Long-Distance Nationalism

Diasporas, Homelands and Identities

Zlatko Skrbiš

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351921374
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

How strong and how significant is the interaction between migrants and homelands in the late 20th century? Have the processes of globalization and transnational interaction produced new forms of nationalism or at least altered the old ones? By using Croatians and Slovenians in Australia as examples this book examines the extent to which migrants are influenced by historical and contemporary processes of migration mediated through political and cultural symbolism. What are the factors which influence the existence, nature and intensity of ethno-nationalism in the migrant context? The study analyses both the existence and transmission of ethno-nationalism between migrant settings and homelands and specifically deals with the transmission of ethno-nationalism sentiments across migrant generations. To understand the effects and consequences of long-distance nationalism fully the book proceeds from an analysis of nationalism's public manifestations to an analysis of the relatively private domain of diasporic ethno-communal existence.

1 Introduction

This study is both an exploration into the phenomenon of long-distance nationalism and an analysis of Croatians and Slovenians in Australia with a particular focus on second generation individuals. The generational aspect of ethno-nationalist transmission in a diaspora context is a real test of the strength of ethno-nationalism. It is quite easy to understand why first generation migrants feel strongly about the developments in their homelands but to explain the nationalist sentiments of second and subsequent generations, a range of additional factors needs to be scrutinised. What are the factors which enable the successful transmission of ethno-nationalism across the generations? What is the difference between the intensity of ethno-national sentiments between migrant generations? Do these sentiments manifest differently (and above all more subtly) in subsequent generations? What is the role of the state in this process? Is an active and highly interactive relationship between the ethnic homelands and diaspora populations necessary for intense ethno-national sentiments to develop in the diaspora? How does an external threat (e.g. war in the parents' homeland) influence the nature and extent of these feelings? How do these feelings influence the way of thinking, pattern of behaviour and actions of second generation individuals in different social contexts of the 'host' society? Is their influence something which could potentially undermine the social cohesion of a country which hosts ethnic groups whose homelands are in conflict? These and similar questions deserve our intellectual curiosity because they provide one of the important keys to an understanding of the global social processes in the modern age. They are of particular importance for countries with a large intake of diverse groups of migrants (Australia, Canada, Germany, Israel, Sweden to name but a few).

Although an enormous amount of attention has been given to the phenomenon of nationalism in the past few decades, the above questions have not received adequate consideration. The belief that modernisation processes will eventually or inevitably bring about the demise of nationalism could be held partly responsible for this (e.g. Breuilly 1982, Hobsbawm 1990, Harris 1991). Closely related to this are the widely shared assumptions about the impact of globalisation, identified by Holton (1998) as globe-talk. He argues that alongside this process we witness "the continuing development of the nation-state and a revival of ethnicity" (ibid., p. 7). A.D. Smith (1995, p. 160) makes a similar point when he argues that both nationalism and the nation "remain indispensable elements of an interdependent world and a mass-communications culture." It appears that ethno-national mobilisation has successfully adapted to a new hi-tech environment and that it comfortably utilises modern media and global networks (Anderson 1994, Margolis 1995, Naficy 1991). Ethno-nationalism¹ and globalisation thus need to be viewed as complementary rather than contradictory processes.

The discrepancy between all too optimistic expectations about the gradual demise of the significance of nationalism and the global resurgence of nationalism since the mid-1980s, makes the question of the persistence of ethno-nationalism in diaspora settings particularly interesting. The extension of this question to include the persistence of ethno-nationalism in second generation diaspora settings makes the debate between the expectations of the modernisation theorists and the stubborn persistence of ethno-nationalism even more complex.

1 The relativisation of distance

'Distance', 'isolation', 'space' and 'time' are concepts which require thorough re-evaluation. The processes causing and effecting these changes have been at work throughout a relatively long historical period. According to some (e.g. Anderson 1993 rev.ed.), this would be the invention of print which enabled the imagining of national collectivities, for others, the attempts at standardisation of time (Nowotny 1994), or the discovery of the New World. Regardless of any particular answer, migratory movements of unprecedented scale are also to be considered as significant factors in these changes. Reflecting on the massive movements of the population, Benedict Anderson (1992a, p. 13) observes that over the past 150 years the market, war and political oppression "have profoundly disrupted a once seemingly 'neutral' coincidence of national sentiment with lifelong residence in fatherland or motherland." Interactions between groups and individuals who reside in different countries or even continents are becoming increasingly regular and geographical location has become a relatively minor obstacle in such transnational exchanges. To be sure, these massive movements of populations represent nothing radically new as such movements have been in existence for centuries. What is new, however, is the ease and frequency with which people transgress the political and physical constraints of time and space. Standardised time regulates every aspect of social, cultural, economic and political life on the planet, and distance has been obliterated. As Holton (1998, p. 1) puts it: "[G]eography has, in this sense, been pronounced dead."

It is precisely in this context of relativisation of time and space that one can understand a rather presumptuous statement made by a Greek Consul in Melbourne: "Australia is the first line of defence in the battle for Macedonia" (Danforth 1995, pp. 7-8). The Consul's statement, referring to an old dispute over 'Macedonia', which is half a world away, astutely captures the obscurity of physical distance which is becoming of minor relevance in modem nationalist struggles. This quotation is also revealing of the interference of the state and its representatives in the construction and sustenance of ethno-nationalist hegemonic narratives. In other words, to understand the multidimensionality of contemporary nationalist conflicts, one needs to examine thoroughly the nature of interactions between diasporas and homelands.

Migrant groups are affected by events in their homelands. Eugen Weber (1977, p. 103) wrote about "how little impact" the 1870-71 Franco-Prussian war had "on the popular mind in the [French] countryside." Nothing apparently had changed "apart from the departure of a few soldiers." If the 'countryside' in this case represents the lack of synchronisation with the contemporary world, then one might feel tempted to say that 'countryside' in that sense no longer exists. Physical distance nowadays neither removes visual images of the homeland (because of media hi-tech), nor does it prevent physical interaction (because of transport). More than three decades ago, Charles Price (1963, p. 305) wrote about Greek islanders in Australia who, "thumping down glasses of liquor", discussed issues that stirred them up, such as, for example, "the proper time and method for Greek Cypriots to obtain Union with Greece." By the same measure, Catalan settlers in Melbourne "were concerned with the policy of the Franco government toward Catalonian independence" (ibid.). Kuropas (1991, p. 132), in his study of Ukrainians in the United States, discusses the ecstatic feelings of some segments of American-Ukrainian communities at the beginning of the First World War conflict, when the "long-awaited opportunity for national emancipation from Russia had finally come." He also examines the actual support for resistance of the various Ukrainian communities regarding the Soviet occupation of Ukraine. Campbell and Sherrard (1968, p. 301) claim that "(t)he War of Independence (1821-29) and the Balkan Wars of 1912 brought emigrants back to fight for Greece." Similarly, although much more remarkably, according to Glazer and Moynihan's (1965, p. 242) interpretation, when the American Irish "discovered they were Celts, locked in ageless struggle with Saxons", the following happened:

The speeches were grand; the rallies grander. One hundred thousand persons attended a Fenian gathering in Jones' Wood in New York in 1866 - against the wishes of the Archbishop! The Fenians hoped to free Ireland by capturing Canada. From their New York headquarters they raised an army, and prepared for the invasion, with the full regalia of a modern government-in-exile.

Nothing came of it. A thousand men or so marched into Canada. And marched right out again, in the one battle of the whole fiasco, eight Irishmen were killed.

Last but not least, in Australia, the Australian Gallipoli legend² was - in addition to the support of a large proportion of the Australian citizenry - also made possible by those Australian British migrants and their children who believed the call to arms by the British Monarch had to be obeyed. These are but a few examples of this not unusual phenomenon of long-distance 'obedience' which is so commonly found in diaspora settings.

In order to proceed with this discussion, I first need to deal with the ambiguity of meaning of the term diaspora. Although a variety of definitions of diaspora are available in the literature (Connor 1986, Safran 1991, Klausner 1991), I would like to make two comments in relation to its existence at this point.³ Firstly, a diaspora population may result from the disappearance of a homeland from the world political map. A classical example of this kind is the existence of the Jewish diaspora from the period of the Bar-Kochba revolt (AD 132-135) until the state of Israel was proclaimed by the Zionist National Council in Tel Aviv in 1948. Secondly, a diaspora population may retain its diaspora status despite the existence of a 'homeland'. The reasons for this might be complex and one could again use the Jewish diaspora as an example: the act of the establishment of the Israeli state did not mark the end of the existence of the Jewish diaspora. Clearly, the existence of the diaspora population is not dependent on the simple fact of deprivation of homeland.

As Sheffer (1986b, p. 1) put it, the research into "networks created by ethnic groups which transcend the territorial state" is a relatively new field of study. He criticises the existent definitions of diaspora because they define diasporas as a transitory phenomenon which is "destined to disappear through acculturation and assimilation" (Sheffer 1986a, p. 8), He argues instead that it is the other way around, as "diasporas and their trans-state relations will continue to exist even as diasporas acculturate" (ibid., p. 9). More recent theorising (Safran 1991, Tölölyan 1991) considers the term diaspora as a metaphoric designation for different categories of individuals:

... expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial minorities tout court - in much the same way that 'ghetto' has come to designate all kinds of crowded, constricted, and disprivileged urban environments, and 'holocaust' has come to be applied to all kinds of mass murder. (Safran 1991, p. 83)

Such a broad definition (as used in most contemporary writing) makes the distinction between diaspora and migrant settings superficial to a considerable extent. In a recent paper Tölölyan (1996, p. 8) expressed some reservations about such a broad use of the term diaspora, which is increasingly turned into a "promiscuously captious category that is taken to include all the adjacent phenomena to which it is linked but from which it actually differs in ways that are constitutive, that in fact make a viable definition of diaspora possible." Although Tölölyan's critique makes some well measured points, for the present purposes I have no difficulty in embracing Safran's definition cited above, which is commonly used in the contemporary literature. Conceptualising diaspora in this broader fashion reinforces the link between globalisation processes and rapid diaspora formation, and breaks with the past tradition which perceived diasporas as a consequence of necessarily traumatic and massive uprootings. The formation of modern diasporas is not necessarily linked to such developments but could be seen as a product of a combination of economic, cultural and/or political factors.

2 Long-distance nationalism

The present study builds on the assumption that the formation of new diasporas is an ongoing process, closely related to a combination of economic, cultural and/or political factors. Diasporas are not necessarily a consequence of social or political upheaval. One should consider the possibility that diasporas are a consequence of migrations induced by economic processes or even a consequence of a conscious and orchestrated effort by the homeland establishment. McDowell's (1996) study of Tamil asylum diaspora in Europe could be used to illustrate the latter possibility. He reveals how Switzerland has become the target country of Tamil asylum seekers and how Switzerland's Tamil community is vibrant, well organised and supportive of the homeland struggle by design rather than default. The long-distance orchestration between the Swiss-based Tamil diaspora and Tamil Tigers in Northern Sri Lanka is instrumental in keeping up the Tamil resistance against Sri Lankan military forces. Furthermore, this long-distance orchestration of political and nationalist passion and money donating is entirely necessary for the Tamil liberationist struggle to continue. The main purpose of the existence of diaspora in Switzerland is to fund the conflict.

The significance of fundraising was brought to the fore during the recent and current military struggles in Kosovo between the Serbian police and Albanian resistance fighters. It is a well-known fact that Albanian resistance has been made possible by the financial backing of well-organised Albanian diaspora in Western Europe. Their members not only contributed generous funds but many have also returned to Kosovo to fight.

The logic behind the highly publicised, religiously inspired terrorism also has a lot in common with what is here described as long-distance nationalism. In particular, they share the obliteration of the significance of distance and the appreciation of financial backing. The international hunt for Saudi multimillionaire Osama bin Laden is a case in point.

The enormous range of possibilities which long-distance interaction offers invites a researcher to reconsider its impact on modern nationalism. Nationalism is neither becoming obsolete, as some authors would like us to believe, nor is it becoming an overdetermining factor in world politics, as some others argue. Is long-distance nationalism a new form of nationalism or maybe just a modified version of something much older? Paradoxically, one could argue both. Long-distance nationalism is still a nationalism but one that is profoundly adapted to the conditions of a modern global system. I propose the following working definition of long-distance nationalism: it is that type of nationalism which crosses neighbouring states and/or continents.

Long-distance nationalism is an ideal-type and I do not postulate the existence of anything as absurd as 'short-distance' nationalism. Reference to long distances is simply used to indicate the focus on nationalist processes which transcend a relatively strictly limited locality. At best, one could argue that at the opposing pole of long-distance nationalism we can talk about 'easily localisable' nationalism - i.e. nationalism which emerges and subsequently seeks resolution in relatively well defined and compact territories without the considerable assistance of a co-ethnic population arriving from beyond the neighbouring states or other continents. Such 'easily localisable' nationalisms have never existed in pure form, but 19^th century nationalisms come quite close to this ideal-type model.

The term long-distance nationalism derives from Benedict Anderson's writing (1992a, 1992b, 1994) in which he charts the way for further explorations into the intersections of migration studies and nationalism. He establishes a close link between the capitalist order, mass migrations and mass communications and argues, for example, that the survival of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is possible "not only because of its nationalist appeal and its ruthless methods, but because it has gained political and financial support in the United States and inside England, weapons on the international arms market, and training and intelligence from Libya and in the Near East" (Anderson 1992a, p. 13). Furthermore, he asks whether we are witnessing the emergence of a new category of nationalist, the long-distance nationalist. He concludes (ibid.) by stating:

For while te...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Figures and tables
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 History, homeland, nostalgia
• 3 Diasporas and community sentiments
• 4 The distant view
• 5 Constructing the Other
• 6 Marriage choices
• 7 Conclusion
• 8 Bibliography