Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis

Dick Leurdijk, Dick Zandee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781351791571
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2001. Kosovo: From Crisis to Crisis deals with the main features of the most recent crisis, leading up to operation Allied Force. It provides an excellent analysis of all major aspects of NATO's intervention and it discusses the current problems with the implementation of the settlement. Until recently, Kosovo was a rather unknown territory in a far-away corner of Europe. The Serbian-Albanian armed conflict, NATO's intervention and the following struggle by the international community to rebuild this area has turned Kosovo into terra cognita for diplomats, politicians, the military, aid workers and the public. Essential reading for political scientists with special interest in ethnic and conflict studies.

1 Origins of the Kosovo Conflict

‘The abolition of Kosovo’s autonomous status by President Milosevic in 1989 resulted in the conflict with the Albanians which a decade later was to end in war’. Such is, in short, the popular view on the context of the Kosovo conflict. By a similar simple reasoning the decline of Yugoslavia began with the campaign for a Greater Serbia, launched by ‘the nationalist’ Milo§evic, at the end of the nineteen eighties. With the withdrawal of the Serbian-Yugo- slav forces from Kosovo it was back to square one. The dream of a Greater Serbia turned into a nightmare of a Smaller Serbia.

If one would assume the end of its autonomous status to be the cause of the Kosovo conflict there would be ample reason for optimism about the future. The restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the replacement of the Milosevic regime by more moderate political forces in Belgrade would logically lead to peace and stability in the region. Although both these developments would undoubtedly have a positive impact, the Kosovo problem would thereby not be solved. The underlying causes of the conflict, which are part of the Balkans’ history of the nineteenth century, still influence the current situation. Events of the past ten years cannot be observed in isolation; they just constitute the next phase in the Kosovo question.

Insofar as commentators do pay attention to Kosovo’s history, they frequently refer to the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. At Kosovo Poljea Turkish-Ottoman army supposedly defeated the army of Serbia, whereupon centuries of occupation and oppression followed. In this view, a medieval battle is seen as the origin of an armed conflict at the end of the twentieth century. It seems to be a far-fetched explanation, not based on historical analysis but on popular belief.

This chapter provides the background and the historic context of the conflict: the impact of the myth of Kosovo Polje; the birth of the Kosovo question about a century ago; and, in brief, developments since then. The objective is not to deliver a detailed description of Kosovo’s history. Based on the analysis of the most important capita selecta, the aim is primarily to explain that any long-term solution to the Kosovo question will be influenced by its history and cannot be treated in isolation from the underlying causes of the Serbian-Albanian confrontation.¹

The Myth of Kosovo Polje

At a short distance from the capital of Kosovo, Pristina, lies a plateau known as Kosovo Polje or ‘the Field of Blackbirds’ (kos=blackbird and polje=field in the Serbian language). There, on 28 June 1389, a famous battletook place. A Serbian army under the command of Prince Lazar is believed to have been defeated by Turkish-Ottoman forces. The outcome of this battle sealed the fate of the Balkans. It was the beginning of a centuries-long period of repression of the Serbian people by the ‘Turks’. Not before the early twentieth century Kosovo, the ‘cradle of Serbia’, was recaptured by the Serbian-Mon tenegrin army. A long and dark period had come to an end. Kosovo, the centre of the late-medieval Serbian Kingdom and of the Serbian Orthodox Church, was brought back to the reborn state of Serbia.

Such is, in short, the Serbian-nationalist view of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. Question is: is this view historically correct or is it the product of falsification and mythologisation. If Kosovo Polje is a myth, then the question is how did it come about? And also, even if the story is mythical, what has been its impact on the Kosovo question and what are its implications for an ultimate solution of the conflict?

Falsification and the Birth of the Myth

In the second half of the twelfth century the Kingdom of Serbia was created, led by the dynasty of the Nemanja’s. The founding father of this dynasty was Stefan Nemanja, whose family from 1160 onwards reigned over the territory known as Rascia. The capital of this territory, Ras (Raska in Serbian), was located very close to the present city of Novi Pazar, to the north of Kosovo. On this basis, the historian Noel Malcolm has concluded that the original centre of the Serbian Kingdom was located outside present Kosovo.² Stefan Nemanja and his son - also called Stefan - exploited the decline of the Byzantine Empire. At the time of his coronation of King of Serbia in 1217 Stefan (the son) reigned over a territory roughly encompassing present Montenegro, the Sandzak (the south-western part of the current Serbia) and Kosovo. The young dynasty became closely connected to the Orthodox Church. After his resignation in 1196 Stefan (the father) had retreated to Mount Athos, now located in Greece, to join his youngest son, Sava. Sava drew up the regulations for the Serbian monasteries, adopting them from the rules of a Greek monastery near Constantinople. The first Serbian monasteries were to be found in the original centre of the Serbian Kingdom, i.e., outside Kosovo. Not before the end of the thirteenth century the seat of the Archbishop of the independent Serbian Church was transferred to Pec in Kosovo; the famous monastery of Gradanica near PriStina was founded in the early fourteenth century.

Miranda Vickers has a slightly different view than Malcolm. In her opinion Kosovo became the cultural and administrative centre of the Serbian Kingdom after the fall of Constantinople in 1204, but few concrete facts are presented to substantiate this view.³ The Belgian Balkans expert Raymond Detrez seems to share Vickers’ perception, but nevertheless emphasises that the early Serbian state came into being halfway through the ninth century around Raska. The conquest of Kosovo and northern Macedonia occurred as late as the second half of the twelfth century: ‘Kosovo as a matter of fact was annexed to the first Serbian state three centuries too late to be considered the true “cradle” of Serbia’.⁴

Around 1350, under Stefan DuSan’s reign, the Serbian Kingdom reached its territorial maximum. It extended from Belgrade in the north to Thessaloniki in the south and encompassed the entire area to the west of that line, including present Albania, Macedonia and northern Greece. Under Dusan the Serbian Orthodox Church, formally part of the Greek Orthodox Church, became fully independent with a Patriarch as the highest church leader. After DuSan’s death in 1355 the vast Serbian Kingdom rapidly disintegrated due to a number of factors. In some areas the local nobility seized power, the Nemanja dynasty became extinct and the Turkish-Ottoman forces advanced northwards. In 1371 a Serbian army suffered a crushing defeat at Marica in present Bulgaria. Many historians believe that the Battle of Marica was far more significant than that of Kosovo Polje.⁵ Serbia had now been opened up to further conquest of the Ottomans, which was only a matter of time.

Serbia’s disintegration was far advanced when in June 1389 two armies met on the Field of Blackbirds. According to the popular view the Turkish- Ottoman forces defeated the Serbian. According to Malcolm scarce historical records only reveal that both sides suffered substantial losses in an intense battle, whereby the two army commanders, Sultan Murad and Prince Lazar, were killed. At the end of the day the Ottoman army controlled the battlefield, but it subsequently withdrew southwards. It remains unclear whether the battle was won by the Ottoman army or that it ended in a draw. Another point of debate concerns the exact composition of the armies. Although clear proof is lacking, it seems likely that Hungarians, Bosnians and Albanians formed part of Prince Lazar’s forces.⁶

The importance of the Battle of Kosovo Polje was that Serbia’s military power had been broken. Serbia would not recover from the 1389 clash. In the following years the Ottomans were able to finish the job. Detrez concludes: ‘The Battle of Kosovo Polje hardly changed the course of history. Lazar’s successors re-acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty and subsequently behaved like rather docile vassals until 1459, when Serbia was finally annexed to the Ottoman Empire’.⁷

Despite the relative importance of the Battle of Kosovo Polje, Prince Lazar nevertheless was to become an influential factor in Serbian history. Worship of his heroic death by the clergy forms the starting point of the myth of Kosovo Polje. To combat pessimism in Serbia and to create hope for a bright future, the monastic authors in sermons, eulogies and prayers portrayed Lazar as a martyr. He was portrayed as the Serbian Jesus Christ, preferring his own death over surrender. Lazar was God’s favoured servant on earth, the Serbs were the chosen people of the New Testament. Thus emerged the resemblance with the Babylonian exile of the Jewish people. One day the Serbs would be led out of slavery to freedom. Kosovo became ‘the new Jerusalem’. Vickers states: ‘Lazar’s death is depicted as the triumph of good over evil - a martyrdom for the faith and the symbol of a new beginning. Responding to contemporary needs, the medieval writers transformed the defeat into a kind of moral victory for the Serbs and an inspiration for the future’.⁸

The epic tradition of the Serbs resulted in a further elaboration of the myth. But Malcolm emphasises that the epic of the Battle of Kosovo Polje has first been placed in the context of the Serbian historical-national selfconsciousness as late as the nineteenth century. The myth arose in the context of the growing national awareness and drew attention to the glorious past of pre-Ottoman Serbia. A renewed cult of Lazar was used by nationalist writers and politicians to indicate that Serbia should once more become a Kingdom. The commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1889 was turned into a celebration of national unity.⁹ Future generations of Serbs were taught that the collapse of the medieval Serbian state was the central event in their history. The epic myth of the national defeat at Kosovo Polje was changed into an historic fact.¹⁰

The Myth’s Impact and its Consequences

In the Balkans myths play an important role, particularly in support of nationalism. Still, the myth of Kosovo Polje has derived special significance as it became related with religious and ethnic hatred. According to the nationalist view, for centuries the Serbian people have been suppressed by the Ottomans, with the Albanians as their collaborators. The facts are different. Killings, looting and destruction of churches and monasteries took place during the military conquest. However, once their rule was established the Ottomans were rather tolerant with regard to the different cultures within their Empire. Religious communities even enjoyed protection within the millet system in exchange for their submission to Ottoman rule. The erection and restoration of buildings of worship were allowed and religious art flourished. Vickers states: ‘Within the Orthodox millet, the Serbs could preserve their language, religion and ethnic individuality because religion not nationality was the fundamental factor in the Ottoman concept of governance’.¹¹

In the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth century the situation changed. The declining Ottoman Empire felt increasingly threatened by the Great Powers, in particular by Slavic Russia. Islamisation of its subjects in the Balkans was perceived as an instrument to preserve unity within the Empire. It would fail. The forces of nationalism would prove to be too strong. It is important to note that with the emergence of Serbian and Albanian nationalism contrasts between both peoples arose, but until that time they lived together in relative harmony: ‘Before the advent of the Eastern Question, Serbs and Albanians, though never in such an intimate relationship as the different Albanian religious groups, did nevertheless share strong social similarities expressed in numerous common customs and traditions and in their shared struggles against the Ottoman authorities; often they even had blood ties’.¹² On the status of the Serbs under Ottoman rule Detrez writes: ‘In the Ottoman Empire the living conditions of the vast majority of the Christian population, the farmers, were not much worse than in Western Europe, and they were certainly better than in Russia’.¹³

In this context the nationalist mythologisation of Kosovo Polje in a sense marks a break with the past. Changing historic facts or providing a biased account of historic events are characteristics of every myth. What gives the myth of Kosovo Polje its tragic aspect is the stirring-up of ethnic- religious hatred toward the Albanians. To the nationalist Serbs the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Kosovo Albanians are ‘Turks’. Consequently, they are addressed as such. Detrez observes in this respect: ‘The Kosovars are held almost personally responsible for the Battle of Kosovo Polje and the subsequent Ottoman domination. Hence the Serbs do not feel any compassion towards them; in Serbian eyes the current sufferings of the Kosovars are a peace of cake as compared to the sufferings of the Serbs done to them by Albanians “and other Turks” during the period of Ottoman domination. To the Serbs the thought to have to live within a Kosovar state is equal to the restoration of Ottoman rule’.¹⁴

If the myth of Kosovo Polje were so closely connected with Serbian nationalism a degree of optimism would be justified on the possibilities to change its negative impact. If more moderate political forces were to seize power in Belgrade, perhaps the myth would be ‘removed’ as a source of ethnic-religious extremism. In this respect, Tito’s Yugoslavia might serve as an example. In this socialist period the Lazar cult did not get much public attention; the anniversaries of the Battle were limited to small-scale ceremonies. The change came about after Slobodan Milo§evic had used the emerging Serbian nationalism for political ends. On 28 June 1989 the Serbs helda massive celebration on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the Battle, with portraits and pictures of Milosevic dominating the scene. In his public address Milosevic appealed to Serbian frustrations by drawing a direct line between the Battle of Kosovo Polje and the present: ‘The moment has come when, standing on the fields of Kosovo, we can say openly and clearly - no longer! ’ According to Vickers his public address contained a clear message: that day the Serbs had won an important victory in Kosovo and this victory would not be the last. Milosevic ended his address with prophetic words: ‘Today, six centuries later, we are again fighting battles, they are not armed battles although such things cannot yet be excluded’.¹⁵ A decade later the Kosovo war was a fact.

The Origin of the Kosovo Question

The nineteenth century saw the decline of the Ottoman Empire....