The End of the Experiment

The Rise of Cultural Elites and the Decline of America's Civic Culture

Stanley Rothman

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781412862486
• eBook ISBN: 9781351295628
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Classes & Economic Disparity
• Index: Social Sciences

The End of the Experiment ties together Stanley Rothman's theory of post-industrialism and his four decades of research on American politics and society. Rothman discusses the rise and fall of the New Left, the sixties' impact on America's cultural elites, and the emergence of new post-industrial humanistic values.

The first part of this book explains how cultural shifts in post-industrial society increased the influence of intellectuals and redefined America's core values. The second part examines how the shift in American social and cultural values led to a crisis of confidence in the American experiment. And in a final section, Rothman's contemporaries provide insight into his work, reflecting on his continued influence and his devotion to traditional liberalism.

Rothman presents a quantitative study of personality differences between traditional American elites and new cultural elites. Rothman argues that the experiment of America—as a new nation rooted in democracy, morality, and civic virtue—is being destroyed by a disaffected intellectual class opposed to traditional values.

Part I

---

The Unraveling of Liberal Capitalism

1

---

Post-Industrial America

The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty, and the destiny of the Republican model of Government, are justly considered as deeply, perhaps as finally staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American People.

— George Washington, first inaugural address

Introduction

The quotation with which this book begins is quite properly from George Washington’s first inaugural address. Like the other founders, Washington was aware that free republics had been far less common in human history than had despotic empires. America was an experiment. Under God, protected by vast distances from the corruption of Europe, lacking vast differences in status and wealth, America might, just might, show a new direction for mankind. What were required were civic virtue and the right set of political institutions.

To Washington and the other founders, the success of the experiment was by no means guaranteed. Indeed, for some of them probably, the odds were against it. The lessons of history were not encouraging, and for the most part, those who founded the republic did not regard human beings as infinitely plastic.

It is my contention, however, that the experiment has failed, that democracy in America is in decay, and that the immediate future belongs to the bureaucratic state. Clearly, therefore, this book is partly a scholarly polemic.

In so stating, I do not mean to suggest that it is different than any other book dealing with contemporary social and political problems. All such books are, in some sense, polemics. They are or are not perceived as such, partly as a result of the style in which they are written, but more importantly, because readers often decide whether or not a book is or is not polemical on the basis of agreement or disagreement with the picture of the world that the author presents. When this picture is in accord with their own, they tend to accept it as a picture of what is (or should be), even if the evidence presented for the picture is not really very compelling. On the other hand, should a description of the world deviate widely from their own, readers have a tendency to dismiss it as biased, or at least to demand considerably more evidence for the proposed picture than they otherwise might.

I am not trying to suggest that the moral political positions taken by people are inevitably derived from their conscious perceptions of reality. Indeed, very frequently, an individual’s statements about reality are rationalizations of deeply held prejudices, which he or she is trying to justify. One suspects, though, that these statements often are derived from a largely unconscious view of what the world is like.

But, to return to the point that produced this discussion—this book is a polemic. I argue for a perspective on the nature of American society and its relation to the rest of the world, which some will reject because they will see it as having implications that run counter to deeply held concerns. While, I suspect, conservatives of both the traditional and neo types will reject my argument, the strongest criticism will come from the liberal-cosmopolitan community that currently dominates academia and the media. I will be accused of being a sexist, a racist, a conservative, and/or inhumane, and the book will be said to have repressive implications. Sic Transit Gloria Mundi. Such arguments are, of course, spurious. Such labeling and accusations represent an effort to gain the moral high ground (so that one does not have to argue the facts) and have always been characteristic of debate over deeply felt issues. As William Connolly (1969) pointed out, from a rather different perspective than mine, groups are always attempting to set the terms of discussion by defining their own positions as moral and those of their opponents as immoral. Thus, those arguing for a view of the world we do not like are labeled communists, sexists, or racists, depending on the group engaged in the labeling. The aim of such action is to put their opponents on the defensive (although the motives are generally unconscious, or at least those engaged in such labeling are often unaware of the function it serves). Rather than discussing the merits of their case, its proponents are now forced to prove that they are not communists, racists, or what have you.

I hope, although I am not terribly optimistic, that those reading this book will consider the arguments advanced, rather than stereotyping them. I am not overly optimistic, because I am all too aware of my own primitive impulse to engage in labeling and the great difficulties I have in considering positions that I find distasteful.

While this volume is concerned with contemporary affairs, it begins with a giant step backward. It is my contention that liberal capitalism, by which I mean a society founded on individualism, private property, and relatively free markets, and characterized by representative government is, historically, an oddity, even in its imperfect forms. Such a society emerged in northern Europe only a short time ago and has been limited in practice to a relatively short historical period and to relatively few nations. I argue that it arose as the result of a peculiar concatenation of economic and cultural patterns which were characteristic of Europe, that there is little likelihood of it developing deep roots elsewhere, and that the patterns that brought it into existence in the West have now eroded to the point that its future in Europe and America is quite problematic.

More specifically, liberal capitalism in the West is a product of the decay of Christianity. It emerged in the course of this decay from sources that were an integral part of the Christian tradition. However, as the decay has proceeded further, it has finally undermined the very roots that brought liberal capitalism into existence. A significant source of the decay lies in “enlightenment.” Enlightenment, by which I mean the demythologizing of the universe and the substitution of a rational instrumental view of the world for religious myths, has been among the great achievements and glories of the West. However, in the end, enlightenment self-destructs, for it destroys the psychological preconditions of rationality itself.

There is nothing particularly original about this argument. It is based on my own peculiar fusion of the views of Weber, Freud, and, more recently, Louis Hartz (1955) and Daniel Bell (1973; 1976), although none of them would necessarily accept the conclusions I have reached.

Like every historical analysis, mine is a “just-so story.” My argument will persuade, if it does, only those who read the book through to the end. I argue that the decay of America is partly the function of an intellectual stratus that dominates the dissemination of ideas and has imposed its definition of reality upon larger society. It is this group that determines collectively, although not conspiratorially, what issues will be researched, how such issues will be researched, and in many cases what conclusions follow. They have succeeded, in Kuhn’s terms, in producing a paradigm revolution (Kuhn, 1962).

It is not that this group contains the best social scientists or the most brilliant journalists or the most creative intellectuals. Far from it. Rather, for reasons I will indicate in the book, they do have the troops. In another work, I have documented the extent to which this group created an image of the New Left based on ideologically tainted studies.

I am not a relativist. I believe that there is something called truth about human affairs. However, I also believe that we never fully understand most things, however much we may chip away at our ignorance. I also believe that unconscious needs are extremely powerful and that the impact of the ideas of one or a few books, no matter how well argued, are unlikely to persuade many people. Indeed, the better argued they are, the greater the hostility they are likely to arouse.

Why then do I bother? The answer is quite simple. One has but one life. I chose the intellectual life for many very complex (and often infantile) reasons. Early on I developed a passion to know and to communicate my knowledge to others. I write this book then because I cannot help myself and because, while I agree with Freud that the voice of reason is weak, I also hope that it can speak to at least some people and thus make a difference.

One final point. Readers will find few if any policy pronouncements in this book. I find it difficult enough to try to understand (albeit incompletely) some of the sources of our present problem. I do not know how to solve them. The older I get, the less sure I am of what we should do. I have a few notions about what we should not do, but beyond that, I have little to offer those who are seeking solutions.

* * *

America as a Post-Industrial Society

During the 1950s and early 1960s, a series of changes ushered in the beginning of a new cultural, social, and political dynamic in America—a long period of economic growth, the rapid development of new technologies, a tremendous increase in the percentage of young adults attending college, and the substantial enlargement of the technical service sectors of the economy. The new dynamic also included the emergence of national television, communication, and transportation networks, which guaranteed that most Americans, to an unprecedented extent, gained access to the same image of reality, whether they lived in a rural small town or New York City (Rothman, 1979b, p. 346–88).

Daniel Bell, among others, coined the term “post-industrial society” to describe these developments (1973) and outlined a new kind of society, information-dominated and service-oriented, that would replace industrial society as the dominant system. There are three components to a post-industrial society: an economic shift away from manufacturing to services, the central role of new industry based on science and technology, and the rise of new technical elites with concomitant new norms of social stratification.

Post-Industrial Labor

The shift to services in the generic sense is not only those services of the personal sort (e.g., household servants) characteristic of agrarian societies where labor is cheap and unemployment is high. Post-industrial society is characterized by various kinds of services. This includes personal (e.g., department stores, laundry, car washes, day care); business (e.g., banking, finance real estate, insurance); transportation; communication; utilities; health; education; research; and government.

How much has the labor force changed? Historical statistics show that the US is moving from a basically agricultural-based economy to an industrial one to a post-industrial, advanced capitalist economy (Carter, 2003). In 1800 America was primarily an agricultural economy with roughly 75 percent of the labor force in agriculture. By 1900 less than a third labored in agricultural, while 21 percent was in manufacturing, 14 percent in services and 5 percent in the professions. By 2000 a little more than 2 percent of the labor force was in agriculture and roughly 15 percent was in manufacturing. In contrast, 38 percent was in the service sector and 16 percent was in the professions. In other words, workers in these latter two “post-industrial” sectors were roughly 54 percent of the economy.

In post-industrial America, information, knowledge, and related technology are prime human capital. Blue-collar workers in the industrial sector declined in value and number, while service and professional labor (e.g., scientists, those in the cultural sector) grew in value and importance.

Education

Along with the change in the labor force was a significant improvement in technology and educational attainment (US Census Bureau, 2010). At the beginning of the twentieth century, most Americans had attained only a primary-school level of education (three or fewer years of education).

In 1950 11 percent had one to four years of education, and another 36 percent had between five and eight years. Only 20 percent had up to four years of high school and a mere 6 percent had up to four years of college. By 2000 7 percent had eight or fewer years of school. One-third had only graduated high school, while 25 percent had some college and 26 percent had four or more years of college.

Status of Women

In the post-industrial economy, American women in increasing numbers went to work. In 1950 roughly one in three women were in the workforce. By the end of the twentieth century, it rose to almost 60 percent (US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000).

In greater numbers, women went to college, obtained college degrees or more, and entered the high-status professions (National Center for Education Statistics, 1993; US Census, 2001). In 1940 4 percent of women had four or more years of higher education. In 1960 it rose to 6 percent, in 1980 it was 14 percent, and in 2000, 22 percent. By the end of the twentieth century, women made up roughly half of all law and medical students. In many advanced masters and PhD programs, women outnumbered men (Golden, 2006).

Feminism among the new upper class had much to do with these changes. In the second half of the twentieth century, there was not only a movement of women into traditionally male preserves, but also the emergence of feminist literary and political philosophies and key shifts in personal relationships between men and women (Kramer, 1986; Lagerfeld, 1986) that gave ideological meaning to this massive social change in education, social relations, and the American labor force.

These changes in American economy and society have led scholars to posit the rise of a “new class” within advanced capitalist society. Politically and culturally, neoconservative writers in the late twentieth century claimed that the intellectuals, academics, and the “scribbling set” experienced an escalation of power and influence in the wake of the 1960s; they constitute the core of this “new class” (see Lerner et al., 1996 on the new class concept).

The white-collar occupations (professional, managerial, technical, sales, and clerical) have expanded in size and influence, and those in the white-collar professions became more liberal in voting behavior and general political attitudes. In the 1970s a segment of white-collar managers and professionals were the most liberal of occupational groups on most economic, social, and foreign policy issues (Ladd, 1978; Lipset, 1981). Despite a slight shift to the right on economic issues during the 1980s, the pattern has not fundamentally changed (Davis, 1980; Ladd, 1979; Brint, 1984, 1987; and McAdams, 1991).

Correlation, however, is not necessarily causation. Daniel Bell argues that the rise of liberalism among white-collar professionals is not a necessary concomitant of a rising class conflict between the traditional middle class and a new (upper) class. For a variety of reasons, the liberalism of the white-collar occupations is the most extreme and visible case of a societal-wide trend:

The “new class” consists of individuals who have carried the logic of modern culture to its end. Serious and committed, as many are, or trendy and chic as others may be, they make up a cultural phenomenon that mirrors the breakdown of traditional values in Western society. It is not a “new class” in any social-structural sense. It is the endpoint of a culture in disarray (Bell, 1980, p. 162).

But it is more than a culture in ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Part I: The Unraveling of Liberal Capitalism
• Part II: New Strategic Elites
• Part III: Rothman’s Impact
• Bibliography
• List of Contributors
• Index