Émile Durkheim

Justice, Morality and Politics

Roger Cotterrell

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780754627111
• eBook ISBN: 9781351940573
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

This volume focuses on three closely-connected aspects of Émile Durkheim's work: his sociology of justice, his sociology of morality and his political sociology. These areas of his thought are the most relevant and practical today in considering fundamental problems of contemporary societies and they provide many of the richest and most important insights of his social theory. Yet they are also relatively neglected and this volume collects together the most incisive recent periodical commentary on them. Within the justice-morality-politics triangle, Durkheim examines moral pluralism and the possibility of identifying a unifying value system for complex societies; the nature and conditions of democracy; the relations of the citizen, the state and corporate groups; criteria of justice and of effective economic regulation; and modern individualism with its associated ideas of human dignity and human rights. This tightly-integrated volume presents Durkheim's thought in an unusual and revealing light, showing him as a key social and political thinker for the twenty-first century.

Part I
Solidarity in Modern Society

[1]
Continuity and Change in
Durkheim’s Theory of Social Solidarity^*

M.J. Hawkins, Kingston Polytechnic

This paper examines the controversial question of whether the theory of social solidarity contained in The Division of Labor in Society remained crucial to Durkheim’s thinking after the book’s publication in 1893. It is argued that this theory is rooted in a number of assumptions concerning primitive social life, the boundaries between nature and culture, and human nature. An analysis of material written after 1902 shows that Durkheim revised his approach to these topics to such an extent that he appears to be in the process of constructing a new theoretical framework for the investigation of social solidarity. In both the early and the later theories, however, the models of primitive social behavior, though different, perform similar intellectual functions.

Although most sociologists have agreed that a central theme of Durkheim’s work is a concern with the nature of social solidarity, a consensus has been less readily forthcoming on the question of whether the theoretical treatment of this subject in The Division of Labor remained crucial to his thinking after the book’s publication in 1893. Two different positions on this issue can be identified in the secondary literature. One view is that Durkheim abandoned his original typology of solidarity as he came to realize that many features of mechanical solidarity, far from being confined to primitive and traditional societies, are in fact the foundations of unity in all types of social systems (Nisbet, 1975:139; Parsons, 1968:1,321; La Capra, 1972:90; Marks, 1974:354). This interpretation has been subjected to a great deal of criticism by a number of scholars who, while agreeing that some modifications in Durkheim’s thinking are apparent, insist that the theoretical framework established in The Division of Labor continued to play a fundamental role in his subsequent sociological inquiries (Giddens, 1971, 1976; Sheleff, 1975; Neyer, 1964; Bellah, 1973; McCloskey, 1976).

My intention is not to discuss these interpretations or to examine the textual evidence upon which they rest. The purpose of this paper is to show that Durkheim’s original approach to the problem of social solidarity belongs to a definite theoretical perspective, a crucial dimension of which is a number of assumptions concerning the nature of primitive societies. In his later work, the moral and organizational characteristics of these societies are re-defined, and it is with respect to this particular change, one that has been accorded insufficient attention in the literature cited above, that modifications in other areas of his thought must be evaluated. This argument will be sustained by means of a comparison between The Division of Labor and a selection of texts written after 1902.

The Division of Labor has been exposed to sufficient critical commentary to preclude the need for a lengthy rehearsal of its contents here. In order to show the nature of Durkheim’s later theoretical re-orientation however, it is necessary to draw attention to a number of familiar but important themes in this book.

I. The scope of the “conscience collective” in primitive societies. For Durk- heim, the principal source of cohesion in societies characterized by mechanical solidarity is the conscience collective, shared ways of thinking and feeling which bind the members of society together to form a tightly knit community. This is solidarity based upon likeness and in primitive societies where it is most fully developed, uniformity is so strictly maintained that there is an almost total absence of individual autonomy and identity. The conscience collective not only provides a detailed regulation of moral, political and economic activities but also controls the private affairs of each individual (Durkheim, 1964: 106, 135, 138, 159-60, 289). But there is one area of behavior which escapes the jurisdiction of the conscience collective, which Durkheim designates the “circle of physical necessities.” Unfortunately, he fails to specify the precise nature of these necessities or their relationship to private spheres of behavior. This omission gives the impression that there is a realm of distinctively personal activity which avoids collective regulation, and, indeed, there are occasions when Durkheim appears to ascribe such autonomy to primitives. For example, he claims that the satisfaction of physical needs introduces an element of irregularity and capriciousness into the life of the savage (Durkheim, 1964:394) and gives rise to weak and intermittent social relationships (Durkheim, 1964:58-61, 207-10). These statements, however, must be appreciated within the context of Durkheim’s overall position with regard to primitive social life and his theory of human nature. Beyond certain vague and indeterminate predispositions common to all men, psychic life is a product of social interaction and is, consequently, irreducible to some pre-social biological or psychological human constitution (Hawkins, 1977: 230-36). In primitive societies the conditions necessary for the development of personal consciousness are absent and “the only psychic life which may be truly developed is that which is common to all the members of the group, which is found identical in each” (Durkheim, 1964:347). Individuation and differentiation are the consequences of social forces that can be generated only when societies first have been constituted on the basis of homogeneity (Durkheim, 1964: 277, 350). Far from being an incorrigible individualist, the savage lacks any self-conscious identity and he is completely absorbed by his group (Durkheim, 1964:129-30, 194, 404).

From these arguments it is clear that for Durkheim, the circle of physical necessities lies beyond the domain of consciously directed action and consists of non-reflective modes of behavior which are governed by instincts. Physical needs, therefore, are satisfied automatically and unconsciously, as with animals, and do not stem from a pre-social cognitive apparatus. In the course of social evolution, instincts decline in importance and are replaced by culture as a means of organizing behavior (Durkheim, 1964:347-49). In primitive societies, where culture is coterminous with the conscience collective, the mind of the individual is a mirror of the beliefs and feelings of the collectivity, and the solidarity produced in this manner is called mechanical precisely because individuals are capable of no thought and action independent of the group.

II.The morphological basis of mechanical solidarity. Durkheim describes the morphology of primitive societies as “segmental,” that is, consisting of relatively undifferentiated parts linked together in a non-hierarchical manner. This structure “allows society to enclose the individual more tightly, holding him strongly attached to his domestic environment and, consequently, to traditions,” thereby reinforcing the determinacy of group beliefs and practices (Durkheim, 1964:302). These are ideal conditions for the collective surveillance of individual behavior, for “when the attention of all is constantly fixed on what each does, the least misstep is perceived and immediately condemned” (Durkheim, 1964: 298). Increases in the volume and density of a society reduce the effectiveness of the “collective gaze” upon which the maintenance of moral homogeneity depends and allows the individual more autonomy. In short, both the scope and the intensity of the conscience collective are closely connected with the segmental type of social organization, and the effacement of the latter leads to the erosion of the former.

III. The role of the “conscience collective” in advanced societies. When societies reach a certain level of internal differentiation, collective sentiments begin to decline until they “consist of very general and very indeterminate ways of thinking and feeling, which leave an open place for a growing multitude of individual differences” (Durkheim, 1964:172). In matters involving the moral status and dignity of the individual, though, the conscience collective actually becomes stronger, providing a common frame of reference and an important source of shared values for the members of a society. Nevertheless, this “cult of the individual” is not a surrogate conscience collective; respect for the individual has been increasing steadily throughout Western history and its contemporary manifestation merely accentuates existing values and hence does not compensate collective beliefs for their decline in other areas (Durkheim, 1964:167, 400). Furthermore, although this cult is a product of society, it does not have the group for its object, and thus, for Durkheim, this cult performs functions qualitatively different from those realized by the collective value systems of the past (Durkheim, 1964:172).

IV. Moral relationships in organic solidarity. Durkheim maintains that an advanced social system is “organized,” that is, it is an intricate network of functionally specialized but interdependent parts whose continuity cannot be assured by the re-imposition of the moral conformity typical of the past (Durkheim, 1964:361, 409). Shared values and repressive penal sanctions do not disappear completely, but they play a relatively minor role in the maintenance of solidarity in advanced societies, where the division of labor itself becomes a source of cohesion. As work becomes increasingly specialized, so do individuals become progressively more dependent upon one another for the satisfaction of their needs. Under normal circumstances these relations of reciprocal dependence generate moral bonds which are primarily concerned with the coordination of social functions rather than with the control of individual behavior. This normative order is upheld by a system of cooperative laws with restitutive sanctions which act to ensure continuity and equilibrium (Durkheim, 1964:128).

V. The direction of social evolution. The distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity enables Durkheim to describe social change in terms of an evolutionary development in which one type of social and moral organization is replaced by another as societies increase in volume and density. This transformation engenders diversification and specialization, which in turn lead to the gradual emancipation of the individual from the “double yoke” imposed by the natural environment and the conscience collective (Durkheim, 1964:404). Societies which experience these changes require moral bonds that rest upon principles considerably removed from those governing social relationships in less advanced communities.

Two points emerge from this sketch of Durkheim’s arguments in The Division of Labor. The first is that the intellectual scaffolding of this book is furnished by a set of oppositions—mechanical/organic, repressive/restitutive, segmental/organized—all of which resonate a broader dichotomy between primitive and advanced societies. Secondly, the model of primitive societies fulfills a crucial function by acting as a contrastive device by means of which the salient features of modernity can be illuminated by comparing them with radically different types of social structure. The result is a distinctive theoretical perspective within which specific concepts are defined by their place within the wider system of dualisms. The question that has to be considered now is this: To what extent did Durkheim retain this perspective after 1893?

A complete answer to this question would require an analysis of all of Durkheim’s work produced after the publication of The Division of Labor, a task obviously beyond the scope of this paper (see Gurvitch, 1950). It is necessary, therefore, to confine the analysis to those texts which contain discussions of solidarity in both primitive and modern societies. This condition is fulfilled by the lectures on moral education delivered at the Sorbonne in 1902-3, and the writings on religion produced in the last few years of Durkheim’s life.

In the lectures on moral education Durkheim proclaims his intention of discovering the universal properties of morality (Durkheim, 1973a:21). One such property is the attachment felt by the individual for his group, and in particular, for the society of which he is a member. Such sentiments of group loyalty mean that all societies exhibit a certain degree of moral uniformity, and Durkheim maintains that this homogeneity is an essential prerequisite for social harmony: “Society, in fact, cannot exist except on the condition that all of its members are sufficiently alike—that is to say, only on the condition that they all reflect, in differing degree, the characteristics essential for a given ideal, which is the collective ideal” (Durkheim, 1973a:87-88).

If moral resemblance constitutes a fundamental basis of social order then Durkheim apparently has revised his original theory, which restricted such conformity to pre-modern societies. Indeed, there are suggestions in these lectures that the model of organic solidarity is inadequate: “A society in which there is pacific commerce between its members, in which there is no conflict of any sort, but which has nothing more than that, would have a rather mediocre quality. Society must, in addition, have before it an ideal towards which it reaches” (Durkheim, 1973a: 13). If society lacks an effective coordination of its various functions and “lacks the unity based upon the commitment of men’s wills to a common objective, then it is no more than a pile of sand that the least jolt or the slightest puff will suffice to scatter” (Durkheim, 1973a: 102). In a later essay Durkheim claims: “To see society only as an organized body of vital functions is to diminish it, for this body has a soul which is the composition of collective ideals” (Durkheim, 1974:93).

Durkheim no longer attributes a specifically moral function to the division of labor, which he now considers to be responsible for an atomization which could threaten the continuity of the social order. Diversification is essential for an advanced society whose members should receive an education which equips them for the performance of specialized roles; but in addition they must also be imbued with common sentiments and values in order to prevent this structural differentiation from attaining pathological proportions (Durkheim, 1956:117-23). Durkheim retains his allegiance to the values associated with the cult of the individual (Durkheim, 1974:60; 1915a:22-24; 1915b:427), but they are now elevated to the status of a conscience collective, as the only ones capable of providing a common focus (Durkheim, 1904:261). This cult is far from being vague and indeterminate, as was claimed in the earlier theory, though it differs from the collective value systems of less advanced societies in that a person’s submission to it is rational, based upon a knowledge of its source and functions (Durkheim, 1973a:52). Personal autonomy, then, becomes defined, not in terms of freedom from the conscience collective, but as a rational assent to the obligations imposed by it, in contrast to the blind and unreflective obedience characteristic of the past.

It is this advocacy of a conscience collective for modern societies that usually has been interpreted as evidence of Durkheim’s re-evaluation of the nature of mechanical solidarity. As I argued above, however, the concepts employed in The Division of Labor belong to an integrated th...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Émile Durkheim
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Series Preface
• Introduction: Durkheim on Justice, Morals, and Politics
• PART I SOLIDARITY IN MODERN SOCIETY
• PART II DURKHEIM’S SOCIOLOGY OF MORALS
• PART III JUSTICE IN SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
• PART IV INDIVIDUALISM AS A MODERN VALUE SYSTEM
• PART V POLITICAL THEORY: CITIZENS, SOCIAL GROUPS AND THE STATE
• Index