Rebuilding Communities in an Age of Individualism

Paul Hopper

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351906258
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

As modern societies become increasingly individualistic, this fascinating book examines how we can maintain and revive local communities and community life. It demonstrates how the major developments and processes of our time, notably globalization, post-industrialism and de-traditionalization, contribute to this individualism to the detriment of community life. The author examines how community is a necessary and important component of human life and discusses possible ways in which to arrest its decline. In this regard, strategies geared to fostering trust and social capital are outlined as the basis for reinvigorating community life. The volume provides a coherent and distinct analysis of community as well as offering concrete policy prescriptions to counter the excessive individualism of our times. In both the nature and scope of its analysis, it offers a unique contribution to an extremely important issue in the contemporary period, one that increasingly preoccupies politicians, academics and ordinary citizens.

PART I

AN AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM

Introduction

Part I seeks to demonstrate a growing shift towards more individualistic and private-orientated modes of behaviour within Western democracies. It is argued that this is to the detriment of civic and community life within these societies. This position is based upon an examination of the primary processes of the contemporary period.

In Chapter 1, recent changes in technology, the workplace and the organization of modern economies, which have come to be termed ‘post-Fordism’ or ‘post-industrialism’, are considered. A significant feature of the post-Fordist transformation has been the undermining of co-operative and collectivist patterns of behaviour and organization in the workplace. This it will be claimed is fostering economic insecurity, which in turn is encouraging individualistic and entrepreneurial responses.

In Chapter 2, ‘detraditionalization’ is examined in terms of its role in fostering individualism. The steady diminution of traditional or established forms of authority and practices, ranging from organized religion to marriage, has removed many constraints acting upon people leaving them freer to pursue their own individual life-styles. However, there are negative aspects to detraditionalization, especially with regards to the functioning and cohesiveness of communities and societies. Moreover, many of these ‘traditional’ practices and institutions have historically provided sources of support and security for citizens.

Globalization, it is argued in Chapter 3, is also likely to lead to greater individualism. Even sceptical accounts of globalization are confronted with an increasing number of Western governments that regard it is as an economic reality, and are formulating policies accordingly. For ordinary citizens, this entails having to become more self-reliant in order to adjust to the new economic circumstances.

There are a number of aspects to Chapter 4 but all centre upon a consideration of the decline of local communities in the contemporary period. A recurring theme is an examination of the impact of the key forces of late modernity – post-Fordism, detraditionalization and globalization – delineated in the previous chapters. It is concluded that the greater individualism and insecurity these processes foster diminishes forms of social capital, such as trust, sociability and co-operation, thereby undermining an important prerequisite of community life.

Endeavouring to demonstrate the growth of individualism in advanced industrial societies is clearly a difficult, not to say massive, task. Moreover, such a wide-ranging analysis is inevitably susceptible to counter-evidence – of examples of people leading gregarious, altruistic lives, and so on. However, the concern here is simply to identify major trends, and above all to establish there are developments currently discouraging and running counter to civic and community activity.

In summary, the argument of Part I is that the social and economic processes identified in this work – globalization, post-Fordism and detraditionalization – are deep-rooted and have come to shape our late modern age. They are creating widespread anxiety and uncertainty. Above all these processes encourage greater individualism and a preoccupation with the private realm to the detriment of civic and community life.

Chapter 1

Post-Fordism and Individualism

Post-Fordism is the term or concept used to describe recent changes in the structure, organization and processes of modern economies. It is primarily an economic and technological development, but its impact has been wide-ranging, including upon the realms of culture, politics and gender. Although broadening concepts associated with production to embrace wider social and economic developments such as trade unionism, community life and patterns of individual behaviour is rejected by some academic commentators (see Clarke, 1988, 1992). However, this is the approach undertaken here because it is difficult to imagine how it is possible to separate changes in the nature of production and the labour process from wider society.¹ And as Stuart Hall (1989) has noted, post-Fordism insists ‘that shifts of this order in economic life must be taken seriously in any analysis of our present circumstances’ (ibid., 119).

In accordance with the overall purpose of this work, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the ways in which aspects of post-Fordism foster individualistic and private-orientated modes of behaviour. This is an area, which has received relatively little academic attention to date. It will also entail a consideration of whether the shift towards a post-Fordist economy ushers in new forms of co-operation and solidarity.

Fordism and Post-Fordism

Both Fordism and post-Fordism have been subjected to criticism, and even to doubts about their legitimacy and existence. Some commentators question whether the nature of production and work organization is undergoing fundamental change. For example, John Tomaney (1994) contends recent developments ‘represent an intensification of existing tendencies’ and ‘are conditioned by deeply embedded traditions of industrial practice’ (ibid., 157–8). They should not be considered as constituting a radical break with past practices. In a similar vein, the Marxist position would be that the condition or nature of modern societies has not changed to the extent that the exponents of post-Fordism claim. The private ownership of the means of production and the system of wage-labour continue to be the primary organizing mechanisms of contemporary capitalism. Yet as will be shown during the course of this chapter, for an increasing number of people their experience of work, employment prospects and relationship with other workers or citizens, has changed quite considerably in the recent period.

What then is post-Fordism? And how does it differ from Fordism? Before answering these questions it is important to note that in the transition from one paradigm or epoch to another there is an inevitably an overlap and elements of continuity (Jessop, 1994). Many firms will employ a combination of Fordist and post-Fordist methods and practices to suit their particular needs. This means that what is presented here therefore is inevitably somewhat of an ideal-type description of Fordism and post-Fordism.

Many commentators consider the Fordist regime of capital accumulation began ‘to run out of steam in the 1960s’ (Murray, 1989b: 56).² The Fordist era was one of mass production and consumption, characterized by the division of labour and standardized production (‘assembly line’) techniques and products. Such production methods necessitated stable patterns of work which, in turn, paved the way for collectivist forms of behaviour in the form of trade unions and communities growing-up around the workplace.

In contrast, within the post-Fordist epoch there is a shift towards specialized patterns of consumption and the development of flexible production methods, machines and systems, in order to meet changing consumer demand. It is also characterized by technological and organizational innovation; a reliance upon new microelectronic technologies; the movement towards a service and information economy; and, a rise in the number of white-collar workers (professional, technical and managerial staff) with a concomitant decline in the proportion of the manual working class. In particular, ‘flexibility’ and ‘flexible specialization’ are the buzz-words, especially when applied to labour markets and the labour process. This encourages a movement away from ‘Taylorist’ forms of work organization – with its emphasis upon the division of labour and close management supervision – towards cell or group manufacturing whereby small teams of multi-task workers produce entire products. Companies now increasingly require, and expect, a labour force and technology capable, at short notice, of adapting to rapidly shifting markets. For the individual worker, this has entailed learning new skills and competencies, and being prepared to retrain for other jobs. It has also meant a reduction in the number of permanent jobs available. For example, in the United States, according to a report in the New York Times (17 March 1988), during the first half of the 1980s almost one third of the ten million new jobs created could be classified as ‘temporary’ (Harvey, 1989: 152).

In accounting for the emergence of post-Fordism a number of factors and processes have been identified by commentators. Firstly, it was made possible by technological advances in the field of communications and information technology, with computers and computerized knowledge becoming the principal new force of production. Secondly, the growing competition faced by Western producers from regions like East Asia led to the search for new models of efficiency (Mathews, 1989). Thirdly, the post-Fordist model is considered by many employers to be more responsive to consumer demands than mass production techniques, and therefore more profitable. Fourthly, there have been other advocates of these developments, ranging from academics to trade unionists, who consider they can usher in better working practices for workers – the ‘new optimists’ as Tomaney has called them. For these reasons there is likely to be an extension of such methods in the future.

Post-Fordism and Individualism

Having outlined some of the debates surrounding post-Fordism, it is now possible to indicate how the shift towards this industrial paradigm has encouraged individualism and private-orientated modes of behaviour. There are a number of aspects to this process, and five will be discussed here.

To begin with a notable feature of the post-Fordist epoch has been – as a result of the greater competition from other regions in the world as a result of the spread of the global market – a degree of de-industrialization in many Western countries. This is especially evident in the decline or ‘restructuring’ of traditional industries such as coal, iron, shipbuilding and steel, as well as some sections of manufacturing, such as the automobile industry. For example, in the United States, the number of workers employed in manufacturing has dropped by 9 per cent in twenty years: in the early 1990s it was 17 per cent, compared to 26 per cent in 1970 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993: 409). In particular, forms of de-industrialization in countries like Britain, the United States and Sweden has had a devastating impact upon the regions where such industries are located.³ As well as eroding standards of living in these areas, it has contributed to the break-up of working-class communities, undermining community life and associated co-operative forms of organization. For instance, Stanley Aronowitz (1992) has described how some areas of America’s industrial heartland, ‘from western Pennsylvania to Chicago, Detroit to Cincinnati’ (ibid., 3), have become ‘ghost towns’. Economic activity is an essential prerequisite of community, and the shift by firms to post-Fordist practices as a result of operating within a global economy, introduces instability into this relationship. As W.Paul Cockshott and Allin Cottrell (1993) have noted:-

There is a great deal of official cant going around about the ‘community’. We hear talk about Community Care, Community Programmes and so on at the very time that economic development is destroying any organic basis for community. A community can only exist on the basis of shared cooperative activity. (Cockshott and Cottrell, 1993: 165)

The disruption of communities and community life is therefore one way in which the post-Fordist transformation paves the way for greater individualism.

Secondly, the shift from mass production to flexible specialization under post-Fordism has facilitated changes in modern consumption patterns. There has been a movement away from mass consumption to the fragmentation of markets, evident in more differentiated purchasing and the individualization of choice. This theme, and how it contributes to individualism and a greater emphasis upon our private lives, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. For now all that needs to be stated is that the new technologies enable producers to be more receptive to the demands of the individual consumer, paving the way for niche marketing and greater product differentiation. This has also resulted in the increasing displacement of mass culture by a postmodernist culture, which emphasizes image and life-style (Jameson, 1984).

Thirdly, the developments in information and communications technologies that provided much of the momentum behind the shift towards a post-Fordist economy are also encouraging a return to the private realm. In particular, personal computers, modems and fax machines has enabled an increasing number of people to work from home.⁴ This form of working provides some obvious benefits for employees, notably in terms of spending more time with their family, working in a more comfortable environment, and not having to commute to work.

However, there are disadvantages and costs involved in so-called ‘telecommuting’. It entails less regular contact with fellow workers and with it their everyday support and co-operation, and can lead to feelings of estrangement and loneliness. The workplace is an important arena for social interaction: a forum that enables us to develop our social and communication skills, socialize and form friendships (Connelly, 1995). Home-workers can also feel detached from the running of the firm, especially in terms of having less direct input into the day-to-day decision-making processes.

Overall this development runs counter to collective activity in our working lives. With the workforce more scattered because of home-working, the shared experience and solidarity which comes from working in a single workplace is increasingly missing, making it much more difficult for trade unions to organize and function. The wide range of occupations engaging in telecommuting also entails there is probably insufficient commonality to set-up a Teleworkers Union (Holdemess, 1995). This in turn means there is a greater risk of exploitation; a point supported by the history of home-working before the arrival of telecommuting. In general home-workers, the majority of whom are women, suffer from low-status and are low-paid being employed on the basis of piece-rates (Hill, 1995).

Yet it is likely that more of us will be ‘telecommuters’ in the future. Home-centred working has obvious environmental benefits because it is likely to mean fewer people travelling to work each day. This will appeal to national governments with internationally agreed environmental targets to meet, and some may well actively promote these new patterns of work. While for employers, telecommuting is usually more cost-effective: they need less office and factory floor-space, and can more easily employ home-workers on a freelance or subcontracting basis. This in turn can contribute to the development of a ‘flexible’ workforce less able to insist upon pension schemes and redundancy payments, nor sickness and holiday pay. There will therefore be a strong temptation for firms to seek the ‘casualization’ of existing workforces, and encourage more of their employees to become ‘telecommuters’. Already there is an increasing tendency for Western firms to outsource work to developing societies where wage levels are lower. Again it is the new technology which has made this both possible, and relatively easy to set-up.

In a number of works Alvin Toffler (1981) has argued that we are about to witness a rapid rise in the number of what he terms ‘electronic cottages’ leading to the home becoming the centre of society, something last in evidence in pre-industrial times. And there is some statistical evidence to suggest this process has already begun. For example, in Canada more than a million people now work from home (Nadwodny, 1996). In America, 6 per cent of the workforce are telecommuters (Barnes, 1994); other writers point to market research indicating that in 38 per cent of U.S. households there is at least one person working at home (Dunkin and Baig, 1995).

Yet there are variations in the statistical data on this area making it difficult to determine exactly what is going on. This can be seen in the case of the United States. For example, one survey conducted in the early 1990s classifies almost 25 per cent of the workforce as home workers (Popcorn, 1992: 52). While the U.S. Census of Population Survey of 1991 reveals that only 14.5 per cent of people worked more than 35 hours a week at home (Edwards and Field-Handley, 1996). But what can be concluded from this research is that despite the variations significant numbers of people are now working from home. And as we have seen there are financial and environmental incentives for this to continue apace in the future, further enhancing the importance of the private realm within contemporary life.

Fourthly, the advent of post-Fordism has introduced new divisions into the workplace and wider society, and challenged working class collective identity.⁵ The movement away from mass production techniques to flexible specialization demands a different type of workforce. New technology and more sophisticated consumer demands means fewer workers need to be employed in the production process, but they must be highly trained, computer-literate and multi-skilled. Under the influence of Japanese management practices, these core workers will often have the security of a job-for-life, as well as corporate welfare systems in the form of company pension schemes and health provision. In return they will be expected to be extremely adaptable, able to work in small teams, and capable of undertaking a variety of tasks within the firm, ranging from manufacturing and maintenance to the improvement of the products and processes. They therefore have a direct input – through such ideas as quality circles – into the production process (Murray, 1989a: 45–8). And as a result of the continuous training they receive, and high level of investment in them, the core worker becomes difficult to replace – hence the job-for-life guarantees – and consequently their status is enhanced. Indeed, Rank Xerox has tried ‘to change its accounting system so that machinery becomes a cost, and labour its fixed asset’ (ibid., 49). All of which has impacted upon the nature of modern management leading to an erosion of traditional managerial hierarchies as these new ‘flexible’ workers are granted greater autonomy and the chance to use their own initiative.

For firms, these practices enable them to ‘downsize’ and to shed those who are viewed as non-core workers, with any additional work being sub-contracted out. This also provides companies with greater control over wage levels for workers that fall into this category (Harrison, 1994). The post-Fordist transformation therefore establishes two types of division in modern society. Firstly, there is a division between the core and ‘peripheral’ workforce.⁶ Work for the non-core majority becomes increasingly of the part-time, short-term contract, job-sharing variety. Denied regular access to the levels of training that their full-time counterparts receive, there is the danger that those on the periphery will find themselves being left behind. And invariably excluded from the medical and pension schemes of companies as a result of their status, they have to rely upon provision from an ‘overloaded’ state (Huntingdon, 1975). This in turn helps to foster differences in terms of the welfare provision received by citizens.⁷

A second form of division under post-Fordism exists beyond the coreperi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• PART I: AN AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM
• PART II: REBUILDING COMMUNITIES
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index