Dynamics of Transformation, Elite Change and New Social Mobilization

Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen

Muriel Asseburg,Heiko Wimmen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781317222514
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The political transformations initiated by the so-called Arab Spring in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen have been marked by strong political contention, continued social mobilization and, albeit to different degrees, weak central state institutions. This book proposes that, rather than agreed roadmaps of institutional change (e.g. elections, drawing up new constitutions) and centrally crafted transition processes, it has been the competition of key political actors for resources of political power and control that has set the pace and influenced the direction and depth of the transformation processes. Hence, the contributions in this volume use an actor-centred approach. Two perspectives are assumed: first key political actors – referring to the "Politically Relevant Elite (PRE)"– are identified and their motivations as well as their strategies and capacities to steer the transformation process. Secondly, the authors investigate the capacity of politically "Mobilized Publics" to exert influence on agenda setting and decision making, ask to what extent popular and social movements have emerged as political actors in their own right, and to what extent such forms of bottom-up participation have constituted a fundamental change to the political culture of these countries. Both avenues of inquiry analyze how the elites are constrained by continued social mobilization, how they engage with mobilized publics to promote their own agendas, and whether the extended scope of popular participation contributes to the legitimacy and stability of the emerging political orders, or causes disruption, fragmentation and conflict. This book was previously published as a special issue of Mediterranean Politics.

Dynamics of transformation, elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab World

Muriel Asseburg^a and Heiko Wimmen^b

^aStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany; ^bStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, Germany

ABSTRACT

This article provides a conceptual framework for a special issue of Mediterranean Politics that investigates the transformation processes inaugurated in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen in 2011 in the wake of the uprisings commonly referred to as the “Arab Spring”. It proposes that these processes should not be conceptualized as linear and centrally crafted transitions from authoritarian orders towards preconceived outcomes, but rather, as contested and open-ended transformations. These are best understood through an actor-centered approach that focuses on the choices and strategies of the ‘Politically Relevant Elite’ (PRE) and its interactions with citizens intent on exerting influence, described here as ‘Mobilized Publics’. Drawing on the results of eight research papers presented in this volume, this article argues that the PRE perceived the transformation processes as mechanisms to maximize political resources and monopolize power. The ensuing, increasingly polarized contestations hastened the cooptation and instrumentalization of mobilized publics by the PRE, thus spelling the end of their capacity to offer avenues for broad, bottom-up participation and preparing the ground for renewed top-down control in Egypt and Tunisia, and to state failure and civil war in Libya and Yemen.

Contested Transformations

The upheavals that have shaken the Arab world since December 2010, often subsumed under the rubric ‘Arab Spring’, have precipitated dynamics of change and conflict ranging from gradual or piecemeal reform to authoritarian retrenchment, deepened internal conflict and all-out civil war. In four Arab countries – Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen – the formal prime decision makers of the authoritarian regimes that had been in power for decades were forced out of office by combinations of popular movements, military defections or coups and, with the exception of Tunisia, external involvement ranging from verbal encouragement (Egypt) to robust mediation and the threat of sanctions (Yemen) to military intervention (Libya). As a result, these four countries have been in the throes of drawn-out transformation processes. While the trajectories of these transformations have taken distinct forms, they have all been marked by several central challenges.

First, consensus over key components and principles of the new order has remained elusive. Democratic representation, good governance and the rule of law were the declared, or at least the assumed, objectives of the transformation processes. Yet, in reality, intense struggles over power and competition for influence in elected and executive institutions have dominated the political processes. Conflicts over ostensibly incompatible values, as well as memories of past and fear of future marginalization and victimization have informed the behaviour of nearly all the actors involved in the processes and the attitudes of the public toward them. Consequently, crucial political actors have mostly failed to reach consensus on the direction, depth and speed of transformation.

Second, the countries in transformation have experienced eroding capacities for central state control, governance and policy making rather than more effective or better governance. With the demise of the old core elites, institutions of the central state lost part of their capacity to control society and provide security nationwide. They have also become focal points of contention in the struggle over power, influence and access to resources. Fierce competition over the control of state institutions has prevented the consensus necessary to reform them, as actors have feared rivals exploiting such reforms to impose their own domination. These struggles also left precious little capacity and interest for policy making among decision makers and obliterated common ground for pragmatic co-operation between them. This issue has been most salient in the security sector. Political violence shook Tunisia and Egypt in 2012 and 2013 and has remained a serious threat in both countries. The capacity of Libyan and Yemeni state institutions to control militarized non-state actors appeared all but non-existent, and in late 2014 the territorial integrity of both countries remained at stake.

Third, the emerging orders and the new rulers have failed to achieve broad legitimacy, so contentious politics have persisted. Against the backdrop of the 2011 uprisings, acquiring a popular mandate became an essential condition for legitimate rule. What constitutes a popular mandate and its limits remained disputed, however, with electoral success recognized as a necessary but by no means sufficient condition alone. Polarization led some segments of society to dispute the legitimacy of certain actors and to blame them for faltering governance; others despaired of the transformation altogether. To borrow an image proposed by Robert Dahl, the reservoir of legitimacy created by the 2011 popular mobilizations appeared to be constantly draining (Dahl, 1971: 124–88).¹ In response, parts of the public have remained engaged in contentious politics.² Strikes, street protests and political violence have become normal(ized) forms of political contestation. Partially formalized structures and entirely informal, local or spontaneous congregations of citizens carried out decentralized and recurrent social protests and remained an unpredictable factor that the new rulers, short on legitimacy and resources, struggled to control. Such groups also became political resources that warring camps attempted to appropriate and use against one another.

These parallels between Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen’s distinct trajectories suggest that a focused and structured analysis of the four cases could yield useful insights into the dynamics of the contested transformations of authoritarian political systems initiated by the Arab Spring. They are also part of the argument for including Yemen in this volume despite its geographical location. In addition, the internationally sponsored transition pact for Yemen, the so-called GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) Initiative, constitutes a test case for an approach that has been the subject of much attention among academics and policy makers and has been proposed as a model for conflict resolution in other countries in the region.³

The contributions in this volume examine the transformation processes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen between early 2011 and late 2014. The overall objective is to identify the crucial actors and understand the dynamics behind the cycles of contestation that shaped these processes and led to a significant variety of preliminary outcomes ranging from state failure, civil war and de facto partition (Yemen and Libya) to authoritarian restoration (Egypt) and precarious consensus on a more participatory and liberal order (Tunisia). With regard to Tunisia and Egypt, the objective is also to determine the extent to which these preliminary outcomes offer prospects for a sustainable balance among meaningful participation, effective governance and stability.

An Actor-Centred Approach to Understanding Transformation

As noted by Pace and Cavatorta (2012: 127), the events of 2011 initiated a process of ‘soul-searching’ among scholars of the region.⁴ Democratization theory, long out of favour due to the apparent failure of economic and political liberalization to generate momentum towards democratic rule in many parts of the world, appeared poised for a revival. Debates arose over a possible fourth or fifth wave of democratization (Howard & Hussain, 2013; Szmolka, 2012, 2014). Other scholars advanced more cautious narratives under the label of post-democratization (Valbjørn, 2012, 2014). In contrast, the notion of authoritarian resilience (Brumberg, 2002; Albrecht & Schlumberger, 2004; Heydemann, 2007) appeared ripe for major revision.

Beyond proposing explanations for the popular uprisings and the ousting of authoritarian rulers – which at the time of writing still constitute the bulk of the academic literature concerned with the Arab Spring – the various paradigms also imply predictions for the ensuing transformations. Advocates of a post-democratization perspective draw attention to the multi-dimensional re-politicization of Arab societies (Valbjørn, 2012) and the emergence of a vibrant civil society (Khatib, 2013) as indications that a return to stable authoritarianism is unlikely. According to Lynch (2014: 16), ‘the emergence of turbulent, contentious societies may ultimately be more important than who sits in the presidential office’. Authors committed to the democratization and good governance discourse prevalent in international institutions and elsewhere presume a basic consensus around such principles among all local actors involved and thus present inventories of ‘achievements’ (and remaining challenges) along the path of political transition mostly focused on institutional processes (Yahya et al., 2013; Mabrouk & Hausheer, 2014).

At the same time, chaotic processes and the partial return of authoritarian practices have buoyed sceptics who view the post-2011 developments as yet another, if particularly dramatic, episode in the process of authoritarian learning (Heydemann & Leenders, 2011). Pessimistic views on the transformation processes have also been presented through structuralist interpretations that emphasize the unfavourable conditions for democratization (Brownlee et al., 2013). The initial electoral successes of Islamist parties triggered renewed speculation about an alleged incompatibility between democracy and Islamic culture (Jones, 2013) and predictions of hybrid regimes as the best possible outcome (Schmitter, 2012; Stepan & Linz, 2013). Some scholars have offered interpretations connecting structural factors (such as economic conditions and levels of education) as well as the agency of political actors (e.g. their capacity for ideological consensus), but assume that resources and actors’ orientations remain stable throughout the process and that outcomes are a function of the interplay of these factors (Ishay, 2013).

In contrast, the inquiries assembled in this volume start from the premise that the developments that have unfolded in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen since 2011 cannot be characterized as linear, centrally crafted and steered transitions from authoritarian orders towards specific, preconceived outcomes. Rather, they approach these developments as ‘dynamic, ambivalent, and open-ended processes of transformation’ (Bouziane et al., 2013: 2) driven by actors who negotiate, struggle and at times violently fight over rules of governance and representation as well as norms and values, all of which serve as means or political resources potentially influencing the trajectory of the transformation.⁵ Therefore, the authors do not intend to measure the dynamics at play against benchmarks of institutional transformation, nor do they strive to identify causal links between structural factors and preliminary outcomes. Rather, legacies and structural conditions are seen as yet another set of political resources or as part of ‘a good or a bad “hand” to play in the political struggle over new institutions’ (Ahmed & Capoccia, 2014: 9). Institutional arrangements, such as new constitutions, should therefore be seen as the expression of specific balances of power as evolved during the transformation process.⁶ To understand how they are created, Ahmed and Capoccia (2014: 9) propose ‘focus[ing] on the strategic interaction of key actors in fighting over institutional innovations’.

Accordingly, the research presented in this volume takes an actor-centred approach in analysing the dynamics of political contestation and co-operation between the key actors that have been driving the political struggles in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. This approach is based on the central assumption that an analytical focus on the strategies, choices and performances of those actors who wield significant influence over the political process - referred to here as the politically relevant elite (PRE) – as well as the evolving relations between them can identify the key dynamics at work in the four cases discussed here. At the same time, consideration is given to the criticism of many studies on political transformation: the ‘over-emphasis on the role of the state, ruling elites and traditional political and civil society actors to the detriment of societal forms of unstructured mobilization and non-traditional, leaderless and horizontal social and political actors’ (Pace & Cavatorta, 2012). Hence, half of the case studies focus on what this volume refers to as mobilized publics – i.e. citizens who become active in a variety of ways in order to influence the political process. The two avenues of inquiry first intersect in discussions on how the PRE are constrained by sustained social mobilization and to what extent they engage with bottom-up participation, ignoring and suppressing it or utilizing and exploiting it. They intersect again concerning the issue of whether the extended scope of popular mobilization generates increased opportunities for participation and whether this contributes to the legitimacy and stability of the emerging political order or causes instability and conflict.

The Politically Relevant Elite

An actor-centred approach of course requires identifying the people and groups who pl...