Revival: Mind and Body: A Criticism of Psychophysical Parallelism (1927)

Hans Driesch

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138552975
• eBook ISBN: 9781351338738
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

This little book is not a text-book of psychology. It is exclusively concerned with one particular psychological problem, a problem, however, that stands at the very centre of psychology. The relations between mind and body are analysed; that is to say, the following three psychedelic problems are successively raised: What is the mind? What is the body? What are the relations between mind and body? But it is only the third problem which is extensively dealt with; the first two are only briefly defined.

MIND AND BODY

First Part
Critique of Psychophysical Parallelism

Chapter I
The Problem

1. The Orthodox Theory of Psychophysical Parallelism

THE modern theory of so-called psychophysical parallelism runs as follows: the 'Physical,' in the sense of the mechanical interpretation of nature, and the 'Mental,' are two separated realms of being and of becoming, or even of being only. They are two realms which are not related by any kind of causal link, but which, in their mode of being, correspond so completely to each other that there is, at all events, no mental reality without its physical counterpart, and perhaps also no physical reality without its mental counterpart.

This is the most general statement of the theory; but involved therein is the question how far there are or may be varieties of hypothesis within this general theory. Not all parallelists acknowledge a complete correspondence of being and of becoming in each realm; many, in fact, do not recognize mental becoming and activity at all: for them there is just mental being, whatever that may mean. Others, again, do indeed allow to all mental reality its physical counterpart, but do not allow to all physical reality its mental counterpart. These two varieties of the theory may be combined; but that is not necessary, for it is possible to assume 'mental causality' with a physical causal-counterpart and yet deny mental 'correlates' to all things physical.

However, it is not proposed in the present essay to go more deeply into the different varieties of the parallelistic theory, which mostly belong to its more 'materialistical' side, and to what is called 'epiphenomenalism.' It is proposed, rather, to lay stress upon that which is common to them all and which may properly be called the heart of the parallelistic theory. This, then, is the proposition, to restate it in different terms:

Whatever belongs to the Mental, whether it consists only in being or also in becoming and activity, has in all cases and in every smallest detail a physical representative both in regard to its ultimate parts or elements and also in regard to the relations between such parts; and 'the Physical' in its totality is throughout nothing but a mechanical (or energetical or electrodynamical) system.

The meaning of the words existence or being, essential nature or quality, becoming, activity ('causality'), on the one hand, physical or natural and psychical or mental on the other hand, is for the moment taken as understood. Their customary meanings will be sufficient for the understanding of our handling of the problem. In my Ordnungslehre all these concepts of order are either precisely characterized or, where such a course is practicable, strictly circumscribed (that is, "defined'). Definition is only possible, however, for becoming and activity, that is, connected sequence or ' causality,' and for nature and mind, but being and quality are primary notions. We shall return to this subject later.

I do not propose here to go into the history of the parallelistic theory; it is well known that the names of Spinoza¹ and of Fechner are more closely associated with it than any others.

I intend also to touch only very briefly on the various philosophical standpoints, for which the examination into the validity or falseness of the parallelistic theory has any meaning.

On a genuinely 'metaphysical' basis, be it 'naïve' or not in its attitude towards the critique of knowledge, the parallelistic theory as quite evidently a very clear meaning. There are two realms, precisely because substance has two attributes, through each of which it completely expresses itself; and in these two realms each and every part correspond. There can be no doubt what is meant here. But there is equally little doubt that from the metaphysical point of view theories other than the parallelistic one are possible, for instance, the Cartesian. Thus metaphysics by itself cannot solve the problem of the validity of one or other of the theories of the relation between physis and psyche, and the determination of this problem must clearly be matter for a special inquiry.

But parallelism, as well as its opposite, has also a meaning (though not much importance) on the basis of a pure theory of order, which does not go beyond the investigation of the contents of my experience and of the form of its order. Such a theory of order makes use of the concept of the quasi-independent object which it treats as if it were independent in itself. This as if-object is found, however, both as a natural and as a mental quasi-reality, and it thus has some little meaning upon the theory of order to inquire into the question of parallelism or interaction between these two kinds of quasi-independent realities.

That the question 'parallelism or its opposite?' can also be reasonably raised on a Kantian basis is obvious from what has already been said, and has in recent years been expressly emphasized by Stumpf,¹ Simmel,² and McDougall.³ For the Kantian doctrine is no more than a theory of order, mingled inconsistently enough with fragments of a realistic metaphysic, as, for instance, the concept of the 'thing-in-itself' (the existence of which is not questioned by Kant), and the concept of an 'affection' of the senses. Moreover, the a priori possibility of both theories of the relation of the psychical to the physical was granted by Kant himself.⁴

The inquiry into the validity of parallelism thus has meaning both on a metaphysical basis and on the basis of a 'critique,' that is, on a theory of order. On the other hand, this inquiry is no longer possible even as a question when, as is not unusual nowadays, the well-known esse percipi of Berkeley is without further justification (though, to be sure, in so wide a sense of the percipi as to make it mean simply' my conscious content'), and in a manner certainly not wholly envisaged by its originator, made a short way of escape from all metaphysical thinking. In reality, this doctrine runs, there are 'many egos,' but the Physical exists only as an actual perceptum or conceptum, that is, as 'the perceived' or as 'the conceived' (but actually conceived) by one of these egos. It is unquestionable that on this basis the parallelistic theory has from the outset no clearly defined meaning: That an ego, A, has consciously the content √2, and that this 'having' of A 'corresponds' to a condition of his physical brain is meaningless here, because this condition of the brain exists only as the possession of another ego, say B. Thus, at least one consciously-having B acts as the physical correlate of the having of A; if now the consciously-having B is to have in turn a 'physical correlate,' then this must be a consciously-having C. And so it goes on endlessly; the whole inquiry is meaningless,¹ although it had some meaning, as has been said, for the pure theory of order, which uses the concepts of the as if, that is, of the quasi-independence of natural reality. For the theory of order, when it speaks of nature, assumes that the realm of natural objects is real in the form of a quasi-independent reality; but it does not maintain that a particular natural reality in order to 'be' must be actually perceived or thought of.

Finally, no particular explanation is required to show that the psychophysical problem does not arise for solipsism; that, indeed, it cannot arise there, for upon that theory I only observe 'my' own experience quâ experience, and I do not allow the existence of any quasi-independent object of nature, much less of any 'thing' in the naïve, common-sense meaning of that word. Elsewhere ² I have attempted a complete examination of these questions as I viewed them at the time of writing.

II. The Concepts ‘Factual’ and ‘Logical’

Having thus briefly explained what the parallelistic theory is and what the chief assumptions are on which it is (generally speaking) possible, we now proceed at once to the immediate purpose of this study; we have, that is, to examine the real validity of psychophysical parallelism, or rather, the ultimate possibility of its real validity.

This statement of our aim expresses at once my conviction that we have to deal here with a problem in empirical reality, and not at all with something involving a necessary postulate or axiom, and that the problem with which we are concerned is one that can be solved once and for all by rightly understanding a few of the general characteristics of the facts themselves.

But what is meant by 'understanding the facts 'as compared with the use of axioms or postulates? Is there a sharp distinction between these two methods of inquiry?

Upon the theory of Order there is no sharp distinction between them; for that theory, concepts postulated by logic and concepts derived from things are both of them concepts of order.

All concepts or 'signs' of Order come into existence and are experienced as parts of an ordered experience. Some of these 'signs' are valid once for all for all objects in the widest sense as soon as they are understood, and this I know by virtue of my very capacity of seeing Order. These are the primary concepts and propositions, e.g. 'this,' 'such,' 'different,' 'so many,' etc.; propositions like 'X is A or not A.' Other signs or meanings are valid only for certain groups of objects, the groups being themselves constituted according to principles of Order—I am referring here to the mediately constructed objects which make up the domains of nature and of consciousness. Within these groups the signs I am referring to 'have' to be valid for all possible objects. Conceptions such as 'persistent,' 'ground,' and 'consequence,' 'substance and causality' belong here. That such concepts and propositions founded on them are valid for every object of a group, e.g. for all things in nature, is clear from their meaning once that meaning is clearly understood.

Here we have before us the 'a priori' in its clearest meaning. This meaning comes to consciousness in experience in a way which ought not really to be called a priori or a Posteriori. As soon as I am conscious of the meaning I know that it is valid for all that falls within a defined group. I understand the meaning and validity of the signs as truly as I have the idea of Order and as truly as I 'foreknow' Order in a strange unexplainable way.

But all other concepts, and especially those of science, are ordering concepts, some of wider, some of narrower validity. The concepts, for instance, of mechanics belong to the former class, and are peculiarly clear and simple. These are valid for objects, so far as objects exist, which fall within Newton's definitions. What these objects are I do not know; I cannot even be sure that all inanimate objects are included. Whatever I may assume, the facts that I know must decide. No order would be of any use which did not agree with the facts.

It is thus that the 'logical requirements' and 'facts' become opposed ideas, possibly at war with each other.

But the considerations adduced show, I think, that the transition from requirements of logic, axioms, etc., to inductive reasoning from facts is a gradual one. The primary concepts are 'factual' for they 'order' all possible facts. And some propositions about persistence and connexion are true of all facts in nature. As soon as I understand these concepts and propositions I know that they must be binding for all nature.

Yet for all Nature only—not for the coming and going of my own experience as immediate experience. This consideration makes still clearer the contrast between the 'requirements of logic' and the 'facts themselves.'

We expect all concepts and propositions about natural groups of natural events, however wide or narrow the group, to accord with the facts, and such conceptions within their own domain are law giving—just as far as that domain has been fully understood and fully worked out. I can, however, never know beforehand (i) what the domain is or (2) if it has been worked out. This I must find out a posteriori. The application of my concepts of Order to any domain of knowledge, even to one as wide as inanimate nature, is limited by these two requirements.

This difficulty, this provisional use of every a priori...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• Original Copyright
• TRANSLATOR'S NOTE
• PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
• PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
• PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
• Contents
• FIRST PART CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOPHYSICAL PARALLELISM
• SECOND PART THE BODY, THE MIND, AND THEIR RELATION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HANS DRIESCH
• INDEX OF NAMES