Chongqing’s Red Culture Campaign

Simulation and its Social Implications

Xiao Mei

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9780367177850
• eBook ISBN:
  9781315408040
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Between 2009 and 2012, the city of Chongqing came into the national, and even international spotlight, as it became the geographical centre of the 'Singing Red, Smashing Black' campaign, and later the political storm that swept China. Chongqing's Red Culture Campaign drew an incredible amount of interest at the time, but speculation and prejudice has since blurred the public understanding of the sensational story that ties the campaign with the rise and fall of a political star, Bo Xilai.

This book, therefore, seeks to study the nature of Chongqing's Red Culture Campaign, and the interaction between the political programme and the practices of its participants. Based on fieldwork conducted in Chongqing, it seeks to question whether the Red Culture Campaign was actually a return to Maoist revolutionary mass campaigning whilst examining the relationship between the CCP's political power and the lives of the ordinary people as reflected in the case of the campaign. Ultimately, it highlights that the campaign was not in fact a real Maoist mass movement. Although it followed the pre-existing model of past mass campaigns in China, containing a series of frequent and highly performative operations, Xiao Mei argues that it essentially demonstrated critical features of 'simulation'.

By contributing to our understanding of the discrepancies between a designed political programme, and what it actually becomes when implemented on the ground, this book will be of use to students and scholars of Chinese Studies, Politics and Sociology.

1
Chongqing under the spotlight

The ‘Chongqing Model’ and its controversies

Chongqing under the spotlight

In early 2009, Hong Kong-based magazine Asian Weekly published an article introducing and praising the ‘Chongqing Model’¹ as a breakthrough in China’s pursuit of economic revival.² A subsequent article, describing Chongqing as ‘Chicago on Yangtze’ and revealing its startlingly fast development to the outside world, appeared in the prestigious magazine Foreign Policy,³ Over the next three years, Chongqing waltzed into the national, even international spotlight, not only because of the ambitious ‘Chongqing Model’ but also because it became the geographical centre of the political storm that swept China in 2012.

Chongqing had been a relatively low-profile megacity in southwestern China, despite its once substantial political status in China’s modern history. Chongqing, cradle of the ancient Bayu (巴渝) culture, has a proud history of more than 3,000 years. Nesting at the congruence of the Yangtze River and Jialing River, Chongqing has always been an important river port that connects China’s west to the rest of the nation and the outside world. With a total population of almost 30 million and covering an area of 82,400 km², Chongqing is currently divided into 38 administrative districts. More than 70 per cent of its landscape is mountainous. The political significance of Chongqing reached an unprecedented height when the then-ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomingtang) made Chongqing the wartime capital in 1937 during China’s anti-Japanese war. As a consequence, Chongqing quickly rose to become the political, economic, and cultural centre of Kuomingtang-ruled China. After Chongqing was ‘liberated’ by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 1949, Chongqing had been a centrally-controlled municipality within the Southwest Bureau. In 1954, it was downgraded to a provincially-governed city under the jurisdiction of Sichuan Province. In the 1960s, however, Chongqing became a key site of the ‘Third Front’ (sanxian 三线) development project.⁴ During the large-scale industrial relocation, heavy industry developed swiftly in Chongqing. As part of the unforeseeable consequences of this development, Chongqing’s ‘armed struggle’ (wu dou 武斗) during the Cultural Revolution (CR), especially in the most violent periods of 1966 and 1967, was one of the most violent, destructive, and lethal due to the relatively easy access to heavy weapons. In the era of reform and opening up since 1978, Chongqing became one of the pilot cities for the national comprehensive reform of the economic system in 1983. In 1997, Chongqing was once again separated from Sichuan Province and became one of the four municipalities with a provincial status in China.⁵ In the past two decades, under the directives of the central government, such as the ‘314’ plan,⁶ Chongqing is making ardent efforts to turn itself into an economic and business centre in China’s western area and prides itself for being a pioneer in the ‘Open up to the West’ (xibu da kaifa 西部大开发) movement. Chongqing now hosts the largest industrial compound near the upper Yangtze River and is one of the most important trade and transport ports in South-western China.⁷ As the largest municipality with a provincial status, Chongqing occupies a critical position in China’s modernisation project. Yet Chongqing still trails coastal cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai, in economic prosperity and international presence.

Chongqing’s sudden rise to fame might seem unexpected. Yet there is an important political context for its ascendance. That is, the CCP’s 18th National Congress was taking place in November 2012, during which the standing committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo Standing Committee [PBSC]) welcomed a new generation of leaders. Chongqing’s then-Party secretary Bo Xilai, before his fall from grace in 2012, was widely speculated to be a strong contender for a seat on the PBSC, the most powerful position in the country. The PBSC is the ruling body of the CCP and effectively China’s top decision-making mechanism. Although the National Party Congress is the Party’s highest power organ in theory, in reality the CCP’s Politburo and its Standing Committee make the final decisions concerning policy making, implementation, as well as discipline inspection.⁸ Changes in the CCP’s leadership have always been extremely important in Chinese politics because political power in China is highly concentrated at the top.⁹ During the pre-Jiang Zemin era, leadership changes were accompanied by dramatic institutional transformations in China’s socio-economic policies, foreign relations, and state-society dynamics.¹⁰ The change of leadership often resulted in significant changes in policies. Since the CCP’s 16th National Congress, however, the leadership transition procedures have become more institutionalised and far calmer. Nevertheless, the leadership selection remains largely behind closed doors.¹¹ Although the CCP’s most recent leadership transition officially took place during the 18th National Congress in November 2012, the real contending process occurred in the informal elite arena, where ‘retiring incumbents and prospective successors maneuvered, typically with elaborate subtlety and political opacity’, long before the actual congressional meetings.¹²

The ‘Chongqing Model’

Bo Xilai, Party secretary of Chongqing Municipality (2007–2012), is the son of the Chinese Communist Party revolutionary leader Bo Yibo. A celebrated member of the ‘princeling’ fraction of China’s ruling elites, Bo Xilai built his own political career as the mayor of Dalian in the 1990s, governor of Liaoning Province (2001–2004), minster of commerce (2004–2007), and Party secretary of Chongqing from 2007 until his prosecution.¹³ His relocation to Chongqing after the 17th National Congress was widely considered a demotion, and Bo was forced out of the most inner circle of the Party leader hopefuls. It was believed that the ‘Chongqing Model’ and the conspicuous display of Chongqing’s ‘success’ was Bo’s attempt to get back into the game on the eve of the 18th National Congress.

The so-called ‘Chongqing Model’ consisted of a series of economic, social, and cultural policies. Chongqing’s economic policies combined efforts to attract outside investment, increase government investment, and boost domestic consumption. A new export-processing model, ‘one end outside, one end inside’ (yi tou zai wai, yi tou zai nei 一头在外, 一头在内),¹⁴ successfully attracted a large number of parts companies to settle in Chongqing’s new-fledged special industrial zones. HP, Ford, Foxconn, and many of the world’s biggest corporations came to invest in Chongqing. Moreover, the government invested greater than 30 billion yuan (≈ £3 billion) in the infrastructure every year, building extensive transportation networks of highways, bridges, and subways. As elsewhere in China, ‘land financing’ (tudi caizheng 土地财政) constituted a key force in driving urban development.¹⁵ As a result, Chongqing maintained a startling GDP growth rate of around 15 per cent during the few years for which Bo was Party secretary.¹⁶ The social policies implemented in Chongqing included the construction of 40 million m² of affordable public housing, special assistance for children and the elderly who had been left behind in the rural areas, and an attempt to reduce the discrepancies between the urban and rural areas and improve people’s standard of living. The slogan ‘Five Chongqings’ vowed to build a metropolis that was green, safe, healthy, pleasant, and convenient to live.¹⁷ The cultural policies aimed to enrich the city’s cultural life and improve people’s mental outlook, including promoting the Red culture campaign. At the same time, Chongqing was committed to enforcing better discipline and a ‘mass-line’ approach to work among the Party cadres in the city.¹⁸ All levels of cadres in Chongqing were requested to participate in three activities: ‘da xia fang’ (大下访, visiting the masses and asking about their difficulties), ‘san jin san tong’ (三进三同, getting involved at the grass-roots level by visiting villages and eating, living, and working with peasants in their households), and ‘jie qiong qin’ (结穷亲, building long-term assisting relationships with households suffering hardship).

The most controversial endeavour among the various policies carried out as part of the ‘Chongqing Model’ was a pair known as ‘Singing Red, Smashing Black’ (chang hong da hei 唱红打黑). The ‘Smashing Black’ campaign, led by the chief of police, Wang Lijun, was a relentless crackdown on alleged organized crimes.¹⁹ The campaign started in June 2009 and was said to have cracked more than 2,000 criminal cases, leading to arrests of more than 1,500 suspects and confiscation of billions of Chinese yuan over the duration of four months. The campaign evoked both approval from local residents, applauding the significant improvement in public security in the city, as well as heavy criticisms from China’s legal community, who accused it of violating legal procedures and tampering with human rights. During the campaign, the vice director of the Police Bureau and director of the Justice Bureau, Wen Qiang, was sentenced to death along with a dozen alleged mafia bosses.²⁰ Many wealthy businessmen were targeted and sentenced following hasty trials, and the trial of Li Zhuang, a lawyer who had defended one of the businessmen, spurred huge controversy.²¹

Equally eye-catching was the Red culture campaign (June 2008–March 2012), which featured four elements: ‘Singing Red, Reading Classics, Telling Stories, and Spreading Mottos’ (chang du jiang chuan 唱读讲传). ‘Singing Red’ appeared to be the most prominent and controversial aspect of the programme. Popular activities included singing competitions organized by all levels of the Chongqing government, regular Red-themed singing and dancing performances in public squares, TV programmes featuring Red songs produced by the Chongqing satellite TV channel, and so on. The ‘Reading Classics’ section of the programme focused on the publication of small pocket books edited by Chongqing’s Propaganda Department. The intention was to encourage the officials and masses to read classic works that ‘represent the fruits of civilization and wisdom of humanity’.²² The first collection of ‘Reading Classics’ was published in December 2008. In the subsequent years, 28 series of small booklets were published, with a total issuance of more than 17 million units. The third element – ‘Telling Stories’ – was launched in March 2009. Pamphlets of ‘Telling Stories’ (jianggushi 《讲故事》), containing up to 8,000 stories, were printed and disseminated among the public. The fourth part – ‘Spreading Mottos’ – involved sending Red-themed text messages. The most famous was probably the one that Bo sent to millions of mobile phone users in Chongqing on 28 April 2009. He quoted several of Mao Zedong’s famous dictums, including ‘Humans need to have some spirit’ (ren shi yao youdian jingshen de 人是要有点精神的). In 2008 and 2009, Chongqing organized two consecutive ‘Red text-message composition contests’ to encourage ‘the study, composition and transmission of Red mottos’.²³

The controversies over Bo’s ‘Chongqing Model’

Comments on the ‘Chongqing Model’ by both public intellectuals in China and observers of China abroad, were split at the time. In the context of the Chinese intellectual field, ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ have specific meanings and carry connotations different from the ones they have in Western political discourse. On the spectrum from ‘Left’ to ‘Right’, one can identify four basic categories of political factions in post-CR China: the ultra-Left (Maoist); the new-Left; the reformist; and the far-Right (Liberals). The ultra-Left (Maoist) insists on the rule of the CCP, a planned socialist economy and supports, or is at least sympathetic to the CR and Mao’s doctrine of continuous revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Left d...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• 1 Chongqing under the spotlight: the ‘Chongqing Model’ and its controversies
• 2 Putting the Red culture campaign into perspective
• 3 Chongqing’s Red culture campaign as simulation
• 4 Who were the participants in Chongqing’s Red culture campaign?
• 5 Experiencing the campaign: patterns of practices by the local people in Chongqing
• 6 How the official programme interacted with the practices of the local participants: exchange
• 7 How the official programme interacted with the practices of the local participants: framing
• 8 Conclusion
• Epilogue: understanding the case of Chongqing
• Appendices
• Index