Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity

The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 1

John Sisko, John E Sisko

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367734138
• eBook ISBN: 9780429019654
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Spanning 1200 years of intellectual history – from the 6th century BCE emergence of philosophical enquiry in the Greek city-state of Miletus, to the 6th century CE closure of the Academy in Athens in 529 – Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity provides an outstanding survey of philosophy of mind of the period. It covers a crucial era for the history of philosophy of mind, examining the enduring and controversial arguments of Plato and Aristotle, in addition to the contribution of the Stoics and other key figures.

Following an introduction by John Sisko, fifteen specially commissioned chapters by an international team of contributors discuss key topics, thinkers, and debates, including:

• the Presocratics,
• Plato,
• cognition,
• Aristotle,
• intellect,
• natural science,
• time,
• mind, perception, and body,
• the Stoics,
• Galen, and
• Plotinus.

Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, ancient philosophy, and the history of philosophy, Philosophy of Mind in Antiquity is also a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as Classics.

Introduction to volume 1¹

John E. Sisko

The chapters in this volume offer explorations into major figures and movements in ancient philosophy of mind.² The time period assayed herein spans about 1,200 years, from the 6th century BCE, with the emergence of philosophical enquiry in the Greek city-state of Miletus, to the 6th century CE, with the decline of pagan philosophy in the wake of Emperor Justinian’s closure of the Academy in Athens in 529 CE. Some of the theories discussed in this volume are poorly aligned with what we moderns now take to be core issues in philosophy of mind. Some of the theories are over-broad and over-general in relation to more modern approaches to the mind, while remaining silent on crucial topics, such as intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of volition. Further, where such theories address legitimate topics, like the ontology of mind, they offer only surface-level assessments. For example, Anaximenes (floruit c.550 BCE) contends: “our soul, … which is air, controls us” (DK13B2).³ Yet, there is no evidence that Anaximenes considers the issue of how air might go about controlling the body.⁴ Other theories discussed in this volume appear over-narrow: they limit discussion to only a subset of problems, while neglecting topics that are now taken to be central to philosophy of mind. For example, in Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates contends that, while reason belongs to the soul, emotion belongs to the body and not to the soul (94b7–e5). This suggests that Plato (c.428–c.347 BCE), during at least one period in his development, might accept the thesis that the study of emotion belongs to some domain of enquiry other than philosophy of mind.⁵

Still, other theories discussed in this volume are neither over-broad nor over-narrow. Aristotle (384–322 BCE), for example, engages in sophisticated and nuanced discussions on a host of important topics, including emotion, perception, intellection, consciousness, self-awareness, intentionality, judgment, volition, and the relation between mental states and bodily states. Further, Aristotle’s theory of intellection is nicely calibrated with our modern interests: within his account, some scholars espy anti-reductive materialism, others discern the supervenience of the mental upon the physical, and still others see functionalism (see Shields). Another thinker who is discussed in this volume, Galen (c.130–c.210 CE), gains the respect of modern readers for his empiricism and his ingenuity with experimentation. Galen’s most famous experiment – that of cutting the recurrent laryngeal nerves of a pig and, thereby, eliminating its vocalizations – provides strong evidence that the brain controls behavior (UP.VII.14–15; see Gross). Yet, even those theorists discussed in this volume who appear at times to be modern-seeming also advance views that will strike the modern reader as outlandish, uninformed, bizarre, and markedly non-modern. Aristotle, after all, thinks that the brain is a cooling system for the body (PA.II.10.656a14–36), Galen claims that appetites and desires originate in the liver (PHP.V.577; see Hankinson), and Plato suggests that, after death, the souls of pleasure-seeking humans go on to wander around graveyards as phantoms or ghosts (Phaedo 81c8–d4). So, we would be doing ourselves a great disservice were we to study ancient approaches to philosophy of mind with the aim of coming to understand the field at its contemporary and cutting edge. For that purpose, given modern advances in neuroscience and empirical psychology, much of what is discussed in this volume must be considered jejune. So, we might reasonable ask why we should concern ourselves with the early history of philosophy of mind.

One answer to the question is that the study of ancient philosophy of mind provides us with important instrumental benefits. By coming to grasp major themes in ancient thought, we move towards a more comprehensive understanding of our place in cultural and intellectual history. First, elements of ancient thought are part of the threadwork of modern culture and, while many of the views discussed in this volume do not harmonize with contemporary science, some of the views harmonize quite well with notions that are held to be true by many individuals within our society. For example, Plato has many (non-philosophically minded) contemporary allies when it comes to belief in ghosts. Still, this lingering and unenlightened belief seems rather trifling when compared to some of the more damaging holdovers from ancient times. So, the study of early philosophy of mind helps us place certain ingrained (and often broadly held) cultural beliefs at arm’s length. Further, it affords us the opportunities to uncover our own unwitting presuppositions. This promotes intellectual autonomy: it positions the reader to embrace or reject such views, with cognizance of each view’s genesis, development, and legacy (as well as cognizance of arguments advanced by the early critics of each view). Second, the ancient world is the crucible in which questions that are central to contemporary philosophy of mind are first forged. Thus, once we are able to understand why ancient thinkers discard or discount certain issues, while they accept, embrace, and champion others, we gain a second type of critical distance. Knowledge of ancient theories of mind positions us to consider whether the questions that are asked by contemporary philosophers are in fact the questions that they, or we, should be asking. By gaining this critical distance, we are empowered to assess whether contemporary philosophy of mind might be due for a bit of disruption: we gain an eye with which to gauge whether the field (or some part of it), as it stands today, may be in want of a new paradigm. Third, we cannot fully appreciate or properly contextualize later developments in the philosophy of mind if we lack knowledge of relevant ancient theories. It is no accident that both Plato and Aristotle are mentioned and discussed in each volume within this six-part series: in many ways, these two philosophical titans still shape and define the field. In addition, we cannot gain a robust understanding of Descartes, without also turning to Augustine (354–430 AD); we cannot master Brentano, without also studying Aristotle; and we cannot comprehend key changes that take place during the Renaissance, without also exploring Lucretius (obit. c.50 BCE) (see Greenblatt). Later philosophers of mind (including contemporary ones, whether they are aware of it or not), stand on the shoulders of giants. So, the study of ancient philosophy of mind has important instrumental value.

Another reply to the question of why we should study theories advanced by early thinkers is that ancient philosophy of mind has intrinsic worth; plus, there is significant value in studying history for history’s sake (see Frede and Reis, p. 4). We cannot help but be awestruck by the brilliant flashes of insight that characterize this period. As an example, when Aristotle advances the theory of hylomorphism (see DA.II.1–3), his synthesis, through which both the thesis that mind is material substance and the antithesis that mind is immaterial substance are rejected and superseded, is a manifestly stunning advance. In this fresh and unheralded move, Aristotle gives birth to a new and impressive worldview. Simply put: when we study ancient philosophy of mind, we witness powerful intellectual wonders and adventurous theoretical delights.

In what follows, I provide an overview of the choppy and undulating seascape of ancient philosophy of mind. I resist the temptation to wade into debate over contentious issues. Still, within this synopsis, I do not shy away from introducing my own views, especially where I have a stake as a participant in some lively, ongoing debates. Further, my account falls short of providing an adequate survey of even just those theories that are advanced by the more prominent thinkers of the period: in respect to both breadth and depth, my outline is far from complete. I sketch a few common themes and shared questions concerning the nature of soul, soul’s relation to the body, and models for the possible mortality or immortality of soul. I also chart out some of the explanatory schemes that are integral to ancient philosophy of mind. Herein I offer a general framework which may help the reader to contextualize the issues and topics that are explored in the probing, rich, and illuminating chapters that comprise the main body of this volume.

1. Soul: range, nature, and relation to body

Many early thinkers who touch on topics associated with mind have no conception of philosophy of mind as such. Their views on mind are part of the fabric of their explorations into psychology. Yet, to call these thinkers psychologists would be misleading, for the conception of psychology that they share is much broader than the modern conception (see Everson, pp. 2–5). These thinkers are engaged in, what we might call, general life science. They consider soul (psuche) to be the principle of life and they affirm that living things have soul (they are empsuche, ensouled), while dead or inanimate things lack soul (these are apsuche, or soulless). So, early thinkers excogitate on the nature of soul and on the characteristic abilities of living things. Given that reproduction, growth, and nutrification are common to all living things, many early thinkers suppose that, in addition to humans and in addition to animals, even plants have soul. Among the Presocratics, Empedocles (floruit c.460 BCE) most assuredly holds this view (see DK31B117) and, arguably, Pythagoras (floruit c.540 BCE) does as well (see DK44B89; cf. Huffman, p. 38, n. 50).⁶ Further, some Presocratics not only think that plants have souls, but also assign powers to plants that we would attribute to only humans or to only animals and humans. The author of On Plants (Pseudo-Aristotle) indicates, “Anaxagoras and Empedocles say that [plants] are moved by desire and they affirm that they also perceive and feel pain and pleasure… . Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Empedocles held that plants possess mind and knowledge” (DK59A117). The passage suggests that certain early philosophers believe that the cause of desire, perception, and thought is the same as the cause of nutrification, reproduction, and growth: the cause is simply and plainly soul. Without considering the possibility of functional taxonomies of living things or of types (or aspects) of soul, these philosophers infer that anything with soul must think, perceive, desire, and digest. Some early thinkers go a step further by supposing that the set of living things is actually broader than the set of all plants, animals, and humans. Thales (floruit c.600 BCE), for example, who takes the power to cause motion to be definitive of life, expands the set of living things to include magnets. As Aristotle testifies, “it appears from what is recounted of him that Thales too understood the soul to be a source of motion, since he said the loadstone has a soul because it moves iron” (DA.I.2.405a19–21=DK11A22). (If Aristotle’s report is accurate, Thales apparently conflates self-motion – both locomotion and growth – with the power to cause motion in external objects.) Perhaps going yet another step beyond the pale, Anaximenes, it is argued, thinks that all matter is alive: he appears to embrace hylozoism (see Guthrie 1965, p. 341).⁷ Hylozoism, in effect, destroys the very distinction between the living and the non-living. So, the evidence shows that philosophy of mind, in its earliest stirrings, is part of an expansive and wildly imaginative, yet empirically uninformed and taxonomically misguided, shared theoretical campaign, focusing on general life science.

As early philosophers start to weigh the relative merits of competing theories of mind, they also begin developing perspicuous taxonomies both of living things and of types (or aspects) of soul. The Pythagorean philosopher Philolaus (floruit c.430 BCE), as an example, states,

the head [is the seat] of thought, heart of life [soul] and sensation, navel of rooting and first growth, and genitals of sowing seed and begetting. The brain <contains> the source of man, the heart that of animal, the navel that of plant, the genitals the source of all of them. For all things sprout and grow from seed.

(DK44B10)

So, for Philolaus, the powers of thought, desire, and reproduction are situated in different parts of the body. Further, Philolaus maintains that these powers are not equally distributed among living organisms: he holds that reproduction is shared by all living things, while desire is common to only animals (and humans), and thought is unique to humans. Aristotle and Augustine hold the same view, when it comes to perishable beings (see Aristotle DA.II.2.413a26–b1 and Augustine De Quantitate Animae 33.70). Aristotle, while rejecting the notion that the faculty of reason is located in the brain, further schematizes and develops Philolaus’ taxonomy by considering not only faculties, but also sub-faculties and even faculty-specific sub-components (see Perler 2015). For example, he contends that all animals share the perceptual modalities of taste and touch, whereas only those animals capable of locomotion possess the distal senses: the modalities of sight, hearing, and smell (see DA.II.2.413b2–8 & III.11.433b31–434a2). So, on Aristotle’s account, taste and touch are taxonomically separate from the other perceptual modalities.⁸ Further, Aristotle questions whether all animal species possess imagination (see DA.III.11.433b31–434a5), asserts that some species lack memory (see Meta.I.1), and is curious about whether certain non-human species might convey pertinent information to their own kind through vocalization or speech (see HA.IV.9).

Philolaus is not the only thinker to affirm that different psychological powers manifest themselves, or have their sources in, spatially distinct parts of the body. Still, against Philolaus, certain early philosophers do not believe that the threefold division of plants, animals, and humans constitutes a taxonomy of living things: certain thinkers see the divide between animals and plants as marking a separation between the empsuche and the apsuche. For example, the Stoics affirm that plants lack soul (see Aëtius 5.26.3 and Sorabji, pp. 98–99). Nevertheless, Philolaus’ taxonomy of living things, ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Notes on contributors
• General introduction
• Introduction to volume 1
• 1 Presocratic interest in the soul’s persistence after death
• 2 Presocratic accounts of perception and cognition
• 3 Soul, perception and thought in the Hippocratic corpus
• 4 Plato’s guide to living with your body
• 5 Plato and tripartition of soul
• 6 Cosmic and human cognition in the Timaeus
• 7 The power of Aristotle’s hylomorphic approach
• 8 Aristotle on the intellect and limits of natural science
• 9 Aristotle on the perception and cognition of time
• 10 Aristotle on mind, perception, and body
• 11 Rational impressions and the stoic philosophy of mind
• 12 Mind in an atomistic world: Epicurus and the Epicurean tradition
• 13 Galen’s philosophy of mind
• 14 Plotinus’ theory of affection
• 15 Intellect in Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Philoponus: divine, human or both?
• Index