Comparing Political Corruption and Clientelism

Junichi Kawata

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351949934
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Past modernization literature has assumed that corruption and clientelism reflect a pre-modern social structure and could be referred to as a pathologic phenomenon of the political system. Very few have considered corruption and clientelism as structural products of an interwoven connection between capital accumulation, bureaucratic rationalization, interest intermediation and political participation from below. This volume analyzes key aspects of the debate such as: should corruption and clientelism be evaluated as a 'lubricant' in terms of administrative efficiency - legitimate demands from the margins of society to redress social and economic inequality or to readdress economic development? What would be the effect of strengthening policing to control political corruption? Could electoral reform or a decentralization of government power be a cure for all? These questions among others are answered in this comprehensive volume.

Chapter 1

Political Clientelism and Corruption:
Neo-structuralism and Republicanism

Masaya Kobayashi

Development of the Theories of Political Clientelism

This chapter examines the concept of political corruption focusing on the similarities between political corruption and political clientelism. To start with, let us review the development of the theories of political clientelism.

Today, ‘the traditional relationship between aboss and his subordinates’ (Oyabun-Kobun Kankei in Japanese) suggests an outmoded phenomenon. From a modern point of view, this kind of relationship is thought of as being somewhat feudalistic and old-fashioned. As morals and ethics demand a degree of independence, affiliations of this type often attract criticism. These types of human relationships exist not only in Japan but in various other regions of the world such as in South-east Asia, the Mediterranean area and in South America as well.

As this phenomenon in human relationships became commonly recognizable, it became universally referred to as ‘clientelism’ or ‘patron-client relationship’. At first the concept of clientelism was used in the field of cultural or social anthropology. Then, from the 1970s, it was introduced into the field of comparative politics by researchers working in South-east Asian countries such as the Philippines, and by researchers working in the Mediterranean region, particularly in southern Italy.¹

Along with the spread of the concepts, theoretical explanation appeared instead of simple criticism on moral grounds. ‘Patron-client relationships’ were understood as dyad relationships within a strict hierarchy where resources, as rewards, were mutually exchanged between patrons and clients. It was thought these types of exchanges had loosely existed for a long time and both patrons and clients benefited from them. Also, this situation did not seem too detrimental even from the clients’ point of view because they at least gained a minimum reward for the part they played in it. It appeared that a kind of mutual trust existed between the patrons and their clients based on ‘affection and duty’. In addition, as these kinds of relationships were premodern in nature, it was assumed that they would die out as modernization and economic development advanced. These commonly accepted theories in the 1970s recognized these relationships as being based on mutual exchanges, so these theories on clientelism can be called ‘theories on dyadic exchange relations’.²

Such theories have been criticized since the 1980s. Let us single out some important examples:

1.Firstly, these theories only focus on micro-relationships between the two parties that make up a hierarchy. Therefore, it was pointed out that these theories did not directly deal with macro-relationships in societies as a whole. The characteristics of clientelism in premodern societies, as in feudalistic societies, are different from those in modern societies. However, theories on dyadic exchange relations can neither theorize sufficiently these differences nor explain societies as a whole.

2.Secondly, it was actually assumed that these patron-client exchange relationships within a hierarchy would also involve relationships with authorities. It was argued that the upshot was, in fact, that these relationships did become detrimental to the clients. For instance, in the landlord-farmer relationship, it can actually be said that the farmers are exploited by the landlords. It was also pointed out that relationships with ‘human feelings’ only existed in the ‘Myth of Patronage’ (Silverman, 1977). Theories on dyadic exchange relations were criticized because clientelism was being dealt with in a halfhearted manner. Stricter criticism of clientelism was considered necessary.

3.Thirdly, examples were taken from regions of the world such as Japan and Italy to develop these theories. However, clientelism, it was pointed out, would never be eliminated in these regions. It would persist, changing into newer forms, in spite of the development of economic modernization.

The Structuralist Theory of Clientelism

Originally, even in theories on dyadic exchange relationships, the following issues could be observed:

As the persuasive influence of nationalism penetrated local areas, parliamentary systems and political parties, traditional examples of clientelism as observed in the relationship between landlords and farmers, developed into neo-clientelism. A typical example of this is the type of clientelism where political parties, and the politicians within those parties, become the patrons and the local electorates become the clients. This is observed when the former brings public enterprises, such as the construction of railroads, and so on, along with various kinds of subsidies, to groups of their supporters in local areas and interest groups by applying political pressure to influence the government or key bureaucrats. When the former is supported by the latter in this way, clientelism is formed.

Theories on dyadic exchange relations contend that, by and large, clientelistic type relationships, despite a change of form from traditional to neo-clientelism, would experience a decline over time as a result of modernization. But it has been proved that this inference was not necessarily accurate.

So taking these criticisms into consideration, the celebrated sociologists, S. N. Eisenstadt and L. Roniger (1984), employed the concept of a ‘generalized exchange’, which had previously been introduced by the cultural anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1971), in their own way and went on to give a comprehensive explanation of the ‘clientelistic mode of generalized exchange’. Using this theory, they also explained macro-clientelistic societies, as well as micro-clientelistic behavior between two parties. In addition, they presented theories on the dynamics of relationships and explained from a cultural perspective that clientelism still existed in spite of society’s ‘modernization’. In this way their theory introducing the concept ‘generalized exchange’ overcomes the limitations in the former theories on dyadic exchange relationships and, therefore, their approach is very meaningful: while the former theories on dyadic exchange relations can be characterized as ‘atomistic exchange theories’, the latter theory on ‘generalized exchange’ can be seen as a ‘holistic exchange theory’.

In my view, it is necessary to further develop the latter theory by presenting questions about their way of using the concept of ‘generalized exchange’: the solution is implementing this concept by tracing it back to the original in Lévi-Strauss’ structuralism. In The Elementary Structure of Kinship by Lévi-Strauss (1971), the concept of a generalized exchange was originally represented in a relationship between more than two parties. There existed forms of cyclic exchange in these relationships in the sense that resources flowed in a fixed direction, returning to the beginning (A→B→C→……→A→…).On the other hand, a long-term and mutually rewarding relationship based on faith between two parties is called a ‘limited exchange’. In these terms, clientelism is the long-term exchange between two parties. Therefore, it is a kind of ‘limited exchange’, not a ‘generalized exchange’. So, clientelism should be explained by the concept of a limited exchange rather than a generalized exchange as presented by Eisenstadt and Roniger.

Lévi-Strauss basically deals with relationships between or among equal partners. So, with this in mind, it can be argued that the terms he uses, ‘generalized exchange/ limited exchange’, can be modified to ‘horizontal generalized exchange/horizontal limited exchange’. On one hand, clientelism can be defined as a ‘vertical limited exchange’. On the other hand, politics in itself corresponds to a ‘vertical generalized exchange’. The centers of power accumulate resources by way of taxation, actualize public benefits for the public good and return those benefits to the citizens. This is the role of, as it were, ‘innate politics’, and this can be understood as a ‘vertical generalized exchange’.

This theory on clientelism could be termed a ‘structuralist theory of clientelism’. Observed from this perspective, the clientelism phenomenon exists as a type of ‘deep structure’ that is universal to the human mind. So, even though, superficially, the structure of a society changes through modernization, unless the mental spiritual structure of the people living in a certain region also changes, clientelism will regenerate, wrapped in a new guise.

Clientelism and the Relation between Public and Private

Why is clientelism generally thought of as a negative phenomenon? Let us deal with this question in a simple way. Clientelism is considered negative because its intention is to generate ‘private’ revenue for patrons and clients and, as a result, obstructs ‘public’ revenue for members of the general community who are not a part of the patron-client arrangement.

In terms of public philosophy, the presumed purpose of ‘innate politics’ is to actualize ‘public good’ or ‘publicness’ for people within the community at large. The power of the national government is referred to as kou kennryoku (official or governmental power) in Japan. As a matter of fact, national governmental power is sometimes also characterized as koukyou, which means ‘public (and common)’ in Japanese. However, here, let us make a theoretical distinction between ‘official’ or ‘governmental’ (kou) from ‘public’ (koukyou) (Yamawaki, 2004). I will basically employ the word ‘official’ to mean ‘official governmental matters’, and use ‘public’ to mean ‘public affairs’ concerning the general public. Yet, there are cases where it is desirable to use the word ‘public’ for both meanings and, in these cases, these two can be expressed as ‘official public’ and ‘public common’ repectively: koukyou (public) in Japanese can be translated as ‘public (kou) common (kyou)’.

Then, the purpose of ‘innate politics’ is that ‘official’ power should be used for the ‘public (common)’. In other words, ‘official’ power should actualize ‘public interests’ or ‘public good’. But clientelism is formed by mutual gains between patrons and clients. So if clientelistic relationships influence politics, benefits for those who are outside of these relationships tend to be neglected. People involved in clientelistic relationships are just one segment of the general population and the benefits for these people are turned into ‘private’ benefits in terms of ‘public interests’ for all citizens. When clientelistic relationships affect the execution of authority, you have ‘private’ interests influencing the execution of ‘official’ authority and this harms the ‘public interest’.

In structuralist terms, it can be said that ‘innate politics’ aims at a generalized exchange in vertical relationships: it concentrates resources such as citizens’ taxes under the auspices of official authority and brings about general ‘public’ benefits by using these resources for ordinary citizens. On the other hand, clientelism is a vertical and limited relationship in that it is limited to just two parties. Therefore, exercising authority associated with this kind of relationship has the effect of interfering with generalized exchanges.

Does ‘good clientelism’ not exist? In some cases, clientelistic relationships create mutual gains for the subjects involved. Also, in some cases, for example feudalistic societies in which clientelistic relationships are considered central and appropriate, clientelistic relationships are not necessarily to be considered as negative phenomena. In addition, in primitive societies which cannot be formed by any other means, social relationships develop through clientelism because clients gain minimal advantages in so much as there are mutual rewards whereas there are no such rewards in naked domination-subordination relationships.

However, there are actually abundant examples of ‘bad clientelism’ in developed societies today. Firstly, where standards and systems are formed by the development of societies in which ‘official’ powers should be publicly exercised, it contradicts the common good within the realm of ‘public relations’ to prioritize clientelistic relationships between two parties. Secondly, within the structure of clientelism there is an actual risk, as mentioned above, that patrons may oppress and exploit clients. Thirdly, there is the danger that clients have the possibility of being caught, as it were, in ‘the trap of paternalism’, possibly resulting in a loss of their autonomy.

The problems of clientelism appear objectively as distortions and injustices in the ‘flow of resources’. With regard to the second point mentioned above referring to issues within clientelism, if we compare ‘gains’ and ‘supply’ for both patrons and clients, three types can be distinguished: ‘benefits/balances/exploitation’ for the clients. On the first point mentioned above relating to ‘public benefits’, official funds which should be used for the public’s benefit are ‘privately’ used under the pretext of ‘public’ enterprises and the like, resulting in clientelistic profit-taking. As a consequence of this, the distribution of resources is distorted and financial burdens and tax increases are brought into play: situations deteriorate financially.

The third point concerning the interference with the clients’ autonomy is rather more of a moral issue. Clientelism entails moral problems because it impels dependent relationships to remain incessant. However, even if the moral problem is disregarded, clientelism is a phenomenon which should be impartially denied or improved upon in terms of revenues and the distribution of resources.

Development of Theories of Political Corruption

Basically, the concept of political corruption conveys a greater sense of criticism from a moral point of view than does the concept of political clientelism. So, at the outset, critical discussions became centered on moral issues.

Then, just as in the case of clientelism, how to define this corruption was the next issue to be discussed. In a collection of important articles on political corruption, the editors Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) first state that the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) divides the definition of corruption into three categories as follows: (1) ‘Physical’ (physical corruption); (2) ‘Moral’ (political and moral corruption); and (3) ‘The pervasion of anything from an original state of purity’ (causing impurity). They point out the following: when people like Aristotle and Montesquieu regarded tyranny as imperial corruption, they meant corruption as defined in the third definition (impurity), while today’s political corruption is equivalent to the second definition (political or moral).

The editors introduced three social-scientific definitions:³

1.Firstly, political corruption is defined as ‘public office-centered’. Some theorists look on political corruption as an offence against the obliga...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• 1 Political Clientelism and Corruption: Neo-structuralism and Republicanism
• 2 A Typology of Corrupt Networks
• 3 Political Corruption and Reform in Democracies: Theoretical Perspectives
• 4 Anti-fraud Politics in the European Union: Multi-level Disjuncture of Legitimacy and Effectiveness
• 5 Internal Party Organization in the Italian Christian Democrats and Japanese Liberal Democrats: Factional Competition for Office, Clienteles, and Corrupt Exchange
• 6 The End of the Conservative/Reformist Era and the Emergence of Corruption Politics
• 7 Mafa, Corrupted Violence and Incivism
• 8 The Long Life of Clientelism in Southern Italy
• 9 The Development of Political Clientelism in 20th-century France: Party Networks and Patterns of ‘Voter Loyalization’
• 10 Clientelism’s Electoral Connection and its Policy Effects: Comparison between Korea and Japan
• Index