Aftermath of the Ukrainian Crisis

Panagiota Manoli

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138684744
• eBook ISBN: 9781134853748
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Democrazia

The crisis in Ukraine that began in November 2013 constitutes a turning point in Euro-Atlantic security with potential global repercussions. It is the most significant security problem between Russia and the 'West' in the post Cold War period and the crisis has marked a new era in global politics. Contributions in this edited volume attempt to address a number of key aspects of the Ukrainian issue. How does the crisis impact upon Black Sea geopolitics and on regional governance? How can EU – Russia relations evolve under the new multipolar system? How is NATO affected? How important is the energy parameter in Russia-Ukraine-EU triangle? This edited volume aims to discloses the diverse narratives on the roots, evolution and repercussions of the crisis, indicating the extent of its complexity and highlighting important parameters of the Ukrainian issue. This book was originally published as a special issue of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

Global and regional repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis

Panagiota Manoli

Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean, Greece

The current crisis in Ukraine constitutes a turning point in Euro-Atlantic security with potential global repercussions. The crisis began in November 2013 when Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych took the decision not to sign an Association Agreement (AA) with the European union (EU). The Maidan protests which followed that decision triggered a series of dramatic events, the failed mediation between the protestors, Western officials and the Yanukovych government, the collapse of Kiev’s government and the flight of Yanukovych to Russia, the establishment of a controversial interim government in Kiev, military clashes and continuing unrest in Eastern Ukraine. The discourse on Maidan protests has been taking conflicting narratives in Moscow and the West. While Maidan protests are viewed by the Western community as an outcry of Ukrainian people against an anti-European, Moscow imposed decision (i.e. the decision not to sign the AA) undermining the right of Ukrainians to freely chose their county’s orientation, Moscow’s narrative points to a west orchestrated, ‘colored revolution’ to destabilize and bring down democratically elected pro-Moscow government in Ukraine.

The two conflicting narratives on the roots and evolution of the Ukrainian crisis are indicative of the diverse paths that Russia and the Western allies are taking with regard to European security itself. The catalytic event in the Ukrainian crisis has been Crimea’s annexation by Moscow following the referendum held in Crimea on 18 March 2014 which has not been recognized either by Kiev or the international community. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Moscow’s seizure of Crimea righted a historical injustice. What gave a pretext to mass anti-Maidan protests in Crimea was a bill (that was never signed) attempting to deprive the Russian language of its official use in Russian-speaking region of Crimean and Eastern Ukraine. The events in Crimea and its swift and bloodless annexation caught the international community by surprise and signified a new form of ‘hybrid war’ (mixture of covert military measures and overt military actions). The Crimean case has also been illustrative of the existence of Moscow’s well prepared contingency plans for such an operation which could possibly apply as a model in other cases in future. It also manifested Moscow’s unwillingness to go into a direct military conflict with the Ukrainian army and possibly the West. It has, however, brought to the surface differences in how the Euro-Atlantic security mechanisms are perceived by Russia and West with Moscow raising fundamental questions about the organizing principles of today’s European order seeking to revise them. The most recent revision initiated by Russia was in 2007–2009 (i.e. the OSCE’s Corfu Process).

Crimea’s annexation violated Ukrainian sovereignty and in addition to its widely discussed military and geopolitical importance had a direct impact on Ukraine’s domestic political and economic scene. The consequences on Ukrainian volatile economy were severe among others due to the loss of state property in the energy sector and port infrastructure. Crimea’s part in the country’s GDP was 3.6% in 2013, while Donbass used to account for 16% of Ukraine’s GDP and a quarter of its exports. Economic sanctions have further contributed to recession, the decline of exports in the country while private consumption has shrunk due to inflation and an IMF austerity programme. Still, the economic impact cannot merely be assessed in GDP percentages.

More than a year since the annexation of Crimea, its return under Ukrainian rule seems less and less possible. The public discussion has rather shifted on the future of the Ukrainian state itself which is de facto currently disintegrating, on the various ideas on its ‘federalization’, the persisting unrest in the eastern regions and the failure to implement the Minsk agreements. The future of Ukrainian state is undisputable not a ‘peripheral’ but a central issue in European order. Though frozen conflicts in South Caucasus have been maintained for more than 15 years, one should not expect Eastern Ukraine to turn into such a long-term ‘protracted’ conflict given the geopolitical importance of Ukraine in the European context.

What lies at the core of the Ukrainian crisis? The strategic orientation of Ukraine bears geopolitical consequences for Europe’s order and balance of power. Without Ukraine, as Brzezinski (1997) has pointed out, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire and its plans for a Eurasian Economic Union – Moscow’s twenty-first century geopolitical tool – would look futile. For the EU, on the other hand, losing Ukraine to the Russian sphere of influence would cancel its Eastern policy, diminish its ‘soft power’ actorness in its neighbourhood and condition EU’s neighbourhood policy to Moscow’s geopolitical choices. The triumph of ‘zero sum’ logic in the above narrative is evident. It remains, however, still very relevant.

In an attempt to be on track for EU integration, the Ukrainian government signed the AA with the EU in June 2014 committing itself to difficult political, economic and judicial reforms. Still, the future course of the AA and the linked to it Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) is questioned given the ongoing war in the east of the country, the dire state of the economy and Ukraine’s many problems in its political system. Ukrainian’s economic integration into the European market (as a survival option following Crimea’s annexation) through the DCFTA would bring fundamental structural changes in the country’s economy with potential regional implications especially with regard to trade. However, addressing Moscow’s concerns on the DCFTA, the European Commission has opened trilateral discussions – Kiev, Brussels and Moscow – (in parallel to gas negotiations) and has been stating that it is not looking for an exclusive economic relationship with Ukraine as DCFTA is compatible with preferential trade relations that Ukraine has with the members of the Eurasian economic union within the framework of the Community of Independent States free trade area. The trilateral discussions on Kiev’s DCFTA have generated reactions both within Ukraine and beyond. As put by Hryhoriy Nemyria, an MP from Ukraine, and a former Deputy Prime Minister.

[m]any people gave their lives for the AA and DCFTA, this is core. That defines Ukraine’s short to medium term future, and this is a roadmap. That’s why I would be very much cautious … to what extent trilateralism, or the idea of trilateralism, even institutionalised, could be helpful (Gotev 2015).

Still, analysts such as Michael Landesmann from the Vienna Institute of International Economic Studies have warned that without proper negotiations including Russia, Moscow would inflict countermeasures following the entry into force of DCFTA, and argue that in the medium term, Ukraine’s market access to Russia and to the other CIS countries should be maintained, and that in the long run, it is one of the advantages of this country to be a bridge between markets (Gotev 2015). The policy of trilateral negotiations that engage third parties in an agreement should however be assessed carefully as it may well constitute a precedent in other trade agreements currently negotiated by the EU such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or DCFTAs with other neighbouring countries.

The ‘big’ question that has arisen is whether Ukraine is the next ‘protracted conflict’ around the Black Sea which will signify the beginning of a new Cold War type era in global politics or what is rather called ‘Cool War’ or a period of ‘congagement’.¹ As Larrabee, Wilson and Gordon argue (2015, 1), the Ukrainian crisis challenges two basic assumptions on which US policy towards Europe in the post-Cold War era has been based: (1) that Europe is essentially stable and secure, thereby freeing the United States to focus greater attention on other areas, particularly Asia and the Middle East, and (2) that Russia had become more of a partner than an adversary. Consequently, today the European front has risen again on US agenda while NATO has been acknowledged as still the only reliable military umbrella in Europe especially with regard to Eastern European states. Crimea’s annexation has raised security dilemma especially in east European countries and prompted calls for NATO to station combat forces in Eastern Europe. Consequently, NATO approved plans for the creation of a 4000-man rapid reaction force in the region. Seen from a European perspective, according to Monaghan, what the world today witnesses is better described as the ‘clash of Europes’, thus, an emerging rivalry between the more liberal, Western-oriented part of Europe embodied by NATO and the EU, and another ‘Russian Europe’ taking shape against it (Monaghan 2015, 6). Beyond NATO’s role, new security realities in Europe have called for a significant EU response too. It is to Berlin where most of expectations focus. Berlin which has been following a cautious policy vis-à-vis Moscow in the post-Cold War period underscored by economic and energy interests, it is currently leading Europe’s response to halt Moscow’s expansionary drive. The tougher policy towards Russia which so far involves mainly economic and diplomatic measures has been given impetus by Crimea’s annexation and Moscow’s unwillingness to stabilize Ukraine’s east. It also underlines Germany’s willingness, as the richest European state, to assume greater international responsibility and leadership. President Joachim Gauck, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2014 called for Germany to take more actions ‘to guarantee the security that others have provided it for decades’ (Gauck 2014).

Sanctions by the West were introduced in March 2014 after Crimea annexation aimed at ‘stopping Russian action against Ukraine, restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty’ (Council of the European Union 2015). The deterioration of relations between Russia and the West took an economic turn with the intensification of trade sanctions from both sides and the annulment of energy-related projects (including the South Stream project). Economic asymmetries between the EU and Russia though have left Russia more vulnerable to sanctions. The Russian economy is much more dependent on the EU and much smaller – a mere fifth of the EU GDP, even at purchasing power parity; needing Western technology if it is to modernize (Havlik 2014, 5). Thus, the deterioration of the Russian economy in 2015 was a combined effect of the sanctions, the deteriorating investment climate, rouble depreciation, capital flight and reform setbacks (Havlik 2014, 9).

Repercussions have been important in the region, especially the countries around the Black Sea and the South Caucasus where protracted conflicts still undermine security, stability, and democracy in European periphery. All Eastern partnership countries, but Belarus, are confronted with protracted or frozen conflicts on their territories and with the presence of Russian troops. The unrecognized territories have positively viewed the rhetoric used by Moscow on Crimea’s annexation case, considering it as a useful precedent. Moscow has turned into a revisionist state calling for a new pan-European security convention establishing the organizing principles of the new European order which could even mean the redrafting of current borders in the ex-Soviet space (specifically with regard to the state of the territories of protracted conflicts). The European capitals and the US will need to address this challenge, either reinforcing the existing OSCE organizing principles and mechanisms or consenting in their revision but setting the preconditions to engage in such a revision. The Western alliance seems, however, to be deprived of strategic thinking for Europe’s future. In this regard, the Ukrainian crisis has expedited the issue of how to manage the new European order. A new European order, that marks the era after the end of the long transition period, would require reinforced foreign and defense capacities of the EU too. The Ukrainian crisis has brought forward Germany’s role in new Europe which for the first time has been taking the lead in handling an international crisis. Despite Germany’s successful attempts to forge a European response of economic and diplomatic rather than military nature, the crisis has exposed first, EU’s deficiencies in strategic policy second, EU’s deficiencies in collective response at the level of institutions and third, the constrains existing in the military dimension of Germany’s power.

The special issue at hand presents various and diverse views on the regional and global repercussions of the still evolving Ukrainian crisis. Steven Blockmans in his article discusses how the Black Sea region has become an acutely contested geostrategic zone. Russia’s strategic interests in the Black Sea region especially in terms of energy and military presence collide with those of Ukraine, Turkey, the EU and the United States, among others, and expose the governance gap left by the existing conventions and institutions in dealing with the region. It is argued that Russia’s move to annex Crimea was a strategic decision made irrespective of its destructive effect on the post-Cold War order. Furthermore, until a new normal has been accepted by the main players, there is no hope of revising the existing conventions and institutions pertaining to the basin. Nadia Arbatova places the Ukrainian conflict in a wider perspective tracing its roots in the Soviet legacy, the patchy collapse of the former Soviet union and the ill-conceived policies of the involved parties, Russia, and external actors, namely the USA, NATO and EU. Arbatova considers that security order in post-Cold War Europe is an ‘unfinished business’ that needs to be concluded. She argues that a Pan-European peace conference should revise the Helsinki principles of 1975 and establish the new security order. Still, Russia–West relations will probably never return to the pre-2014 period unless Russia comes back to its European vocation. The West and Russia should maintain key channels of interaction for global and regional stability and build their relations on a balance between values and interests. Alexey Gromyko gives a wider perspective on the Ukrainian crisis and links it to global geopolitical and economic power shifts. As global economy is in a state of flux, Gromyko argues, that risk perception of European states is also rising. He however, argues that the emerging polycentric structure of the world presents opportunities to achieve a new global and durable order which will put an end to the current period of increasing tensions. Sharyl Cross looking into how NATO and the international community can handle the crisis, argues that the experience of two decades of cooperation in the Black Sea region should be preserved. Advocating for an ‘inclusive’ policy she argues that without cooperation of all parties of the region, to include Russia, resources are likely to be dissipated and the risk of accidents or confrontation could entail scenarios that would not be advantageous to any country of the region. NATO’s relationship with the Soviet union and then Russia has been central to defining the European regional and global security configuration for decades. The author offers an assessment of the potential for future NATO-Russia clashes or cooperation in the Black Sea, and for broader regional and global security. Despite Russia moving closer to Europe and the West in many respects, and NATO and Russia have managed to cooperate in critical security issues, there is a persistent deficit of trust. As Sharyl argues, the lingering images of the divisions of the Cold War still remain very much fixed in the frame of reference for so many in our foreign policy communities, media, and societies. Unfortunately, there has been a failure to fully appreciate the opportunity created by the opening offered at the beginning of the decade of 1990. Still, she argues that pragmatic cooperation is possible and that the United States, European nations, NATO, and Russia ‘do not have to be “friends” or even “partners”’ as even during the period of the Cold War, they managed to cooperate in areas of critical shared security interests such as arms control. The stakes in the relationship between the NATO allies and Russia are potentially enormous, and this relationship can shape the future security architecture and landscape in Europe, Eurasia, and the wider global community for decades ahead. No one should underestimate the challenges and difficulties in repairing the damage created as a result of the recent war in Ukraine, but all efforts must be devoted to avoiding a further deterioration of the situation and circumstances in ways that none of us would desire. Hanna Shelest however, argues that business as usual and broader cooperation between the two adversaries (i.e. Kiev and Moscow) should not be expected any time soon, despite economic interdependences that still remain. She locates the roots of the Ukrainian crisis in Russia’s perception of Ukraine as a vital element of its own integration as a large majority of Russians have never stopped viewing Crimea as culturally and ethnically a part of Russia; … in the centre of its sphere of interests. According to Shelest, Moscow’s plan is not seizing more of Ukrainian territory but preventing it from stabilizing. Theodoros Tsakiris discusses the energy parameter of the Ukrainian crisis. He points to the overwhelming dependency of Ukraine on Russian energy and the lack of any short-to-medium term diversification of EU oil and gas supplies away from Moscow, which dictate a cooperative approach vis-à-vis ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Global and regional repercussions of the Ukrainian crisis
• 2. Security relations in the Black Sea region: Russia and the West after the Ukrainian crisis
• 3. Russia–EU relations at a crossroads: preventing a new Cold War in a polycentric world
• 4. NATO–Russia security challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond
• 5. Crimea and the quest for energy and military hegemony in the Black Sea region: governance gap in a contested geostrategic zone
• 6. After the Ukrainian crisis: Is there a place for Russia?
• 7. The energy parameters of the Russian–Ukrainian–EU impasse: dependencies, sanctions and the rise of ‘Turkish Stream’
• Index