India-Russia Post Cold War Relations

A New Epoch of Cooperation

Chandra Rekha

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351987134
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political History & Theory
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Post Cold War international relations have undeniably been a litmus test for the bilateral relations between India and Russia. With the emergence of a new international system, the foreign policies of both countries vacillated to explore new avenues of partnerships with other international players, an opportunity that otherwise proved effective to a large extent. National priorities and the geo-political architecture remodelled by the US, thus, compelled New Delhi and Moscow to pursue a foreign policy that moved away from serving the interests of each other. While defining the trends in the bilateral relations between the two countries, the strategic community has questioned whether the relationship can remain as special and strategic as it had been in the past. Are both countries still as relevant to one another as they once were?

As the constant debate revolves around these questions, the two entities have, however, indicated a certain level of distinguishing characteristics in order to address the complexities and challenges in the partnership and have acknowledged that their relationship is not only special but also indispensable. What has also continued to remain undamaged and an integral part of the bilateral relations is mutual trust, understanding and concern, thus, resulting in maturity and pragmatism, irrespective of the uncertainties that the two countries face. It is in this context, that the new stage in the bilateral relations between the two countries requires a thorough assessment. It stands to reason that with the developments that are taking place in the current international milieu, there is a need for India and Russia to reemphasise their strong strategic partnership, goodwill and diplomatic trust that have stood the test of time. This book undertakes a serious assessment of the strategic partnership in the contemporary international set up. The seven chapters of the book attempt to address the myriad challenges through detailed analyses and evaluation of the partnership between India and Russia in various spheres, including the political, defence, economic, nuclear, energy, science and technology, security, and strategic engagement.

Please note: Taylor & Francis does not sell or distribute the Hardback in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka

1.
Evolution of India-Russia Bilateral Relations in the Post Cold War Era

India and Russia are fast emerging as potential global players in international affairs in the post Cold War era. The bilateral interaction between the two countries is transforming into a broader engagement. Additionally, both countries have displayed immense resilience and understanding in the partnership despite the complexities, issues and challenges that have surfaced not only in the reciprocal context but also in the current international system. It is true that the foreign policy approach of New Delhi and Moscow has vacillated since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Conversely, it has also permeated in its scope and strength and, hence, it will be an unlikely scenario that the developments in the existing geo-political architecture will unsettle the special rapport between the two countries. Having realised the existence of myriad challenges in the bilateral ties, the unfolding of historical circumstances will aid in disregarding the growing contradiction in policy interests between the two countries. Hence, historical evidence will assist in substantiating why India and Russia will continue to maintain an indispensable partnership as the evolution of the relations between them has laid the foundation for strong bilateral ties despite both countries pursuing independent and pragmatic foreign policy principles in the contemporary world order.

The end of World War II and the beginning of the bipolar system saw the emergence of many nation states after the overthrow of colonial rule. These events brought drastic changes in the foreign policies of many countries that aimed to promote and protect their core national interests. The foreign policies of these countries also ensured that they maintained their political independence and the security of the region much in line with the existence of a bipolar world. The newly independent states in the 20th century, thus, played a significant role in shaping the contours of international politics. However, the policy-makers of both Soviet Russia and India realised the significance and prospects of the partnership in the bipolar world and, hence, altered their respective policy approaches to further enhance the relevance and influence of the strategic partnership.

Consequently, this chapter reviews the evolution of the bilateral relations between India and Russia in the post Cold War era alongside a brief historical survey of the factors and conditions that prompted the two allies to develop a strong partnership during the Cold War period. The chapter has been divided into two sections. The first section aims to understand the foreign policies of Soviet Russia and India during the Cold War era, and the factors and circumstances that motivated their international behaviour. This segment also provides an insight into the decisions of the leaders and policy-makers of both countries, their goals towards stronger ties, keeping in mind the international system in the bipolar world and the shifts that took place in their respective foreign policy orientations. It also seeks to provide a chronological framework of the impact of the Cold War period on the relations between India and the Soviet Union. The second section of the chapter focusses on the developments that took place in the bilateral relations between India and Russia in the post Cold War period, the predicaments that emerged in the initial phase of the Soviet disintegration, the policies and reforms that were initiated by the two entities to strengthen bilateral ties, and the external factors that influenced the changes in the foreign policy approach in the strategic partnership of the two countries.

In order to draw out the essence of the strategic culture that has evolved in India’s and Russia’s foreign policy outlook, let us look into the various factors that have determined the international behaviour of both New Delhi and Moscow. The foundation of the strategic culture of both India and Russia can mainly be attributed to the events and developments of the 20th century which were mostly an outcome of internal factors such as culture, economic status, demography of the state, ideology, personality cult and the role of political elites in determining the foreign policy doctrine, while the external factors include the status quo in the international system, coalitions with other countries, foreign threats and, more importantly, change in the balance of power.

Historical Background of Indo-Soviet Relations during Cold War Period

During the Cold War period, the world was divided into two superpower blocs: one dominated by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union. While this period saw the struggle for status quo and balance of power post World War II, it also marked the end of the ultra-nationalist ideologies of Fascism, Nazism, Racism, Colonialism and Imperialism. There was decolonisation of the Asian, African and Latin American countries that led to the emergence of many new states, including India, which gained independence in 1947 from the British Empire. The decolonisation movement triumphed as world politics after the end of World War II was enshrined in the United Nations’ concept of national self-determination and global development.¹ These newly independent states ventured into the international system and global power structure, though not as advanced or developed in economic or military power as the Western and Euro-centric countries. As a result, many of these fledgling states relied on the developed countries, especially for economic aid and military assistance, which, in turn, led to the formation of alliances with either of the two superpower blocs.

Nevertheless, both superpower blocs tried to bring these newly independent states under their wings to secure new markets as well as to broaden the scope of their respective ideology. Interestingly, much to the dismay of the two power blocs, a few of the newly independent countries, including India, chose a different path in the bipolar system. These countries adopted an independent foreign policy approach which stood against the new global power structure and aimed to establish peace, freedom and equal cooperation among countries.

The experiences of President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India led them to work together in developing a common approach for the formation of a new movement for the fledgling states. Non-alignment was chosen as the instrument of foreign policy during the Cold War by the founder leaders as it was seen as a political framework of reference within which they could structure their foreign policies more comprehensively.²

Paradoxically, the international milieu and geo-politics of the Cold War created security concerns for India as the United States developed closer ties with Pakistan. Islamabad joined the Western bloc by signing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and, subsequently, the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). This apprehension further exacerbated with China emerging as the ‘all-weather’ friend of Islamabad. Unfortunately, India could not confront the diabolical alliance of Islamabad-Washington-Beijing with its limited capabilities. Although India enjoyed a special diplomatic relationship with Moscow and remained non-aligned in the initial period of the Cold War politics, the unravelling of the geo-politics of the South Asian region and the security threats led both India and the Soviet Union to develop a stronger partnership which evidently led to the signing of the 1971 treaty.

As mentioned earlier, the ties between India and the Soviet Union initially were distant. Though Prime Minister (PM) Nehru had expressed admiration for the Soviet Union’s rapid economic transformation, the Kremlin regarded India as a “tool of Anglo-American imperialism”. However, after Josef Stalin’s death in 1953, the Soviet Union expressed its hopes for “friendly cooperation” with India. This aim was prompted by the Soviet decision to broaden its international contacts and develop ties with the non-aligned and newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Nehru’s state visit to the Soviet Union in June 1955 was the first of its kind for an Indian premier. It was followed by the trip of Premier Nikolai Bulganin and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev to India in November and December 1955 respectively. The Soviet leaders endorsed the entire range of Indian foreign policy based on the Panchsheel and supported India’s position against Pakistan on Kashmir. The Soviet Union also supported India’s position vis-à-vis Portugal on Goa, which was territorially integrated into India as a union territory by the Indian armed forces in December 1961 (it became a state in May 1987).³

Furthermore, India’s economic arrangements with the Soviet Union contributed to its emergence as a significant industrial power through the construction of plants to produce steel, heavy machinery and equipment, machine tools and precision instruments and also to generate power and extract and refine petroleum. In addition, the Soviet investment in India was mostly in the public sector industries which the World Bank and Western industrial powers refused to assist. Soviet aid was also extended on the basis of long-term, government-to-government programmes, which covered successive phases of technical training for Indians, supply of raw materials, progressive use of Indian inputs, and markets for finished products. Bilateral arrangements were made in non-convertible national currencies, helping to conserve India’s scarce foreign exchange. These factors brought India closer to Moscow and by the 1960s, the Soviet Union had become the second largest national contributor to India’s developmental programme based on the Five-Year Plans of India for economic development.⁴ Apart from the economic factors, strategic outreach guided India to develop stronger ties with the erstwhile Soviet Russia due to the security challenges that emerged post India’s independence.

During the security crises between India and its neighbours, Nehru obtained a Soviet commitment of neutrality on the India-China border dispute, especially during the 1962 Sino-India War. Throughout the India-Pakistan War of 1965 also, the Soviet Union acted with the United States in the UN Security Council to bring about a ceasefire. Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin went a step further by offering his good offices to negotiate a settlement, which took place at Tashkent on January 10, 1966. Until 1969, the Soviet Union took an even-handed position in South Asian geo-politics and supplied a limited quantity of arms to Pakistan in 1968. India, on the other hand, from 1959, had accepted Soviet offers of military sales. Indian acquisition of Soviet military equipment was important because purchases were made against deferred rupee payments—a major concession to India’s chronic shortage of foreign exchange. Simultaneously, provisions were also made for licensed manufacture and modification in India, a criterion of self-reliant defence on which India placed increasing emphasis. Nonetheless, Soviet sales were made without any demands for restricted deployment, adjustments in Indian policies toward other countries, adherence to Soviet global policies or acceptance of Soviet military advisers. In this way, the Indian national autonomy was not compromised.⁵

It can be said that during the Cold War period, India followed a different path unlike many other decolonised countries that became allies of either of the two superpower blocs. The objective of adopting non-alignment as its foreign policy was to ensure strategic autonomy without the interference of ‘alien’ actors in the politics and decision-making process of independent India. Ironically, India, in its embryonic stage, required political, economic and strategic support from other international players as it was yet to establish and stabilise the country’s domestic and international status post colonial rule. Moreover, it faced security challenges from its neighbouring countries and, hence, required defence capabilities to safeguard its boundaries from external threats. Additionally, India was yet to enjoy the fruits of industrialisation as it had neither the finance to invest in indigenous development of defence equipment nor the required skilled labour force. These vulnerabilities of free India became the appropriate circumstances for the superpower blocs to penetrate the subcontinent.

While Nehru adopted non-alignment as his foreign policy doctrine, Mrs. Indira Gandhi interpreted this strategy as a flexible equation dependent on the changing circumstances and the particular impact of its policies on the national interests of the country. Hence, India’s relations with other countries were in accordance with the needs and requirements of its national priorities. As a result of the close relationship with the socialist state systems and its unqualified support on critical issues, India, under the leadership of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, began to view the Soviet Union as a natural ally.⁶ In the following years, this led to India’s inclination towards the Soviet Union and a compromise of its non-alignment principles.

India and the USSR signed the coveted “Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” on August 9, 1971. Eventually, the USSR became one of the paramount partners in the international forum for India during the bipolar world system. The Soviet involvement in the partnership with India began to take shape as an altruistic alliance as the USSR became the largest supplier of military equipment and its restrictions on the use and provision of technology were far less compared to those of the other defence equipment supplying nations. This also helped in developing the public sector industries such as iron and steel which the US was reluctant to help with. Accordingly, it is important to assess the relevance of the 1971 Treaty in further strengthening the ties between India and the Soviet Union.

Several events took place during the 1970s that persuaded India to be more inclined towards the Soviet Union for friendship despite being one of the advocates of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the bipolar politics. The crisis in East Pakistan and the huge inflow of refugees into the Indian states of Assam, Tripura and Meghalaya⁷ further enhanced India’s security concerns. The United States and China guaranteed Pakistan support against India. During the July 1971 meeting between Henry Kissinger and Chou En-Lai, the Chinese administration expressed its consent to launching a military intervention against India on behalf of Islamabad. Having faced a war against China in 1962, India was desperate to avert another Chinese attack.⁸ Furthermore, the improved Sino-US relations had emboldened China to be unreceptive to Indian overtures and it declared that it was ready to intervene militarily on behalf of Islamabad.

As a result of the emerging Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis,⁹ Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the Soviet Union to discuss the situation in East Pakistan. She received unqualified support from the Soviet leaders, who conveyed to her that they viewed the East Pakistan/Bengal problem as an issue that could only be settled by war with the Pakistani generals, and that the Kremlin would provide India all-out support and assistance in that eventuality. The geo-political interests of the axis led India and the Soviet Union to attempt to neutralise it.¹⁰

The treaty of 1971 epitomised the special relationship between India and the then USSR, and also acted as a guarantor of regional peace. The treaty was signed for a period of 20 years with an automatic extension of five years for each subsequent period. It was signed by External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh on behalf of India and External Affairs Minister A.A Gromkyo, on behalf of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics. It also put a stamp of legali...