William III, the Stadholder-King

A Political Biography

Wout Troost

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780754650713
• eBook ISBN: 9781351872836
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

In Britain the name of William III is synonymous with sectarianism and Orangism. Ever since he burst onto the English political landscape in 1688 to take the throne of his catholic uncle, James II, William has tended to be viewed within a largely domestic sphere. Yet, it has been acknowledged that William's main motivation in accepting the English crown was to aid the ongoing struggles of the United Provinces against the might of Louis XIV's France. Whilst both the British and European aspects of William's activities have been studied before, there has until now been no English language book that draws together both his Dutch and British concerns. In this book, made available in English for the first time, Wout Troost exploits his detailed knowledge of Dutch, English, Scottish and Irish sources to paint a holistic and convincing political analysis of William's reign. Beginning with a brief biography of William, the real strength of this book lies in its analysis of the first part of William's reign before the events of 1688. It is this crucial period that has been most neglected by English-speaking historians, despite the fact that it is crucial to understanding the events that follow. For without an appreciation of William's formative years as Stadholder and soldier, his actions and decisions relating to the English crown cannot be properly construed. Providing a truly balanced insight into the political career of William, this book will be welcomed by all those with in interest in European history, or who wish to better understand the political and religious geography of modern Britain. The translation of this book was made possible by a generous subsidy from NWO, the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek.

Chapter 1
The House of Orange on the Death of William II

A Mixed Constitution: The Provincial States and the Stadholder

After the States-General abjured their allegiance to Philip II in 1581, they were faced with the question: who should exercise power in the provinces without a king? Attempts to entrust a foreign ruler with the sovereignty of each of the seven provinces failed, and it was not until 1588 that they decided not to seek another overlord, but to perform that role themselves. From that time the States of the provinces exercised sovereign power in what was to become known as the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands.¹ The States were regarded as the chief guardians of freedom, and their inhabitants were reminded of their patriotic duty to defend the country’s liberty.² To regulate certain Union matters, such as foreign policy and defence, the States sent their delegates to the States-General, but they made their anxiety to defend their provincial independence very clear by requiring unanimity in its most important decisions.

Even so, to insist too much on provincial autonomy would have made the Republic ungovernable. An additional complication for the Republic was the enormous disproportion in wealth and power between Holland and the other provinces. From 1616 Holland paid 58 per cent of the Union’s expenses, and this financial power generally enabled it to get its way in the States-General.³ The province had opposed the King’s efforts at centralization during the rule of Philip II, but now it was able to conduct an active Generality policy, since its economic predominance often allowed it to determine the line taken by the States-General.⁴ Even when the provinces first rebelled against their sovereign they had kept his deputy, the stadholder or provincial governor. William of Orange held this office in Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht under Philip II until 1567. When these provinces rose in revolt against Philip II in 1572 it was not strictly necessary to retain his deputy,⁵ but the rebellious provinces needed a princely figurehead for their relations with foreign powers. The choice fell automatically on Orange, who was re-appointed stadholder of Holland and Zeeland by the first free assembly of the States of Holland at Dordrecht in 1572. By this appointment the rebellious provinces kept up the fiction that they were not attacking the position of Philip II. After Philip’s authority was formally abjured in 1581, the States sought to declare William of Orange Count of Holland, but under very restrictive conditions, for they were now the true sovereigns. If that nomination had succeeded a dual system of ruler and States might have developed.⁶

After the death of Orange the States of Holland appointed his son Maurice as stadholder to make it clear that they regarded themselves as the successors of Philip II.⁷ A few years later he also became stadholder of Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel, adding the functions of captain-general of five provinces and admiral-general of the Union.

On the one hand the stadholder was the servant of the States, while on the other he had powers that gave his position more authority. He possessed the right of pardon and could exert a direct influence on the choice of sheriffs, aldermen and burgomasters in most of the towns, choosing from a list of names submitted by the local regents.⁸ And Maurice had exploited a resolution of the States-General of 1618 to purge the magistracies in the towns of Holland, dismissing a large number of sitting regents and replacing them with new appointees. The combined authority of the stadholder and captain-general naturally enhanced his power because the army was always at his disposal.⁹ The common people supported him, and the ministers of the Reformed Church never tired of blowing the trumpet for the Oranges. In their view the Princes of Orange had been marked out by God, like the Judges of the Old Testament, to lead the people of the Netherlands out of Spanish Catholic servitude.¹⁰

It will be clear that the structure of the state in the Republic was not the result of a preconceived plan but of historical chance. Indeed the form of the state was regarded as anomalous even by contemporaries, who did not always know what to make of it.¹¹

Nevertheless Hugo Grotius attempted to provide the structure of the state with a solid basis in his ‘Treatise of the Antiquity of the Batavian, now Holland Republic’ of 1610. He employed the concepts of traditional Aristotelian politics: the three pure forms of state (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) and the mixed constitution. According to Aristotle a pure state rapidly fell into corruption: monarchy degenerated into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy and democracy into mob rule. Aristotle’s opinion was that aristocracy was the best form of state in theory, but that in practice a mixed constitution was preferable. The Greek philosopher himself was a proponent of a constitution that kept a middle way between aristocracy and democracy.

Grotius followed the example of Aristotle in assuming a mixed authority in the Republic. He depicted the States as the aristocratic element and the stadholder as the representative of the monarchical element. This mixed constitution was the best, according to Grotius, because it steered a middle course between monarchy and democracy, both of which were liable to degenerate.

From the viewpoint of political theory Grotius’ work clearly exalted the role of the stadholder. Although his argument was chiefly concerned to uphold the sovereignty of the States and the authority of the urban patricians, the explicit introduction of a monarchical element in Grotius’ treatise put a powerful weapon in the hands of those who championed the stadholdership.¹² Its prestige was further enhanced by the praise heaped on tempered monarchy as the ideal form of government in lectures in politics at Leiden University and elsewhere in the country until the middle of the seventeenth century.¹³

The idea of a division of sovereignty between States and stadholder did not, however, lead Maurice to increase his power at the expense of the States. He was much more of a captain-general than a stadholder. It was his successors Frederick Henry and William II who were to try to strengthen the combined powers of stadholder and captain-general in a way intended to achieve oneman rule in the Republic.¹⁴

Frederick Henry Expands his Power

In 1625 Frederick Henry succeeded his brother Maurice as stadholder of five provinces, while Ernst Casimir of Nassau-Dietz remained in office in Friesland and Groningen. At the proposal of Holland, Frederick Henry became captain-general, not of the separate provinces but of the Union, which considerably enhanced his military prestige.

Thanks to the financial recovery under Maurice, Frederick Henry had become a rich man, who learned from his wife Amalia van Solms how to spend money on building palaces and buying works of art.

Amalia was the former lady-in-waiting of Elizabeth, the wife of Frederick V of the Palatinate, who is known to history as the Winter King. Frederick V, a grandson of William of Orange,¹⁵ had been elected King of Bohemia by the Protestant Czechs in 1619, but had reigned no more than a single winter before he was defeated by the German Emperor Ferdinand II only a year later at the White Mountain. The Winter King then fled to the Republic, and Amalia van Solms came with him to The Hague as lady-in-waiting of Elizabeth of Bohemia, the daughter of James I. She was related to the Nassaus and on the same social level, as her family were counts.

Examples of Frederick Henry’s mania for building were Honselaarsdijk, Huis Ter Nieburch near Rijswijk (now demolished) and Huis ten Bosch. Maurice had always remained a German soldier and noble, but Frederick Henry created a court, which became a centre of power in the rising Republic and under his grandson was to grow into an instrument for controlling Dutch policy.¹⁶ As captain-general of the Union he scored some great successes: in 1626 he captured Oldenzaal and in 1627 Groenlo. The high points of his military career were undoubtedly the capture of Den Bosch in 1629 and the campaign along the Maas three years later.

His command of the army and his social position as the highest nobleman in the Republic were sources of great power for Frederick Henry,¹⁷ who used them to concern himself with matters that went well beyond the scope of his duties as stadholder. He was more interested in politics than was his brother Maurice, and keener to play the leading role.

In the Republic the States-General were formally responsible for the conduct of foreign policy, but it was difficult and also undesirable to involve 2000 local regents in such dealings. In view of the preponderance of Holland the grand pensionary of Holland had come to play an important part in foreign affairs, but in the early 1630s Frederick Henry succeeded in gaining control of much of foreign policy.¹⁸

He exercised this control through the Secrete Besognes or committees. According to Groenveld, there were three of these ad hoc bodies, each with eight or nine members: for planning campaigns, to accompany the Prince on his campaigns, and to decide questions of an international scope.¹⁹ The Prince managed to keep a tight grip on these committees, though they were never wholly under his control. Their members were bound to secrecy and empowered to take final decisions, so they possessed carte blanche.²⁰ The treaty of 1635 with France reveals the influence of such a committee. Apart from its ratification it was entirely the work of the secret committee for French affairs.

Frederick Henry also consolidated his position in the province of Holland. In 1636 he was involved in the removal of the Grand Pensionary Adriaen Pauw and his replacement by Jacob Cats, who followed the lead of the Stadholder.²¹

Olaf Mörke regards the role of the grand pensionary as that of an intermediary between the States of Holland and the stadholder,²² but that does not seem to have been the case for Cats. The Zeelander was much more a useful tool of Frederick Henry, in fact one of his creatures, even though the Prince had ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Ilustrations
• List of Maps
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 The House of Orange on the Death of William II
• 2 Youth (1650–66)
• 3 The Path to Power
• 4 The Year of Catastrophe, 1672
• 5 The Task and the Tools
• 6 The Peace of Nijmegen (1672–78)
• 7 The Twenty Years’ Truce of Regensburg (1679–84)
• 8 James II, William III and Louis XIV (1685–88)
• 9 The Glorious Revolution (1688–89)
• 10 William III as King of England (1689–1702)
• 11 War or Peace? (1689–1702)
• 12 William III and Scotland (1660–1702)
• 13 William III and Ireland
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index