1 The Schmitt-Podemos connection
In 1977, almost two years after the death of Francisco Franco, the German jurist Carl Schmitt published an article in the Spanish newspaper El PaĂs calling for an amnesty, âa mutual act of forgettingâ (Schmitt, 1977). âAn amnesty in the true and authentic sense of the wordâ, Schmitt wrote, âsignifies nothing less than the end of civil warâ. By this time almost forty years had passed since the end of the Spanish Civil War (1936â39), and just over thirty years since the defeat of German National Socialism, the political movement with which Schmitt is most closely associated. Since 1945 Schmitt had been unable to work in German academia because he had refused to accept his own denazification, expecting, perhaps, that he himself would be granted the dignity of amnesty. But in Spain he had found something of a second home. It was through his daughter Animaâmarried from the 1960s to Alfonso Otero, a Spanish professor of legal history, and living in Spainâthat Schmitt authorised publication of the El PaĂs article, which he had in fact written in 1949. The family had a farm in Santiago de Compostela, where Schmitt would spend his summers with his daughter and grandchildren (RodrĂguez Mourullo 2011). On Thursdays, when there was a market in the town, Schmitt could be seen on the corner of the street watching the rustic scene. âWith timeâ, recalls sociologist FermĂn Bouza, who grew up in the city, âI guessed the meaning of his gaze, which was directed towards nostalgia for rural and medieval Europe, which was already lostâ (Bouza 2012).
Long an admirer of the Spanish legal theorist Juan Donoso CortĂ©s, and a devout Catholic, Schmittâs relationship with Spain had been close for decades (MĂŒller 2003, p. 133). Donoso, whose notions of dictatorship and the political decision had influenced Schmitt profoundly, becameâthanks to Schmittâs writingsâan important source of political thought for intellectuals under Francoâs regime, which lasted from 1939 until 1975 (LĂłpez GarcĂa 1996, p. 142). During this period Schmitt had come to be seen in Spain as the âlast guardian of the âGreat Christian-European Traditionââ that yoked religion to politics (p. 142); he was enough of an intellectual celebrity that Francoâs Information and Tourism minister referred to him as Spainâs âbuen amigo y maestroâ (MĂŒller 2003, p. 134). Soon after a trip to Spain in 1951, Schmitt himself wrote to a friend that he was âstill as if numbed by the contrast between the truly wonderful, and also honourable, welcome in Spain and the malicious persecution in my fatherlandâ (Mehring 2014, p. 450). In the Spain of this era, in turn, Schmitt saw the realisation of a project he had hoped to see come to fruition in Germany but which had been thwarted by the Second World War (MĂŒller 2003, p. 147). âEssentiallyâ, writes Schmitt scholar Jan-Werner MĂŒller, âhe inverted JosĂ© Ortega y Gassetâs notion that âSpain is the problem, Europe is the solutionââ (MĂŒller 2003, p. 138; cf. Mehring 2014, p. 525).
For some decades after the passage of Spainâs Amnesty Law in October 1977 (nine months after the publication of Schmittâs article), it might have seemed as if Schmittâs influence had wanedâalthough, as we will learn in later chapters, the politics of this period remained distinctly Schmittian. Until a few years ago, that is, when various Schmittian concepts began to reappear in Spanish politics: his belief that the will of the people must sometimes override the constitution; his notion that democratic politics must always involve exclusion and the risk of fatal violence; incitements to the release of public passion; and calls for national myths to reinvigorate political practice. The principal agent behind this reappearance was, counterintuitively, the progressive political force known as Podemos (âWe Canâ in Spanish), which by mid-2016 had become the third largest party in the Spanish parliament after less than three years on the political scene. Podemosâ paradoxical revival of Schmittian political thought did not go unnoticed: âuntil the rise of Podemosâ, observes professor of constitutional law Javier Tajadura, âno political party has ever assumedâin such a clear and distinct formâSchmittâs doctrine: decisionismâ (Tajadura Tejada 2015).
The Schmitt-Podemos paradox
Schmittâs work has been tarnished since the 1930s by his close association with German National Socialism. In the decade after the First World War, the militancy, authoritarianism and anti-pluralism that characterised Nazism rose to the surface of his writing; to any of his readers after this point they would have been unmissable. Yet, soon after the end of the Second World War, the political left began to appropriate his ideas. As early as the late 1960s in Italy, for example, the political philosopher and Communist Party activist Mario Tronti used Carl Schmitt as a corrective to Marxist theory, drawing on his ideas to propose that capitalists be treated as absolute political enemies (cf. Mandarini 2014; MĂŒller 2003, p. 178). But what is remarkable about Podemosâ more recent appropriation is the consistency with which Schmittian ideas have been integrated into a major political partyâs programme. Schmitt has not appeared in Podemosâ politics merely as a background figure who occasionally contributes to its thinking, as do other political theorists such as Machiavelli. Instead, Schmittâs thought has unmistakably helped to structure Podemosâ political performances; it is right there on the surface, brazen and with its edges hardly blunted.
Schmitt is certainly not the only theorist whose ideas have moulded Podemosâ political thought. Thinkers on the Left have also exerted a strong influence on the partyâs intellectual underpinnings. But this fact subtracts nothing from the importance of a Schmittian cosmology to Podemosâ politics: Schmitt may not be their most significant intellectual influence, but it is undeniable thatâat least during the partyâs first three yearsâSchmittian political thought came to play a major role in the way the partyâs leaders thought about politics. Given the web of memory through which Schmittâs vision of politics is likely to be read in Spainâa web in which Schmitt is tightly entangled with the fascist regime of Francisco Franco and its legacyâthis requires further explanation. Our concern is not to present a comprehensive guide to the political theory behind what has become one of the most successful political formations of recent times. Nor is it to assess to what extent Podemosâ political behaviour is really Schmittian or notâthough the concluding chapter will deal with this question briefly. It is simply to lay out how Schmittian ideasâwhether or not they have come directly from Schmitt himselfâhave shaped the party leadersâ political world view, and to ask why they have been able to do so, apparently against significant odds.
As in Trontiâs Italy of the 1960s and 1970s, fascism has a recentâand to some extent an ongoingâhistory in Spain. While few seem aware of the Schmittian juristic justification given to Spainâs fascist regime by its intellectuals from the 1930s onwards, or of Schmittâs proximity to the regime after the Second World War, the Schmittian aspects of Francoist politics continue to be discussed and condemned by those on the political Left even when they are not labelled as such. Yet the young Podemosâ patriotism verging on nationalism, its bellicose metaphors, and its veneration of strong leadership all bear traces of the same kind of politics, which Spain has apparently worked so hard to eradicate. If these ideas do not recall the dictatorship itself, then they certainly revive many of the themes of the Civil War that preceded it, which after the 1977 amnesty Spainâs political class made such a performance of forgetting.
Part of the story here, no doubt, is about âself-positioningâ and âbrandingâ (Baert, 2015, pp. 158â189) in that the Podemos intellectuals have drawn in part on a Schmittian perspective to locate themselves (some would say, rather skilfully) within the Spanish political context, presenting a radical agenda that ostensibly moves beyond the traditional left-right divide. In what follows, we shall uncover how their self-positioning has taken place very much through the âpositioningâ of others, relying on sharp juxtapositions: the intellectuals involved have portrayed the group they call âla castaâ (the so-called political elite) as the enemy, the transition from Francoâs dictatorship to democracy as a charade, liberal democracy as a smokescreen, and so on. We shall also learn, however, that the political context in which Podemosâ leaders currently operate is not simply âgivenâ: it is also one that they have helped to create and maintain. Indeed, the very same writings and speeches in which they elaborate on their political stances also depict their political context as one that is politically depletedâone that calls for the resurrection of the kind of heroism associated with an earlier period in Spanish history. Podemos has been particularly persuasive in providing a new depiction of contemporary Spanish politics and of its recent history. In this book, we will explore this unique political imaginary which allowed for the reconciliation of prima facie conflicting political positions. What we will not do, however, is evaluate how far this imaginary and its positioning effects have contributed to Podemosâ success. Our intention is not to explain Podemosâ impressive trajectory through the political sphere, analysing its reconfiguration of Spainâs political party structure; others have taken up this task (see Ramiro and GĂłmez 2017; Ferrada Stoehrel 2017). It is to account for an intriguing segment of its leadersâ trajectory through the realm of ideas.
To use the term âpositioningâ, as we just did, is not to suggest that Podemosâ leaders are always craftily and cynically manipulating their audiences or that privately they hold very different (and possibly opposing) views to the ones they publicly profess. Of course, given the nature of their activities, there has been an element of political manoeuvring, with the occasional discrepancy between private convictions and public utterances. Especially their positioning beyond the traditional left-right divideâor, to put it differently, their avoidance of a leftist labelâis at least partly strategic. As our story unfolds, however, it will quickly become apparent that the main protagonists seem remarkably committed to and emotionally entangled with the stances they take and that their trajectories indicate a continuity (and, to some extent, authenticity) of their political views that cannot simply be ignored. Therefore, an exclusively instrumental-rational reading of their writings and speeches would be thoroughly misguided.
This, then, poses the question how and why Podemos took up this Schmittian tradition of political thought during the partyâs infancy, given that it is redolent of a bellicose far-right politics and that its principal exponent was so closely associated with Nazism. To answer this question we will focus on the period between the partyâs inception in 2014 and its second Citizen Assembly in February 2017, when the influence of Schmittian thought on Podemosâ rhetoric was at its clearest. Our investigation will take us into both Spanish and German history, and into the intellectual hinterland of Podemosâ leaders. It will take us into the theory and strategy behind a populist political party built for the twenty-first century and its institutionsâan agent capable, if its leaders are to be believed, of reversing the bleak prognosis commentators have been handing down to the European left for years. It will also, briefly, bring us to the question of what it is to be a young European today, and specifically to the question of what it is to be a young academic in todayâs European universities. Beyond these narrative landmarks, which make for an interesting story in their own right, investigating the apparent paradox of Schmittâs reincarnation in contemporary Spain brings us to four further questions, the first pair more generalâfrom the sociology of ideas and political theoryâand the second pair quite specific.
The sociology of ideas poses the question of how readers who would have vehemently rejected the politics implied by a theory in its original context come to adopt the theory none the less. Just as it is fascinating how exponents of the French Nouvelle Droite such as Alain de Benoist have been adopting Gramscian theory (whilst unmistakably rejecting Gramsciâs political agenda), it is intriguing how key figures in Podemos came to flirt with Schmittian political theory. This poses a question about resonance: how has Schmittian political theory been able to resonate so strongly with these readers that its original implications have not hindered its appropriation? The answer is that the filter through which Podemosâ leaders view Spanish politics makes contemporary reality appear much more like Weimar Germany, the original context in which Schmitt was writing, than it may seem to us. This filter takes the form of a narrative in which personal and political stories are woven togetherâa narrative that extends into both Spainâs past and its future. It is a narrative that draws on cultural structures at play in Spanish politics for over a century, resulting in a patterning homologous to that which runs through Schmittâs political theory. Homology of narrative structures is the key to understanding how Schmittian ideas have managed to resonate with leaders of a progressive political party a century later (see Alexander and Smith 2005). While the polarity of the narrative elements within these structures may be different, similarities between the structures themselves have in this case been sufficient for resonance to occur.
Because the Podemos leadersâ narrative connects the personal and the political, and because it extends into the future as well as the past, it tells a story not just about a prospective political transformation but about a prospective personal transformation as well. It is partly because Schmittian theory echoes the part of the Podemos leadersâ narrative that deals with personal transformation that it has successfully resonated with themânot just because it echoes the part that deals with Spainâs political transformation (though as we will see, to distinguish two different âpartsâ in this way, while analytically useful here, is probably misleading). Theories should be understood to attract readers not just because of their perceived accuracy, but because they appear to promise a desired personal transformation (cf. Isaac 2009, pp. 406â408). By thinking and acting in accordance with a new theory, by beginning to perform their life according to its script, readers can, or so it may seem, change their form of life. Quite significant inaccuracies and even damning associations may be passed over if a theory offers sufficient performative pull. For the Podemos intellectuals, living through Schmittian political theory promises to end the boredom and frustration produced both by the immediate milieu of academia and by liberal politics. The script of Schmittâs theory suggests a dramatic life that takes up where their ancestors, who fought against Franco, left off, and continues the epic in which they were protagonists. When combined with its structural fit with Podemosâ narrative about Spanish politics, the performative pull of Schmittâs decisionism has been too strong to resist.
One of the central claims in what follows is that intellectual currents or ideas in general are more likely to resonate with people if they can be incorporated into compelling individual narratives. In two other socio-historical studies of public intellectuals, we have come across a similar phenomenon. Firstly, The Existentialist Moment showed how in the 1940s Jean-Paul Sartreâs writingsâhis philosophy, novels, plays, journalistic pieces and public lecturesâmanaged to resonate with sections of the French public because they spoke directly to their recent experiences. Sartreâs writings and speeches provided a vocabulary to make sense of the trauma of the war, helping to draw a line underneath it and move forward (Baert 2015). Secondly, a recent socio-historical study on the Black Consciousness Movement revealed how in the 1970s Steve Bikoâs interventions were remarkably compelling and struck a chord with Black South Africans partly because he was particularly skilful in linking his political agenda to their everyday lives. His political views were not simply abstract formulationsâthey were intimately connected to his own biography and that of millions of others (Morgan and Baert, 2017). In both casesâthe study of Sartre and Bikoânew theoretical articulations were linked to the notion of rebirth, with a tabula rasa enabling the conception of new societal and political projects as well as new biographies. We shall find that Podemos and Schmittian thought follow similar patterns.
Political theory, meanwhile, poses the question of the nature of populism. Much has been written claiming that populism is inevitably a sinister mode of doing politics: that a return to populism is a return to the horrors of the 1930s. By peering directly into the darkest part of Podemosâ politics, the part influenced by Schmitt, we can test what some have claimed is an innocuous, even positive, incarnation of populism. Does this focus on Podemosâ Schmittian seam reveal something sinister within the poster party of the European populist left? Or does it instead show that in the right hands even the worst aspects of populism can be transformed into something to be embraced, rather than feared?
In his book on populism, Schmitt scholar Jan-Werner MĂŒller argues that the phenomenon should be understood in Schmittian terms. MĂŒller defines populism as âa particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified ⊠people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferiorâ (MĂŒller 2016, p. 20). Podemosâ imagination of politics certainly corresponds to this definition. Yet MĂŒller goes on to characterise populists as anti-pluralist (p. 20), as hostile towards real participation by citizens (p. 29), and as prone to internal authoritarianism (p. 36). Schmitt would have approved of this kind of populism, and it is because of this that, as MĂŒller writes, Schmittâs work âserved as a conceptual bridge from democracy to nondemocracyâ (p. 28). But has Podemos taken up these Schmittian elements of populism, in which case might it too be the bridge from democracy to nondemocracy in Spain?
The answer is not straightforward. Though he mentions that Podemos has been labelled âpopulistâ MĂŒller does not have much beyond that to say about the party. He does, however, suggest that despite their anti-elitism the precursor movement to Podemos, the indignados, were not âactual populistsâ because they were not a part of the population claiming to represent the wholeâand that distinguishing non-populist anti-elitist political actors from populist ones âis a prime task for a theory of populism in Europe todayâ (MĂŒller 2016, p. 98). The fact that Podemos has drawn directly on Schmitt provides an unparalleled opportunity to see precisely how far this self-described âpopulistâ phenomenon does correspond to the pessimistic definition espoused by political theorists such as MĂŒller, ...