Xinjiang and the Chinese State

Violence in the Reform Era

Debasish Chaudhuri

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138063051
• eBook ISBN: 9781351401050
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Chinese History
• Index: Social Sciences

This book focuses on the nature of ethno-national conflicts and impacts of ideological orientation of the Communist Party of China (CPC) towards the national question in the context of Han nationalism and political, economic and security policies towards Xinjiang. Violence in Xinjiang since the mid-1990s is projected as one of the major national security challenges for China, along with issues pertaining to Tibet and Taiwan. The author argues that the post-Mao reformist model may have been a beneficial economic and political innovation, but failed in dealing with regional conflicts and unrests arising out of the demands for independence, freedom, greater autonomy and assertion of democratic and civic rights.

The book discusses Chinese nationalism and the construction of Uyghur national identity, consequences of economic modernisation in the region, ethnic conflicts and coercive measures, the security and social stability situation in Xinjiang, intensification of violence in Xinjiang under the new leadership, vision of the 'Chinese dream', key policies and programmes, post-riot fallouts and social contradictions manifest in discourses surrounding development, separatist violence, religious fundamentalism and international terrorism.

With its in-depth, accessible and comprehensive analyses, this book will be a valuable addition to scholars and researchers of Chinese studies, politics and international relations, security and strategic studies, sociology, social anthropology and ethnic studies.

Chapter 1
Historical background

In the modern period, China was subjected to threat from several Western imperialist forces; however, only a fraction of its territory came under colonial power. The partial colonial status with continuous fear of being subjugated into a full-fledged colony¹ influenced China’s relationship with the peripheral lands and non-Han inhabitants. It also created a strong sense of urgency among the majority Han community to incorporate the peripheral regions inhabited by minority nationalities such as the Uyghur, Tibetans, Mongolians and people of various other ethnic origins within China.

In the face of Western imperialism, the traditional power structure between the core and peripheral peoples in China had undergone drastic transformation. In the latter half of Qing rule, conquest of less integrated peripheries of the empire and expansion of control in various spheres of life of politically weak minority communities was given priority over traditional expansionism in the increasingly Han-dominated court. Moreover, because of slow and belated penetration of the Western colonial forces in the remote parts of the traditional societies, many peripheral peoples remained unaware of the danger of new forces of subjugation and the evolving nature of relations with the emerging Han-dominated centre in the modern period. Xinjiang is one such peripheral area which experienced the process of incorporation within China while the latter went through the course of state formation under the late imperial, nationalist and communist regimes.

Geographical nomenclature

The territory situated to the west of China proper (zhongguo benbu) was referred to as Western Regions or Xiyu in Chinese historical sources. Following the Qing conquest of the region in 1759, it came to be known as Xinjiang, which means ‘New Dominion’ or ‘New Frontier’. The word Turkestan (the land inhabited by Turks) was already in use in Persian texts since the 12th century and the term must have entered into post-renaissance Western academics through Muslim sources (Wei 2003: 2–3). In reference to the Russian part of Central Asia, Xinjiang is referred to as Chinese Central Asia or Chinese Turkestan or Eastern Turkestan in the Western sources since the 19th century.

There are two large geographical subregions in Xinjiang – the Tarim River Basin south of the Tianshan Mountain; and the Zungar Basin or Zungaria in the north, named after Zungar tribes of Mongol origin who ruled this part of the region between 1634 and 1757. There are two other smaller divisions – Turfan Depression in the east and the Ili River Valley in the west. Because of the Muslim dominance, south Xinjiang used to be known as Huibu or Huijiang² in the Qing historical records. South Xinjiang is also known as Kashgaria or Altishahr (a Uyghur word meaning six cities) that includes six principal oases – Khotan, Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hissar, Ush Turfan and Aksu. Because of geographical proximity with Central Asia and cultural affinity with the Turkic Muslim population across the border, south Xinjiang was also referred to as Bukharia or Little Bukharia (Millward 1998: 23). The eastern part of Xinjiang comprised of Turfan and Hami prefectures known as ‘Uighuristan’ until the completion of the Islamisation process in the region in the early 16th century (Oda 1978: 22–3).

The terms Turkestan (Tujuesitan) or Eastern Turkestan (Dongtujuesitan) was mainly used in academic discussions in PRC until the Uyghur of the region began to express their resentment violently. Gradually, various Eastern Turkestan organisations came into existence in the 1990s. In recent years, Chinese officials and think tanks have engaged enthusiastically in analysing the term ‘Eastern Turke-stan’ (Dongtujuesitan or Dongtu) from various perspectives and challenging the historicity of the term used by the Uyghur separatists. As China initiated denouncing this geographical nomenclature and an all-out attack against the Eastern Turkestan organisations, frequency of appearance of the term has increased manifold.

Turkesisation and Islamisation

According to some scholars, the oldest inhabitants of Xinjiang were of Indo-European origin and categorised under a broad generic term Tokharian (Narain 1990). The existing sources suggest that hordes of Turkic people came from the north and settled in present-day Xinjiang and Central Asia, which ultimately transformed the ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious characters of the region.

A powerful Turkic Khanate was established in Inner Asia in the middle of the sixth century. The Khanate was extended from Mongolia in the east to the Aral Sea in the west covering a vast area of present-day Xinjiang. This nomadic confederation was divided into two halves – the eastern Khanate centred in the Orkhon River valley of Mongolia and the western Turk confederation covering the important centres of Central Asia and Xinjiang. The rulers of the Tang Dynasty (618–906) took advantage of the internal strife between the two confederations and defeated them in AD 630 and 657, respectively. The remnants of this Turkic Khanate ruled from the Ordos region until AD 744 when the Huihe (widely recognised as the original ancestor of the Uyghur) succeeded in establishing a powerful steppe empire in Mongolia, which lasted for almost a century from AD 744 to 840 (Sinor 1990). In order to avert confrontation with other nomadic forces, the main branch of the Huihe Empire moved to present-day Xinjiang, and within a very short period established two separate empires – the Karakhanids (840–1230) in the western Xinjiang covering Kashgar and some parts of the Kazakh steppes and the Gaochang Huihu Kingdom (860–1284) in the eastern part of Xinjiang. It is estimated that by this time 15 different Turkic tribes had migrated to the north and south of the Tianshan and other Central Asian regions (Haneda 1978: 8). The rise and fall of the Turkic confederations in the vast region initiated a process of demographic transformation and the new ethno-linguistic and cultural forces gradually replaced the old Tokharian elements in the region, referred to as Turkicisation in the history of Xinjiang.

The ancient Huihe society underwent rapid transformation from the eighth century under the influence of Manichaeism. The community became more and more inclined towards a sedentary agrarian way of life, and following the growing trend of urbanisation, nomadism among this ancient race began to decline. There was a growing intellectual advancement in the field of theology and other cultural aspects among the Huihe people (Mackerras 1990). The ancient Uyghurs also came under the influence of many religious practices before adopting Islam. Because of strong Buddhist influence, in the initial phase proselytisation efforts by the Arab Muslims among the Central Asian Turks were not an easy task. It was only after the establishment of the Samanids (874–999), a Sunni Iranian dynasty in Bokhara that conversion of the Turkic population became easier (Bennigsen and Bryan, 1987: 370). It was possibly in the first half of the 10th century that Satuk Bughra Khan (d. 955), the Karakhanid ruler, adopted Islam and this marked the beginning of Islamisation in today’s Xinjiang. Xinjiang was then divided into two Buddhist kingdoms, Yutian (in Khotan region) and Gaochang (besides Buddhism, other religions were also practised here), and Islamic Karakhanid dynasty at Kashgar.

The Islamisation process inside Xinjiang considerably slowed down with the decline of the Karakhanid dynasty following the establishment of Western Liao (1124–1211), a Sinicised Mongolian dynasty, also known as Kara-Khitai. The Kara-Khitai dynasty had established dominance over both the sedentary as well as nomadic Turkic population of the region. The newly converted Muslim communities lost their stronghold in Xinjiang during this time (Grousset 1970: 127–34, 164–6). By 1218, the local rulers of Xinjiang came under Mongol dominance. The Mongols maintained their nomadic lifestyle and followed their tribal religious faith, which presented a sharp contrast to the sedentarism of the majority population in the oases of eastern and southern Xinjiang. Under the heavy influence of culturally advanced local population, the Mongol rulers adopted Turkic language and culture, which culminated in the final stage of the Turkicisation process in this region. At the same time, conversion of various Mongol hordes to Islam started in the entire region, which ultimately gave birth to various Turco-Mongol ruling houses that led to the final stage of Islamisation process in Xinjiang. In the course of assimilation with the subject population, the Chaghataids made a lasting contribution to the Islamisation process in Xinjiang, which was completed with the annexation of Hami in 1513 by the East Chaghatai Khanate (Oda 1978: 34).

Early control mechanism

In the early period of dynastic history, northern China was always subjected to incursions by the nomadic horsemen of the Mongolian steppes. In order to protect the empire, the ancient Chinese rulers often reached matrimonial alliances with the powerful nomadic tribal confederations of the western and northern frontiers. The practice of sending court women as bride to the rulers of the peripheries as gesture of friendship by the imperial houses of the central plane was known as heqin policy. Some Chinese scholars now interpret this policy in the positive light and claim that this type of marriages helped spread the Chinese language and Han culture in the frontier regions like Xinjiang and Tibet (Wan 2000: 35). The policy was, however, considered disgraceful and humiliating by the Chinese rulers (Bai 1984: 15). The Han court realised that this kind of conciliatory policies with nomadic rivals was not an ideal arrangement, and in order to establish superior position over their nomadic rivals, the Western Han Emperor Wudi (140–88 BC) tried to build a military alliance against northern nomads Xiongnu and sent Zhang Qian to the Western Regions in 138 BC as his envoy. Zhang Qian was the first Chinese envoy engaged in military and diplomatic campaigns with the Western Regions and his visit is generally considered as the beginning of Chinese rule in the region. However, the Han imperial success in the region did not last long and subsequent efforts by the later dynasties was at best partially successful.

China gradually developed more nuanced peripheral policies and tried to change the core-periphery relations through military manoeuvre, diplomatic persuasion, migration, integration, assimilation and trade and tributary relations. The tributary system (chaogong) and vassal relationship (fanshu) proved to be the most effective of all these policies. The later imperial dynasties, though faced with different kinds of forces in the peripheries, pursued the tributary system and vassal relationship with the surrounding people. Even in the absence of a unitary state in China proper or when the central authority was too weak to retain its superiority, the fiction of tributary vassal relationship remained which helped to construct the historical myth of allegiance and loyalty of the surrounding lands and peoples with the Chinese civilisational centre (Yü 1986: 384–9). In contrast to the Han dynasties, the non-Han conquest regimes in China were much more successful and were equipped to rule both sedentary and nomadic subjects of China proper and its peripheral lands. The dual system adopted by the ruling elite from China’s borderlands helped to develop a multi-ethnic empire state. These regimes pursued a bilingual or multilingual policy and far more tolerant religious policies (Rawski 1996: 833–8). In terms of maintaining an original power base and expanding the sphere of influence in the steppe as well as ruling the largely Han-dominated China proper, the Manchus excelled among all Inner Asian peoples who ruled China.

Incorporation of Xinjiang within China

During the early phase of the Qing rule, northern Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet remained outside the Manchu sphere of influence. Northern Xinjiang was under the Zungar Khanate led by Oirat Mongols, who extended their influence in southern Xinjiang, Turfan and Hami by 1681. In 1688, when the Oirats waged a full-scale attack on Mongolia, a local Mongol tribe Khalkha retreated to southern Mongolia and requested for Qing protection (Barfield 1989: 277–83; Soucek 2000: 170–1). The Qing responded by sending its first military campaign against the Oirat Mongol rulers.

By the end of the 17th century, the Qing controlled Hami, but refrained from active rivalries with the Zungar until 1715. In order to stop a possible Russo-Zungar alliance, the Qing government established diplomatic relations with Russia in 1728. Due to lack of any able leader in Zungaria, the central authority of this nomadic confederation began to decline and a smallpox epidemic further weakened the Zungar strength, which created an opportunity for the Qing forces to wipe out the last major peripheral nomadic power in 1757 (Barfield 1989: 289–94; Perdue 2005: 48).

The local Muslim resistance against the Qing advancement in the region was mainly carried out by Sufi religious leaders from south Xinjiang. Most of the rulers (local Begs and religious leaders) of Altishahr and eastern Xinjiang acknowledged the Qing authority when they established control over the Zungar area by annihilating the Oirat in the 1750s. In 1759, a Qing army invaded and annexed regions under the control of one branch of Naqshbandiyya Sufi religious order known as Afaqiyyas (also known as White Mountain khwajas). But because of continuous sectarian disputes among the two branches of Naqshbandiyya, the White Mountain khwajas could never put up a unified resistance against Qing expansionism in south Xinjiang. The White Mountain khwajas who refused to accept Qing rule in the region took refuge in Khokand Khanate of Central Asia. In 1765, there was an anti-Qing rebellion in Xinjiang by the White Mountain sect, which was readily suppressed and the khwajas of this branch had to flee to Central Asia (Fletcher 1995a: 88–9).

The Khanate of Khokand in Ferghana sheltered many White Mountain khwajas and supported them in their anti-Qing struggle. In 1820, the Khokandi ruler supported the khwajas to attack the Qing-occupied Xinjiang region. An army was mobilised and a holy war was declared against the Qing. After an initial setback, the khwajas regained their popular support in Altishahr and by 1826 the Qing fortress in Kashgar was captured. Because of internal division among the local rulers, the Qing authority was able to suppress the rebellion without much effort, capture their leader Jahangir Khwaja and executed him. In 1830, one more resistance broke out in Xinjiang which was also backed by the Khokandi ruler. However, this campaign failed to attract support of the majority of the Eastern Turkestan population and most of the members of White Mountain sect distanced themselves from this invasion. The Qing Chinese authority once again suppressed this invasion effortlessly. However, intermittent military incursions by the Khokandis and the holy war conducted by the seven leading White Mountain khwajas continued for the next three decades (Fletcher 1995a: 88–9; Fletcher 1978: 360–85).

The situation in Xinjiang became more complicated in the second half of the 19th century, when Tsarist Russia had strengthened its presence in Central Asia. It had already established control over the Kazakh occupied the steppes in the north, and from 1860 onwards, the Russian military launched a series of attacks on various Central Asian Khanates. In most of Central Asia, the Russians faced strong resistance from the local rulers. The struggle of the Khokandi rulers against Tsarist aggression had direct implications for the history of Xinjiang. During the second half of the 19th century, the British government in India, another foreign player in the Central Asian politics, began to penetrate Central Asia in a big way only when the Russians sped up their colonisation programme in the region. British interest in the Qing-occupied portion of Central Asia increased after the outbreak of Muslim rebellion led by the Khokandi General Yaqub Beg.

Because of the rise of Muslim uprisings in Shaanxi and Gansu between 1862 and 1878, the Qing-occupied areas in China proper were practically isolated from Xinjiang before the Yaqub Beg-led rebellion broke out. By mid-1864, the Qing had lost control of Kashgar, but two sectarian Muslim groups vied with each other over the control of the city. The Kyrgyz chief Siddiq Beg, leader of one of the groups, called for Khokandi intervention in 1865. The ruler of this Central Asian Khanate did not involve himself directly but sent Buzurg Khan, the only surviving son of Jahangir Khwaja. He came to Kashgar with only a little over 60 soldiers, led by Khokandi General Yaqub Beg (1820–1877; Liu, Smith and Smith 1980: 221–3). By utilising religious sentiments among the Kashgarian people, Yaqub Beg was able to mobilise a large army within a very short time and seized Kashgar and Yarkand and gradually defeated other Muslim leaders of Altishahr (Liu, Smith and Smith 1980: 223–4). In 1868, he sent envoys to the British government in India as well as to the Russian government for recognition. Worried about the Russian activities in this region, the British government in India sent Thomas Douglas Forsyth in 1872 to conduct a mission to Yarkand, and Britain finally accorded diplomatic recognition to the Kashgarian state under Yaqub Beg and showed its willingness to provide military support to him (Liu, Smith and Smith 1980: 225). The Caliph of Turkey recognised Yaqub Beg as the Amir of Kashgaria in 1873, which was significant merely from the religious point of view (Rahul 1997: 82–3). The governor-general of Russian Turkestan felt the need to check the rise of Yaqub Beg and occupied Ili in 1870 (Hsü 1965: 29–30). After restricting Yaqub Beg’s possible advance to the northwestern part of the region, Russia decided to use Yaqub Beg to gain an edge over the Qing government. In 1872, the first Russian envoy met Yaqub Beg and recognised him as the leader of Eastern Turkestan. In exchange, the Russians were allowed to trade throughout Kashgaria. However, in 1874, Russia ostensibly showed its concern for the Chinese troops fighting against Yaqub Beg by providing food at low prices in the hope that China would extend further trading privileges to the Russians (Paine 1996: 122–3).

The Qing China, however, strongly opposed any Russian intervention and decided to find a long-term solution to resolve the problem in Xinjiang. In the mid-1860s, Zuo Zongtang (1812–1885) was appointed governor of Shanxi, and in September 1866, he was given the charge of Gansu province as well. The following year, he was given the post of imperial envoy with the authority to command military affairs in Xinjiang. General Zuo Zongtang moved to northern Xinjiang in July 1876 – most part of which was still controlled by the Donggans, a Chinese-speaking Muslim community of Xinjiang and Central Asia – and within four months he defeated all Muslim rebel forces and established a stronghold in the north (He 2005: 73). By this time, Yaqub Beg’s regime showed symptoms of decay, and eventually he died a mysterious death on 29 May 1877. By January 1878, the Qing forces had recovered the entire region except the area occupied...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Illustrations
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Historical background
• 2 Theoretical aspects
• 3 National question and nationality work
• 4 Uyghur nationalist resurgence and the Han-dominated nation state
• 5 State ethnic policies
• 6 Regional economy
• 7 Ethnic resurgence and state response
• 8 International dimension
• Conclusion: conflicts and dreams
• Glossary
• References
• Index