Politics, Public Policy and Social Protection in Africa

Evidence from Cash Transfer Programmes

Nicholas Awortwi, Emmanuel Remi Aiyede, Nicholas Awortwi, Emmanuel Remi Aiyede

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781351716819
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Africa is now in a much-improved position to support its poor and vulnerable people. It has more money, more policy commitment and abundant intervention programmes. Yet the number of citizens living lives of desperation, or at risk of destitution, is at an all-time high, and still rising. What is turning such positive prospects into such a disappointing result?

Politics, Public Policy and Social Protection in Africa reveals key answers, drawing on empirical studies of cash transfer programmes in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. Social cash transfer might be the most effective "safety net" formula to emerge so far. The country chapters in this book explore why it works and how it might be harnessed for poverty alleviation. The studies uncover the very different motives of donors, politicians and the poor themselves for making it their preferred choice; why governments are not expanding the donor-driven pilot programmes as expected, and why ruling elites are not trying to help or hinder a concept which, on the face of it, could derail one of their most lucrative gravy trains.

This book will be of value and interest to researchers and students of African politics, African social policy and sociology, as well as policy maker and donors.

1
Politics, public policy and social protection in Africa

An introduction and overview

Nicholas Awortwi

Introduction

African political and social institutions are not strangers to the principles of social assistance. Solidarity with orphans, persons with disability and older persons has always been the glue that knits African households, extended families and communities together as societies. Ubuntu, Ujaama and Harambee all describe the common African philosophy of ‘I am because you are’ (Metz, 2007; Eze, 2008; Swanson, 2012; Aina and Moyo, 2013). However, after many countries attained independence and with increasing urbanisation, globalisation, commodification of labour and changing perspectives of what constitutes a modern society, African egalitarian tradition has undergone major ‘structural transformation’ (Giddens, 1990). The social assistance model embedded in traditional African societies has been translated into increasing expectations of the State as the provider of welfare services (Aina et al., 2004; Adesina, 2007). In the mid-1980s, as African governments cut back on expenditure on welfare services as a result of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the disposable incomes of households were squeezed and social assistance to the poor and vulnerable became precarious.¹

The implementation of SAPs meant that the rich and the poor were to negotiate their own life chances through the market, irrespective of their capacity to do so. The neo-liberal ideology was that economic growth, inflation control, balanced budget and minimalist government would result in a broad-based development that would benefit all. The neo-liberals were wrong! The 1997 East Asia crisis brought home the message that growth alone was not enough to lift people from poverty (de Haan, 2011:351).

Since 2000 there have been considerable efforts by development partners and African governments to give money directly to the poor and vulnerable as an essential component of social protection programmes (Hanlon et al., 2010; Ferguson, 2015). While giving money has been part of Africa’s egalitarian history and is well documented in studies on African patronage systems, as a formal written policy instrument the model is relatively new.

Perhaps the most important recent shift is acceptance by development partners that the practice works. It actually does tackle vulnerability, alleviate poverty and improve economic inclusiveness and social development. In fact Western donors and multi-lateral financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF – hitherto always critical of the Africa patronage system (World Bank, 1989b; 1992) have now become cheerleaders of the social cash transfer² programme: a non-contributory assistance to people without any other means to support themselves and their households.

Cash transfer to the poor, people with disability, older persons, orphans and vulnerable children and the destitute is gradually becoming a popular social protection programme in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It can be given either conditionally (e.g. beneficiaries must fulfil requirements like sending their children to school or attending antenatal care) or unconditionally. Hanlon et al. argue that simply giving money to the poor – without any strings attached – might be the most promising approach not just for avoiding hardship and reducing poverty, but for long-term development as well (2010).

From 2000 to 2009, there were more than 120 social cash transfer programmes in Africa (Garcia and Charity, 2012). The State of Social Safety Net report 2015 shows that from 2012 to 2014, the number of SSA countries implementing cash assistance programmes had increased from 20 to 40 (World Bank, 2015). While stopping short of calling the system a magic bullet, scholars and development practitioners celebrated cash transfers within and outside Africa as effective instruments for poverty reduction and inclusive development (Barrientos and Hulme, 2008; Hanlon et al., 2010). This acclaim is perhaps second only to the Grameen Bank social finance model.

While the number of countries implementing social cash transfer programmes is increasing, there is also a change in economic, social and political context and narrative. Over a decade, many African countries have experienced consistent economic growth. The banner ‘Africa rising’ as clearly narrated by the Economist³ is real. Six out of the ten fastest growing economies in the world for the past five years are in Africa (ACET, 2014; AfDB, 2015). However, a ‘rising tide does not lift all boats’ and the Asia crisis in the 1990s confirms this adage. Growing economies in Africa have not provided increasing and inclusive job opportunities and income growth, so poverty and inequality are both rising. These are direct drivers of conflict and State insecurity in the region (Nelson, 1998; Akokpari, 2007). Giving cash to the poor and vulnerable is therefore a key strategy to integrate the poor and make them feel the benefit of changing economic fortune.

There are many stakeholders in the congested African policy-making terrain who argue for expansion of the cash transfer programmes because there is fiscal space in a growing economy to absorb the cost (UNICEF, 2009; Hagen-Zanker and Tavakoli, 2011; Ortiz et al., 2015). Conversely, analyses across 90 developing countries by Ravallion suggest that the fiscal space is limited for redistribution to the poor even if one maintains no more than the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day (2009). Critics of cash transfer suggest that social assistance is expensive and has the tendency to create disincentives in the labour market, promote dependency and deplete still relatively scarce public funds that could otherwise be employed for ‘productive’ investment (Bonilla and Gruat, 2003:1).

Currently, in many countries in Africa less than 10 per cent of the eligible population has access to State social assistance. For example, in 2009 cash transfers covered only 3 per cent of eligible households in Zambia, only 8 per cent in Malawi and 9 per cent in Kenya. If calculated in terms of all poor households, the programmes cover less than 1 per cent, 2 per cent and 4 per cent respectively (McCord, 2009). Recent figures suggest that there has been progress in coverage. In Kenya, the number of households increased from 226,630 in 2012 to 450,000 in 2014 out of an estimated two million households (22.5 per cent) that were eligible for cash transfer (Mwasiaji, 2015:1). In Zambia, only 145,000 households in 50 districts are covered out of an estimated 1.5 million considered eligible (9.6 per cent) (Michelo, 2015:1).

To unconditionally transfer public money to a section of the population and not all is a matter of public policy, which in itself is a political decision (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013). Depending on the level of citizens’ political participation, decisions on how much of the State budget can be devoted to social assistance may be subjected to a democratic process. That leads to another changing context in the Africa-rising narrative – the nature of political turnaround. By 2000 almost all African countries had changed from military or one-party regimes to various forms of multi-party democracy (Carbone, 2007:4) providing opportunity for multiple actors to claim space for differing interests.

Social protection has attracted an especial diversity of actors, and politics has been central to discussions on whether there can be expansion of cash transfer programmes beyond piloting. Yet this issue remains substantially under-researched, in particular the examination of the political economy context. Recent studies and publications (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Kelsall, 2013; Hickey et al., 2015) demonstrate the overbearing influence of politics on all development interventions, including social protection. Studies and consultancy reports have provided excellent recommendations on ways to enhance ‘implementation’ of cash assistance programmes, but have not interrogated the incentive for governments and many stakeholders to expand the concept. Instead, it is assumed that the primary interest of politicians is to effectively reduce poverty. While this may be correct to some degree, the action (and inaction!) of politicians may suggest otherwise. It’s important to state a priori that in the real world, political actors are also – and often primarily – interested in gaining net benefits for themselves. While giving money directly to the poor to some extent reduces the diversion of funds, it could work to the particular advantage of those who engage in patronage politics – still an endemic problem despite some progress in democratisation and institutionalisation of good governance. So to what extent has this form of politics informed the formulation, implementation and expansion of social cash transfer policies and programmes in Africa?

Development partners fund a substantial part of Africa’s social assistance programmes but sustainable implementation would require State funding. The International Labour Organization (ILO) suggests that a minimum package of social protection benefits, including targeted social assistance, universal old-age pensions and child benefits could be affordable, costing just over 1.8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) annually for a number of low-income countries (ILO, 2008; UNRISD, 2010:140). Table 1.1 shows that in seven African countries, none would spend above 3.1 per cent of estimated government expenditure.

Table 1.1 Cost of providing a social transfer equivalent to US$0.50 a day (in purchasing power parity terms) to the poorest 10 per cent of households

	Cost of benefit (US$ millions)	As percentage of GDP	Aspercentage of estimated government expenditure	Aspercentage of development assistance (2003 level)
Burkina Faso	13.4	0.3	1.8	3.0
Cameroun	27.8	0.2	1.2	3.1
Ethiopia	50.8	0.7	2.4	3.4
Guinea	6.3	0.2	0.7	2.7
Kenya	77.2	0.5	1.7	16.0
Senegal	10.4	0.1	0.6	2.3
Tanzania	82.4	0.7	3.1	4.9

Source: (Ncube and Basil, 2012:11, quoting ILO, 2008)

In Senegal for example it would cost as little as 0.6 per cent. The cost of providing an old-age pension of US$0.50 a day to all people over 65 would be only slightly more expensive, between 1.3 per cent (in Guinea) and 3.7 per cent (in Tanzania) (Ncube and Basil, 2012). Does this suggest that extending cash transfer programmes to a greater number of people is affordable but governments are simply not committed to provision? Or perhaps African governments are just too careful about expanding the coverage of cash assistance programmes, lest it begins to reverse current economic growth? Does allocation of State budget to cash transfer programmes – compared with what development partners provide – suggest differences in government policy priority and ownership of social protection? What evidence is available about Africa governments’ commitment to progressive expansion of cash transfer programmes after donor governments provided the seed capital? As international agencies and donors fund social assistance programmes they also influence the public policy direction and priorities (Barrientos, 2004; McCord, 2009). If that is the case, how can one describe ownership of these policies and programmes at the national context?

The changing perspective of economic, political and social context in Africa now provides a good starting point for serious analysis of the extent to which the current fortunes may have influenced the increasing interest or disinterest in expansion of cash transfer. It is evident that Africa is rising, but understanding the extent to which this matters in shaping design, coverage, funding and implementation of cash transfer is limited. This book provides evidence from five countries, and these provide intriguing insights into the political economy conditions that have informed the adoption, formulation, implementation and progress of cash transfer.

Over 18 months, the researchers conducted extensive interviews with key stakeholders comprising government officials, programme implementation staff, beneficiaries, politicians, academics, and development-funding partners – to piece together the political economy of cash transfer, from both historical and current narratives. The study approach was akin to process tracing (Gerring, 2007: 172–185). The studies analysed the power, ideas, incentives and motivations faced by key stakeholders. Each of the five country studies addressed two over-arching questions:

1. How do political, economic, social, historical and institutional factors and actors support the drive for or resistance to social assistance in general and cash transfer in partic...