War & Revolution in Asiatic Russia

Morgan Philips Price

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351802048
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Russian History
• Index: History

Part diary, part journalistic dispatches this volume, originally published in 1918 is a short history of the Caucasus campaign and connects the events that were taking place in the Middle East with the past history of Central Asia. Witnessing the effects of the Russian Revolution on the Asiatic provinces, the author reveals the real state of Asiatic Russia, in the months preceding the Russian Revolution and shows how the Russian reaction was in part responsible for the disastrous state of affairs in Armenia and was contributing with the Turkish Government to bring that country to the verge of ruin.

 

 

 

PART I

MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CAUCASUS CAMPAIGN (1914–16)

CHAPTER I

EARLY STAGES OF THE CAMPAIGN
(1914–1915)

CONTEMPORARY writers on the history of the war are inclined to turn the whole of their attention to Europe, as though they were unaware of any events of importance outside Belgium, France, or Poland. The idea of hurling masses of men against Germany’s West flank got such a firm hold upon the public mind from the first days of the war, that two very weighty considerations were almost entirely ignored. First, it was forgotten that the mere hurling of raw masses in overwhelming numbers does not decide the fate of a modern campaign. This has been proved by the Germans themselves, who by organization and technical skill have largely succeeded, in spite of inferior numbers, in holding their West front, while they were advancing victoriously against Russia’s millions. Secondly, it was forgotten that very important victories might be won without crushing Germany’s military forces in Europe at all. For instance, the professed object of the war would have been attained if, as the result of intelligent political propaganda on the part of the Allies, the German masses had learnt that their real enemy was in their own country. But even if the war be considered less in terms of ideas than of more material aims, such as the conquest of Eastern markets, spheres of influence for financial interests, control over trunk railways, etc., we shall see that substantial victories could have been gained without this hurling of millions against Germany’s lines in Belgium and France. The war, in fact, on its purely strategical side, ought to have been regarded as extending far beyond the confines of Europe. For by occupying parts of the Middle East, and by driving the Turks out of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Persia, the Allies would have completely eliminated the influence of the Central Powers from these Eastern markets and areas of exploitation. The capture of Constantinople, indeed, would have put the solution of the whole Eastern Question entirely into the hands of the Allies, and Germany would have been definitely confined to Europe, as a State with no colonial future. Thus the theatre of warfare both in Europe and Asia should have been regarded from the outset as a fiery ring surrounding the peoples of Central Europe, and the task of a united Allied Staff, if such could ever have been obtained, would have been to close this ring ever tighter round the prisoners.

Now the Caucasus campaign, when looked at from this point of view, becomes no mere insignificant skirmish in a third-rate area of war, but an important link in this chain surrounding the Central Powers. Along with the Mesopotamian and Egyptian campaigns, it has helped to decide which of the economic world-states is to control the southern “gateway” between Europe and Asia. There have been three competitors for this prize: the Central land Empires, the Western maritime Empire of Great Britain, and, before the Revolution, the land Empire of Russia. The fortune of war might give to any one of these the control of the southern “gateway”, or else it might decide, as up to the present it has decided, in favour of a political Balance of Power in the Middle East, part of Mesopotamia and Arabia coming under Great Britain’s influence, Anatolia and Upper Mesopotamia under Germany’s, and Armenia under Russia’s. Now all these territorial gains are cards which at the Peace Conference will play no insignificant rôle in the settlement of the Eastern Question. In so far, therefore, as military events affect the ultimate world-settlement, the Caucasus campaign of 1914–16 has its place in history.

In the period preceding the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, Russia had been engaged in consolidating the position in the Trans-Caucasus, which she had acquired by her voluntary union with the ancient kingdom of Georgia. This had given her a hold over the lowlands lying immediately South of the main range of the Caucasus, and had established her upon the first step of the ladder leading onto the Central Asian plateau. But after 1877, by the occupation of Kars, Russia acquired a footing upon the next step of the ladder in Greater Armenia. This region is, as it were, a bridge connecting Asia Minor and the Iranian plateau. The Central Asian plateau in its western extremity is founded upon two main ranges of mountains which are the spines of the continent; these are the Taurus to the South, and the Anti-Taurus to the North, both running in a parallel direction East and West from Anatolia to Persia.¹ The Taurus, starting along the south coast of Asia Minor, curves North-east in Cilicia, and then East in the Assyrian highlands as far as the Persian frontier, where it bends South-east, and is continued along the shores of the Persian Gulf in the Bakhtiari highlands. The Anti-Taurus commences East of Kaisarieh in Anatolia, and running in a North-easterly direction passes Sivas on the South and Erzinjan and Erzerum on the North, finally joining up with the Azairbijan mountain system East of Mount Ararat in the basin of the Middle Araxes. But this chain is broken in one place by the volcanic plateau of Kars and Erzerum, which is piled upon the Anti-Taurus chain, burying it under a mass of detritus. The whole of this plateau is a great volcanic bed composed of layers of lava and dykes, which were erupted here at a comparatively recent date in the earth’s history. This volcanic activity has completely altered the original structure of the plateau, and has raised the level of the land some two thousand feet above the surrounding regions. Thus to the North of this great volcanic uplift lies the relative depression of the Chorokh Basin and the Upper Kura valley, so that the upper table-land is laid upon the older table-land of Georgia and Lazistan, while both of these two regions are one step higher than the coast of the Black Sea. On the highest volcanic table-land stand the two fortresses of Kars and Erzerum. It was natural that after Russia had established herself upon the northern strip of this volcanic plateau, she should make Kars her base, facing the Turkish base at Erzerum. These two fortresses were the pivots upon which the Russian Caucasus army and the Turkish Armenian army hinged their operations, since they were the commanding positions on the highest of the plateaux. But it is clear that no operations were possible here with safety, unless both sides had secured themselves against flanking movements of the enemy in the depressions on each side of the plateau.¹ To the North lay the depression of the Chorokh valleys, through which a Turkish army could pass by a short cut into the valleys of the upper Kura and the fertile lands of Georgia, thus cutting off the Caucasian army at Kars from Tiflis. To the South lay the broken country of the Mush and Bitlis vilayets, across which a low range runs parallel with the Taurus and Anti-Taurus. This South Armenian volcanic plateau is much broken up by dykes and irregular outpourings of lava to the North and West of Lake Van.¹ To the South rises the great barrier of the Taurus, passage through which is only possible by the defiles caused by faults and fractures. But a Turkish army, once established in this South Armenian plateau, would be able to break through into the depression of the lower Araxes, and so outflank from the south-east the Russian base on the high plateau at Kars. On the other hand, it is clear that both these depressions, the Chorokh and the South Armenian plateau, could be used by the Russians (as they actually were) to turn the left and right flanks of the Turkish army, based on the highest plateau at Erzerum. The outflanking of the fortress-bases of their enemies was therefore the main problem before the Russian and Turkish Staffs in Greater Armenia.

Farther to the East, on the extreme Russian left and Turkish right, is the relative depression of the northwest Iranian table-land. Azairbijan extends between the basin of the lower Kura in Eastern Trans-Caucasus, and the lowlands of the Tigris and Euphrates. The basin of the Kura is of the utmost importance to Russia, as it is the railway and oil centre of the whole Caucasus; while Mesopotamia is the region where the Bagdad railway is to end, and the scene of the great future development of European enterprise. The occupation of Azairbijan by Turkey would therefore threaten the industrial heart of the Caucasus, while its occupation by Russia would open the road to Mesopotamia, and forge the link between the British and Russian Empires in Asia, so as to surround the Central Powers and Turkey on the East. Azairbijan could be occupied by the Turks coming in from the West by the South Armenian plateau. Between the basins of Lake Van and Lake Urumiah there is no natural obstruction, for the ranges of Taurus and Anti-Taurus here run East and West, parallel with each other; so that once a Turkish force is in Van, it can easily drop down to Khoy, by the valley of the Kotur Chai. In the same way a Russian occupation of the road-centre at Khoy, and of the Dilman and Urumiah plains, would make the whole Turkish position upon the South Armenian plateau insecure. Thus we see that the outer wing of the front in Persia was of great importance to the main Russian and Turkish positions.

When on October 31st, 1914, the war between the Central Powers and the Allies spread to the Asiatic fronts, the Caucasus army, which had been already mobilized, took the initiative at once. The 2nd and 3rd Army Corps had been previously transferred to the European front, leaving only the 1st and the 4th Caucasian Army Corps, and some frontier guards, to hold the 3rd Turkish Army. This consisted of the 10th, 11th and 12th Army Corps, which, with the Khurdish Hamidiehs and the gendarme regiments, numbered about 120,000 men. But the slowness of mobilization, and the lack of railways and good roads in Turkey, caused a delay of at least six weeks in bringing these forces into the field. The Russians meanwhile began to form a fresh force, which became the 2nd Turkestan Army Corps.

During the first days of November the Russian frontier troops advanced from Sary-Kamish and Kagisman in the Kars plateau over the hills into Turkish territory. Here they occupied a part of the Passan plain to the East of Erzerum in the Araxes valley. From Kagisman they occupied the Alasgert valley, while from Igdir on the Araxes they occupied Bayazid, just South of Mount Ararat. For the moment Russia was content with this success in occupying a small strip of Turkish territory parallel with the old frontier. The attention of the highest Russian command was at this moment chiefly occupied with the problems of the Polish and Galician fronts, where the plan of seriously invading Austria was still thought possible. For the Turks, on the other hand, the Caucasus front was the main interest. A conference had taken place at Erzerum during October between the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Turkish Armenians (described elsewhere, see Chapter VIII) in which a great plan was unfolded for invading the Caucasus, driving the Russians back to the Cossack steppes, and forming three autonomous provinces under Ottoman suzerainty between the Black Sea and the Caspian. With this political object in view, the Turkish military plans were laid for a grand offensive. As soon as the mobilization of the whole 3rd Army of the “Armenian Inspection Area” was completed, Enver Pasha himself came to take charge of the campaign. He was assisted by a German officer, von Schellendorf, as Chief of his Staff. It soon came to their knowledge that the Russian preparations in the Caucasus were not making very rapid progress, and that there were some weak spots in the long line across the plateau, stretching from the Black Sea to northwest Persia, particularly in the Olti region (middle Chorokh basin),¹ where only a regiment of frontier troops had been put to guard the fortress of Kars and the supply-base of Sary-Kamish from flanking movements on the North. Some years before a Georgian officer, Amiradjibi, on the Russian General Staff for the Caucasian Army, had warned his colleagues of the danger of a flanking movement on Kars viâ the Olti depression. Little attention was paid to his warnings, because it was thought that the Bardus Pass, leading up from this depression on to the Kars plateau, was impassable for an army, especially during the winter, when it was known to be covered with snow. But the Caucasus Staff had not reckoned on the endurance of the Turkish soldier. Sending the 9th and 10th Army Corps into the Olti depression, and holding the main force of the Russians on the Passan plain with the 11th Corps, Enver Pasha took the field in spite of frost and deep snow, which on December 3rd was falling fast all over the plateau. He was warned of the rashness of his plan by one of his Staff officers, who saw the danger of leading two Army Corps into a roadless country in mid-winter with only horse and mule transport. But Enver Pasha hoped by initial success to find supplies to guarantee his further progress through the Caucasus. Up to a certain point his confidence was justified, for on December 15th he had entered Olti, driving the small Russian force out, and capturing prisoners and booty; after which he and the 10th Army Corps crossed the Bardus Pass in the rear of the Russian army on the Passan plain, and on December 26th were within a few hours of Sary-Kamish, the Russian supply base. The Caucasus army was now literally surrounded. It was held in front by the 11th Army Corps, while the 9th and 10th had suddenly appeared between them and their bases at Kars and Sary-Kamish. The Turks, however, had not yet occupied these two points. Their advanced posts were within 20 versts of the fortress of Kars; and their extreme left, which had come up from the Olti depression, was east of Ardahan and within two days’ march of Tiflis. But their main force was still on the wooded heights above Sary-Kamish. A terrific snow-storm had hampered the movements of its commander, Ishkhan Pasha, and prevented him from keeping in touch with his rear. In the valley below him lay Sary-Kamish, the Russian supply centre, where he would be safe, and from which he could demolish the Caucasus army at leisure, if he could only get there. But now the little Russian garrison in Sary-Kamish began to direct a vigorous artillery fire upon the hills above the little town. They had only one battery, and ammunition which would not last twelve hours against the force that was opposing them. But with the energy of despair they poured out all the shot they had, in the hope that relief might come to them from Kars. Ishkhan Pasha, thinking that he was confronted by a division instead of by one battalion, feared to advance. But now his ammunition was giving out, the snow-storm showed no signs of abating, and his men were being frozen and were suffering from hunger. Moreover by this time the Russian army on the Passan plain had somewhat recovered, and a successful regrouping of their forces had been undertaken by General Eudenitch (the Commander, General Meshlaefsky, having in the meantime run away to Tiflis). On January 2nd the left wing of the Russians, now facing north in the valley of Mezhingert, advanced to attack the half-frozen Turks on the heights above Sary-Kamish. In twenty-four hours the danger was over, and the Caucasus army was safe. Ishkhan Pasha with the 9th Army Corps was taken prisoner, while of the 10th Army Corps half was captured, and the rest escaped over the Bardus Pass into Turkish territory. The Russians had passed through a serious crisis. Apart from the material losses, the effect of this blow on the morale of the native races in the Caucasus was not small. The Caucasus had been invaded, and whispers began to go round in the bazaars of Tiflis, Erivan and Kars, that a new Shamyl Beg would appear to welcome the Turks. The rest of the Winter of 1914–15 was spent, both by the Russians and by the Turks, who had suffered very heavily in men and guns, if perhaps they had gained in prestige, in strengthening their old positions and organizing their rear.

In the Spring the offensive again rested with the Turks, who decided now to pay attention to their extreme right wing in the Azairbijan province of Persia. During the Winter there had been some intriguing between Djevdet Pasha, the commander at Van, and the Khan of Maku, a powerful Persian chief living in the corner of Azairbijan, where the Persian, Turkish and Russian Empires meet. The Sirdar Khan was believed by the Russians to have come to an understanding with the Turks to help them, if they invaded his corner of Persia. He was therefore removed, and his cousin put in his place. This somewhat arbitrary violation of Persian neutrality was the result of a policy pursued for many years before the war. Persia had been rendered so weak by her revolution in 1909, that she had become unable to protect her own frontiers from violation, and the country had been reverting to the tribal state, in which any mountain brigand or caravan-thief, if he had sufficient support from the Russian consular and military authorities, could set himself up as a local ruler. Both Russian and Turkish forces had been roaming about the territory between Mount Ararat and Lake Urumiah for at least four years before the war; so the temptation was now too strong, and Persia too weak, to prevent a considerable development here of military activity on both sides. During November a small Russian detachment, with a battalion of Armenian volunteers under Andranik, had advanced from Khoy, and in an engagement with the Turks west of Kotur had entered Turkish territory and occupied Serai. During the crisis at Sary-Kamish this force had retreated to the Persian frontier at Djulfa, whence it advanced again to Khoy in January 1915. At the same time the Turks were preparing a new division of Nizam troops under the command of the able Turkish general Halil Bey. This division left Mosul in March, and crossing the extreme eastern Taurus by the defiles of the Great Zab, reached the Urumiah plateau about the middle of April. Halil Bey’s plan was the same as Enver Pasha’s at the Sary-Kamish battle, namely, to advance into the enemy country, and trust to getting supplies on the way. He had to be very sparing in his use of ammunition, for unless he could capture large amounts, he could not be sure of replenishing his stock. Once his army had crossed the Taurus to the Persian plateau, he was absolutely cut off from all communication with his base. Such were the primitive methods employed by the Turks in their campaigns upon their extreme flanks. But no less remarkable was the daring of their commanders, and the endurance of the askers in carrying out movements and attacking with vigour in these remote regions.

In occupying the rich Urumiah plain, and pushing up to the eastern shores of the lake to the plain of Dilman, Halil Bey was aiming at the Russian railhead at Djulfa, whence he hoped to cut across the plains of the lower Araxes to Baku. On the morning of May 1st, 15,000 of his Nizams with 3,000 Khurdish cavalry were drawn up on the Dilman plain, facing a small Russian force numbering about 5,000, with 1,000 Armenian volunteers. The Russians had entrenched themselves very hastily, and were waiting for reinforcements from Djulfa. During the day the Turks attacked the village of Muganjik, but the Russians managed to hold their own by an effective use of artillery. On the second day Halil Bey sent his cavalry to get round the Russians in the hills on each side of Muganjik. With the greatest difficulty the Russians held out until dark, and then decided to retreat during t...