The Men Who Planned the War

A Study of the Staff of the British Army on the Western Front, 1914-1918

Paul Harris

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781134808175
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

During the Allied victory celebrations there were few who chose to raise a glass to the staff. The high cost of casualties endured by the British army tarnished the reputation of the military planners, which has yet to recover. This book examines the work and development of the staff of the British army during the First World War and its critical role in the military leadership team. Their effectiveness was germane to the outcome of events in the front line but not enough consideration has been paid to this level of command and control, which has largely been overshadowed by the debate over generalship. This has painted an incomplete picture of the command function. Characterised as arrogant, remote and out of touch with the realities of the front line, the staff have been held responsible for the mismanagement of the war effort and profligate loss of lives in futile offensives. This book takes a different view. By using their letters and diaries it reveals fresh insights into their experience of the war. It shows that the staff made frequent visits to the front line and were no strangers to combat or hostile fire. Their work is also compared with their counterparts in the French and German armies, highlighting differences in practice and approach. In so doing, this study throws new light upon the characteristics, careers and working lives of these officers, investigating the ways in which they both embraced and resisted change. This offers evidence both for those who wish to exonerate the British command system on the basis of the learning process but also for those critical of its performance, thus advancing understanding of British military history in the First World War.

Chapter 1

Origins, Training and Duties

In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, General Paul Bronsart von Schellendorff, a senior Prussian staff officer, produced his highly influential work The Duties of the General Staff.¹ This detailed the purpose and duties of the staff officer as a part of the command function. Von Schellendorff underlined the critical role of the general staff within the modern army organisation when he pointed out:

The General commanding a large body of troops cannot (and least of all in war) encumber himself with minor details, though their consideration and proper arranging may be often of the highest importance. Apart from the fact that the mental and physical powers of one man are not equal to the task, the comprehensive supervision of the forces under his command would suffer. He should consequently have assistants.²

These ‘assistants’ were the officers of the general staff who not only converted the ideas of the General into orders but also acted as his ‘devoted and confidential counsellors’.³ In von Schellendorff’s opinion, the performance of the staff was keenly felt throughout a military formation. He observed: ‘Troops very soon find out, especially in war, whether the duties of the General Staff are in good hands.’⁴ Prussia led the way in developing a modern professional staff organisation. Sir Michael Howard described the creation of the Prussian general staff as ‘perhaps the great military innovation of the nineteenth century’.⁵ As warfare became more complex and armies grew in size, the value of an efficient, educated and professional staff became increasingly apparent. The role and impact of the staff was aptly described by the French General Buat:

First of all, what is the Staff? It is both everything and nothing. Nothing because it possesses no authority of its own, it has no responsibility and its personal inspiration does not exist. It is not even free to express an idea, for it never speaks in its own name. Everything, because a whole army may be imperilled if its staff is bad.⁶

This chapter traces the evolution of the staff function within the British army, the duties it entailed and how officers were trained for the role. To set staff duties in context, an overview has been provided of how the staff function developed from the early nineteenth century until the outbreak of the First World War. The development of the British staff is weighed against progress made by the French and German staffs during this period. Two documents are key to understanding the British staff system. The Field Service Regulations of 1909 (Part II) and the 1912 Staff Manual laid out how staff officers were expected to operate as part of the command function. They outline the duties of the staff and form an essential guide to the expectations that were placed upon them.

Origins of the Staff

The origins of the modern staff organisation can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The French took the lead in introducing innovations during the Napoleonic period but failed to sustain their pioneering position. This fell to Prussia, which by the middle of the century had established the staff as a central element of military operations. Emphasis was placed upon education and a systematic approach to warfare. The contribution an effective staff could make became apparent over the succeeding decades in the successful Prussian campaigns conducted against Austria and France.

British thinking lagged behind its counterparts in continental Europe though some effective staff work was evident within the Duke of Wellington’s force during the Peninsular War.⁷ Colonel Charles Craufurd gave an indication of the parlous state of military expertise within the British army during this period:

When an [English] Army goes upon service we are so destitute of officers qualified to form the Quartermaster-General’s Department and an efficient corps of aides-de-camp, and our officers in general have so little knowledge of the most essential parts of their profession that we are obliged to have recourse to foreigners for assistance or our operations are constantly liable to failure in their execution.⁸

In an effort to find a solution to these issues a military college was founded at High Wycombe in 1799. This was the precursor for the Staff College at Camberley, established almost 60 years later as a separate entity. Led by Colonel J. Le Marchant, the military college aimed to teach staff duties to junior officers and drew upon the army of revolutionary France as a model.⁹

The development of the French staff had begun in 1796 under Marshal Berthier, Napoleon Bonaparte’s Chief of Staff. It was divided into four sections, each with a specific set of duties. Paul Thiébault encapsulated contemporary French military thought in his authoritative manual published in 1800.¹⁰ In the view of the soldier and writer, Brigadier-General J.D. Hittle, this work established the foundation for the structure of the staff and represented the first attempt in the modern military era to combine staff theory and techniques.¹¹ The manual outlined the different staff functions, the basis of staff organisation, how work should be allocated and detailed how staff reports should be compiled. Thiébault’s work may have been pioneering but regrettably it was largely discarded after the Napoleonic era.

Instead of the four section French model, Wellington split his staff into two sub-divisions: the Adjutant General’s and Quartermaster General’s. There was no general staff branch and responsibility for issuing orders lay with the Adjutant General. The efficient administrative and supply work undertaken by the staff played a substantial part in the success enjoyed by the British in the Peninsular campaign. Although they were housed in different headquarters, a close relationship was forged between Wellington and the staff according to the historian George Ward. He argued:

There can be no test of a staff but that of war. Mistakes were made; the weaker elements were ground out in the grim attrition, together with many of the stronger; but the residue, though perhaps small, was by all standards very good.¹²

Some commentators, such as Hittle, believe that Wellington made a significant contribution to the development of British staff organisation.¹³ His personal involvement with the staff played an integral part in their success even though French ideas may have influenced the way they operated.

In common with the French, the legacy bequeathed by Wellington was sadly squandered as British staff performance regressed during the nineteenth century. Deficiencies were exposed during the Crimean War as inexperienced staff struggled to get a grip on their duties.¹⁴ It marked a period when the training and education of the staff was neglected by the British army. Although the Staff College at Camberley was inaugurated in 1858, soon after the Crimean conflict, there was a dearth of literature on the subject of the staff until the end of the century. The British continued to regard a general staff as expensive and largely ornamental.¹⁵ It needed the trauma of a war to jolt Britain into recognising the critical role properly trained staff could play.

A lack of trained staff officers was a malaise that affected both sides in the American Civil War. There was no staff college or staff corps. Appointments to the staff were frequently made on the basis of nepotism or political considerations.¹⁶ A major problem was the absence of any formalised system. There was scant evidence here of any influence from the Prussian model.¹⁷ Orders were often given verbally rather than being confirmed in writing. Inevitably, this led to misinterpretation, delay and lost opportunities. One commentator declared, ‘the improvised Civil War armies suffered badly from their lack of trained staff officers’.¹⁸ They were forced to gain their experience from learning on the job, a method the British army was forced to repeat during the First World War. Improvements in staff work during the course of the American Civil War were outweighed by the failings. In the latter stages of the Civil War, when mobility was restored, the staff were taken by surprise and struggled to get to grips with the new challenges they faced.¹⁹ The war failed to produce a professional staff system. That was very much in the hands of the Prussians.

The comprehensive defeat inflicted by Prussia upon the French in the war of 1870 highlighted the merits of capable staff work. It showed that a well-trained staff working with established methods and systems could make a major contribution to military success. The organisation and structure of the Prussian field staff took shape in the early nineteenth century. The Kreigsakadamie [War College] was established in Berlin in 1810 and its graduates filled the posts of the general staff. The Prussians recognised the importance of military planning and fostered an elite of specialised staff officers. They acted primarily as advisors and planners within the command team. These officers rotated between staff and command positions. The advent of the railways provided the opportunity for the rapid transportation of troops and supplies. The Prussian staff harnessed this potential to move resources swiftly to where they were needed. Detailed planning became the key to the deployment and manoeuvre of large forces in the field, which Prussia used to great advantage. The German general staff remained in place for over 100 years with only minor changes and ‘possessed all the essential elements of a modern staff system’.²⁰

Wide reaching reforms were instigated across the French staff system after their 1870 defeat. The staff college, École Supérièur de Guerre [ESG] was established in the following decade with the objective of developing a professional and meritocratic staff. In 1900 the structure of the French staff was changed with three bureaux taking the place of the four established during the Napoleonic period.²¹ These initiatives indicated French recognition of the key role played by the staff officer in modern warfare.

The British General Staff

After witness...