The American Merchant Seaman and His Industry

Struggle and Stigma

Craig J. Forsyth

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351813532
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

The descriptive data in this book, first published in 1989, were obtained from participant observation and interviews with merchant seaman current and retired. In addition there is reprinted a complete set of the laws relating to American seaman between 1918-1970. Together they provide a comprehensive understanding of the historical events surrounding the American merchant seaman, the creation of maritime policy, and the policy itself.

Chapter 1
An Historical View of U.S. Maritime Policy

. . . what is there for the sailors to do? If they resist it is mutiny, if they succeed, and take the vessel, it is piracy. If they ever yield again, their punishment must come; and if they do not yield, they are pirates for life. If a sailor resists his commander, he resists the law, and piracy and submission are his only alternatives.

Richard Henry Dana

There are relatively few theoretically guided analyses of relations between the federal government and specific industries or organizations. This analysis uses principles derived from neo-Marxian and neo-Weberian theories of political economy to examine the maritime industry's relations with the federal government. These relations have been varied, complex, and contingent upon unique historical circumstances. This chapter examines three historical factors that shaped the relations between the maritime industry and the state during three periods of maritime development (Forsyth 1988). The three factors are: (1) the strategies of capital accumulation, (2) the nature of the class conflict within the industry, and (3) the organizational interests of the modern capitalist state, which includes fostering both capital accumulation and the maintenance of the perception of legitimacy. The three time periods examined are: the American Revolution until 1867; 1868 to 1897; and 1898 on. These three periods represent distinct times of policy change and strategies of capital accumulation. The period from the American Revolution to 1867 was a time of intense capital accumulation with U.S. investment focused on overseas trade. The wealth of the United States was in its shipping and commerce (Hohman 1956: Lawrence 1966). The post-Civil War period (1868-1897) represents a time of decline for shipping as investment shifted to internal development. This shift occurred both in capital and government support. During this period maritime labor also started to make gains. In 1898 a new era for the U.S. merchant marine began. Impelled by the historic need to raise its merchant marine to a level demanded by its imperialistic expansion, the United States was faced with the inescapable necessity of altering its entire maritime policy (Lang 1943: 66).

Accumulation, Legitimacy, and the Emergent Needs of the State

Historically, the capitalist state has had to perform two opposing functions (O'Connor 1973). The state must always function to allow capital accumulation, and at the same time to preserve its own legitimacy (Balbus 1973; Offe 1973). "It must simultaneously be a class state and a universal state" (Wolfe 1974: 149).

This relationship between the state and the dominant class is necessitated by the fact that the state is immediately dependent on the economy. State managers cannot ignore the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation. This would risk drying up the source of state power: the economy's surplus production capacity, and the taxes drawn from this surplus and other forms of capital. But the capitalist state that openly uses its coercive force to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes may lose its legitimacy and hence undermine the basis of its support and loyalty (O'Connor 1973: 8). The legitimacy of the state is further contingent upon a healthy economy, since all citizens hold the state accountable for their economic well-being (cf. Butler and Stokes 1974). Hence state managers must serve accumulation and legitimacy and mediate the conflict that is inherent in these contradictory functions.

The capitalist state also has emergent interests. This goes beyond the conventional neo-Marxian notion of relative autonomy that is required to mediate the conflict resulting from the capitalist system (O'Connor 1973; Poulantzas 1973; Wolfe 1974). These interests are more consistent with a neo-Weberian theory of political economy, which views the state as an organization serving its own needs for growth, sustenance, and legitimacy (Hearn 1984; McNamee 1987). The key characteristic of the state from a neo-Weberian perspective is its reproductive character; the ability to keep itself in existence (Althusser 1970; Wolfe 1974: 135).

These interests, particularly as they involve enhanced strength and autonomy, are most palpable during periods of crisis: (1) war and depression when state managers have their greatest opportunity for freedom of action or (2) when the pressure exerted on state managers by the capitalist class is less than during stable periods, and pressure applied by the subordinate class is greater. In these situations state managers act, contrary to the preferences of the dominant class, in order to ensure state autonomy and survival. During these periods state managers make reforms in the name of mollifying pressures from below, but shape these concessions so as to enhance state power and the role of the state in the economy. In time this increased power of the state gains acceptance of the capitalist class because these reforms become recognized as essential to the objectives of capitalism (Hearn 1984: 129-130). Although war brings state power to its apex, it also amplifies its dependence on industries such as the merchant marine, which are necessary for defense. During these periods state managers have served all three interests well: increased support for shipping, higher wages for seamen, and increased its own role in the maritime industry (Kilgour 1975; Forsyth and Cullison 1984).

Gradually the process of capital accumulation becomes dependent upon and contoured by state policy. In advanced capitalism state managers set the rules for most economic transactions, directly regulate the class struggle through labor laws, determine the size of the social wage, provide the infrastructure of capital accumulation, manage economic growth and the tempo of business activity, take measures directly and indirectly to maintain effective demand, and have the state participate in the market as a massive business actor and employer (Klare 1979: 125).

State Relations

The State as Supporter of Capital—1789–1867

In 1789 the federal government was interested in maintaining an adequate merchant marine under a U.S. flag (Marvin 1919; American Bureau of Shipping 1933: p. 1).

One of the first acts of the first Congress of the newborn United States of America, in 1789, heeding the pleas of hardheaded George Washington, was the enactment of measures which would protect and encourage an American Merchant Marine. Most states had their own laws, aimed at England, but they became united in one matter; any American vessel was allowed in any state duty free. Thomas Jefferson, arguing a House resolution, first presented what is now so well known by America, that shipping and sea commerce is essential to American industry and economic balance and that the merchant vessel in times of war is the very core of successful naval and expeditionary operations. He advanced the unique theory that the oceans are the common property of all-an idea that his struggling America had to again spill blood for before England and other European nations accepted it as truth. (Lane 1941: 15)

The activities of state managers during this initial period of organization indicate that the primary strategy for capital accumulation was to ensure profit for the shipowner through the use of protective tariffs, mail subsidies, and the regulation of maritime labor (Wissman 1942: 5-6).

During this early period the federal government embarked upon a protectionist policy for shipping interests. Acts passed in 1789 and 1790 levied heavy duties on foreign-flag, foreign-built vessels in the coastal trades. During this time period the U.S. government passed several acts that were all intended to control labor.

In 1790 the government passed a state authorizing the arrest of deserting merchant seamen, and their detention and return to the vessel. (Appendix D describes the legal evolution of desertion codes).

. . . if a seaman shall absent himself without leave of the master for less than forty-eight hours he shall forfeit three days' pay for each day's absence; if absent for more than forty-eight hours he shall forfeit to the owners of the vessel all the wages due him and effects on board or ashore and be liable for damages for the expense of hiring other seamen. (MacArthur 1919: 115)

Section 7 of the same act, although not imposing a criminal sentence for desertion, prescribes that the seaman be detained until the vessel was ready to sail.

Another penalty contained in section 3 of the act was for refusal to sail but not deserting. In such cases the seaman was to be imprisoned until he had paid back double any sum advanced him by the owner, in addition to legal expenses subscribed by the arresting officers. Much like the treatment of criminals, there was also a $10-a-day fine for "harboring deserters." Section 4 of the act provided

Whenever any person harbors or secretes any seaman belonging to any vessel, knowing him to belong there to, he shall be liable to pay ten dollars for every day during which he continues so to harbor or secrete such seaman . . . (MacArthur 1919: 147)

This 1790 act, although purporting to regulate the working conditions of seamen, offered little protection and left them at the mercy of the shipowners. Historically it had been difficult for seamen to organize along the lines of economic self-interest, because as a group seamen are a uniquely transient population. Additionally, there was little if any group solidarity due to constant turnover, language and racial barriers, further hindering organization (Wissman 1942: 5; Forsyth and Bankston 1983, 1984; Forsyth et al., 1984).

Alexander Hamilton in 1792 offered support for seafaring labor and legitimation for the state when he called for the establishment of marine hospitals to care for seamen. But this relatively new humanitarian concept established the merchant seamen as a class of men unable to care for themselves (Straus 1950). This idea was later to influence legal decisions (Forsyth and Gramling 1985).

A cabotage law in 1817 excluded foreign vessels from the coastal trade. This legislation was later extended to include trade between the United States and its offshore possessions and territories. The effect of this protectionist policy was to insure the existence of a U.S. domestic and foreign trade fleet. Between 1828 and 1849 protective tariffs were reduced, but these reductions were offset by congressional action in 1845 that authorized the postmaster general to grant mail contracts to some U.S. flagships. These mail contracts remained in effect until 1858 and were again reinstated in 1864, 1877, and 1891, but only temporarily (Morris 1979; Bess and Farris 1981: 1—31; Whitehurst 1983).

An 1835 law, which remained in effect until 1898, made beating, wounding, imprisoning, withholding suitable food, and other punishments inflicted by the ship's master permissible if, in the reasonable judgment of the master; it was done with cause (Taylor 1923: 19). The law was actually amended several times starting with an 1850 decree that prohibited using a whip to beat seamen. But this only brought on the use of other instruments. Although there was some public outcry against corporal punishment, this was countered with the idea that such punishment was indeed necessary (Glenn 1984). This was the only piece of legislation during this period whose purpose was to protect seamen.

During this entire period there is only one recorded strike, in 1803, and it proved unsuccessful. The lack of protest by seamen was primarily a product of the existing desertion laws. Should a seamen protest working conditions by striking, he was labeled a deserter, facing fines and/or imprisonment. The desertion clause remained a determent to successful unionization until 1915 (Taylor 1923: 6-7). Another product of these desertion laws was the hiring system that had evolved in the industry, known as the crimping system.

Crimps were boarding-housekeepers, who controlled the labor market. The practice of withholding all or part of the seaman's wages until the termination of the voyage was initiated to prevent desertion, but this legal practice gave rise to abuses. In the case of long voyages, wages could accumulate to a considerable sum. Since many masters shared in the profits of the voyage, there was the ever present temptation to get rid of crew members before the termination of the voyage; in such cases, they would be labeled deserters and forfeit all wages. One method was to "mistreat" the seaman in port in order to cause desertion. The crimp would entice the mistreated seaman with the prospect of higher wages on another ship, liquor, women, and other unaccustomed luxuries. He would then enter the crimp's boardinghouse, be relieved of what money he had, allowed to run up a debt, and then be shipped as a substitute to take the place of another deserter. The master would pay the seaman's debt and a "finder's fee" to the crimp, both of which were counted against his wages (Clee 1926).

The problem was made worst because it became the predominant means of obtaining employment. Those seaman who did not "frequent" the establishments of the crimps or refused to pay for the privilege of getting employment had a hard time finding a ship. Masters of vessels who did not want to participate in the system had a hard time finding a crew (Forsyth 1987, 1988). The captain of one ship is reported to have admitted that he had "not paid a red cent except by advance note to any crew for over twelve months" (Clee 1926: 657). In some of these cases this represented two years of work. Not until 1872 would there be any attempt to correct this system.

By 1855 the U.S. California and China clippers, ruled the sea, but America had perfected a sailing vessel that was increasingly required to compete with British iron-steam vessels (see Appendix A). To compete with cheaper foreign shipping rates, created by more efficient ships, shipowners had to increase speed and space for cargo. Both crew size and living space per crewmen were reduced. Stable workers started to leave the industry (Hohman 1956; Weintraub 1959; Dillon 1961; Forsyth 1987) and were increasingly replaced by noncitizens. The percentage of U.S. citizens on U.S. ships began to decrease around 1830 and reached a low of about 10 percent at the end of the nineteenth century (Goldberg 1958; Taylor 1923).

As the nation began to switch from shipping to internal development, the philosophy of mercantilism, which guided the maritime industry, was changing into laissez-faire "support." The purpose of government was only to maintain order and security. At sea this meant the immediate and ruthless suppression and punishment of all lawless, disobedient, and disorderly elements (Hohman 1956: 21). As crews became more foreign, the problem of legitimacy became easier since "Americans" were not being abused. This factor also contributed to the lack of public support for seamen, since they were either foreigners or the dregs of U.S. society. Hence, with no public support, the class conflict was mediated through the application of harsh labor laws to control this dangerous class of men (cf. Michalowski 1985).

In 1864 a law was passed in response to more efficient and cheaper foreign shipping, which removed all citizenship requirements for crews on U.S. flagships. The final blow to maritime labor came in 1867 with the elimination of all statutes relating to compulsory U.S. labor. The sole exception to this trend were those laws relating to seamen (Wissman 1942: 6; Goldberg 1958: 15). The end of this period found the merchant marine and conditions aboard ship in decline.

Whereas the theoretical section of this chapter argues that during war the state is able to expand its field of interests, the Civil War offers a contradictory situation. The Confederacy had virtually no ships. The Union had most of the nation's merchant ships, which could be converted into gunboats, in its possession. In response to superior Union naval power, the Confederacy devoted its small force to the commercial raiding of northern vessels. The response of many northern shipowners was to give up flying the American flag. During the course of the war more than 1,000 ships passed from the American flag. A law of 1797 stated that American vessels once foreign could not be repatriated. Thus by the end of the war, the American merchant marine was devastated (Morris 1979).

The Post-Civil War Period, 1868–1897

The post-Civil War period was an era of continual decline for the maritime industry as the U.S. emphasis shifted to internal development. Capital investment had shifted to railroads with little investment made in the shipping industry. Better pay and opportunities for profit beckoned worker and capital into western land development and new manufacturing enterprises (Hohman 1956). "The country's best young men no longer went to sea, nor did its best entrepreneurial talent invest in marine enterprises" (Whitehurst 1983: 3).

The abuses of seafarers were gradually being brought to the public's attention (cf. Dillon 1961: 300-316; Levine 1971), hence the legitimacy of the state was being questioned. Writers such as Melville (1924 [1849]) shocked the public into action. During this second phase of maritime policy, state managers, fulfilling the legitimacy function, responded to those abuses created by the previous phase. They also attempted to deal with the transitional economy created by western expansion. Shipping remained at a low ebb throughout this period, since the government's support was too spasmodic and inadequate to accomplish much. As can be seen in Appendices Β and C, the American fleet during this period was declining in terms of total tonnage and in the percentage of American commerce carried in U.S. flagships. The percentage of American commerce carried on U.S. flagships is generally regarded as a reflection of government support, protective tariffs, and subsidies (Morris 1979: 200-206; Bess and Farris 1981: 1-31). During this stage the state is no longer so dependent on shipping for capital accumulation.

Maritime unions and philanthropic institutions began to become a stronger "voice," causing state managers to become increasingly concerned with the appearance of legitimacy. Apart from the now classic writings of Melville (1924 [1849]) and others, the maritime unions published what was called the Red Record. These books and pamphlets listed in gruesome detail the outrages occurring on American ships (International Seamen's Union 1895). Maritime legislation during the period is indicative of the class conflict within the industry with shipowner interest answering, in legislation, each challenge of labor and its supporters. The result was that nothing improved (cf. MacArthur 1919; Taylor 1923), except the unionization of the labor force.

In an attempt to correct some of the abuse it had helped to create, the federal government passed the Shipping Commissioner's Act of 1872. It was intended to correct the scandalized hiring system. Under this law seamen had to sign articles before a shipping commissioner, thus enabling them to obtain jobs free of charge. Shipowners fought the passage of the act and they apparently won, since the final act included a criminal charge, of up to three months in prison for desertion.

For desertion, by imprisonment for not more than three months, and by forfeiture of all or any part of the clothes or effects he leaves on board, and of all or any part of the wages or emoluments which he has earned. (MacArthur 1919: 110)

Even the commissioner's off...