Reintegrating Jihadist Extremist Detainees

Helping Extremist Offenders Back into Society

Daan Weggemans, Beatrice de Graaf

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351744874
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book seeks to understand the processes of reintegration of former Jihadist detainees, as well as the role that the police and other frontline professionals play in this process.

Over the past few decades the number of people who have been detained under the suspicion of terrorist activities has grown significantly. This has resulted in an increased scholarly interest in the topic of prisons and terrorism. However, the main focus of academic research has been on the period of incarceration with researchers paying extensive attention to the conditions under which terrorists have been detained as well as to various processes of alienation and (violent) radicalisation that sometimes take root while in prison. Much less has been written about the period after their incarceration and the steps being taken to prepare them for that transition. This book seeks to fill this gap. It argues that sentencing or incarcerating terrorism suspects is not the end of the story, but just the beginning of the next phase: a process of reintegration, or the start of a new cycle of violence. This exploratory study outlines the factors during and after detention that contribute or hinder the reintegration of those who have been incarcerated for violent extremism and terrorism. The overriding aim of this work is to facilitate further research into the radicalisation and de-radicalisation of jihadist suspects.

This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, Islamist radicalisation, criminology and security studies in general.

1 Introduction

Since 11 September 2001 (or, more commonly, 9/11) the threat of jihadi terrorism has been high on the security agendas all over the world. In many countries an initial series of legal, intelligence, police and executive measures followed suit. These were soon to be expanded after a series of terrorist attacks in, among others, Madrid (11 March 2004), London (7 July 2005) and Boston (15 April 2013). The unprecedented numbers of Western foreign fighters who travelled to Syria and Iraq since 2013 and attacks in Paris (7 January and 13 November 2015) and Brussels (24 May 2014 and 22 March 2016) once again precipitated a fresh stream of executive and legal measures.

This upturn in counterterrorism measures has in turn contributed to an increase in the number of people suspected and convicted of terrorism. For the last years, the number of terrorist inmates has in many Western countries increased significantly. In the United Kingdom, for example, the total of convicted terrorists has risen by more than 50 over the last five years (Guardian, 2016). In the United States there has been an increase by more than 150 alleged terrorist inmates since 2007 (New York Times, 2016). A similar trend is observable elsewhere, both in the number of trials and the number of detainees suspected of terrorism (related) offenses.

Despite these individuals being under lock and key, convicted and incarcerated terrorists continue to occasion a sense of uneasiness (Bovenkerk, 2011). In some prisons they try to collaborate with other inmates in cultivating plans for continued violence or to recruit fellow detainees to embrace their political point of view. In 2005, for example, Kevin James was able to plan attacks on military recruitment centres, an Israeli consulate and various synagogues in the Los Angeles area from his Folsom Prison cell in the United States, which were thwarted at the last minute by the FBI and a Joint Terrorism Task Force (Hamm, 2013). We also know from history that some detainees continued their terrorist activities while still on the inside. Examples include the first generation leaders of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Andreas Baader and Gudrun Ensslin, as well as IRA terrorists who organised hunger strikes in prison to garner popular support by drawing attention to the alleged violation of their rights. Convicted members of terrorist groups also have turned to hunger strikes to protest what they took to be the inhumane or adverse conditions of their incarceration (De Graaf, 2012).

Unrest is also evident beyond the walls of the prison; all the more so as the release date for these inmates approaches. Victims and next of kin can be outraged at the (early) release of those who have continued to influence their lives. In the case of the murdered Dutch politician, Pim Fortuyn, for example, supporters dispersed dozens of posters soon after Volkert van der Graaf was sent to jail for this crime with the image of the perpetrator and stamped with the text: ‘Hunting season opens on 6 May 2014’.¹ Years later, when the release date for Van der Graaf was imminent, a petition circulated objecting to this release, which was eventually signed by more than 45,000 people.

There has been substantial scholarly interest in the topic of prisons and terrorism. The main focus of most academic research has been the period of incarceration (e.g. De Graaff & Kessels, 2010; Neumann, 2010; Veldhuis, 2012; Hamm, 2013; Silke, 2014; Veldhuis 2016). Researchers have paid extensive attention to the conditions under which terrorists have been detained as well as to various processes of alienation and (violent) radicalisation that sometimes take root while in prison. They have also examined whether or not convicted terrorists should be isolated from other regular prisoners. Much less has been written about the period after their detention and the steps being taken to prepare them for that transition. Relatively little empirical data has been collected on the risk of recidivism among those arrested or sentenced for extremist acts. Few attempts have been made to document the (successful and less successful) experiences of former extremist inmates as well as of those who are involved with supervising the reintegration process and, as a result, have a wealth of experience and information in this regard (see also Balogh & De Muijnck, 2009). This leaves many important questions about the opportunities and challenges for an effective re-entry process unanswered.

The re-entry of detainees with an extremist background is a sensitive but important topic for us to discuss. The potential of revolving door terrorists has been put squarely on public and political agendas. Do these alleged terrorists actually want to return to the society that they despised before their arrest and that now has also punished them for their ideals? Isn’t ‘after detention’ pretty much the same as ‘before the next arrest’ or, worse still, ‘before the next terrorist attack’? Experiences at home and abroad with detained extremists who returned to criminal or extremist activities after their release feed these doubts.² For instance, the jihadist attacks in Toulouse (2012), Brussels (2014) Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) were all carried out by ex-detainees. As a result, citizens may react with fear or anger when they discover that people who have served time for acts of terrorism will now be living in their midst. One could even say that the day an alleged extremist leaves prison is perhaps just as fraught as the day he or she was arrested or sentenced. This is not only true for society-at-large and for the professionals who have to deal with all of the unrest, but also, if not more so, for the detainees themselves. They are expected to integrate back into society and to once again participate in the normal goings-on of every day. But they are inevitably confronted with all kinds of obstacles that frustrate their process of reintegration. The stigma of having been imprisoned and the social isolation that that brings with it are well-known phenomena; they make former inmates feel like they are wearing clothes with invisible stripes when they are out and about. All of which can, in theory, heighten the risk of future criminal behaviour; especially when they are regarded by fellow believers and old comrades as a hero or affirmed in their role as a jihadist. Accepting the status of hero or martyr can only contribute to the likelihood of reoffending.

Successfully transitioning from the ‘inside’ to the ‘outside’ lowers the risk of relapse (Shinkfield & Graffam, 2009). That is why more and more experts are convinced that the supervision and guidance of alleged or convicted radicals during the reintegration process must be better regulated (Mullins, 2010; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). A variety of individuals and organisations would ideally contribute to a monitored process of transitioning. It takes that kind of collaboration to properly oversee whether the former detainee actually takes distance from extremist measures or whether ‘after detention’ is but a prelude to new arrests or continuing radicalisation. This is important not only from a long-term security perspective, but also because offering a former detainee (when possible) the opportunity of integrating back into society is an intrinsic and non-negotiable component of a constitutional democracy. After legal dictates have been met every citizen enjoys the right to rehabilitation and to protection against a continuation of further punishments for the same offences that he or she has been sentenced for.

We hope that this book will fill an important gap in the research on radicalisation and de-radicalisation of jihadist suspects. Our assumption is that sentencing or detaining terrorist suspects is not the end of the story but just the beginning of the next phase: a process of reintegration, or the start of a new cycle of violence. Which factors promote and which impede the process of reintegration? Which increase the risk of relapse for alleged or convicted extremists? At the same time this research is focused on a practical and exploratory mapping of the parties and agencies – including the police³ – that play a key role in the reintegration process, and on those who, knowingly or not, influence this process. In sum, with this study we first aim to outline the factors during and after detention that contribute or hinder the reintegration of those who have been detained on suspicion of violent extremism, and second bring into focus what role the police have played in promoting an effective return of these individuals to society.

This study is first of all exploratory in nature – which is to say that we did not limit ourselves beforehand as to which factors would be identified or chosen. Our research is, second, qualitative in nature – which is to say that we first review the existing scientific literature and existing instruments and practices, taking stock of documented factors that contribute to radicalisation and de-radicalisation and that influence the relationship between detention, recidivism and reintegration. We then turn to a set of experiences of people who were part of the process of seeking to facilitate a successful return to society. These include both former prisoners as well as representatives of agencies that play a role in these reintegration processes. ‘Exploratory’ in this context also means that this is not an exhaustive study, but one that pencils in some of the basics. As a result, our research is also limited in scope; as explained in the next paragraph, we were able to confer with only so many people.

Researching the reintegration of violent extremists

The purpose here is to better understand the process of the reintegration of (former) detainees with an extremist background, as well as the role that the police and other frontline workers play in this process. The term reintegration refers to a process by means of which inmates return to society, (re-)establish a more or less regular life and commit no new major infractions (Farkas, 1996). Reintegration can therefore be understood as a successful process of re-entry. Following Veldhuis (2012: 2), reintegration in this book is defined as ‘a safe transition to the community, by which the individual proceeds to live a lawabiding life following his or her release and acquires attitudes and behaviours that generally lead to productive functioning in society’. This stands in contradistinction to recidivism, which refers to a person’s relapse into criminal behaviour – either in the realm of violent extremism and terrorism or in regular criminal networks.

We concentrate specifically on the reintegration of former detainees with a jihadist background. This has a number of reasons. In view of the time and resources available, we chose to focus our research on a clearly defined field. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, Islamic extremism has remained in the limelight. Current reports about people who continue to head off to Syria and Iraq to take part in the armed conflict there, and the aforementioned attacks on the part of those returning from that civil war and/or by previously detained jihadi suspects, are reason enough to justify this focus at this point in time. In addition, relatively little is known in a documented fashion about the reintegration and de-radicalisation of this particular group. Much has been written about the de-radicalisation, exit and reintegration of left- and right-wing extremist perpetrators, but that is less the case for this group (see also Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). By focusing our research on the reintegration of Islamist extremists we hope to gain new insights into this relatively young and complex field. Finally, there is the practical desire of citizens, the media and various agencies to get a better handle on dealing with jihadi extremists who are returning from their time in jail (Demant, Wagenaar, & Van Donselaar, 2009).

We will use the case of the Netherlands as an illustration to address the importance of the topic of reintegration of (suspected) violent extremist detainees. The Dutch case is interesting enough in its policy: the country is among the first countries, to actually reflect upon and start working on the topic of reintegration for (suspected) jihadist detainees. In this sense, Dutch agencies and security organisations did have a forerunner function. This is also true for the detention of terrorist offenders. For over a decade, terrorist (suspects) are being separated from the general prison population in the Netherlands. Now, years later, debates about similar policies are unfolding in other countries as well (such as recently in the United Kingdom). At the same time, the case of the Netherlands is not especially special, meaning it is an easy-to-use case for other European and Western countries. While there remain, as always, significant political and social differences between countries, the development of phenomena like violent extremism, terrorism, foreign fighters and radicalisation in the Netherlands has been quite similar to many other Western countries. In other words, the Netherlands had to deal with similar issues, dilemmas and transnational developments as Denmark, Germany, France and the UK, to name but the most prominent other countries that faced an increase in home-grown terrorism over the last decade. Therefore, the key aspects of the cases we retrieved in the Netherlands can be considered exemplary for other Western countries as well. These generic aspects will be further elaborated upon in Chapters 4 and 5.

This study employs (often touchy) terms and concepts that are not always used with precision in the academy or in the public forum. Most important concepts for this study, such as rehabilitation, (de-)radicalisation and disengagement, will be discussed in length in the subsequent chapters below. However, for the sake of clarification of what this book is about (and what it is not about) some concepts need further explanation at this point. In what follows, we define global jihadism, following the NCTV, as ‘a worldwide violent ideological cultlike movement’. Jihadi extremists consider Muslims to be a suppressed community; they reject the democratic legal order and want to establish an Islamic caliphate, including sharia law. Doing so, they are convinced, is the only way to deal with the crisis (fitnah) within the Muslim community. Violence, and the sacrifice that comes with it, is ‘the only liberating power jihadists believe in’ (NCTV, 2014). The religious content of jihadism is in some ways similar to Islamism (or Political Islam). However, Political Islamism is convinced that a pure Islamic state apparatus can be realised with current political (and, hence, also democratic) means. Islamism is not by definition violent and, in fact, is usually nonviolent. Jihadi extremism, on the other hand, is all about the violent expression of radical ideas. The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, 2016a) in the Netherlands considers jihadism as a form of extremism and describes it as an ‘extremist ideology that glorifies violent jihad’. As is common in the research literature on these issues, jihadism and Islamic/jihadi extremism will be used interchangeably in this study.

The definition of terrorism that is used in the Netherlands by the AIVD (2016b), as well as in legislation, jurisprudence and case law, and that is likewise relevant in this study, reads:

Terrorism is to plan or carry out (or to intimidate with) violence that is directed at people or at wreaking havoc within society. Its intent is to bring about social change, to frighten the public or to influence political decision-making.⁴

The research population that is central to this study does not only consist of individuals convicted of terrorism or extremism. Although an increasing number of individuals may come into contact with the long arm of the law only some will be convicted for terrorism-related acts (Entemann, Van der Heide, Weggemans, & Dorsey, 2015: 10). A number of those who are held i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• PART I: Theories and concepts
• PART II: Policy overview
• PART III: Experiences of professionals and former delinquents
• Appendix
• Index