India's Soft Power

A New Foreign Policy Strategy

Patryk Kugiel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351987165
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

It is sometimes said that, in the 21st century, the country that tells the better story wins, rather than the country whose army can prevail on the battlefield. That ability to attract others, persuade and set the agenda, soft power, plays an increasingly important role in international relations and in Indian foreign policy. However, while most of the rediscovered interest in India has been focused on its hard power attributes, such as its military and economy, this book concentrates on less tangible assets, such as its culture, ideas and people.

The first comprehensive analysis of India's soft power done from an international relations perspective, this book tracks the changes in Indian foreign policy over last two decades to show how soft power strategy, tools and institutions have been given a more prominent place in India's external affairs. The study evaluates India's soft power assets and liabilities and shows how the state is trying to make better use of this potential to realise its national interests. It assesses the effectiveness of India's soft power approach and provides recommendations on possible improvements to make India a major smart power in the future.

An intriguing and comprehensive analysis, it will be valuable for students and scholars interested in Indian foreign policy, soft power theory and international relations. Underlining India's uniqueness, it substantiates the argument that soft power is not confined to the Western world. Thus, it contributes an interesting case study for comparative study of soft powers.

Please note: Taylor & Francis does not sell or distribute the Hardback in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka

1
Soft Power in International Relations: A Conceptual Framework

Power is a central concept in international relations. Yet for such a fundamental idea, it has various definitions bestowed by different schools, and its definition is still regarded as “contested” (Nye, 2011b), “troublesome” (Gilpin, 1981) and “controversial” (Waltz, 1979). Not surprisingly, the idea of soft power shares the same weakness and is even more difficult to define. Over two decades after American scholar Joseph Nye coined the term, soft power is still not fully explained and is often misunderstood. There are ongoing heated debates about its theoretical rigidity and practical applicability. According to some critics, “treatments of soft power have developed little beyond ‘soft theory’” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.25). A fluid concept, its identity often takes on varying interpretations imparted by different people and states. Its vagueness leaves many questions unanswered.

This chapter examines the basic features of soft power and addresses the most important controversies surrounding the term: What constitutes soft power resources? Where does soft power start and hard power end? What is the relationship between the two? How does soft power work and how can it be implemented effectively as a state policy? How can soft power be measured and how can it be made more efficient? In unravelling these questions, the chapter arrives at a broader definition of soft power that includes not only intangible resources but also tangible assets and behaviour that makes countries attractive and legitimate. In doing so it adjusts the concept to better accommodate it in India’s context.

Concept of Power in International Relations

The idea of soft power has evolved in opposition to the dominant discourse of realism in the theory of international relations, which emphasises the roll of a state’[s hard attributes in its pursuit of foreign policy aims. In this school of thought, which can be traced back to thinkers such as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli or Thomas Hobbes, the international system is seen as anarchic, and the principal actors are unitary, self-interested rational states that compete with each other for survival and influence. In order to defend their security and attain other national interests, these self-help-system states tend to accumulate power. Therefore, power becomes a central notion in realism, regarded both as an objective of state policies and a means through which they can influence other actors to act in a desired way. Power is seen as a capability to coerce others to do what one wants, or to do what, in other circumstances, they would not (Dahl, 1961).

According to realist scholars, power is understood in terms of material resources. Kenneth Waltz (1979: p.131) lists these resources as consisting of the “size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.” According to Robert Gilpin (1981: p.13), power is “the military, economic and technological capabilities of states.” For John Mearsheimer (2001: p.55), “power is based on the particular material capabilities that a state possesses,” of which the most crucial are military assets. Although over the years more emphasis was put on economy or technology(rather than just military strength)—in determining a nation’s power, realists tend to focus on tangible and measurable resources.

This is not to say, however, that realists have completely ignored the importance of ideas and perceptions in international affairs. Leading scholars, from E.H. Carr – one of the main representatives of classical realism, to Kenneth Waltz – the founder of the neorealist theory, recognise the role of morals and believe in foreign policy. They are aware of the material power’s limitations and agree it is not the best way to exercise power in all situations, pointing at the power of opinion. Hans Morgenthau, a renowned American foreign policy realist, writes about “the significance of a policy of prestige in an anarchic world” and claims that states should “be alert to international morality and world public opinion in order to maintain their international status” (Lee, 2010c: p.13).

This interest in other, “softer”, forms of power has only grown with the changes in the international system and the emergence of new international relation theories such as liberalism or constructivism. For liberal thinkers who underline the importance of economic interdependence and international laws and institutions for making a more peaceful, stable international system, national power is equated mostly with a strong economy. Constructivism, on the other hand, emphasises the power of ideas and perceptions in describing relations between states, as opposed to security and institutional concerns. Both schools of thought yield evaluation of other dimensions of power rather than focusing singularly on military and economic might.

As against a power based on coercive measures, thinkers like Bachrach and Baratz (1963) suggest a “second face of power” linked to agenda setting and control (Nye, 2011b: p.14). Lukes (1974) and Isaac (1987) then propose a “third face of power” based on the process of cooptation in which “one actor is able to mould preferences and interests of other actors so as to converge closer to its own preferences and interests” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.29). Such consideration over different aspects of power eventually paved the way for soft power, which incorporated the second and third faces of power – agenda setting and co-optation.

The emergence of the soft power theory was preceded by important changes in the international system by the end of the Cold War. According to Nye (1990b: p.160), there were five trends that contributed to the diffusion of power: growing economic interdependence, the rise of transnational actors, strengthened nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues. For Gallarotti (2011: pp.37–39), these enabling factors were: mounting interdependence and globalisation; acquisition of nuclear weapons and modern military technologies by more states; the growth of democracy in the world system; more prosperous and modern populations that were “far less enamoured of a ‘warrior ethic’”; and the growth of international organisations and regimes, making cooperation easier and more natural.

By the end of the 20^th century, it was becoming apparent that the traditional ways of exerting influence were less acceptable. States required other instruments and policies to realise national objectives as “the use of military force became simply more costly for modern great powers than it had been in earlier centuries” (Nye, 2004: p.15). In fact, the majority of contemporary wars have been internal conflicts, and there is less tolerance for solving international disputes through military force. In a new, more interdependent world, hard power policies are less legitimate – and thereby less effective – in attaining national objectives. In Nye’s (2004b: p.69) words: “Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength in war. Today, however, the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force and conquest that marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more significant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important.” Moreover, fast technological development in the 20^th century caused power to pass from the “capital-rich” to the “information-rich”. Consequently, more attention now is granted to instruments based on cooperation, attractiveness and persuasion.

Soft Power and its Criticism

Soft power, along with military and economic power, determines the ability of states to exert influence in foreign relations and realise their national interests. According to the most common definition, soft power “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye, 2004a: X). In the narrowest sense, it is seen as equal to the cultural attractiveness of a country. In a broader perspective, it encompasses everything except military capabilities. In practice, a country’s soft power or “power of attraction”, “co-optive power” stands for its legitimacy, reputation, international credibility, etc.

The term soft power was first coined and popularised by Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr. in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and an article in Foreign Policy, “Soft power”. He subsequently elaborated upon the concept in several books and articles. Nye (1990a: p.154) criticised the traditional understanding of power “as ability to control others” and “associated with the possession of certain re-sources: population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability”. Instead, he claimed, “power is becoming less transferable, less coercive, and less tangible” (ibid: 167). Such resources like “communication, multilateralism, national cohesion, universalistic culture, and international institutions and culture” (Nye, 2004b: p.14)became more important.

Initially, Nye described soft power as “co-optive power” as opposed to hard power, understood as “command power”. Whereas the first is “the ability to shape what others want”, the latter is “the ability to change what others do” (Nye, 1990a: p.267). Soft power rests on “the attractiveness of one’s culture and ideology or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes actors fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic”; hard power, on the other hand, works through “coercion or inducement” (ibid). Soft power co-opts, rather than coerces, people. In other words, whereas “soft power is pull, hard power is push” (Nye, 2011a: p.19). Going beyond the neoliberal school of thought, Nye prioritises ideas and perceptions over economic or military power.

The popularity of soft power did not prevent it from falling under severe criticism. Its critics argue that the soft power concept brings little explanatory and predictive value (Kearn Jr., 2011); that it is too vague and elusive; and that it is practically impossible to measure (Rothman, 2011). Niall Ferguson (2003) writes that “the trouble with soft power is that it’s, well, soft” dismissing its ability to influence behaviour of other states. Scholars point out problems with the applicability of a soft power approach stemming from its relational and contextual character (Nye, 2004; Kearn Jr., 2011; Gallarotti, 2011). Others argue that it brings a false promise of country exceptionalism while also threatening to relegate a military strength’s relevance as a foreign policy tool (Gray, 2011). The debate is far from over, but its multifaceted nature provides an opportunity to clarify four fundamental questions.

What Constitutes Soft Power?

While the cause of a country’s military or economic power is widely understood, the ingredients of soft power are not as self-evident. If soft power is about shaping preferences of other countries, what are the currencies that countries can use to influence choice? What are the resources that make the country a soft power? How is soft power different from hard power? Since there is no single precise and universally accepted definition of soft power, there are several misperceptions regarding its scope and character. For instance, it is a frequent mistake to reduce soft power to culture, or any other of its elements. Here, Nye leaves no doubt—explicitly stating, “soft power is not simply equal to popular cultural power” (Nye, 2004: p.11). Not to be dumbed-down, soft power is a much more complex phenomenon encompassing many other resources. Another mistake is to identify soft power with one of the tools through which soft power works – be it public diplomacy or cultural promotion. While soft power can manifest itself in certain policies or activities, it is not confined to these elements. Moreover, soft power is sometimes seen as a moral or idealistic policy, whereas, in reality, soft power does not necessitate morality. Like any resource, soft power can be used for good reasons, such as building trust and confidence, and for bad, such as rationalisation of an unjust invasion. “But soft power is a description, not an ethical prescription. Like any form of power, it can be wielded for good or ill” (Nye, 2006a). This presents an identity crisis: If soft power is not defined by the above characteristics, then what is it actually?

Nye claimed, originally, that soft power is associated with “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and international institutions” (Nye, 1990b: p.167). He has since changed the scope of a country’s soft power to include three slightly different elements: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad); and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (Nye, 2004a: p.11). In this classical sense, soft power is differentiated from military power and economic power according to the criteria of tangibility. Thus, soft power would not include any material resources, such as money transferred abroad in the form of foreign assistance.

Most soft power researchers followed Nye’s definition to the letter, and they tended to see soft power resources as intangible – as opposed to concrete assets of hard military and economic power. For instance, Hymans (2009: p.235) claims that “soft power is based on intangibles: less emphasis on what you own, and more on what you represent. In other words, soft power is the ability to make others do what you want on the basis of how they see you.” But this simple juxtaposition of soft and hard power resources as tangible and intangible assets is confusing and does not properly convey the whole picture.

In fact, neither good institutions nor attractive culture can function properly when separated from a secure material base and financial support. Culture not only comprises intangible ideas and values, but also, or mostly, material artefacts and products. For instance, a good Bollywood movie cannot be produced without access to a budget. Similarly, technological progress would stall without certain economic investments. Undeniably, a country’s economic wealth and prosperity is what makes it attractive to others. Hence, economic strength may itself be a powerful source of soft power.

It is not by coincidence that countries regarded as strong soft power holders are usually the most affluent and developed nations, while the poorest and underdeveloped rank lowest on the scale. Not many Americans or Norwegians would like to settle down in Afghanistan or the Democratic Republic of Congo, whereas most Afghans and DRC citizens would probably jump at the opportunity to immigrate to the US or Europe. Some initiatives, like the Gross Happiness Index, promoted by countries like Bhutan, may be interesting propositions, but in today’s materialistic world, such indices are seen as a curiosity rather than a real assessment of national prowess; in this globalised era, a high position on the Human Development Index matters much more than a position on the Gross Happiness Index.

Nye himself is rather muddled when explaining the differences between soft and hard power resources. He writes that “soft power does not depend on hard power” (Nye, 2004a: p.9), but at the same time, he hails American technological achievements and economic progress as important sources of US attractiveness. In one place, he regards all economic tools, such as foreign aid or economic sanctions, as hard power tools, only to admit in other texts that soft power instruments include “public diplomacy, broadcasting, exchange programs, development assistance, disaster relief, military-to-military contacts” (Nye, 2011b: p.228). It seems that Gulio Gallarotti (2011: p.34) is correct when he claims: “although there is a tendency to equate hard power with tangible resources and soft power with intangible resources, their principal distinction does not depend on tangibility.”

Contrary to Nye’s initial claim, soft power cannot exist in a void, but is precluded by strong foundations of hard power. The attractiveness of a country is closely connected with its economic strength, and to a large extent, soft power stems from a country’s hard power. As Kearn (2011: p.74) rightly argues: “without a certain amount of hard power resources, it is exceedingly difficult to envision a state possessing a significant degree of soft power.” In practice, there is no single example of a country that can exert significant influence on the global arena by being strong exclusively in soft power while lacking hard power resources (economic or military). Even Nye is guilty of such oversight: he uses Norway as an example, which plays a disproportionately large role in the international arena due to its soft power assets, but he forgets that Norway is one of the wealthiest and most developed countries in the world.

Similarly, for many realists, “unless a nation is equipped with sufficient military capabilities and material resources, the exercise of its soft power only creates a hollow voice in real world situations” (Lee, 2010c; p.14). It seems this is actually well understood in India. As Indian author and proponent of the soft power concept Shashi Tharoor explains (2008: p.43) about mistakes in past Indian policy: “the great flaw in Nehruji’s approach was that his soft power was unrelated to any acquisition of hard power; and as the humiliation of 1962 demonstrated, soft power becomes credible when there is hard power behind it.” Simply put, no one wants to emulate an example of a weak or poor state. Rothman (2011: pp.56–7) is absolutely right when he says that a critical category for any country’s soft power is “success”. Other countries are prone to embrace certain norms, ideals and policies of another state when they see such qualities are the source of prosperity and strength. As Rothman observes in the case of America, “countries emulate the US culture of policy practices abroad because of an innate attraction based on success” (ibid: 57).

In this sense, Nye’s narrow definition – according to which soft power entails only culture, political values and foreign policies – is incomplete. Consequently, it is necessary to expand the definition to include more elements. Even if the core soft power resources are intangible, material assets also form the country’s power of attraction. Soft power legitimises states and increases their attractiveness in the eyes of others. In the absence of economic or technological achievements, the state can promote its success in culture or political organisation, but a country’s soft power comes from myriad sources.

If the difference between soft and hard power is not tangibility, then what is that allows us to distinguish between the two? Nye claims (2011b: p.19) we need to differentiate between “power resources” and “power behaviour”, as “misunderstanding and much of the criticism of [his] theory comes from confusion between these two.” This means that soft power derives not only from specific resources but also from the certain behaviour of states that is seen as legitimate and attractive by others. It is a matter of possession balanced with use. Hard power works through coercion, command, and threats to realise its aims; soft power works through persuasion, attraction and seduction. In this sense, hard power resources, including military assets, can be a source of soft power if they are used properly. In other words, “the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use” (Gallarotti, 2011: p.35).

In behavioural terms, Nye explains, (2011b: p.19) “resources often associated with hard power behaviour can also produce soft power behaviour depending on the context and how they are used. Command power can create resources that create soft power at a later stage, for example, institutions that will provide soft power resources in the future. Similarly, co-optive behaviour can be used to generate hard power resources in the form of military alliance or economic aid.” For instance, military tools can produce soft power for a country when they are used in a humanitarian mission (e.g., in 2004, the US and India used their naval forces during the rescue operation after the tsunami in Asia), dispatched for the UN peacekeeping missions or holding joint exercises with friendly armies. Some scholars propose a certain category of “soft military power” to describe military behaviour that generates soft power (Ladwig III, 2010). On the other hand, “misuse of military resources can undercut soft power” (Nye, 2006: p.11). Likewise, economic resources can create soft power when offered as development assistance or foreign direct investments, but the same such assets would undermine soft power when used as a threat of econom...