Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia

Conflict and Cooperation in the Making of Regional Order

Liselotte Odgaard

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351919814
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Arguing that security relations between China and Southeast Asia are profoundly affected by disputes over maritime space and territory in the South China Sea, the author demonstrates that the primacy of strategic competition over strategic partnerships promotes the emergence of a structure of deterrence, encouraging South East Asia to side with the United States to balance the military power of China. Combining the concepts of international disputes and order, the book establishes a framework designed to focus on periods of transition where international regulatory mechanisms are out of step with developments in the security environments of states. Features include: - Substantial evidence that strategic competition between the United States, China and South East Asia promotes stability. - A comprehensive account of military, diplomatic, economic, historical and legal aspects of security environments of states. Suitable for scholars and graduate students of international relations, international law, security studies, conflict management and regionalism, it will also be invaluable supplementary reading for undergraduate courses.

Chapter 1

Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia

The large area north-westward of the recommended track … is known to abound with dangers. No systematic surveys have been carried out and the existence of unchartered patches of coral and shoals is likely; the positions of the charted banks and shoals cannot be relied upon. Vessels are warned not to attempt to pass this area (B[ritish] A[dmiralty] 967, quoted in Hancox and Prescott, 1995: 43).

[I]n every element of conflict there is always an opportunity for co-operation (Djalal, 1997: 276).

The description by the British Admiralty of Dangerous Ground, a term often applied to the area in which the Spratly island-atoll is situated, highlights the uncertainty surrounding the physical geography of the area. Such uncertainty as to what may lie in waiting also characterizes the dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei over this collection of ragged features and ocean. The rivalling states seem to oscillate between strategies of occupation and dialogue. This pattern of behaviour reinforces the current unpredictability and insecurity of the regional environment in the South China Sea. However, the intractability of the dispute also compels the states to formulate alternative instruments that will keep the dispute from leading to security threats. This combination of insecurity and innovation in the Spratly dispute reflects the central issues of security and order faced by the states in the region at the beginning of the new millennium. This book attempts to investigate this topic.

The book argues that the Spratly dispute reveals Chinese security practices in confrontation with those of Southeast Asia, and on that basis a framework for a security order for the South China Sea is now unfolding. This order arises from the complex disagreements over sovereignty and boundaries in the Spratly dispute, highlighting fundamental choices as regards the bases of Chinese and Southeast Asian security practices. Strategically, the Spratly dispute presents the states with the choice of either pursuing national security without regard for the interests of other states, or of attempting to accommodate their security strategies to the other parties involved. Organizationally, the states can choose between pursuing bilateral relationships, which support a fragmented security environment, or establishing a common framework of decision-making. Morally, they must choose between pursuing unilateral concepts of justice, or establishing common requirements and rules of behaviour.

When the Cold War ended, many of the distortions in China’s relations with Southeast Asia were removed. Chinese-backed communist insurgencies, the overseas Chinese problem, the anomalous relations between China and Indonesia, and the Cold War between China and Vietnam are now largely historical issues (Chin Kin Wah, 1993: 16), and these barriers towards a closer relationship between China and Southeast Asia have been replaced by a gradual rapprochement, as witnessed by the Chinese contribution to the Cambodian conflict resolution process and the common interests of the two parties in resisting Western human rights pressures. However, China has also emerged as a growing security concern for Southeast Asia as it proceeds with plans to build a blue-water navy and changes its security focus from a northbound continental perspective to a southbound maritime perspective.

The Spratly dispute reflects and affects the evolving patterns of state interaction generated by the meeting of the security practices of China and Southeast Asia. By virtue of its role as an arena for displaying and testing the viability of these security practices, it forms the basis of an emerging order for the South China Sea. Djalal gives us an idea of what the outcome of this transformation process might be by pointing out that where there is conflict, cooperation always presents itself as an option. In other words, potential flash points are also windows of opportunity for establishing fruitful inter-state relations, which serve to maintain peace and stability among the states involved.

The fundamental proposition of this book is that through the insecurity engendered by the Spratly dispute, an order is emerging in the South China Sea region that combines a structure of deterrence with a mutual commitment to protect regional peace and stability by means of limited cooperation and common rules of right and wrong state conduct. The future of the region is not so much a question of either-or where the states are presented with a choice between chaos and integration (Almonté, 1995: 47). Rather, the argument of this book is that both paths are possible, in that the elements of order that lie between the extremes of pure national interest based policy and a highly institutionalized multilateral security community are emerging. The claim is that the order in the making evolves out of the complex disagreement over sovereignty and boundaries embodied in the Spratly dispute.

The Spratly dispute is at the junction between the Chinese and Southeast Asian regional environments for three reasons. First, China and Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei are directly involved in the dispute because of their rival claims in the area. Second, the seas surrounding the Spratlys contain large fish resources as well as unknown quantities of hydrocarbon resources. In addition, some of the world’s strategically and commercially most important sea-lanes go through the South China Sea. Consequently, all of the Eastern Asian region and external powers such as the US are concerned about the development of the dispute. Third, maritime disputes are a central security theme for both China and Southeast Asia, as their neighbourhood abounds with disputes that resemble the Spratly dispute.¹

The Spratly dispute differs from other maritime disputes in the South China Sea region because it involves Chinese and Southeast Asian traditions of state interaction. One consequence is that a framework for a new security order combining the traditions of these entities is emerging, where no conscious efforts to establish concrete mechanisms of order existed before. It is thus argued here that the Spratly dispute becomes a catalyst for initiating fundamental changes in existing patterns of state interaction. This argument is supported by a series of empirical developments prior to and after the Cold War. The following incidents are cases in point.

In May 1992, China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation and Crestone Energy Corporation, a US company, signed an agreement to explore for oil in what Vietnam considers to be waters within its jurisdiction. In July 1992, Chinese troops planted a territorial marker on Vanguard Reef in the Spratlys, where exploration for oil was intended to take place. In response, Vietnam accused China of having seriously violated Vietnamese territorial sovereignty. Later that month, Vietnam signed the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as a first step towards becoming a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Three weeks later, at the annual ASEAN Conference of Foreign Ministers to which China and Russia were invited as guests, ASEAN stated an opinion on the Spratly dispute. Called the Declaration on the South China Sea, it urges the parties to the dispute to resolve by peaceful means all issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction pertaining to the South China Sea. It further calls upon the parties to exercise restraint with a view to creating a positive climate for future resolution of all disputes, and to explore possibilities for cooperation in the South China Sea. As opposed to Vietnam, China refused to accept this multilateral attempt at establishing a code of conduct for the South China Sea. The Crestone incident shows that China represents a tradition that keeps international regulation to a minimum. By contrast, the Southeast Asian parties to the Spratly dispute recognize their common interests in consultation, coordination and definitions of acceptable behaviour.

In January 1995, China detained thirty-five Filipino fishermen for a week in the Philippine-claimed sector of the Spratlys. In February 1995, China seized control of a disputed territory from a non-communist Southeast Asian state when it occupied Mischief Reef, which is claimed by the Philippines. The Philippine government responded by sending a squadron of five fighter planes and a patrol boat to survey the reef and called for US military assistance, but the US administration declared that the Philippine-US agreement on military cooperation did not cover areas in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines. The Philippines then turned to the other members of ASEAN and Japan to elicit their sympathy and support. In March 1995, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a statement on developments in the South China Sea, in which they expressed their serious concern over recent developments affecting peace and stability, urging all concerned parties to resolve their differences by peaceful means and to refrain from taking actions that destabilize the situation. Specifically, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers called for an early resolution of the problems caused by the developments on Mischief Reef. After the incident, the Philippine Senate passed a long-awaited bill to modernize the armed forces. The bill appropriated $2 billion over five years, on condition of annual approval by the legislature. In August 1995, China and the Philippines agreed on a code of conduct in which they rejected the use of force to settle disputes, and obliging the two states to apply international law for conflict resolution. They also agreed to set up expert panels to discuss the legal bases of their claims and to promote cooperation in meteorology, navigational safety, piracy prevention and research into and protection of the marine environment. The Mischief Reef incident shows how the Spratly dispute becomes an arena for a contest between patterns of interaction representing elements of order based on national interest and more cooperative elements of order.

The incidents described above indicate that a new order is emerging at the junction between China and Southeast Asia. It may evolve into an order uniting Chinese and Southeast Asian practices of state interaction between the two extremes of national interests and community dynamics. Rather than the pronounced inequalities and threat-based behaviour engendered by an order based on deterrence alone, behaviour based on consultation and coordination appears to be a central feature of the emerging order. In comparison with institutionalized policy responses to security issues produced by a community-based order, cooperation remains limited to noncontroversial areas. These characteristics of inter-state relations in the post-Cold War South China Sea region provide the background for understanding the changes in regional order as a reconstruction process. This process may be described as a departure from an environment where no inter-state order pertaining specifically to the South China Sea states existed, to an environment where an order governing the relations between the littoral states is emerging.

Issues and Problems between China and Southeast Asia

This book proposes that the Spratly dispute may serve as a nexus for developing a working order for the South China Sea. It is claimed that the Spratly dispute is not only a symptom of the problems of regional order. It also becomes a determining factor in compelling the South China Sea littoral states to redesign the mechanisms of order to manage the security relations of China and Southeast Asia. There are two inherent questions in this proposition:

• Is the Spratly dispute a crucial case which poses challenges to the practices of state interaction adhered to by China and Southeast Asia?

• How do the challenges posed by the Spratly dispute to existing practices of state interaction affect regional order?

Answering these questions requires a theoretical framework, which embodies concepts for understanding the nature of international disputes and international order. The theoretical framework applied in this book is the English school, motivated by the shortcomings of the existing debates over the Spratly dispute and the international politics of the Asia-Pacific.

The debate over the Spratly dispute and its consequences for security in the South China Sea generally follows three lines of argument. First, one central question that appears in the debate is if the Spratly dispute may lead to war between the contending states, or if it is, alternatively, a peripheral dispute? For example, one of Marwyn S. Samuels’ purposes is to point to the possibility that the Spratly dispute may end in open warfare (Samuels, 1982). Similarly, Ramses Amer writes that an important motivating factor behind his analysis of the Spratly dispute is the potential for violent conflict (Amer, 1996: 2). Chang Pao-Min concludes that war clouds will remain over the Spratly dispute and at a minimum lead to recurring naval skirmishes without any prospects for a resolution to the dispute appearing on the horizon (Chang Pao-Min, 1990: 37). Based on an analysis of Chinese Spratly policy, Chen Jie concludes that Chinese assertiveness has reinforced the tendency towards rearmament in Southeast Asia and boosted regional unity against China. Chen Jie thus places himself in the category of researchers who conclude that regional peace and stability is jeopardized by the Spratly dispute (Chen Jie, 1994: 902). Alan Collins points out that after the Cold War, a security dilemma determines the relationship between China and Southeast Asia (Collins, 2000). According to Collins, the suspicion and fear created by the security dilemma will continue to bedevil the relations of regional actors, inhibiting the development of a stable regional order between China and Southeast Asia. Lim Joo-Jock analyzes the effects of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship on the regional balance in the South China Sea during the Cold War. His estimate of the prospects for a modus vivendi in terms of the strategic balance in the region is positive. Consequently, he expects that the South China Sea will become increasingly important to the littoral states, without this increased attention necessarily resulting in warfare (Lim Joo-Jock, 1979). Lee Lai To subscribes to the view that China does not intend to bring about deterioration in its relations with the ASEAN states by causing an escalation of the Spratly dispute. Hence, he does not believe that the Spratly issue will result in warfare (Lee Lai To, 1999: 142; 1990).

Second, another central question in the debate is whether the instruments of conflict management used in the Spratly dispute are suited for resolving it, or if, alternatively, they just serve to prolong it? For example, Mark J. Valencia has argued for providing solutions that may serve to eliminate or minimize the dispute (Valencia, 1995). Lee Lai To gives a guardedly positive estimate of the attempts at conflict management taking place in the South China Sea, saying that the initiatives are still in their infancy and therefore cannot be expected to have produced much in the way of substantial results yet. However, given the resistance against formalization and the great number of interests involved in the process, it is definitely an achievement that technical working groups charged with constructing proposals for resolving common problems in the area have been established, and that concrete confidence-building measures have been discussed (Lee Lai To, 1998). B.A. Hamzah takes the view that the policy of engaging China undertaken by the ASEAN member states is necessary if confidence is to be restored amongst the littoral states of the South China Sea (Hamzah, 1997). In view of his role as initiator of the workshop process on managing potential conflicts in the South China Sea, Hasjim Djalal is similarly positive concerning the gains made through these efforts. He states that the informal dialogue on South China Sea problems has achieved quite a lot by devising cooperative efforts between the littoral states (Djalal, 1997: 285). In contrast, Dewi Fortuna Anwar sees the efforts of creating dialogue and cooperation in the South China Sea as having produced more talk than effective action and constraints on threatening behaviour (Anwar, 2.11.1998). Tim Huxley argues that China has only superficially acquiesced in the dialogue on the South China Sea issues initiated by the ASEAN members (Huxley, 1998). Classifying the situation in the South China Sea as one of stalemate, Michael Leifer points to the limitations of dialogue as an instrument of regional security, as evidenced by the Chinese seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995. He therefore concludes that there is a lack of political will to address the complex contention taking place in the South China Sea by establishing regional machinery designed to promote dispute settlement (Leifer, 1999a; 1999b: 32).

The third central question in the debate on the Spratly dispute is whether stated claims correspond to legitimate principles of international law, or whether the claims are in violation of these principles. Austin, for example, argues that Chinese behaviour with respect to jurisdiction over maritime resources has been consistent with international law (Austin, 1998). Choonho Park’s analysis, which focuses on the competing Chinese and Vietnamese claims to the Spratlys, agrees with Austin’s analysis, in that he sees the Chinese arguments as constituting a stronger claim to the Spratlys compared to Vietnamese claims (Park, 1983: 197). Daniel J. Dzurek takes the view that all claims are poor, but that Taiwanese, Chinese and Vietnamese claims fare better under international law than those presented by the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei (Dzurek, 1996). Harry L. Roque Jr. argues that the alleged historical title to the Spratlys claimed by China is inherently weak. Hence, it is uncertain if China can present the most superior claim to the Spratlys (Roque Jr., 1997). Lee G. Cordner argues that the historic sovereignty claims presented by China, Taiwan and Vietnam are incomplete, intermittent and unconvincing. The remainder of the arguments put forward in the Spratly dispute, however, contain flaws which are potentially equally invalidating (Cordner, 1994). Jonathan I. Chamey points out that the history and geography of the Chinese claim to the South China Sea does not appear to be capable of sustaining a historic bay claim. Moreover, this type of claim is no longer used in modem international law (Chamey, 1995: 736–7). Similarly, Gerardo M. C. Valero writes that assertions of historic title are ineffective as evidence for establishing the validity of a claim to sovereignty over disputed territory (Valero, 1994: 343).

The three lines of argument along which the debate over the Spratly issue has developed are unified in their attempt to identify how the dispute evolves within the confines of existing patterns of state interaction. This book proposes to pursue an alternative argument, which not only embeds the dispute in existing practices of state interaction, but also claims that the dispute poses challenges to these practices, affecting their future design. Lim Joo-Jock has emphasized these more fundamental problems of state interaction raised by the dispute by concluding that the South China Sea will increasingly assume a centripetal function as a focal point for the interplay of national interests in cooperation or conflict over an important common frontier zone (Lim Joo-Jock, 1979: 90). Michael Leifer’s analysis is motivated in a similar claim, in that he proposes that the South China Sea may be considered the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, and that its domination by a single power could have far-reaching strategic consequences both in and beyond the region. Leifer in fact concludes by stating that contention in the South China Sea is symptomatic of the problems of regional order in a strategically fused East and Southeast Asia, which lacks a security architecture. He maintains, however, that contention in the South China Sea is the dependent variable, arguing that the balance of power affects its development (Leifer, 1999a). This book proposes that the Spratly dispute is central because of its tendency to highlight divergences between Chinese and Southeast Asian practices of state interaction. This development compels them to find ways in which their differences can be reconciled. This highlights the potential for fundamental change in the security relations between states engendered by developments in the Spratly dispute.

The debate over the international politics of the Asia-Pacific tends to separate into realist arguments and arguments of increased integration and cooperation. International politics in the Asia-Pacific are often considered an object lesson of the central principles of state interaction argued by the realist school of thought. For example, Michael B. Yahuda states that the diversity within the region and the fluidity of the security arrangements are indicative of the absence of a regi...