Betrayal and Betrayers

The Sociology of Treachery

Malin Akerstrom

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351316781
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psicología
• Subtopic: Psicología social

Betrayal has a deep fascination. It captures our imagination in part because we have all betrayed or been betrayed, in small or large ways. Despite this there has been little serious work on the subject. It was this absence that inspired this book.As Akerstrom notes, betrayal is something that most people have encountered at some point in their lives. She defines betrayal as a breach of trust, when information is shared beyond an agreed upon boundary of relations, whether that boundary is a pair of friends or a nation. Taking as a point of departure Simmers work on secrets and secrecy, Akerstrom discusses categories of.betrayal, and conditions that influence its intensity. Sometimes the betrayer is seen as a hero and at other times a traitor; and sometimes there are competing loyalties. In certain situations, she reminds us, it is difficult to avoid betrayal or the perception of betrayal. Akerstrom discusses strategies people employ to avoid betraying, ranging from not telling, to making sure one does not know about something in the first place. With deft precision, she clarifies distinctions and in the process broadens our understanding.Initially inspired by insights arising from her research on the criminal informer, for which she had done in-depth interviews, Akerstrom supplements these with interviews with policemen. She has also drawn from her experiences in the field of social work, particularly with women's and crime shelters. Using biographies, autobiographies and a broad range of literature related to spies, World War II, the McCarthy era, and recent literature on whistle-blowing, Akerstrom has defined a fascinating theme. While her illustrations are sometimes dramatic, she hopes that readers will perceive obvious parallels with their own experiences. Social psychologists, sociologists, criminologists, and others interested in secrecy, secrets, and those who betray them to others will find this an unusual and absorbing volume.

1

Betrayal and Betrayers

Case 1:

Frank Bossard, war time RAF radar officer, civil servant, technical intelligence officer, and finally guiding weapons work in the British Aviation Ministry, supplied photocopies of secret Aviation Ministry files to the Soviet intelligence in return for money.¹

Case 2:

Eva telling how she disliked the annual office picnic. Every section was supposed to bring its own blanket and food. One was not supposed to join any of the other sections. Even if one, as she did, usually had coffee and lunch with the others, on this occasion it was taboo. Not to stay on one’s blanket was treachery, in her own words. (Private conversation)

The above two cases are very different illustrations of how betrayal can be perceived: one is a dramatic, unusual event; the other less dramatic and more common.

Obviously there are differences between the two. Sociologically however I believe it may be fruitful to analyze them as similar social forms - as breaches of trust.² Whether these appear as dramatic or not, it is important to acknowledge that treachery constitutes a central human concern. The importance of trust as a basic relationship has been described by Bateson in the following way:

This is what mammals are about. They are concerned with patterns of relationship, with where they stand in love, hate, respect, dependency, trust and similar abstractions vis-à-vis somebody else. This is where it hurts us to be put in the wrong. If we trust and find that that which we have trusted was untrustworthy, or if we distrust, and find that that which we distrusted was in fact trustworthy, we feel bad. The pain that human beings and all other mammals can suffer from this type of error is extreme. (Bateson 1977, 470)

Bateson refers to the strong feelings betrayal arouses. Intense sentiments such as indignation, contempt, revenge, and so on are not reserved for those directly involved. Furthermore they can continue long after the crime took place. Dante is a case in point: in his lusty description of hell in Divina Commedia he places the archetypal traitors Brutus and Judas Iskariot in the ninth and worst circle where they are lowered to eternal ice and chewed into small pieces by Lucifer’s three maws.

What, then, is this phenomenon that engages us so intensively? Betrayal is easily understood intuitively. Making a more stringent definition is not so easy. I will not suggest a comprehensive definition but I will problematize the concept, and in that process point out some characteristics of that which we experience as betrayal.

Looking for material in the literature on treachery I found mostly characters such as traitors to a country or police informers. Sociologically the subject appears to be much more open for generalities. We also talk about scabs, snitches, deserters, and defectors as social types who betray.³My first point of departure therefore is to discuss betrayal as generally as possible, in the Simmelean tradition of formal sociology. This implies a search for different contexts and types of betrayal where discovered similarities and differences are not attributed to the concrete content. My second point of departure is that betraying is a common rather than uncommon feature of social life. Most of us have experienced betrayal such as a child discovering our friend preferred to play with someone else and onward. We have betrayed or been betrayed - at least as fleeting suspicions. My third point of departure is that the breach of trust involved is an overstepping of a We-boundary - the We consisting of relations ranging from a pair of friends to a nation.

Secrets as Creators of Social Bonds

Why are secrets and confidences exchanged when the risk of betrayal exists and possible betrayal can be so painful and/or dangerous? While acknowledging the complexity of this issue one may concentrate on the purely social motives. Simmel, who has written about secrets and secrecy, has emphasized the bonds created by them. According to him secrecy is one of the “great social phenomena” peculiar to man and one of his greatest achievements, giving rise to a parallel world enlarging life. Without secrets many aspects of social life would be impossible. (1964, 330) Furthermore, secrets make for a division of those in the know and those not in the know: a We/Them dichotomy is created. Confidences bind the confiders to each other. Societies and groups are created by, and live off, their secrecy.

Aubert used Simmel’s analysis when he wrote about his experiences from the Resistance in Norway during World War II. Even in dangerous contexts there is a need for sharing secrets because of the social bonds they create. The Resistance’s preference for the organization being led from Norway rather than by those in exile supervising individual local agents not known to each other was perhaps caused by such considerations rather than by the stated arguments, which had a more “rational” character.⁴

There may have been a feeling that the coldly efficient system of individual agents, isolated from each other, would lead to further deprivations. The possible loss of intimacy and friendship, which existed within the organization and which sustained morale, constituted a latent threat. To be isolated with important and dangerous secrets constitutes a threat to personality, while the sharing of secrets, although dangerous, creates bonds of intimacy. (Aubert 1965,305)

This quotation illustrates that the dramatic and common everyday life betrayal may not necessarily be different after all. In one and the same context they may be intermingled. One also finds an illustration of the social bonds produced as a result of sharing secrets. In this example they were produced by the sharing in itself (obviously accentuated tremendously by the background of danger).

In other circumstances social bonds may be created by exclusive sharing; that is, leaving someone out by creating We’s in a larger We. Goffman has written about collusion, which can be created through such sharing. Collusion need not include direct secrets but rather the sharing of experiences, opinions, and so on that the others in the group are excluded from but that may well involve them. Betrayal in this form seems to be a social necessity in that we use it to indicate the importance or specialness two people or a few members of a group feel toward each other:⁵

Collusion is a normal and no doubt desirable part of social life ... it is probably impossible for interaction to continue among three persons for any length of time without collusion occurring, for the tacit betrayal of the third person is one of the main ways in which two persons express the specialness of their own relation to each other. (Goffman 1972,340)

Betrayal as Not Honoring the We

Information - not necessarily in the form of secrets but particular information having a special value to a number of people - creates a distinctive form of relation. This is a We. Its members may hold alternative interpretations of the shared information but only they (as opposed to the world around them) know the nuances, meanings, and possibilities of interpretations of that information. The symbol of a flag will mean something more, whether you like it or not, through the eyes of a citizen than through the eyes of a foreigner.

The boundaries around the We are given by shared background and knowledge. Once these We’s are formed, however, they are the determinants of what ought to be shared with outsiders. This is evident when some information is declared secret by the We in principle - not because the revelation would hurt anyone.⁶

The size of the We may differ and its members may be more or less intimate. Some groupings constitute natural We’s, such as the family, where we cannot escape common experiences and are given a common background; or the inhabitants of a We may not necessarily know each other. In this sense, We’s are not only a pair or a group but may be a nation, a religion, a common people, or a class. Furthermore one may be a member of many We’s simultaneously. The propensity of betrayal due to the participation in many different We’s holding different, and sometimes opposing, values is characteristic of modern societies.⁷Treachery is thus inherent in the process of socialization:

... the problem of which “self is being betrayed at any particular moment, a problem posited as soon as identification with different significant others includes different generalized others. The child is betraying his parents as he prepares for the mysteries and his nurse as he trains for knighthood, just as he betrays his peer group by being a “square” young scholar and his parents by stealing an automobile, with each betrayal concomitant with “treason to himself in so far as he has identified with the two discrepant worlds. (Berger and Luckmann 1972, 190)

Furthermore We’s are not stable entities. They vary for example according to who constitutes Them. Take a place of work. It often consists of competing We’s, who will form Them’s in relation to each other. Threatened by an outside enemy, these We’s will form one betrayable, unified We.

Betrayal occurs when you in one way or another overstep the boundaries of a We. In some situations the boundaries become more important and overstepping them more serious (for example, times of conflict or when individuals or groups have invested a lot in their secrecy).

Forms of Betrayal

Leaving the discussion of the concept as such, one may go on to explore which forms treachery takes and how it is experienced more concretely. The first that comes to mind is that of something being told. Judas, the archetypal traitor, “told.” But telling is not the only act that constitutes betrayal - not telling may be an act of betrayal as well. Other actions or lack of actions may also be treacherous. “Scabs” are, for example, definitely considered as traitors to those on strike.

The breaching of the We’s boundaries may analytically be categorized in several ways. Apart from the examples given above, someone may reveal too much in the sense of showing outsiders that which should be hidden by opening the door and letting the outsiders look in in a way that is not considered proper. One may fail to use the defense strategies or face-saving techniques that are expected to protect the team or any of its members from embarrassment. (Goffman 1959) Moreover, one may act in a way that will hurt the We and that is perceived as betrayal. Some such acts, if done secretly, are those labeled “stabs in the back.” Leaving the We, thus denying its value, may constitute the most final of betrayals. Betrayal of this sort includes deserting, defecting, or refraining from joining the fight in a conflict.

Below, I have chosen to discuss betrayal in the forms of “telling” versus “leaving.” They are quite different forms of behavior; but in this context, sociologically, they have the same meaning. Obviously not all telling and leaving are associated with betrayal. The conditions when labeled as such will be explored. It should be added that both telling and leaving can be present in any one betrayal as when someone decides to inform because he wants to leave the group and informing thus becomes a sign of his commitment to another group.

Telling

Betraying by telling may take several forms. For example, it might be the telling of something we consider secret or deem sacred. Even though the information divulged might be neither secret nor sacred from the point of view of the teller, the receiver/hearer may betray the secret due to the nature of the information received. Such a situation can occur when the betrayed does not realize that his or her behavior might be judged as a misdoing and thus makes no attempt to hide it.

The social welfare organizations may qualify as betrayers in this sense, as for example when they have certain standards that their clients do not know about beforehand. If you turn to them with trust and believe that you form a We with them, expecting help but getting detrimental results, you are apt to feel betrayed. One example of this was given in a study of battered women. (Schillinger 1988) One of the interviewed women had called the police after a former boyfriend broke into her mobile home and beat her and her youngsters. The welfare case worker who was called in had the children put in foster homes. After this the battered woman’s anger was directed at the authorities instead of the former boyfriend. Apart from the fact that the loss of the children probably was more painful than the battering, she might also feel betrayed because she believed that in this case she was a “deserving victim” entitled to help and that she would form a We with the police and the social worker against the boyfriend. Instead, the authorities turned against her by taking her children away from her. Schillinger makes the general comment:

What surprised me, however, was that in most instances the main thrust of their considerable anger was directed not at the battering mate, but at what was perceived to be the equally brutal and patriarchal welfare bureaucracy. (Schillinger 1988,477)

Telling about that which we call secrets may involve everything from breaking confidences of friends to revealing religious rites. Betrayal among friends, for example, seems to be closely associated with the discovery that sensitive information cannot be passed on. In a study of high school students it is said:

The most prominent feature of friendship is to be found in connection with “trust.” . . . For our students, “trust” meant being able to talk and knowing in turn the other would not talk - behind your back. He could receive confidences and keep them. Indeed the break-up of friendship, as distinct from drifting apart, involved precisely the feeling the other had let one down. (Naegele 1958,243)

Divulged secrets are not the only things that can hurt or injure the exposed party. Some of the experiences we share with another are invested with a kind of sacredness. One wants to keep the specialness in one’s relations, and to cover up some of the members’ practices and thoughts that are not deemed appropriate for the outside world. Social scientists sometimes come close to seeing themselves or being seen by others as “spies” and when reporting about their material as “informers.” Their special problem is that they have gained entrance to a We, and then they have discussed the people they studied without the proper deference which includes hiding and shielding that which is not to be shared with outsiders. They can thus be seen as having profaned the sacredness of the We built on common information and background. It is this that infuriates people.

The hatred occasionally visited upon the debunking historian is visited almost daily upon the person who reports on the behavior of people he has lived among; and it is not so much the writing of the report, as the very act of thinking in such objective terms that disturbs the people observed. It is a violation of apparently shared secrets and sentiments. (Hughes 1960, xiv)

As it is used here sacred obviously does not have to be connected with traditional religious use. It is used in the Durkheimian sociological connotation implying that humans themselves are viewed as sacred. Parts of our private life are therefore sacred symbols of a We. As to the latter, a good illustration has been provided in an analysis of women involved in extra marital affairs. (Richardson 1988) We all show our membership in a We through different social confirmations. When it is impossible to do this through external validation, signs of belongingness may be invested in things or rituals. All the women in Richardson’s study had such ways of “marking We": private language, jokes, anniversaries, phone codes. Even time slots could acquire this quality - one woman told how she and her lover wrote to each other at the same time every day “like we were really together.” Some had shared possessions. These objects could take on a semi sacred quality:

Another woman, after a long preparatory statement, entered her bedroom and positioned herself in front of a bulletin board which held a dried bouquet, a Valentine’s Day Card, movie ticket stubs, and some postcards. A period of silent viewing followed. Later, she said, the board was strategically placed “so I can see it just before I turn off my night-light.” (Richardson 1988,215)

The objects so invested with sacredness were not hidden so they were not secret in that sense, but their symbolic meaning was secret. As I see it, the above is illustrative of how a betrayal of the sacred in everyday life could occur. For example, if that woman overheard her lover cynically speaking of these objects, it might destroy the We.

A more obvious betrayal of the sacred occurs when religious beliefs, traditions, or rituals are profaned by revealing them to the uninitiated. This is probably most pronounced when the revelation concern closed or secret societies or tribes. When outsiders gain access to the sacred by identifying with and being accepted by the in-group and then must simultaneously reveal information due to their job or task, I imagine quite a lot of consciences are prob...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Content Page
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Betrayal and Betrayers
• 2 Third Party Views
• 3 Heroes or Traitors?
• 4 Neutrality as Betrayal
• 5 Avoidance of Betrayal
• Part 6 A One-Context Analysis: Crime and Informers
• Outcasts in Prison
• The Social Construction of Snitches
• Snitches on Snitching
• 7 Cronstedt: A Concluding Illustration
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Index