European Security After 9/11

Matthew Sussex, Peter Shearman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351938389
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Much scholarly attention has been paid to the United States' response to the events of 9/11. This timely volume broadens our understanding of the impact of the attacks by considering instead their consequences for European security and for the relationship between the US and leading European states. The book places into theoretical context the notion that the world changed by assessing shifting conceptions of security and warfare, linking this to new thinking in these areas. It also critically evaluates the idea that the war against terrorism is a manifestation of a cultural clash between the West and Islam, and provides detailed evaluations of British, French, German and Russian reactions to 9/11 and the subsequent war on Iraq. Bringing together an impressive collection of experts this work will be an excellent resource for courses on international security, European politics, and international relations.

Chapter 1
Reconceptualizing Security After 9/11

Peter Shearman

Introduction

The conservative Economist weekly is not noted for its hyperbole, hence its bold headline in September 2001 was clearly a message its readers were expected to take seriously, stating without a qualifying question mark: The Day The World Changed.¹ Fllowing the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon there quickly emerged a general consensus, at least in the Western media and among Western leaders and many academics, that indeed the world had changed. Although newspaper articles offered analogies with Pearl Harbour, reflecting an attempt to understand the events in terms of traditional defence and security patterns, most then went on to argue that this was a radically different kind of conflict. Leading academic specialists, intellectuals and political activists rushed into print offering their assessments, many of which called specifically for a radical reassessment of how we should conceive security.² The aim of this chapter is to provide some background to how thinking on security, war and defence is changing as a result of the attacks on America. It does this by examining traditional notions of security and war, before going on to assess the impact of September 11 on the nature of war, defence strategies, and global politics more generally.

What do we mean by 'security'?

First we should note that security is a slippery concept, one of those in the social sciences that are 'essentially contested' (one of those about which there is no overall agreement in academic circles as to its exact meaning).³ There has been disagreement about who or what should be the most important referent objects of security. Should it be the individual, giving rise to conceptions of human security? Or should the focus be upon social groups, whether based upon religion, culture, or ethnicity, facilitating conceptions of societal security? Or is the global community the appropriate object, leading to conceptions of cosmopolitan or world security?⁴ There has been disagreement among analysts about what should be on the security agenda, and about what should be viewed as the most salient threats to security (military, either conventional or weapons of mass destruction; environmental problems; economic issues; resource scarcities; demographic trends; transnational crime; or terrorism). This debate and uncertainty became particularly intense with the ending of the bipolar conflict between the superpowers. To what extent has 9/11 resolved this problem? Does the 'war on terror', what President George Bush has referred to as the first war of the twenty-first century, mark a shift in thinking on security where transnational terrorism is the most salient threat, and will this then help to define strategic thinking during the emerging new era in global politics, and hence determine defence planning and deployments?⁵ If 9/11 did mark a radical change in thinking about war and peace, and the defence and security policies of the major powers, especially in the U.S., then this would mark a major shift in the conduct of world politics, which would be certain to have consequences for Europe.

To be secure, simply, is to be out of harm's way. If something threatens harm then, depending upon what it is, individuals or communities can develop strategies and policies to deter, counter, or in the final analysis fight off threats. At the domestic level, within the state community, security from harm is provided traditionally by law enforcement agencies and other institutions. Courts of law, police, jails, and health authorities help ensure security against threats, whether from armed robbers, corruption, or pandemics. People might have a generally positive view of human nature and trust in their fellow citizens, but nevertheless most of us feel the need to insure our personal property against crime, even though we might have a general trust in our neighbours not to do us any harm. Security at the domestic level, then, is provided through a mixture of legal mechanisms and insurance policies. No such mechanisms exist when it comes to external threats to the state. The international system of states is defined by anarchy: the absence of an overriding political authority with the power to impose legal authority or offer insurance against international misbehaviour. States traditionally have had to rely upon their own resources to deter and counter threats, and the tragedy of the system dictates that they inevitably seek to enhance their own power by building up their own military capabilities and forging alliances with other states. This creates a 'security dilemma' whereby the provision of one state's security through military build up will be viewed as potentially threatening by others, making them feel less secure. This is how Realist theory, which was dominant during the Cold War, perceives international politics and security. Security in this conventional view focuses upon states, with power defined in terms of material (and principally military) capabilities as the key variable, with national security determined by the anarchical nature of the international system.⁶

States and warfare

In the modem era, since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international security has been associated with states, and war came to be established as primarily a state activity. Scholars have focused on the Great Powers, for it is these most powerful states that were seen to determine the overall balance of power and the stability of the system. When there is a crisis in the state system and order breaks down, war as an instrument (what Hedley Bull termed an 'institution') is used as a last resort to ensure a new stable order emerges.⁷ War has been a phenomenon in human relations since the beginning of recorded history, but during the modern system of nation states for the past 500 years it has been associated with states, most often the most powerful among them. Great Power War has also been for the most part concentrated during the last 200 years on the European continent. European states fought amongst themselves for much of the modern era. One should remember also that the Cold War was centred in Europe, symbolized by the wall dividing Germany, with East-Central Europe and the USSR pitted against Western Europe and the United States. War as a socially sanctioned phenomenon developed rules and norms, mainly devized by Europeans, to ensure combatants' behavior remained within certain limits, and to safeguard non-combatants. War was distinguished from crime, and soldiers from police. States were accorded the legitimate use of military power. Only soldiers representing the state were permitted to engage in combat, in the name of the state.

War has also been seen as having a specific purpose. Wars traditionally have defining battles, followed by surrender and/or the negotiation of peace treaties. Conventional encounters on the battlefield in the modern era have most often been decisive for the ending of wars. Those conducting war need an exit strategy. There needs to be an end goal which is achievable and from which it is then possible to arrange an exit for deployed troops and a return if not to the status quo ante, then at least a return to a non-violent, more stable and secure environment.

War on terror as a new type of war

The war against terror, although its most spectacular manifestation has been in using traditional national military forces and hardware, first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, is not a war against a state or coalition of states in alliance. We can use the continuous present tense in discussing the war against terror, because it has no obvious exit strategy and no logical end point. It is an ongoing war against a largely invisible enemy, an enemy that does not recognize the norms and customs associated with the modern conceptions of war, traditionally associated with states. The bombing of Afghanistan was designed to remove terrorist networks from a state that had essentially failed, with a regime that even before the war began was recognized by only three other states. The Taliban was also the only regime to give official recognition to the rebels fighting against Russian control in Chechnya. It is not a war amongst the Great Powers, but one that has pitted the world's sole remaining superpower - or what some refer to as a 'hyperpower' - against the world's poorest countries that have provided havens to terrorists or thought to be in league with them. The stated purpose of the war on Iraq was to prevent a rogue regime from providing weapons of mass destruction to terrorists who threatened to harm the United States. In a radical departure from previous state practice the world's most powerful state unilaterally preempted war against another state in order to remove a regime that was thought to pose a possible future threat — one of providing WMD to terrorist groups. Yet the real target of the longer war is not a state at all, but essentially a transnational terrorist organization.

The war is a direct response to what would have previously been termed a criminal act, not an act of war.⁸ The opponent in the war did not really articulate clearly the purpose of the attacks in September 2001 (although statements by Osama bin Laden pointed to America's support for Israel, its opposition to Iraq, and the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia as the key concerns). The 9/11 attacks were not traditional in the sense that they were not clearly linked to a demand for territory, nor to a change in government or regime, nor to impose an ideology. Although not having a great track record of success, where terrorism has succeeded in the past it has been linked to direct political objectives. Terrorism has usually had a distinct political purpose relating to territory and nationalism. For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basques, the Tamil Tigers, and various groups of Palestinians have as their central motivating cause claims over territory. Left wing terrorist groups in Europe in the 1970s (such as the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhoff gang) operated in the name of a radical ideology whose purpose was to destabilize incumbent governments. Terrorists have also most often been careful to target military or security personnel or political leaders, or at least given warnings of bombs before they are detonated. Many innocent civilians not associated with the security forces have, it is true, been killed. But flying aircraft into the most densely populated building in the world, with workers going about their daily business, marked a radical departure from previous terrorist practice.⁹

Traditionally, security challenges have a focal point that produces crises that threaten to spill over into war. Here, to take a salient example, Kashmir provides a focal point of conflict between Pakistan and India. Diplomatic and/or military energies and attention are focused upon this issue. Similarly in recent 'conventional' wars there have been clear focal points around which the conflict has centered, and out of which crises grew into wars (Britain and Argentina over the Falklands/Malvinas; the U.S. under Bush Senior and Iraq over Kuwait). Transnational terrorism is distinguished from traditional security threats by not having a focal point of conflict out of which crises result in war over clearly defined issues. Conventional combatants in war also seek to identify, define, and destroy an enemy's principle capacities essential for operations. In the Falklands war it was a case of removing hostile invading forces from the Islands. In the Gulf war over Kuwait it was the Iraqi command and control system.

Yet in the case of transnational terrorism this is not possible. Transnational terrorists operate in small cells with no clear central command station, with each individual cell often not even knowing the identity of others in the organization. There are simply many centres in many places all operating under strict secrecy. The U.S. saw Afghanistan as the centre of gravity, but it is generally acknowledged that fulfilling the objective of destroying the Taliban and the terrorist camps in that country would not effectively destroy al Qaeda's ability to operate. Terrorists move on, some lie low, waiting an opportunity to strike again. It could be from anywhere, aimed against anything, at any time. The Bali bombings in October 2002 demonstrated this fact, with large numbers of innocent, mainly young, holidaymakers blown to pieces in a nightclub. Terrorist atrocities in Casablanca and Riyadh, in both cases in almost simultaneous explosions in multiple locations (including housing complexes, and social clubs) showed, some eighteen months after 9/11, that the war on terror was far from over. The battlefield is indeterminate. The U.S. has threatened to expand the war to other states that might sponsor terrorism, but terrorists hide away deep within societies, making many countries unwilling and/or unknowing hosts to such groups. As September 11 demonstrated terrorists are not from the middle ages, but from the middle classes, not necessarily from the poorest segments of the community, but also from the very wealthiest, not ignorant of the ways of the world, but highly educated, technically competent, and able to blend into American society itself.¹⁰ Part of the U.S. justification for waging war on Iraq in March 2003 was the links that Washington claimed the Saddam regime had with al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups in the Middle East, and the danger of Iraq providing them with WMD. No such connections have since been proven, or any solid proof yet discovered of Iraq being in possession of WMD. And many would see the important ultimate consequence of the U.S. led war on Iraq to be more recruits for the terrorists' cause. This could be another case of 'blowback' in the making, as aggressive American foreign policies provide the seeds for later negative consequences for U.S. long-term interests.

Terrorists also do not operate in accordance with the norms and customs of conventional warfare, or even pretend to recognize laws of war. On the contrary, they are defined in large part by their non-conventional methods. Clearly there is no prospect of the warring parties sitting around a table and negotiating a settlement. Not only are their demands, in so far as they can be ascertained, unlikely to be considered the legitimate basis for diplomacy, the terrorists themselves do not play by the same state-based rules of international politics. It is not possible to contain or to deter an invisible enemy that is willing to commit suicide in the name of an unspecified cause. To complicate things further, even where a cause is the motivating factor for joining a terrorist group, over time 'terrorism can become a career as much as a passion'.¹¹ The United States, in conducting a war against global terrorism, has set itself objectives that are unlikely ever to be fulfilled (at least through the traditional means of military power). There is no simple exit strategy. It is unlikely, unless the root causes of terrorism against the United States can be identified and dealt with effectively, that Americans will be confident in their security in the foreseeable future.

This is therefore an asymmetrical war on a number of levels....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Reconceptualizing Security After 9/11
• 2 Cultures in Conflict? Re-evaluating the 'Clash of Civilizations' Thesis After 9/11
• 3 America and Europe After 9/11
• 4 French Security After 9/11: Franco-American Discord
• 5 German Security After 9/11
• 6 9/11 and Russian Perceptions of Europe and NATO
• 7 New Lines in the Sand: 9/11 and Implications for British Policy in the Middle East
• References
• Index