Elites and Classes in the Transformation of State Socialism

David Lane

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351297301
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Communism, Post-Communism & Socialism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The year 2011 marks the twentieth anniversary of the end of the Soviet Union. This may be an appropriate time to evaluate the adoption by previously state socialist societies of other economic and political models. The transition has sometimes been described in positive terms, as a movement to free societies with open markets and democratic elections. Others have argued that the transition has created weak, poverty-stricken states with undeveloped civil societies ruled by unresponsive political elites. Which is the more accurate assessment?David Lane examines a few of the theoretical approaches that help explain the trajectory of change from socialism to capitalism. He focuses on two main approaches in this volume - elite theories and social class. Theories dwelling on the role of elites regard the transformation from socialism to capitalism as a type of system transfer in which elites craft democratic and market institutions into the space left by state socialism. Lane contrasts this interpretation with class-based theories, which consider transformation in terms of revolution, and explain why such theories have not been considered the best way of framing the transition in the post-socialist states.While recognizing that elites can play important roles and have the capacity to transform societies, Lane contends that elite theories alone are inadequate to explain a system change that brings free markets. In contrast, he proposes a class approach in which two groups characterize state socialism: an administrative class and an acquisition class.

Part I

Elite and Class Perspectives on Social Change and Transformation

1

Introduction: The Elite and Class Paradigms

Interest in the elite analysis of politics of Western societies has declined since the 1970s.¹ This decline, however, coincided with a revitalization of the study of political and economic elites in the field of development and transition studies which later inspired the political analysis of the social transformations of the state socialist societies. These approaches were related to a more historical understanding of social and political change stimulated by writing, such as that of William Bendix, which indicated that the formation of the nation-state in the West and Japan resulted in “disunifed” or antagonistic elites.² Elite instability in turn, it was contended, resulted in regime volatility, a high incidence of political violence, and frequent changes in the make up of government. Modernization theory of the 1960s which envisaged the democratization of politics as a consequence of structural changes in industrialization and urbanization was replaced by an emphasis on elites which could “craft” democratic change. Elites became the movers of transformation in Latin America, southern Europe, and later in the post-socialist societies.

In this book I criticize this approach. While recognizing the role of elites as agents of change and possessing transformative capacities, I contend that elites have to be contextualized in relation to institutions and classes, and that the rise of “dominant,” “ruling,” or “consensual” elites has a social structural basis. In the post-socialist societies, it is particularly important to define the interests which are supported and promoted by elite pacts, as well as those groups who are excluded. The role of international influences is considered to be a major causal factor in political and social change in the post-communist countries.

In the 1960s, social change in the Third World was analyzed in terms of socio-economic variables. S. M. Lipset’s mobilization theory³ contended that social prerequisites were necessary determinants of democratic regimes: democratization would be consequential on modernization (education, urbanization, rising wage incomes, and class formation). Until a country reached a threshold given by levels of industrialization and social development, it would remain non-democratic. In such theorizing, “elites” were recognized as political actors, but they were attached to the stratified class system. Analysis, however, began to change in the late 1970s when elites became decoupled from classes.

Following the fall of dictatorial regimes in southern Europe, American academics sought to influence the policy process to secure political and economic stability in changing societies. The Asian model of strong authoritarian states and weak societies predicated on socially undifferentiated and economically backward societies, it was contended, was “overdetermined”: authoritarian systems were only one, and an undesirable, way to achieve social development. Thinking shifted to viewing actors, rather than structures as vital to promote democratic change. Transition theory associated with writers such as Schmitter, O’Donnell, Di Palma, and Higley,⁴ shifted the focus to elites engaging in “compacts” and settlements, with actors “crafting” constitutions and institutions to a democratic design. Elites then were regarded as the key political variable to explain both stability and instability. Such thinking was stimulated by the “move to democracy” of authoritarian states in the South. Spain, Portugal, Greece, and many Latin American societies moved toward pluralistic political regimes with competing electoral parties, and legitimation of Western-type political rights.

A significant paradigm shift occurred. Whereas previously, writers had conceived of ruling political elites in social structural forms, political leadership was now considered a consequence of political events, of political management. Policy makers were concerned to “craft” democratic regimes favorable to the West and to prevent the rise of authoritarian or statist regimes sympathetic to communism. Elite stability, they argued, was a key variable. Emphasis was put on forms of leadership, consensus building, crafting institutions, and the role of committed political actors to promote democratic solutions. The political dynamic for a move to democracy, it was contended, comes from above in the form of elite-led transitions.⁵ A stable democracy in turn would satisfy the conditions for economic growth and prosperity. An important component here is the exclusion (even suppression) of interests which contest the assumptions on which democratic politics rest (the “rules of the game”) and on which society is to be governed.

Earlier elite studies in the frame of C. W. Mills and William Domhoff took a critical position to the dominant power elite, whereas the developmental elites’ perspective legitimated an open form of competitive market capitalism and electoral political regimes. The preferred form of rule was that of “polyarchy”—a system of rule characterized by competing elites, of which the governing political elite is legitimated from time to time by voters through elections.

The Elite Approach to Post-Communist States

These writings were the background to what became regarded as a transition to a pluralist polity in the European communist states, heralded by Gorbachev who came to power in 1985. An elite approach to power provided not only an interpretation of the changes taking place, but also a normative context in which the new politics of post-communism could be furthered.⁶ Scholars concerned with the “third wave” of democratization focused on the emerging elites: as Higley and Burton have put it: “…political elites continue to figure heavily in studies of communist breakdowns and the postcommunist regimes which have emerged in Eastern Europe.”⁷ The normative implication of these works was that political change could take place within the parameters of state socialism: a kind of socialist pluralism could development quite independently of any major class movements or changes in the ownership of property.

Socialist pluralism, however, was cut short by the instability and deteriorating conditions in the USSR as well as unrest and major political changes in the former state socialist societies of central Europe. On Christmas Day 1991, the Red Flag was hauled down from the Kremlin Tower. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist. Gorbachev’s attempted pluralistic reforms of state socialism, his policy of perestroika, turned out to be a katastroika, with severe declines in GDP, rising unemployment, and breakdown of the authority of the USSR. The major systemic changes subsequently advocated by the now self-styled radical reformers were the removal of the dominant Communist Party and the ruling elites associated with it.

The research design of my own project (on which Chapter 5, Chapter 7 are based), was predicated on within-system reforms, particularly on elite renewal, and was not appropriate to analyze collapse and transformation. The research project then had to turn to the consideration of different problems, institutions, and processes. Analysis of the former state socialist societies required a study of the politics of societies in transformation. Unlike what were usually called “transitions to democracy” in the Latin American and southern European countries, the state socialist societies experienced a comprehensive conversion, involving the collapse of the dominant institutions of power, major transfers of property, and, with some notable exceptions, the exit from politics of the previous rulers and political elites.

But the elite paradigm remained fashionable, though in a rather different guise. Writers previously focusing on the shift from autocracy to democracy in southern Europe and Latin America now applied their theorizing to the post-socialist states. Writing on Russia and Eastern Europe, Kullberg, Higley, and Pakulski claimed quite unambiguously that “the dynamics and trajectories of political change in post-communist countries can be explained almost entirely as a function of the structure and behaviour of elites.”⁸ And, as Higley and Burton put it, “democratic transitions and breakdown can best be understood by changes in the internal relations of national elites.”⁹ This approach was shared by nearly all commentators (including even Marxist ones) on the post-socialist states.¹⁰ Political analysis focused on the extent of elite unity or division. The policy pursued by the Western powers (as shown, for example, by the conditionalities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and European Union—hereafter EU) was predicated on the formation of an elite consensus in civil society. Such writers contended that differences in elite structures, preferences, and leadership styles explained the political outcomes in the post-socialist states—the shift to parliamentary-type democracies in the new member states of the EU (furthered by democratic elites) and to autocratic rule (through the reconstituted communist elites) elsewhere (for example, in the central Asian republics of the former USSR), and later in Russia under President Putin.

Change was so rapid and chaotic that to discover who constituted the “ruling elites,” I utilized the “reputational method” epitomized by the social anthropologists’ technique of asking the newly met tribesman to “take me to your leaders.” (See Chapter 5.) Gorbachev, in seeking to change the system of political power, had undermined the party apparatus and government ministries. Decision making was the prerogative of cliques around Gorbachev and pressure was exercised by various groups and individuals, many of whom were outside the formal apparatus of power. The reputational method of elite analysis was appropriate to uncover the role of social forces and individuals.¹¹ A major finding here was the very high rating given by respondents to the influence of external people and groups—such as George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, and nationalist movements in the Republics and regions of the USSR.

Rather than there being too little elite analysis, as in studies of Western societies, there was rather too much of an emphasis on elites driving the transformation process. Higley, Pakulski, and Wesolowski in a collection on post-communist elites and democracy in Eastern Europe,¹² contrasted a “consensual elite” with “wide differentiation” and “strong unity” which defined conditions in a stable democracy, with an “ideocratic elite” having “narrow differentiation” and “strong unity” characterizing totalitarian regimes.¹³ Rather than framing the discussion of social change in the context of classes and revolution, “transitions” are depicted as the consequences of more or less negotiated settlements between elite actors. This discussion is detailed in Chapter 2. The decoupling of social structure from elite studies leads to a disregard for the social determinants of political expectations. Chapter 4 describes the ways in which the urban, educational, and occupational changes led to the rise of a population predisposed to change.

The reproduction of the elite structure of the Soviet Union has been described by many elite theorists. Higley’s “ideocratic elite” has been reconstituted during the transformation to become the “nomenklatura elite.” This approach is shared by nearly all commentators on the post-socialist states.¹⁴ The nomenklatura elite, popularized by Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White,¹⁵ is seen to derive its power from the apparat, essentially located in the previous Communist Party; such people utilized their connections to remain in power. Evidence here is deduced from the social backgrounds of elite members which show that a large proportion was recruited from the intermediate ranks of the “nomenklatura.”

The nomenklatura elite paradigm has been widely accepted in academia and the media to explain the changing structure of power in the post-communist societies. But it illustrates a common failure in elite studies. A “reproduction” of elites does not necessarily lead to a reconstitution of the former system. (See Chapter 5 in this book.) Leaders may change their views, may learn from their mistakes and recognize the deficiencies of existing structures and procedures, and they may be influenced by the leaders of other countries to mend their ways. Eltsin himself, for example, is a prime example of the “reproduction” of an elite member, having served under Gorbachev’s communist elite, while in his reincarnation he became President of the Russian Federation; he destroyed the USSR and was instrumental in carrying out mass privatization as well as making the Communist Party illegal. Members of a political elite may be political entrepreneurs devising new policies or they may be converted to them.

Moreover, even a formal “circulation” of elites does not necessarily entail changes in the political, social, or economic structure of society. It might mean a change in the balance of forces within the ruling class; or simply, as Pareto put it, purging “decadent elements. …ridding the country of a baneful animal pest.”¹⁶ What is lackin...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Part I: Elite and Class Perspectives on Social Change and Transformation
• Part II: The Transformative Role of Political Elites
• Part III: Outcomes of Transformation
• Biography
• Index