Contrasts and contests about philosophy

Mogobe Ramose

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN:
  9781138223479
• eBook ISBN:
  9781315404721
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

The sheer variety of socio-political events and technological advancements which affect modern society, and the speed and intensity at which these events occur around the world, delivers change known as epistemic and social transformation. Within this context, the question of justice for all is a poignant one. It is a cognitive revolution challenging humankind to consider whether or not the already contested meaning of philosophy can remain unchanged. The contributions to Contrasts and contests about philosophy address this challenge from a variety of different, and even contending, perspectives. This book was originally published as a special issue of the South African Journal of Philosophy.

Dialogue as the negation of hegemony: An African perspective

Pascah Mungwini

Department of Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology, University of South Africa

As an enterprise centred in human experiences, philosophy must acknowledge its history and find its way from that history to define the future of humanity. Inter-philosophical dialogue is an attempt to metaphorically dialogue with that history with a view to creating better understanding across cultures. In this essay, I seek to examine the nature and foundations of inter-philosophical dialogue from an African standpoint. Not only is dialogue the defining element of philosophy, but it is also integral to what it means to be human. I am convinced that inter-philosophical dialogue is critical to the future wellbeing of the world and that of humanity in particular. However, in celebrating its promise, we should not be oblivious to the fact that, being a talismanic concept, dialogue can be manipulated to mask and smooth over the hegemony that still defines the world. The world continues to face the dangers of an ethnocentric rationalism which seeks to measure the legitimacy all other traditions of life and thought in terms of standards set by one dominant tradition.

Introduction

Reason does not become something different because it is exercised in the tropics. Reason is supreme and does not bow to geography. But precisely because reason is not blind, it has, in order to keep an accurate and firm grip on things, to apprehend different realities differently (Ki-zerbo 1981: p. 4).

The submission above, which constitutes my point of departure, is the foundation upon which this discussion on inter-philosophical dialogue is premised. Not only does Ki-zerbo reassert the universality of reason, but he also affirms a very important point—that it is not within the nature of reason to be blind to context. The history of philosophy, particularly in Africa, has had to deal with the problem of a specific form of reason that refused to apply itself seriously to the virtues of understanding different realities differently. The paradox, however, is that, despite reason being supreme, attempts have been made by some to claim sole entitlement to the so-called right to reason and to make reason submit to their whims and ideologies. But by trying to subordinate reason to their whims and ideologies such individuals were invariably rendering themselves unreasonable. A perfect example of such unreasonableness was the myth of races and the belief that the human race cannot be one. Sadly, this belief became the basis of yet another monumental superstition that the indigenous peoples of the world, including Africans, were incapable of producing knowledge. But the question that one might raise is how all this could be reconciled with the ideals of democracy and the dignity of persons which modernity and the Enlightenment have preached for centuries. It is at this point that one is confronted with what Eze calls the

duplicity at the heart of European modernity—the subscription to the ideals of universal humanity and democracy on the one hand, and the imperial and colonial subjugation of non-European peoples and racism on the other (Eze 1997: p. 12).

To this day, African philosophers have to deal with the aftermaths of this paradox, where on one hand European modernity and the Enlightenment touted precious ideals like the dignity of persons and democracy to the world, while at the same time it remained so intimately and inextricably implicated in slavery and the colonial projects (Eze 1997: p. 12). To explain this paradox one could probably appeal to the often cited discrepancy between ‘sterling rhetoric and lived reality’ or ‘glowing principles and actual practice’ (ibid.). But to do so would be to miss some fundamental truth in history on how science has been abused and misused in the service of ideology. No matter who is behind it, any attempt to circumscribe the circle of reason and to redefine who is and who is not a rational animal is itself a moral transgression reminiscent of the sin of hubris—a vice identified by the ancient Greeks as the arrogance of men who wanted to elevate themselves to the level of gods. However, as Ramose (1999) correctly observes, human reproductive power seems to have provided the all-incisive blow to the myth that only a particular segment of humanity was exclusively and truly human while the rest were sub-human, if human at all. What motivates my discussion on dialogue is the position that all human beings, from time immemorial, have sought knowledge both for practical purposes and in order to satisfy their curiosity. It is this historical fact which should constitute the basis for dialogue across cultures.

In this essay, I conceive dialogue as being central to what it means to be human. I consider dialogue not only as instrumental, but inherently constitutive of what it means to reject hegemony in the world. What places all of humanity on the same plane is their dialogical nature as beings endowed with the gift of contemplation. Dialogue, unlike argument, where individuals can speak at cross purposes, assumes prior recognition of our parity as human beings. It is on the basis of such parity that humans should be brought together to grow in understanding through the active process of reciprocal elucidation in search of knowledge and truth about the world. Although this essay will raise important issues which relate to dialogue in general, my major concern is with understanding dialogue within the context of cultures historically marked against each other by hegemonic relations. My analysis therefore revolves around the African experience, which also mirrors the experiences of other postcolonial cultures in their dealings with the West. South-South dialogue, which in essence does not share this historical problematic, will serve in a different discussion.

The essay is divided into four parts. I begin by setting out the historical context within which philosophical practice within Africa and other similar cultures that suffered colonialism is to be understood. It is this historical context which shapes the way dialogue between philosophical traditions will be conceived. The second part is an examination of the concept of dialogue itself. Here an attempt is made to map out the meaning of dialogue and particularly its normative dimension. In my analysis of dialogue, I also draw attention to its potential as a talismanic concept, and what that entails for inter-philosophical dialogue, particularly the search for truth. This is then followed by an examination of the conditions necessary for dialogue and the potential challenges. I argue that dialogue should be conceived as the negation of hegemony. In the last section, I contemplate the future of humanity by paying specific attention to dialogue and the potential that philosophy has in bringing humanity together. Here, as Okere (2003) urges, I distinguish the reality of philosophy from the promise of philosophy, that is, the history of philosophy as we know it, and the promise it holds, the great hope it imbues, and the as-yet-unachieved potential of philosophy.

Dialogue and philosophy

From an African philosophical standpoint, the concept of dialogue between philosophies can have greater significance in a context where an intercultural historiography of philosophy is pursued. This is because at the centre of the problems bedevilling postcolonial philosophies and their relationship to the West is a distorted historiography of philosophy and civilisation in general. Reconstructing the history of philosophy is therefore necessary in laying the groundwork for the possibility of genuine dialogue between philosophies (Dussel 2009). Africans and all other indigenous peoples who have suffered humiliation in various forms see the need to revisit the distorted story of humanity upon which their suffering was premised. In philosophical terms, the desire to revisit the past is in fact a call for scholars to return to the principles of historiography, which requires that the story of humanity be rewritten through the critical examination of sources, and the selection and synthesis of evidence provided by the disparate civilisations into a narrative that can stand the credibility test. Contributing to debate on the possibility of intercultural philosophy, Wimmer (2010: p. 24) proposes that

the discipline of philosophy has to reconstruct its own ideology, in order to establish an egalitarian basis of communication between philosophies from different parts of the world, a basis of polylogue communication.

The establishment of dialogue requires parity in recognition between philosophies and such parity can only be achieved if the correct story about human civilisation, in the spirit of the nature of philosophy as the pursuit of truth, is told. Such a historical reconstruction should not only be limited to the corrective elaboration of history, but should itself constitute the foundation upon which dialogue or engagement with the other is defined.

Philosophy is inextricably linked to human experiences and these experiences are particular to different cultures. However, as Ramose (2003) argues,

the particularity of experience does not preclude the possibility that a similar, as opposed to identical, experience may occur elsewhere (p. 115).

The crucial point though is that Africans, or any other group for that matter, should accord special significance to the particularity of their history as a people. Philosophy is grounded in human experiences, and experiences are always bound to time and place. The human ability to apprehend different realities differently is at the centre of the whole question surrounding the quest for identity in philosophy. To ignore the cultural location and historical exigencies out of which philosophies arise is to pay lip service to the very idea and meaning of philosophy. As Dussel (2009) correctly points out, it is only through the recognition and acceptance of the meaning, value and history of all regional philosophical traditions on the planet that genuine inter-philosophical dialogue, respectful of differences and open to learning from the useful discoveries of other traditions, can be realised. To achieve that is to lay the foundation for a polyphilosophical dialogue, by which we mean the emergence of a new culture of doing philosophy conscious of the existence of multiple voices and free from any hegemonic tendencies.

The relationship between Africa and the West is a relationship that has been historically defined on the basis of a hegemony buttressed on the logic of negation and invidious comparisons. In a world with the penchant for comparisons, Healy (2013: p. 277) reminds us that

the problem of invidious comparison arises not in virtue of the activity of comparison itself but rather because appeal is made to a standard, such as logico-scientific reasoning, which when used as a yardstick for cross-cultural assessments cannot but fail to show the other culture in an inferior light in point of rationality.

Where one group takes its own particulars as both eternal and fundamental to what it means to be human, the stage is set for unfair comparison and the subordination of other cultures. The very idea of African philosophy has

its roots in the effort of African thinkers to combat political and economic exploitations, and to examine, question, and contest identities imposed upon them by Europeans (Eze 1997: p. 12).

It is for this reason that Africans should take seriously the view that the condition that brought about an obliteration of their history as a people and the subsequent marginalisation of their entire civilisation dictates the terms on which they enter into dialogue with the rest of the world. By emphasising the concrete awareness of its own existence and historicity, Africa lays the foundation upon which its own philosophical contribution, defined by its own experiences, can be elaborated. The specificity and distinctive particularity of the African situation cannot be ignored if appropriate foundations for inter-philosophical dialogue are to be established. On this plane, the concern of African philosophy and other indigenous philosophies similarly placed is to come to terms with the condition of coloniality and its continued effects on their existence. In its most basic form coloniality describes the enduring consequences of colonialism long after colonialism has been overthrown in the domains of the economy, power, knowledge and being. This condition persists in the majority of formerly colonised states as a consequence of the colonial matrix of power. The colonial matrix of power describes

a complex conceptual structure that guided actions in the domain of economy (exploitation of labour and appropriation of land and natural resources), authority (government, military forces), gender/sexuality, and knowledge/subjectivity (Mignolo 2011: p. 142).

This enduring system of power and control continues to reinforce the disparities between peoples through mechanisms put in place during the colonial era. In order to address these issues, dialogue is crucial and this is why, for Africans, dialogue should be closely associated with the search for truth and historical justice. Philosophy in African and other indigenous peoples conquered in the unjust wars of colonialism cannot forego its task as an enterprise in pursuit of social justice. A philosophy that Africa demands is one which is at the service of humanity in pursuit of justice and social, economic and political well-being. It is precisely for this reason that Nkrumah (1964) warns that African students of philosophy, due to the unique demands of their context, cannot approach philosophy in the same way their Western counterparts do.

African philosophy is a philosophy born of rage and humiliation; it was born in order to overcome, and to redeem Africa. Its aim, among others, is to repair wounds and find lost dignity (Tabensky 2008: p. 292). As a philosophy with a liberative agenda, engaging in intercultural dialogue creates a platform upon which African philosophy can engage with its counterparts to deal with the current condition in Africa, much of which relates to unresolved problems of the past. Through genuine dialogue, extant supremacist tendencies and intellectual attempts at fortifying particular schools of thought and philosophies find ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Introduction: Contrasts and contests about philosophy
• 1. Dialogue as the negation of hegemony: An African perspective
• 2. Decolonisation and its discontents: Thoughts on the postcolonial African moral self
• 3. Challenging the dominant ideological paradigm: Can community engagement contribute to the central epistemic aims of philosophy?
• 4. Universalism and African philosophy
• 5. Thabo Mbeki, postmodernism, and the consequences
• 6. Transforming the African philosophical place through conversations: An inquiry into the Global Expansion of Thought (GET)
• 7. Philosophy-in-Place and the provenance of dialogue
• 8. Human rights in a moderate communitarian political framework
• 9. This thing called communitarianism: A critical review of Matolino’s Personhood in African Philosophy
• 10. The Analytic appeal of African philosophy
• 11. Chester Himes, Jacques Derrida and inescapable colonialism: Reflections on African philosophy from the diaspora
• 12. The politics of philosophy in Africa: A conversation
• 13. On the contested meaning of ‘philosophy’
• Index