The G8, the United Nations, and Conflict Prevention

Radoslava N. Stefanova, John J. Kirton

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351889032
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This innovative and forward looking work examines the Genoa summit agenda with a view to strengthening international conflict prevention institutions and identifying and analyzing economic early warning indicators. It devotes particular attention to the Italian contribution and approach and the ways in which it can be effectively implemented following the summit. The first book to compare the role of the G8 and the United Nations in conflict prevention and human security, The G8, the United Nations, and Conflict Prevention will be essential reading for academics, government officials and members of the business and media communities.

Chapter 1
Introduction: The G8's Role in Global Conflict Prevention

John J. Kirton and Radoslava N. Stefanova

The Challenge of Conflict Prevention

There are few challenges of global governance as compelling, as complex, and as challenging as that of conflict prevention. Since the relatively peaceful end of the cold war, the world has witnessed a proliferation of violent, destructive, and deadly conflict, largely taking place within the once safe confines of the territorial state, and claiming innocent civilians, women, and children as the primary victims (Hampson 2002; Zartman 1995; Gurr 1990, 1993). The global community's failure to prevent deadly conflict has had a horrific cost in human lives. Post-cold war violent conflict has created five million casualties, of whom 95 percent are civilians (Development Assistance Committee [DAC] 2002, 135-151). But the catastrophic legacy extends far beyond. Millions are damaged and scarred and suffer for generations, uprooted from their homes, deprived of their livelihood, social security, community, and families, and left to live in constant fear. The natural as well as the social environments are damaged, often in ways that overwhelm the resources available to cope and the progress already made in sustainable development. Most broadly, the failure of the global community to prevent violent conflict destroys the reality of economic and human development — and any prospects for such development — for countless millions, nowhere more so than among the poorest people of the world. Even before the deadly decade of the 1990s ended with the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the costs to the broader international community, beyond those countries directly at war, were estimated at about US$200 billion (Brown and Rosecrance 1999). Three quarters of this sum could have been saved and devoted to other essential human purposes had effective preventive measures been mounted in time.

For some countries and regions, the toll has been enormous, assaulting and devastating the most basic of their national interests, common values, and citizens' lives, chances, and hopes. As the war-drenched twentieth century ended, 20 of the 38 poorest countries were in conflict. From 1980 to 1994, 10 of the 24 most war-afflicted countries were in Africa alone. In its 1994 genocide, tiny Rwanda suffered an estimated 800 000 killed, 1.5 million internally displaced, and another 800 000 made international refugees (DAC 2002, 135). The 1999 conflict in Kosovo, the erosion of security in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2000-01, and the ongoing civil war in Chechnya provide haunting reminders that the plague affects not just developing countries, but also affects areas geographically close or adjacent to Western Europe, posing concrete threats to its security.

Although members of the international community have mobilised to alleviate and reverse the devastating effects of violent conflict, the amount and level of violence have far outstripped what committed individuals, civil society organisations, and individual countries have been able to deliver. At the regional level in Europe, in 2001 the European Commission approved a formal communication calling for mainstreaming conflict prevention in its development assistance policies, and for establishing supportive regional integration and links among trade and co-operation (European Commission 2001). At Goteburg in June 2001, the European Council unveiled the European Union's Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. It contained commitments for giving political priority to preventive action, enhancing early warning and policy coherence, developing instruments for short- and long-term prevention, and creating effective partnerships to this end. In October 2001, a seminar held under EU auspices explored the instruments of co-operation available to the EU for conflict prevention. Elsewhere, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU), and other regional organisations have also taken up the task.

On a plurilateral plane, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had begun work more than half a decade earlier. Its Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has been concerned since 1995 with development co-operation in conflict situations. In 1997, the DAC's High Level Meeting approved a policy document entitled 'Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century'. Its framework helped raise international awareness about how development co-operation could prevent conflict and support peacebuilding. The DAC shifted its focus to preventing conflict through development co-operation in situations marked by poor co-ordination and bad governance, in part through workshops and commissioned work in 2001. In 2001, the DAC (2001) approved a new policy document, 'Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners'. It also converted its Task Force on Conflict, Peace, and Development Co-operation, created in 1995, into a network encouraging members to mainstream conflict prevention into their policies (DAC 2002).

Within the broadly multilateral United Nations system, serious work at the centre began with the publication of the Brahimi report in 2000 (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000). The Security Council's discussion of the role of the UN in conflict prevention then followed in 2000 and the Secretary General released a comprehensive report on the prevention of armed conflict in 2001 (United Nations 2001). The latter affirmed the need to move from the prevailing 'culture of reaction' to a new 'culture of prevention'. In keeping with the OECD's work, it called for 'structural prevention' aimed at the roots of conflict, addressing the close relationship between sustainable development and conflict prevention, and greater co-operation between international organisations on the one hand and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civil society, and private sector firms on the other.

It is hardly surprising that the international community has looked in the first instance to these long-established, well-endowed, 'hard law' organisations, with their formal mandates, massive bureaucracies, and operational programmes to cope with the emerging conflict prevention challenge (Goldstein et al. 2000). But their late start, limited resources and expertise, particular legal mandate, sacrosanct rules and procedures, and organisational culture have rendered their efforts inadequate against a problem that proliferated as the twentieth century came to an ever more violent close. It was in this context that another plurilateral institution, the informal, 'soft law' major market democracies of the G7 and G8 (with Russia) increasingly became involved in the contemporary cause of conflict prevention.

The G8 and Conflict Prevention

In the broadest sense, conflict prevention has been a concern of the G7 since its inaugural 1975 Summit at Rambouillet, France (Kirton 1993). Here the leaders publicly declared in their concluding communique that the new institution's central mission was to promote globally the values of open democracy, individual liberty, and social advancement. It further noted that the G7 was actively seeking to manage tensions across the long frozen, East-West, cold war divide. But it was only amid the proliferating disasters of the rapidly globalising, post-cold war world that the G7 and soon the G8 began to focus directly on conflict prevention in its modern sense. This modern conception of conflict prevention goes well beyond earlier efforts at deterrence, compellence, defence, crisis management, and military peacekeeping, truce observation, mediatory diplomacy, and good offices once conflict has erupted, or is on the verge of erupting and spreading (Larus 1965). Rather, it seeks to halt the outbreak of violent conflict at all.

Conflict prevention, in its contemporary sense, can thus be defined as short- and long-term engagement to stop, before it starts, the emergence, outbreak, or spread of any collective violence and the activities that precipitate such violence. It aims not merely to contain conflicts but also to transform those contentious issues in order to eliminate the outbreak of violence and move toward processes that foster co-operation rather than conflict among groups within or across national borders. Clearly, timing is a key component of this working definition, as it distinguishes conflict prevention from other forms of conflict management. It also indicates a particular opportunity when a proactive policy (in the form of intervention or negotiation or other action) is most appropriate to undertake in view of the desired objective (Zartman 1990). Finally, and most importantly, conflict prevention implies a conscious normative commitment, one fundamentally axiological in nature, with an underlying assumption of an a priori rejection of violence. In philosophical terms, this approach is the antithesis of Aran's consideration of violence as a legitimate means for regulating political conflict (Aron 1966).

With the collapse of the cold war and of so many closed communist regimes around the world, the need for conflict prevention proliferated. It has become a permanent feature and priority challenge of global governance in the new era. During the early 1990s, the G7 had presciently kept a watching eye on brewing but often overlooked conflicts such as the one in Kosovo; it had warned of the consequences if the disputing parties were to move toward violent efforts to enforce their demands and pointed to the UN's central role in preventive diplomacy. The transition from such efforts to prevent conflict in individual instances through traditional techniques of statecraft to the identification of conflict prevention as a self-contained, general subject in its own right and requiring new instruments and interventions began at the 1993 Tokyo Summit. Inspired in part by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 'Agenda for Peace', the G7 leaders first referred directly to conflict prevention and highlighted the importance of strengthening the UN's capacity for preventive diplomacy' (United Nations 1992). Naples 1994 repeated this call and the accompanying consensus on the central role of the UN.

At Halifax in 1995, the G7 leaders assumed the responsibility for conflict prevention themselves. They asked the basic question of whether the existing array of international institutions was adequate to meet the new needs of the approaching twenty-first century. After their broad review and as part of their conclusions, they collectively called on the UN to act more quickly, and on the G7 countries to co-ordinate more closely, in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. To assist them in their new conflict prevention vocation, the G7 leaders affirmed the need for the early warning of crises, the early field entry of international personnel, the role of regional organisations, and improved analysis of conflict-related early warning information with respect to human rights and refugees. They also called for development assistance focussed on those with 'a demonstrated capacity and commitment to use [it] effectively', while taking into account trends in 'military and other unproductive spending' (G7 1995).

From this foundation, the G7 moved ever more expansively during its subsequent seven-year summit hosting cycle to commit to the cause of conflict prevention on a global scale. At Lyon in 1996, G7 leaders concentrated on the process and consequences of globalisation, and included conflict prevention as part of this new problèmatique. The chairman's statement that served as the Summit's Political Declaration boldly declared that 'we emphasize the importance of promoting conditions conducive to peace as the surest means to prevent conflict' (G7 1996). It proceeded to single out democracy, human rights and good governance, limits on unproductive and excessive military expenditure, the need for a comprehensive approach that included police training, the importance of action against landmines and conventional weapons harming children, and the use of flexible instruments, including the role of regional organisations. The G7's first-generation agenda for conflict prevention was thus clear. But despite this promising foundation, the constraints on G7 thinking and action were still severe, for the 1996 statement underscored the primary role of the United Nations, the ultimate right of self-defence, action in the post-conflict phase, and instruments such as mediation by the UN and senior diplomats.

The following year, at the Denver 'Summit of the Eight' in 1997, conflict prevention became a priority and acquired an African emphasis. The leaders opened their final communiqué with the words, 'We have agreed to work closely with all willing partners in fostering global partnership for peace, security, and sustainable development that includes strengthening democracy, and human rights, and helping prevent and resolve conflicts' (G8 1997). They noted the need to mobilise a broad assortment of actors to prevent conflict, and recognised the 1997 DAC policy guidelines. Yet they continued to emphasise the key role of the UN in conflict prevention, including through early warning and rapid reaction. They also applauded 'African leadership in developing effective local capacities in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconciliation and recovery'. Birmingham in 1998 was much the same. The communique emphasised the need to 'strengthen Africa's ability to prevent and ease conflict, as highlighted in the UN Secretary General's recent report', and support for Africa-based institutions in this regard (G8 1998).

The following year, 1999, marked a major breakthrough. The Cologne Summit constituted the 'big bang' beginning of the G8's concentrated, comprehensive, coherent work on conflict prevention. In the lead-up to Cologne, inspired by their success in helping bring an end to the conflict in Kosovo, the G8 foreign ministers called for innovation in conflict prevention, especially in regard to long-range democratic institution building (Hampson 2002). Their leaders endorsed the call. G8 foreign ministers held their first ever theme-specific meeting in Berlin in December 1999 on the subject of conflict prevention. Here they asked their political directors — in the new Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting (CPOM) — to translate the general Cologne consensus and agenda on conflict prevention into specific initiatives for approval and action by the leaders at the G8 Okinawa Summit the following year (Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2001). At Okinawa, the leaders delivered, both on conflict prevention and on the tightly related but broader cause of promoting human security (Kirton and Takase 2002; Lamy 2002). The Genoa G8 Summit in 2001 again expanded the field of vision and action (Fratianni, Savona, and Kirton 2002). The Canadian-hosted 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, the first held after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on North America, was preoccupied with the need to respond to the new crisis of terrorism. But it also succeeded in advancing the conflict prevention cause in Africa, Afghanistan, and on a broader front (Fratianni, Savona, and Kirton 2003). The 2003 Evian Summit continued the trend.

After several years of increasing activity and concentrated emphasis, it is important to ask how effective the G8's conflict prevention efforts have been. Why have they succeeded and failed? And what can and should the G8 do in the years ahead? Amid the voluminous literature on conflict prevention in the scholarly and policy communities, there is a rich debate about how the global community has acted on conflict prevention, how and why prevention can flourish, and what roles a variety of international organisations can play in this task (Burton 1990; Cross 1998; George and Holl 1997; McRae and Hubert 2001; Rothman 1992; Shiels 1991; Wallensteen 1991). But this literature largely remains confined to assessing how to make the United Nations work better, perhaps with a little help from regional organisations, ad hoc coalitions of the willing, or individual states (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001). Virtually none of it has identified or critically evaluated the G8's actual or potential place in the conflict prevention process, even though this subject has long been a central part of the G7/8's agenda and a core component of its mission since the start. This volume takes up that outstanding task.

The Purpose and Approach

This book has three central purposes. The first is to assess critically how the G8 has dealt with the rapidly globalising post-cold war world's agenda for conflict prevention, during the G8's fourth seven-year cycle from the Lyon Summit in 1996 through to Kananaskis in 2002 and the launch of a new cycle at Evian in 2003. The second is to consider how well the G8 has converged, combined, or competed with other international actors and institutions, above all the UN, to meet this global governance challenge, and how the G8's performance compares with that of its colleagues and competitors in the cause. The third is to identify why the G8 has been effective, and on this basis how it can best serve the global community as it moves through its fifth cycle of summitry, which started in 2003. In short, this book asks what role the G8 plays, what is its relationship with the UN and other international institutions and actors, and how can each work best, alone or together, in the years ahead.

To meet these objectives, this volume combines the contributions of leading experts from most of the G8 countries, and from — or closely associated with — the major international organisations active in the field. It draws heavily from Canadian and European experts, in recognition of the leading role these countries and regio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Figures
• List of Contributors
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction: The G8's Role in Global Conflict Prevention
• PART I: THE PLACE, ROLE, AND POTENTIAL OF THE G8 IN CONFLICT PREVENTION
• PART II: CONFLICT PREVENTION: THE POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORN
• PART III: THE SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSION
• PART IV: CONCLUSION
• ANALYTICAL APPENDICES
• DOCUMENTARY APPENDICES
• Bibliography
• Index