre-Barbarossa assessments
• 6. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and its consequences
• 7. The Soviet–Finnish Winter War
• 8. Assessments running up to Barbarossa
• 9. The nature of the assessments, and the “reality”
• 10. The beginning of Soviet–German war: Assessments during Operation Barbarossa
• 11. The first turning point of the war: the Soviet winter offensive
• 12. The spring, the coming of summer and continued worries
• 13. The first year of the Soviet–German war: how realistic were the assessments?
• 14. The German summer offensive and Soviet prospects
• 15. The Anglo-American assessments in the context of the possibility to establish a Second Front in 1942
• 16. The autumn assessments and the battle of Stalingrad
• 17. From Stalingrad to Kursk
• 18. The 1943 cross-channel attack that never was and the “90-division gamble”
• 19. The Red ArmyÂ’s first major push to the West
• 20. The final phase of the war: from Operation Bagration to the surrender of Germany (and the campaign against Japan)
• 21. Assessments compared to reality during the last period of the war
• 22. The assessments of war potential and material aid to the USSR
• 23. A comment on the assessments in the context of the early Cold War
• 24. Conclusion
• References
• Index