Challenging the U.S.-Led War on Drugs

Argentina in Comparative Perspective

Sebastián Antonino Cutrona

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351814911
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Challenging the U.S.-Led War on Drugs explores the cases that have resisted the U.S. pressure to adopt a militarized approach to fight against drug trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Through a sweeping narrative history from the recovery of democracy in 1983 to the present, Cutrona applies international relations and comparative politics theories to understand Argentina's different trajectory vis-à-vis the rest of the region. The author demonstrates that in broad questions of vulnerability to U.S. pressure, external factors often play a secondary role in explaining either balancing/resistance or bandwagoning/acceptance of the U.S. security agenda in the Americas. Emphasizing the role of domestic-level politics, Cutrona identifies the subordination of the military to civilian oversight, the transition outcome, the system of check and balances, and the role of civil society actors such as social movements, epistemic communities, and norm entrepreneurs as Argentina's most relevant sources explaining defection from Washington's main dictates to combat drug trafficking.

1 The Emergence and Consolidation of the Standard Security Model

Exploring the Colombian Case

The punitive paradigm against drugs became consolidated in the U.S. after Congress passed the Harrison Act in 1914. Even though it was internationalized through the 1961 United Nations’ Single Convention, the multilateral drug control system was not sufficient to guarantee the punitive paradigm’s full implementation abroad. Thus, the U.S. sponsored a foreign policy specifically designed to combat illicit drugs internationally, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean region: the Standard Security Model (SSM). This chapter briefly explores the emergence, consolidation, and main features of the SSM. The Colombian case, in particular, is used to illustrate these specific set of policies that have promoted the expansion of the military’s role in counter-narcotics efforts by framing the drug problem as a national security threat.

The Origins of the Punitive Paradigm

In 1900, most narcotics were legal in the U.S. Prescribed by doctors or purchased in groceries, substances such as cocaine, heroin, and marijuana were widely available. Most of these narcotics, particularly cocaine and opium, were imported and no restriction other than a tariff disrupted their entry. In this context, by 1900, the U.S. had approximately 250,000 addicts and narcotics were a popular item in everyday life (Musto, 1973). Despite drug consumption being present along every socioeconomic stratum, most addicts were nonetheless identified with foreign groups and internal minorities. While cocaine was associated with African Americans, opium and marijuana were linked to the Chinese and the Mexicans respectively. This biased approximation of the problem, of course, would influence the nature of U.S. drug policy in the forthcoming years.

Not surprisingly, concerns about drug use started growing rapidly after awareness of the harmful potential of narcotics greatly increased at the end of the nineteenth century. This process was fostered, in part, by a group of moral entrepreneurs that began to pressure the federal government in order to avoid “the consequences of other countries’ drug trade” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). American missionaries in Asia, in particular, played a vital role in shaping drug control legislation during this period. Also influential was an emerging medical community, particularly physicians and pharmacists, whose professional consolidation involved the regulation of patent medicines. Willing to restrict the supply and prescription of narcotics, physicians and pharmacists were indeed extremely effective in promoting a drug control regime in the U.S. Underlying these forces was a puritanical strain in American culture that demanded public control of vice. Bertram, Blachmann, Sharpe, and Andreas (1996) suggest that such beliefs were often based on rural nineteenth-century Methodism, Baptism, Presbyterianism, and Congregationalism.

Despite initial setbacks, conditions for federal drug control legislation were ready by the end of 1914. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Harrison Act was passed in December, prohibiting the sale of heroin, cocaine, and their derivatives. From this point onwards, the federal government used its taxation powers to impose the law, particularly because prescribing narcotic drugs concerned states’ rights (Chawla, 2004). According to Musto (1973, p. 68), the Harrison Act “was the triumph of those who believed that law had a moral effect and was designed to prohibit the use of narcotics for the maintenance of ‘mere’ addiction.” The development of the punitive paradigm, of course, also brought a transformation of the U.S. institutional architecture against narcotics. A small drug enforcement section, for example, was created in the Treasury Department until the institution was ultimately incorporated into the Prohibition Unit in the 1920s.

During the 1920s, attention shifted to the alcohol problem. Even though most U.S. national efforts were directed toward alcohol prohibition, some government officials, especially those working at the state level, continued lobbying to advance a more comprehensive legislation against drugs. Marijuana, in particular, became the focus of drug policies in the 1920s, when the ban on the sale, production, importation, and transportation of alcohol reached a turning point in the American history. In fact, half of the states in the U.S. passed a law outlawing the possession and sale of marijuana (Goode, 1997). This legislation was further advanced in 1937 when the Marijuana Tax Act was enacted and prohibition finally became a national issue.

The Internationalization of the Punitive Paradigm

The U.S. campaign to promote a punitive paradigm against drugs was not restricted to its national territory. By contrast, a substantial part of the U.S. efforts was directed toward the international system. Despite the fact that the SSM was consolidated after the 1980s, the internationalization of the U.S. approach dates back to the early twentieth century, when the federal government started promoting a series of international conferences. As Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) note, the main impetus for a multilateral approach during the first years of the twentieth century was provided by American missionaries returning from the Far East. Particularly influential in this respect were Charles Brent, Hamilton Wright, and Richmond Hobson, whose firm determination allowed the development of the Shanghai Conference and the successive International Opium Conferences that a few years later met in The Hague and Geneva respectively.¹

The U.S. crusade to internationalize its drug approach gained momentum in 1961 when the United Nations passed the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This international control mechanism established the main foundations that have regulated the production and supply of narcotics by coordinated international action, unifying prior control elements under one single regime. The Single Convention was further complemented by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Since these international control mechanisms have a mandatory nature, requiring countries to enact domestic legislation following international standards, the U.S. has successfully internationalized many of its moral imperatives to fight against illicit drugs.

Yet this multilateral drug control system has been incremental and progressive, evolving in response to changing conditions (Chawla, 2004). In other words, while the international trade became the first target, the system evolved to cover the supply side of narcotics, including cultivation and production. By the same token, it began with drugs such as opium, cocaine, and marijuana, to ultimately incorporate psychotropic substances. The focus of the multilateral regulation also changed, shifting from production and consumption to precursor chemical control and money laundering. Most of these important transformations nonetheless reflected the concerns of U.S. policy-makers and the country’s own epidemics of drugs during a particular period of time.

According to Andreas and Nadelmann (2006, p. 43), “the U.S. success in globalizing its drug prohibition policy was dependent, however, on both the absence and widespread opposition elsewhere and the existence of common perspectives on drug control, moral, and otherwise, in many states.” The presence of sympathetic societies, fears of minorities, the newness of some types of drugs, and the absence of a real threat against powerful constituencies in any but a few countries in the world, the scholars also point out, created the breeding grounds for the later development of the punitive paradigm in a great variety of countries, particularly during the second half of the 1980s when the SSM became a reality in Latin America and the Caribbean region.

The Punitive Paradigm Revisited

The battle against illicit drugs revived during the 1960s, particularly after Richard Nixon (1969–1974) became president of the U.S. Relying on three primary instruments, that is, the power of public persuasion, the possibility to launch legislative initiatives, and the direct control over the federal bureaucracy, President Nixon made drugs a central national-policy concern (Bertram et al., 1996). In 1969, indeed, Nixon stated that drugs were a “national threat,” thereby declaring a “war on drugs.” His approach to narcotics was revealed in June 1971 when he noted that “drug traffic is public enemy number one domestically in the United States today and we must wage a total offensive, worldwide, nationwide, government-wide, and if I might say so, media wide” (Epstein, 1990, p. 178).

The revival of the punitive paradigm was underpinned by a growing bureaucracy. Together with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) created in 1930, a second agency became involved in the fight against drugs in 1965: the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control. These agencies merged in 1968, during the Johnson administration (1963–1969), to form the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Most important, in 1973 Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), an internationalized agency that has a presence in almost every country around the world. Simultaneously, harsh counter-drug legislation was passed, including the 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, merging previous federal regulation under one single statute. Moreover, this mechanism placed narcotics and other drugs under federal jurisdiction, closing a loophole in previous legislation by outlawing it directly (Mares, 2006). All these major changes had important consequences for the federal budget for drug enforcement, increasing national expenditures from U.S.$43 million in 1970 to U.S.$321 million in 1975 (Andreas, 2013).

Overseas, the U.S. began sponsoring different campaigns against illicit drugs. According to President Nixon (1971, p. 95), the primary goal was to

strike at the supply side of the drug equation—to halt the drug traffic by striking at the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, and trafficking in these drugs beyond our borders.

Following these lines, Nixon launched Operation Intercept, the first modern U.S. attempt to stop illicit drugs at their source. By deploying 2,000 customs and border patrols along the U.S.–Mexican border, the Nixon administration developed what was officially described as the nation’s largest peacetime search and seizure operation (Carpenter, 2003). Most important, this initiative shifted the focus away from heroin-source countries such as Turkey, paving the way for a greater involvement in countries that produce cocaine: Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.

Despite the presence of some major policy changes and the use of a harsh anti-drug rhetoric, the “war” was nonetheless waged sporadically. Furthermore, neither Gerald Ford (1974–1977) nor Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) continued with Nixon’s approach to narcotics. By contrast, both administrations appeared less committed to develop fundamental changes and drug policy remained stagnant. This process was possible, in part, due to the gradual emergence of a more tolerant attitude toward drug use in the U.S., particularly with regard to marijuana. During the 1970s, for example, 11 states decriminalized marijuana use and others even discussed the option of legalization. Nevertheless, as Carpenter (2003) notes, Washington did not de-emphasize the international phase of the war on drugs. Increasing pressure on Mexico to eradicate marijuana and opium poppy crops, together with the growing development of interdiction measures in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, illustrates the U.S. dynamism on the international front.

This situation changed dramatically with the arrival of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989). During his administration the war on drugs escalated as never before, setting the stage for the development of the SSM in Latin America and the Caribbean. Several forces, most of them operating domestically, gave Reagan the strength to accelerate his fight against narcotics. According to Bertram et al. (1996), three factors were particularly relevant in this respect: the resurgence of conservatism, the organizational strength of a moral majority that rejected permissive attitudes toward drugs, and the absence of a strong anti-prohibitionist force. Underlying this process was the explosion of crack consumption and its related violence. This newly developed cocaine derivate changed the domestic market, generating a new social reaction against illicit drugs. Similar to marijuana and opium, drugs that were historically linked to Mexicans and Chinese respectively, the U.S. popular imaginary tied the use of crack cocaine to poor African Americans. The U.S. drug boom during the 1980s, Gootenberg (2008, p. 307) points out, did not emerge out of a vacuum created by easier availability but was a politically constructed phenomenon, especially by the regime of the “cold warrior Richard Nixon.”

These domestic developments were exacerbated by some major changes in the political economy of illicit drugs, particularly with regard to the production and trafficking of narcotics. Specifically, the growing power of international drug cartels abroad and the fact that almost all narcotics circulating in the U.S. were cultivated and processed in Latin America and the Caribbean, reaffirmed President Reagan’s decision to adopt a more aggressive policy against drug trafficking (Bagley & Tokatlian, 2007). Not surprisingly, many drug trade entrepreneurs, particularly those operating in the Andean Ridge, rapidly became the main target of Washington’s escalating interdiction policies. In his 1983 State of the Union speech, Reagan confirmed this trend by stating that “the administration hereby declares an all-out war on big-time organized crime and the drug racketeers who are poisoning our young people” (Marion, 1994, p. 147).

The Birth of the Standard Security Model

Even though the U.S. successfully promoted the punitive paradigm domestically and internationally, the multilateral drug control system was...