The Soviet Union

Empire, Nation, and System

Aron Katsenelinboigen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351316903
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Process
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First Published in 2017. Political change in the Soviet Union never seemed more likely than in the period of glasnost and perestroika. The Soviet Union: 1917-1991 examines some of the less well explored areas of Soviet political and economic life to develop a feasible set of alternatives for future Soviet development and to establish which ones the system is predisposed to select. Katsenelinboigen takes on these difficult questions. Is it wise to develop glasnost in ways that allow masses to participate in the solution of strategic national problems? Can Soviet military expenses be reduced only to direct ones or is the whole Soviet economy military oriented? What explains widespread corruption among Soviet officials? Can market institutions be introduced into the Soviet economy, and if so, how is this best accomplished? Rather than focusing on a single dimension, such as authoritarianism versus democracy, his analysis incorporates multidimensional perspectives (among them, pluralism, division of powers and openness participation of competent and responsible people in decision making) which permit a more precise understanding of the limits of present options and allow him to develop new policy prospects. Although this book is about the Soviet Union, the approaches Katsenelinboigen uses have application in other contexts. His discussion of inflation for example and why it is found in planned as well as market economies has important implications for many developing countries. It will be of interest to those who seek a new perspective on events in the Soviet Union, as well as specialists in international relations, political science, and economics.

I

THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM

One

Russia’s Fearsome Past, Stormy Present, and Murky Future

1

Systemic Causes of the Present Crisis

Symptoms of a Crisis or Just a Slight Cold?

The events in the Soviet Union in the past fifteen years that preceded perestroika, give rise to the question, “Are the negative phenomena visible there merely the result of short-term fluctuations, or the symptoms of a deep-seated systemic crisis?” The prevailing viewpoint, shared by Gorbachev, is that the country faces a crisis situation.¹

The decisive sign of stagnation in the economy was the drop-off, dating from the late 1970’s, in the growth rates in heavy industry. The main element in the ideological justification of the Soviet system has always been its ability to sustain a rapid growth in that sector, which was said to be the key to the country’s defense posture and to the prospective welfare of its citizenry. To that end, everything else was sacrificed, including the service sector, light industry, and agriculture. But when the growth rates, and occasionally even the net output, in heavy industry began to decline, without any concurrent improvement in the consumer sector, one could legitimately start questioning the efficiency of the Soviet economic mechanism as a whole.

Table 1.1 illustrates the situation with steel, which in the Soviet Union is considered a leading economic indicator, similar to automobile manufacturing and housing construction in the United States.

We can see that the increase in steel production in the 1975–1980 and 1980–1985 periods was only 25 to 30 percent of the increase in the preceding periods. Moreover, toward the end of the 1975–1980 period even the net output declined, from 151, 453 thousand tons in 1978, to 149,099 thousand tons in 1979, and 147,941 thousand tons in 1980.² The production picked up somewhat in subsequent years, but the growth rates have not changed substantially, especially compared to those in the 1945–1975 period.

TABLE 1.1. Soviet Steel Production 1945–1988 (in thousands of tons)

Year	Output	Growth per Five-Year Period
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988	12252 27329 45272 65294 91021 115889 141344 147941 154668 160550 161887 163000	15077 17943 20022 25727 24868 25455 6597 6727

Sources: Figures for 1945–1970 are from the statistical abstract Narodnoe khoziajstvo SSSR 1973: 264; for 1975, Narodnoe khoziajstvo SSSR 1980:158; for 1980–1987, Narodnoe khoziajstvo SSSR 1987: 122; for 1988, from the Progress Report by the State Statistics Committee on the fulfillment of the economic development plan in 1988, Pravda, 22 January 1989.

True, a decreasing steel production could be a progressive phenomenon, signifying lower steel consumption per unit of output due to its better quality, increased sophistication in the manufacturing of steel products, or the appearance of substitutes in the form of plastics and nonferrous metals.

I do not have the figures on Soviet trends in steel consumption per unit of output, if for no other reason than that most of them are still classified. Faute de mieux, we have to look at what has been happening with steel-related products. For the sake of simplicity, I have chosen two of them, metal-cutting machinery and tractors, which, thanks to their bearing on defense, are of considerable importance for the Soviet leadership. The data in Table 1.2 are presented in physical terms in order to factor out price fluctuations.

The downswing in heavy industry has been so severe that the overall growth of the Soviet GNP has ground to a virtual halt.

The troubled economic situation becomes all the more significant if we realize that it was preceded, and is now being accompanied, by a host of long-neglected and very serious social problems.

In my view, the present economic crisis in the U.S.S.R. is not a transitory aberration, but the result of more than seventy years of exploitation by the socialist system.

TABLE 1.2. Soviet Production of Metal-Cutting Machinery and Tractors, 1945–1987.

Year	Metal-Cutting Machinery (in thousands of units)		Tractors (in thousands of units)
	Output	Growth per Five-Year Period	Output	Growth per Five-Year Period
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987	38 71 117 156 186 202 231 216 182 164 156	33 64 39 30 16 29 −15 −34	8 117 163 239 355 459 550 555 585 595 567	109 46 76 116 104 91 5 30

Sources: Figures for 1945–1970 are from Narodnoe khoziajstvo SSSR 1973: 280, 288; for 1975, Narodnoe khoziajstvo SSSR 1980: 166, 171; for 1980–1987, Narodnoe khoziajstvo SSSR 1987: 130, 135.

A sharp drop in the overall rate of industrial production has been accompanied by such phenomena as the exhaustion of natural resources in inhabited regions, and increasing plant and equipment obsolescence. Demographic problems constitute another symptom of a deep illness of Soviet society: birthrates are falling, the death rate and infant mortality are on the rise. The latter trend has little to do with the temporary problems in infant care, but is rather the result of a general degradation of the entire generation of newborns. The incidence of mentally retarded children has also increased. These demographic trends are linked to growing alcoholism and increased pollution (exacerbated by the lack of appropriate safety equipment in industry), the prevention of which requires significant capital expenditures.

One could cite many other symptoms of a deep illness of Soviet society. Anomie and cynicism are a mass phenomenon. Communist ideology provokes greater indifference than contempt. Heavy drinking (according to a new version of the theory of historical materialism, a new stage has emerged between socialism and communism: alcoholism) and ingrained corruption in places high and low are universally tolerated.

Since the symptoms I’ve enumerated have been widely discussed in both Western and Soviet literature, there is no need for me to dwell on them here. The mere mention of them is enough for a knowledgeable reader to conclude that there is a deep crisis in the Soviet society. Next, I will try to examine several important underlying reasons for this condition. I do not plan to prescribe radical cures, but the reader is asked to excuse me if I sometimes give in to the temptation to offer tentative advice.

Is The Soviet System Pathological?

What is the role of socialism in bringing about the present crisis of Soviet society? This, it seems to me, is a key question.

Before we tackle it, let us first fix a few concepts: the concept of a healthy versus a sick economic system, and, second, a normal versus a pathological economic system. A healthy system is one in which development corresponds to the wishes of the members of the society (provided they have not been suppressed by the authorities); in a sick system, development diverges from the wishes of the members of the society.

Respecting normality and pathology, Russell Ackoff, with whom Jamshid Garajedaghi and I taught a course on the pathology of social systems at the University of Pennsylvania, opined that a pathological system is distinguished from a normal one by the fact that a pathological system cannot, using the means at its disposal, maintain a normal regime and combat malfunctions. In other words, a system’s illness is not an indication that its condition is pathological. Pathology arises when the system is incapable of handling the illness on its own.

Now let us apply Ackoff’s idea to the analysis of the capitalist and socialist systems. Marxism, for example, considers the capitalist system sick and pathological. Its illnesses are plain to see: inflation, unemployment, crime, prostitution, homelessness, poverty, etc. According to Marxists, the pathology of the capitalist system is defined by the fact that under capitalism private property reigns, and each person pursues his own selfish interests, which in turn engenders anarchy together with social, economic and political illnesses.

Since under socialism property belongs to all the people, and the system is guided by the State Plan in the interests of the people, Marxism considers it to be normal and healthy.

Of course, this view of the two systems is a radical one—in each, only pluses or minuses are acknowledged. In a somewhat ‘softer’ version, Marxism would hold that the ills of capitalism are stronger than its healthy traits, and its pathology stronger than its normalcy. For socialism, the judgement would be reversed.

This is precisely the sort of view that reached its peak in the early 1930s. A deep economic crisis that struck the developed capitalist nations; the World War I which preceded it; the moral decline—these were all the results of internal capitalist developments, in no way attributable to communist intrigues. By that time, the U.S.S.R. had embarked upon a large-scale industrialization. Soviet cities were growing, there was a labor shortage, people were singing optimistic songs. The fact that this process was accompanied by the destruction of a strong peasantry followed by an orgy of political trials against the so-called ‘enemies of the people,’ was put down by Western liberals to ‘growing pains.’ In other words, if the ills from which the West was suffering appeared to the liberals to confirm a pathological character of Western societies, the maladies of the Soviet system were seen by them as mere growing pains, as minor sores on a normal body politic.

Looking back, it is easy to understand how difficult it must have been for Western liberal intellectuals to identify precisely the pathological and normal cases. Exposes in an ever critical and free Western press only strengthened the perception of an impending doom. Because the Soviet press was under strict Party control, and the annihilation of millions of people was carefully concealed, the liberals could take comfort in the thought that the alleged brutalities were a fiction invented by the enemies of the young Soviet regime.

With the benefit of hindsight afforded by more than seventy years of Soviet rule, we can judge more clearly which system has proved to be normal and which pathological, again, from the point of view of the Western liberal. The West did manage to live through the most critical stage of its illness and recover, even though many sore spots still remain and cause a great deal of trouble. Soviet society has entered a prolonged period of stagnation, and there is no indication now that it will be able, even in the long run, to provide for the development of a kind preferred by Westerners.

To be sure, the picture is not all that simple. We cannot say that Soviet society lacks features that most of its citizens find attractive. Arguably, many people, from the most diverse strata, like the idea of the paternalistic state. The Soviet people are also quite eager to see their standard of living increase, and they resent the fact that the system can’t provide it for them. At the same time, the majority of Soviet people, or, more precisely, Russian people, would strongly prefer an enhancement of their country’s military might to personal welfare, that is, they would be willing to sacrifice individual material values and creature comforts for collective military interests. It is not easy to evaluate the Soviet system in terms of values shared by the Soviet people themselves, for it is hard to assign proper weights to various components of people’s preferences.

My guess is that a Western person tends to see the Soviet system as pathological. For the majority of Soviet citizens, maybe even an overwhelming majority, their system, though sickly, is normal and not pathological. Soviet people by and large tend to believe that their system can overcome the current problems and fulfill their aspirations, with the important proviso that to do so it needs a good leader. Only a small minority of active people, who cherish the ideal of independent initiative, can be said to reject the system. Their sentiments are perhaps shared at the top by a fairly large number of leaders who think that the system cannot reliably secure the enhancement of state power, which is a necessary condition for the enhancement of the leaders’ personal prestige. But the majority of people—leaders and citizens alike—are convinced that a Soviet-type system shored up by Stalinist controls (but without Stalinist excesses) is more attuned to Russian culture.

At the risk of gross simplification, I would hazard a two-dimensional classification of cultures premised on (1) the nation’s craving for leadership and (2) its ability to work without compulsion. Allowing only binary choices in each dimension (and adding illustrative examples for each type of culture), produces the matrix shown in table 1.3.

TABLE 1.3. Two-Dimensional Culture Classification

Craving for Leadership	Ability to Work without Compulsion
	Yes	No
Yes	Germany	Russia
No	United States	Poland

What is it in the mentality of the Russians that makes them opt for authoritarianism? That Russians are a capable people can be amply demonstrated. To cite but one fact among many, recall the rapid Soviet industrialization of the 1930s, which brought forth a huge professional cadre of Russian engineers and workers able to operate and maintain sophisticated equipment. At the same time, it is well-known that the Russians are much prone to drinking, besotted debauchery, and irresponsibility. Apparently, the Russians themselves are aware of their character defects, and hence crave a strong leader who can save them from harmful temptations and channel their energies toward constructive ends; among those ends a militarily powerful and independent Russia capable of repulsing any foreign invader occupies pride of place. This historical record of Russian arms is deeply rooted in the consciousness of the people who have been willing to sacrifice so much in both victory and defeat.

I believe that it is the culture of the nation, and especially its way of resolving the tension between the civil rights and socioeconomic rights, that ultimately determines its choice between capitalism and socialism.

What Do Soviet People Prefer More—Civil Rights or Socioeconomic Rights?

There is much in Russian culture that is in keeping with socialist ideals. This is not to say that all Russians subscribe to these ideals. Far from it. Only that the champions of a non-socialist orientation in Russia have never constituted that critical mass which is needed to replace the dominant value system.

There are many preconditions for capitalism, one of which is the presence of a critical mass of people with a certain value system. A key element in this system is the relationship between man and society. The crux of the matter can be expressed as follows: Does the individual exist for the society, or the society for the individual?

The Protestant ethic, which has nourished the development of some Western countries, and especially that of the United States, is largely premised on the notion that the society serves the individual. This squares rather well with capitalism’s cult of the individual.³ On the other hand, those Christian countries that are Catholic or Orthodox tend to subordinate individual interests to collective ones, and exhibit a fairly strong proclivity for various kinds of socialism, including the corporatist one, that is, fascism. Social structures are by no means uniquely determined by religion, but it may be surmised that the primary of the individual over the collectivity is a sine qua non of any stable capitalist order.

The Russians tend to operate on the assumption that man is subordinate to society.⁴

When the Russophiles argue against the West, that is...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• BLOCK I. THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM
• BLOCK II. THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM
• Conclusion
• Index