Chapter One
Situating the Explorations: âThirty Years of Hermeneuticsâ (1996)
This essay was written for the International Symposium on the Interpretation of the Bible in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 17â20 September 1996, and published by The Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and Sheffield Academic Press, in 1998. I have edited the text a little here and there to take account of any observation that has been overtaken by events since 1996, or which otherwise might have been unclear.
The style and content of these first two essays differ in character from the other contributions included in this collection. All of the other essays are primarily research publications. By contrast this first article is an autobiographical account of my developing concerns from 1964 to 1996. I considered omitting it from this volume, but it provides an easily readable introduction to an agenda that has motivated much of my research and writing since 1964. I have indicated in particular the contexts and motivations that have influenced my work at each stage.
Professor José Kra
ovec has granted me a rare privilege, namely to offer âat least a short summary of your hermeneutical worksâ. One could hardly volunteer such an enterprise, without undue self-advertisement. However, in response to this gracious invitation, I propose to trace how a series of issues emerged from a developing context of ideas in teaching and research in hermeneutics in four universities of the United Kingdom over some thirty years.
I shall also offer some tentative comments about prospects for the discipline. Here the issue of the challenge of postmodern perspectives looms large, and readers may note parallels, although not necessarily full agreements, with the contentions of Professor David J.A. Clines who writes elsewhere in this volume [that is, that published by the Slovenian Academy], and with whom I worked as a close colleague in the University of Sheffield from 1970 to 1985.1
I
Work on Fuchs, Wittgenstein and Austin (Bristol, 1964â70)
I was teaching in the University of Bristol when a student asked my advice about English-language books on hermeneutics. This seemingly innocent question initiated me into an almost fruitless literature search. Richard E. Palmerâs Hermeneutics (1969) had not yet appeared, and Hans-Georg Gadamerâs Wahrheit und Methode awaited translation successively in 1975 and again freshly in 1989. I had already worked both on NT interpretation and on the philosophy of language, especially on Wittgenstein, and these interacted to make me discontented with the more traditional textbooks on âbiblical interpretationâ. Alongside these unimaginative text-books on biblical interpretation, there seemed to be only Robert W. Funkâs Language, Hermeneutic and Word of God (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) and the volume edited by James Robinson and J. Cobb Jr, New Frontiers in Theology: II, The New Hermeneutic (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
I was also invited to deliver a paper at Oxford on âThe New Hermeneuticâ. I had already written a review on Ebelingâs Word and Faith (1963), but now set myself to draft an outline of Ernst Fuchsâs major writings, together with my own critical survey of Gadamerâs Truth and Method. I was impressed by the notion of projected âworldsâ into which the reader was drawn, especially where these ânarrative worldsâ constituted precognitive value-systems into which the reader was seduced or enticed, only to find the world and the readerâs expectations subverted and reversed. Fuchs undertook an excellent piece of work on the âreversalâ of expectations of (mere) âjusticeâ alone in the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard in Matthew 20:1â16.2 I pressed on to explore âworldhoodâ in Heideggerâs Being and Time, since Fuchs openly expressed his indebtedness to this work.
However, I came to believe that not all was well on the level of the philosophy of language. Funk had described the view of Fuchs on language-event (Sprachereignis) as âperformativeâ.3 But from 1963 I had become increasingly familiar with the work of Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. Austinâs âperformativesâ presupposed institutional states of affairs and specific contextual conventions, whereas Heidegger and Fuchs regarded assertions, propositions and conventions as at best derivative and secondary to a kind of force that was different from Austinâs illocutionary acts. I expressed this combination of appreciation and unease in âThe Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchsâs Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophyâ in 1970.4
I had been further alerted to the problems left by the âdevaluingâ of assertions in Heidegger and Gadamer by reading Wolfhart Pannenberg on hermeneutics. In 1969 my wife and I had the great privilege of entertaining Professor and Frau Pannenberg in our Bristol home for a few days, and his incisive oral comments on this issue convinced me further of this point. Pannenberg has always remained a major influence on my thinking. I attempted to present a balanced critique of the New Hermeneutic of Fuchs and Ebeling in the volume New Testament Interpretation. I wrote my essay in 1973â74, although it did not appear until 1977.5 Meanwhile I remained concerned to draw equally on the Anglo-American tradition of philosophical analysis and on Continental European traditions. I viewed Wittgenstein as a key figure, who combined the incisiveness and rigour which largely characterized British analytical philosophy with the Continental suspicion of exclusively rationalist method and with a deeper concern about human subjectivity and life-worlds.6 In Wittgenstein this was formulated in terms of âforms-of-lifeâ and âlanguage-gamesâ. Wittgensteinâs observations on Frazerâs The Golden Bough offers a seminal hermeneutic.7
II
Teaching Hermeneutics as an Interdisciplinary Course (Sheffield, 1970â85)
A decisive turning-point occurred for me when I moved to the University of Sheffield in 1970. Our Head of Department at Sheffield, Professor James Atkinson, gave his younger colleagues every encouragement to explore new avenues of enquiry and to design fresh courses for students. He encouraged me to design what I believe to be the first final-year Honours degree course in hermeneutics for students in Biblical Studies, Biblical Studies and English, or Philosophy and Theology. It was thus inter-disciplinary from the first, combining biblical studies, theology, philosophy and literary theory. I was warmly welcomed into the Department of Philosophy, where I offered public lectures on Wittgenstein in 1971â72, and into the Department of Linguistics where I shared some teaching on semantics and (later) shared doctoral supervision. The stage was set for teaching a full critical survey of hermeneutical theory, in the context of research in biblical studies, the philosophy of language, and literary theory.
My work on semantics and on persuasive definition led to âThe Meaning of Sarx in 1 Cor. 5:5: A Fresh Approach in the Light of Logical and Semantic Factorsâ.8 What Paul perceived as âto be destroyedâ, I urged, was the incestuous manâs disposition of complacent self-sufficiency, not his physical body. Paul had redefined sarx in the way that conveyed his theological point, and exclusion from the church was to lead to the manâs salvation by striking at the root of his self-confidence. This more philosophical work on âpersuasive definitionâ is nowadays seen more clearly in semiotic terms. An excellent example is John Mooreâs appeal to the notion of âcode-switchingâ in Eco.9 However, I felt that my most creative use of J.L. Austin appeared in âThe Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writingsâ.10 O. Grether, W. Zimmerli, L. DĂŒrr and even Gerhard von Rad had ascribed the âpowerâ of words in the OT to their being Kraftgeladen in some causal sense, as âan objective reality endowed with mysterious powerâ.11 Zimmerli spoke of a world of curse or of blessing as âa missile with a time-fuseâ.12 But Austin clearly drew a contrast between the causal force of perlocutionary speech-acts and the institutional force of illocutionary acts. A curse or a blessing could not be recalled not because it carries a mysterious Kraftgeladen word-magic, but because while the Hebrew-Christian tradition carries institutional procedures for, for example, âI blessâ, âI baptizeâ, âI commit this body to the groundâ, it has no such procedure for âI un-blessâ, âI un-baptizeâ, âI un-commit this body out of the ground againâ.
During my Sheffield period from 1970 to 1985 my lectures on hermeneutics developed in several directions. Initially I set Palmerâs book Hermeneutics and several others, especially on Bultmann and myth.13 The course included the origins and development of hermeneutics; the foundation of the modern discipline with Schleiermacher and Dilthey; Bultmann and demythologizing; Heidegger, Gadamer and the New Hermeneutic; functions of language with reference to Wittgenstein and to speech-acts in Austin; issues concerning theological context and the status of the Bible as Scripture; an evaluation of narrative theory, and the relation between hermeneutics and semantics. My concern for the multi-functional multilevel operation of language emerged in a short study on language in liturgy.14
Continuing work on semantics found expression in âSemantics and NT Interpretationâ and another related paper.15 There I took up, for example, the theme of Wittgenstein and Ramsey that everyday vocabulary is used with a particular contextual logic. I drew on Austin to illustrate that such speech-acts as âI repentâ or âI believeâ are acts of repentance or of commitment or confession, not attempts to inform God of a context of which he is aware. This also found ex...