Encyclopaedia of Soviet Life

Ilya Zemtsov

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138509566
• eBook ISBN: 9781351316828
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

A by-product of the amazing changes now taking place within the Soviet Union is a change in rhetoric no less than reality. Under Gorbachev, the Russian language has been changing parallel with novoe politichaskoe myshenie - new political thinking - with the effect that such new expressions as have flooded the Russian language clash with the less yielding realities of Soviet economy and society.

The purpose of this volume is to clarify this dynamic in Soviet life, in which stagnation and decay confront hopes and expectations for liberalization. Zemtsov argues that the Soviet political language is self-contradictory, fractured into polarities of good and evil and thus depriving the Russian language of its basic subtlety, coherence, and inner logic.

This work brings to life the Orwellian world of double-speak in a post-totalitarian environment. The Soviet language has two basic components: fictions which Communist ideology proclaims as reality, and realities that are portrayed in the guise of fictions. In this sense, Zemtsov undertakes to do for the Soviet language what the great H. L. Mencken achieved for the American language -show the reality of Soviet life by making plain the fictive qualities of Soviet ideology.

This is a basic library reference work, a volume of indispensable utility for political scientists, area experts, and policy analysts. It offers a taxonomy enriched by a deep, personal knowledge of the Russian language by its author. Encyclopedia of Soviet Life is at one and the same time a basic primer of Soviet contemporary politics, a deep portrait of the psychology of totalitarian manipulation, and a sensitive appreciation of the nobler aspirations of the Russian people that is part and parcel of their great language.

The Dictionary

A

Absenteeism (Progul).

Failure to appear at work without valid reason. Absenteeism is viewed as violation of work discipline subject to administrative sanctions. Penalties for absenteeism range from reprimand, transfer to a lower-paying job, denial of such benefits as bonuses, an extra month's salary paid once a year, summer vacation, allowances for length of service, etc. In cases of repeated absenteeism the absentee (progushchik) is subject to dismissal from work. In reality, however, highly skilled and not easily replaceable workers are treated with forbearance, even if they fail to appear at work for weeks on end due, for example, to heavy drinking. At the same time, the more expendable workers can be easily categorized as absentees and fired on the spot. Unexplained and repeated absenteeism is referred to as “willful” (zlostny) in contrast to absenteeism explicable on grounds of health or family problems, which is referred to as “forced” (yynuzhdenny).

Absenteeism is a grave and apparently insoluble social problem that stems from the absence of a work ethic, lack of incentives, and bad working conditions. From time to time campaigns are launched against absenteeism—with some Soviet leaders wanting to put an end to absenteeism, and others to get rid of the absentees. However, neither repeated condemnations of absenteeism nor punishment of the absentees—even by measures as severe as banishment from urban areas or imprisonment for parasitism (tuneyadstvo)—have had much effect. What is required here is drastic reorganization of the Soviet system of labor management and work incentives, and ultimately of the entire Socialist economy. Naturally, the Soviet leaders cannot agree to such measures, which would threaten to undermine the very foundation of their power.

Additional vacations for an uninterrupted record of work in the current year may be completely or partially denied to absentees from work: to those who absent themselves without valid reason, or who report to work intoxicated. (O dal'neyshem ukreplenii trudovoy distsipliny i sokrashchenii tekuchesti kadrov v narodnom khozyaystve [Ways to further consolidate working discipline and reduce personnel turnover in the national economy]: Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Council of Ministers of the USSR and All-Union Central Soviet of Trace Union, Iz-vestiya, 12 January 1980)

It is particularly difficult for a collective to work if it shuts its eyes to drunkards. As a rule drinking is responsible for their absenteeism and for disruptions of public order. (Agitator, no. 19, 1980, p. 25)

Acceleration (Uskorenie).

A method and process of developing and improving the socialist system, offered as an alternative to its political and social stagnation. The strategy of acceleration concerns itself with both current problems and developmental goals for Soviet society (which are defined for the next fifteen years) as well as with the means by which development is to be pursued (the intensification of production, structural reform of the economy, and the implementation of effective forms of management). But this is not all. The essence of acceleration is conceived of in terms of reaching a higher quality of life, of profound changes in the character of labor, and of changes in material and spiritual values.

In historical perspective, acceleration is seen as a prerequisite for progress, which manifests itself in socio-economic development, particularly in transitions from earlier to more advanced stages of that development. Each successive stage of development releases more numerous and more powerful productive forces than those known to previous generations. This process has unfolded in Russia naturally and freely until it was first fettered and then paralyzed by the political and economic institutions of Soviet socialism. Then the contradictions and imbalances of that system became manifest as some branches of industry were developed at the expense of others and at the expense of the welfare of the masses. In the late 1970s Soviet economic development ground to a halt.

Disproving its slogan of the “historical law of progress,” Soviet socialism was idling. This was due not to the immobilism or incompetence of Soviet leadership (bad administration merely aggravated the deeper social crisis) but rather to inherent features of the system itself. As a result of the dictatorship of the party, extreme centralization, and the command economy, Soviet society found itself in a bind. There was only one way out—to borrow Western methods of management and social organization. This historical shift, or drift, toward capitalistic practices in the USSR in the mid 1980s began with the ascent to power of Gorbachev and his cohorts.

However, Gorbachev's innovations are being carried out inconsistently, timidly, and, most importantly, within the institutional framework left over from a totalitarian society. The entire program of acceleration, its social goals and economic means, is based on the premise of building an “improved” socialism—the latest utopia in the endless succession of Soviet myths. The goal of acceleration is highly specific, even if not realistic: to win in the “historic” contest between the two competing systems of socialism and capitalism. Prerequisite for such a victory, however, would be the most impressive leaps forward in a number of respects: nothing less than doubling Soviet national income and industrial production and realizing an economic potential equal to that reached over the entire previous period of Soviet rule.

To reach goals of such scale, however, appropriate means have to be found. Acceleration relies on a combination of both direct and indirect methods of development. The direct means would entail the simple (which in fact would not at all be simple) establishment of order and discipline and of a sufficient (although it will never be sufficient) degree of organization of the production and labor processes. The indirect means of acceleration would include high rates of economic growth to be attained through a radical transformation of the existing material-technological base, which in turn would increase the production of high-quality goods sharply enough to meet the current aggregate demand.

A crucial implication of the concept of acceleration is the idea that the entire economic structure needs to be radically revamped. By means of perestroika (cf.) an attempt is being made to assess the performance of enterprises, not according to the resources they expend and their gross production output in rubles, but according to their actual contribution to the creation of national wealth. In this process, quantitative indicators of production output (in rubles) are to be replaced by indicators of its quality.

Theoretically, the Soviet leadership could effect certain economic achievements without resorting to mechanisms of a free market. One possible approach would require a reassignment of capital investment priorities from heavy, particularly military, industry to light industry, the production of consumer goods, and the expansion of the service sector. This would allow a significant increase in the salaries of both blue- and white-collar workers and a consequent increase in labor productivity. The discussed reassignment of priorities, however, would be possible only if the Soviet Union were to abandon its global ambitions, which is not yet in the cards. Thus, the bulk of the surplus continues to be invested in machine-building and in the development of the most up-to-date technology for missile production and electronic technology, i.e., in areas vital for the development of modern weaponry. Meanwhile, in light industry acceleration proceeds via minor managerial improvements and attempts to “raise the consciousness” of workers, but without additional resources invested.

The shift to radically new forms of economic development is marked by the present Soviet leaders' excessive caution and insufficient consistency. They reject the methods of acceleration applied by Stalin, like the use of forced labor and the merciless exploitation of the peasantry. But while rejecting Stalin's options they are nevertheless reluctant to do anything decisive to modernize production management out of fear of weakening the regime and undermining their own authority.

As could be expected, Gorbachev's rejection of the most backward forms of management, as well as personnel changes that brought in younger cadres, initially injected a degree of vitality into the country's economy. However, quite soon acceleration began to be stifled by the weight of interference from above, the continuing flow of government directives, and the binding centralized planning.

Limited changes thus far effected have not been sufficient to change the Soviet system. This, however, does not mean that changes within the system are impossible. Some of the reforms already carried out, like the introduction of self-employed labor and family contract-work brigades or the autonomiza-tion of enterprises, provide grounds for believing that acceleration will continue in the Soviet Union—at least for the next few years.

What do we mean by acceleration? First of all—increasing the rates of economic growth. But not only this alone. The essence of acceleration lies in the new quality of growth: intensification of production in all ways possible on the basis of scientific and technological progress, the structural reorganization of the economy, effective forms of management, organization and encouragement of labor. (M. S. Gorbachev, Materialy xxvii s”ezda Kom-munisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza (Materials of the twenty-seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR) (Moscow: Izd. politicheskoy literatury, 1986, p. 21)

Under conditions of acceleration every Party functionary simply must be able to look ahead and boldly solve problems which only yesterday seems insoluble. (Kommunist, no. 17,1986, p. 32)

Scientific and technological progress is the main way of advancing the innovative strategy of acceleration endorsed by the Party. (Kommunist, no. 14, 1986, p. 20)

Accepting decisions enthusiastically (Vood-ushevlennye resheniyami).

A definition of the emotional response that the masses are obliged to display toward newly announced Soviet policies. The phrase implies social consensus, infallibility of the CPSU, and willing acceptance of its authority by the masses. The Soviet citizen has a duty to feel enthusiastic only about the decisions of the higher echelons of the party and government apparatus, such as the Politburo, Party Congresses, and government conferences. In regard to decisions made by city and regional bodies, the citizen does not need “to be enthusiastic,” as long as he or she abides by them.

Similar to “enthusiastic” are: “inspired by” (ydokhnovlenny), “uplifted by” (okrylenny) and the more forceful term, “armed by” (vooruzhenny). Occasionally, the adjective “historic” (istorichesky) is added to create the phrase “accepting historic decisions enthusiastically” (voodushevlennye istoriches-kimi resheniyami). The intention here is to stress the momentous character of the resolutions that mandatorily call for enthusiastic acceptance.

Soviet fighting men, enthusiastically accepting the decisions of the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the first session of the tenth convocation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, are tirelessly improving their training on land, sea and air. (Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, no. 13, 1979, p. 3)

Enthusiastically accepting the decisions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, Moldavian writers will taken an even more active part in the noble work of Lenin's Party. (Literaturnaya gazeta, 29 April 1981, p. 2)

Enthusiastically accepting the decisions of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, the Thirtieth Congress of the Communist Part of Azerbaijan, as well as the May and November 1982, and July 1983 Plena of the Central Committee of the CPSU, they are constantly increasing their contribution to the economic might and defense capability of the multi-national socialist Motherland. (Vyshka, 22 December 1983, p. 2)

Accomplishments (Sversheniya).

Achievement of goals intended to perpetuate the Soviet system. The word “accomplishments” is used in reference to both exceptional deeds and quite ordinary events. The fulfillment of production targets and five-year plans, success in socialist competition, and the completion of construction of industrial installations, housing projects, and the like are all extolled as accomplishments. Moreover, Soviet propaganda never fails to stress that all accomplishments of the Soviet people (in fact their entire lives, in so far as they are based on these accomplishments) are possible only because of the infallible guidance provided by the party leadership in the pursuit of the “great purpose” (velikaya tseV).

Accomplishments are spoken of in a variety of different contexts: “collective accomplishments” (kollektivnye sversheniya), “creative accomplishments” (tvorcheskie sversheniya), “accomplishments of the party and the people” (sversheniya partii i na-roda), “accomplishments of the Soviet people” (sversheniya sovetskogo naroda), “accomplishments of the human spirit” (sversheniya chelovecheskogo dukha), and “accomplishments of our heroic reality” (sversheniya nashey geroicheskoy deystvitel-'nosti). The lofty nature of all accomplishments is underscored by vivid attributes such as glorious, great, mighty, heroic, magnificent, historic, and supreme.

The figures testify to the scale of the current accomplishments of Kabardino-Balkaria. (Iz-vestiya, 1 September 1981, p. 3)

The present period in the history of our country is marked by significant events and great accomplishments. (Agitator, no. 19, 1983, p. 20)

Later, veterans try to keep in contact with the youngsters, and by encouragement and personal example stimulate them to accomplishments in their work. (Krasnaya zveda, 26 October 1983, p. 4)

Activist Attitude (Aktivnaya zhiznennaya pozitsiya).

Participation in various social undertakings imposed on the Soviet citizen by communist morality and implying the “voluntary” assumption of greater responsibilities than required by conventional morality. Activist attitude is conceived of as internalized civic duty that implies disinterested service to the state and dynamic involvement in the production process or in efforts to educate others in conformity with the ideals and expectations of the Communist party.

The ideology of activist attitude and its concomitant ethics imply the relegation to secondary importance of all personal interests, dispositions, and concerns in favor of the implementation of programs and instructions of the party. In practice, activist attitude involves the traditional imperatives of Soviet ethics: idealism and loyalty, communist conscientiousness, civic responsibility and the priority of collective over individual interests. The only social role permitted is that of a fighter for communism or, what is essentially the same thing, of a champion of the policies of the communist leadership. All other roles (for example, that of a critic of totalitarianism or of Soviet society or advocate of reforms) are proscribed. Thus, the philosophy of activist attitude, while theoretically entailing a freedom of choice, in fact denies individuals the right to any choice.

As a concept, activist attitude gained currency after the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU in 1976, which sought to halt the decline and degeneration of communist values. Mass consciousness had begun to reflect widespread indifference toward official ideology, apathy about public affairs, political skepticism, and disbelief in both the rationality and the humaneness of party policies. The public apathy of people who had lost whatever illusions about communism and confidence in the Soviet system they might have once had was generally accompanied by a shift to private concerns and the wish to give short shrift to imposed social obligations.

Along with the political skepticism and apathy in various segments of society, there emerged an overt consumer psychology, expressing itself in acquisitiveness and an interest in comforts and amenities to be amassed by means both lawful and unlawful. However, in Soviet society only the ruling elite has the right to enjoy comforts and amenities. The interest of the Soviet man-on-the-street in improving his material well-being signals a danger to the regime, for it indicates the existence of dissatisfaction with the living standards of the whole society. Besides, the retreat to private concerns implies a certain emancipation from official doctrine.

If communist ideology is to maintain its hold over people's hearts and minds, it cannot afford even a mite of freedom. This is why official propaganda strives to hammer home the idea that the interests of the state come before personal happiness. It explains the current propaganda emphasis upon activist attitude and the recurrent fierce denunciations of any preoccupation with private affairs, which is portrayed as a manifestation of petty bourgeois egotism and individualism alien to communism.

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Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• The Dictionary
• Bibliography
• Index of Russian Terms
• Index of Subjects and Names