john Ăł maoilearca
SPIRIT IN THE MATERIALIST WORLD
on the structure of regard
The duty of philosophy should be to intervene here actively, to examine the living without any reservation as to practical utility [âŚ] Its own special object is to speculate, that is to say, to see.1
introducing the new materialisms: looking back again2
As soon as you believe social aggregates can hold their own being propped up by âsocial forces,â then objects vanish from view and the magical and tautological force of society is enough to hold every thing with, literally, no thing. Itâs hard to imagine a more striking foreground/background reversal, a more radical paradigm shift.3
This essay will make an attempt to review a wide range of ideas stemming from recent work in Continental thought that espouse a turn to materialist and/or naturalist perspectives, be it through direct engagement with the natural or mathematical sciences, or more transcendental meta-theoretical approaches that either deduce or speculate upon (or both) certain findings. âVeracity,â âvalidity,â âcoherence,â âexplanatory power,â âtruth-makingâ or any other epistemological value will not be explicitly invoked to assess these approaches. Rather, the attempt here is to gather them together in a value-neutral way and follow the hypothesis that these thoughts of materialism are materials themselves, consisting of both first-order macro-properties such as opticality, specularity, virtuality, (physical) consistency, circularity, clarity, darkness (or invisibility), and figures-grounds, as well as meta-level entities such as rigour, nihilism, consistency, logic, circularity, groundedness (foundations), and clarity. This gathering together is also a revisioning itself, a kind of âforeground/background reversal,â that will involve a reverse orientation as regards the image of philosophical âorientationsâ as such, be they materialist (of a plain manila variety), mathematical-materialist, nihilist-materialist, or object-oriented.4
What is on offer here, then, is not an improved theory qua any putative correspondence with the facts of the matter â with what there is â but a more inclusive theorising whose only inimical moment is targeted solely at the exclusionary aspects of any one material theory qua theory; that is, we only reject those aspects of theories that mount unique and exclusive truth-claims for themselves. For there is also a parallelism between the thoughts of these materialists as regards their own thoughts (respecting their rigour, truth, logic, and even what can count as thought and thinking) and their views of what matter is, and with that also the value of life vs. death, the void, pure matter as abstract matheme, and so on. When such totalising claims are divorced from the theory, what remains are its material âcorrelationsâ with other theories when held or reviewed together. One can call this method a ânon-philosophicalâ or ânon-standard philosophicalâ approach if one wishes â it is certainly framed as such via the work of François Laruelle and Henri Bergson. The ânon-â here is not negation but extension, an inclusive amplification of thought, an expanded approach to what counts as philosophy. So, it can also be understood as a kind of philosophy, or at least a kind of combined metaphilosophy and metaphysics (though Laruelle himself would abhor such terms). It can be seen as a philosophy that looks in a new way at the material metaphysics of metaphilosophy, of theories as theories, especially monistic ones.
And to do this we return, once again, to Bergson. As Jane Bennett writes when looking at the new materialisms in Vibrant Matter: in order to turn the âfigures of âlifeâ and âmatterâ around and aroundâ such that a âvital materiality can start to take shape,â one must awaken what Bergson described as âa latent belief in the spontaneity of nature.â5 But whether it be a âvital materialityâ such as Bennettâs, or a dark vitalism (as in Eugene Thackerâs After Life), one question animating our research will be whether the dyad of life and matter can bring its two terms together without mutual asphyxiation.6 Can the two persist in one; that is, does one need a minimal duality within every putative monism? Be it the unacknowledged signs of life in mathematicised matter (Meillassouxâs mathemic valorisation of contingency), the avowed signs of death in cosmic thanatology (Brassierâs nihilism), or the ubiquitous life of objects in Latour and Harmanâs ontology of actants/objects, the tensions brought out by such all-encompassing theories can themselves be reviewed as parts of a real inherent duality â one that is actually introduced by the Real (an introduction which some simply call error or illusion).
One recurring theme, then, will be the mindâbody problem that Bergson put at the centre of Matter and Memory. It enters here, however, through the larger perspective of life and matter, and the interconnections between animate and inanimate objects, and even vitalism and anti-vitalism. We do this partly in order to look back again at the various purportedly mysterious, ghostly, âcorrelatesâ of the brain (often attacked simply as qualia, though sometimes also as an erroneous sense of self by the followers of Thomas Metzingerâs work).7 Far from wishing to explain such correlates away or eliminate them in the name of a new matter, we review them in order to raise their status as forms of haunting, background life. This will be an open exercise of âexcessive anthropomorphismâ on the one hand,8 as well as an attempt to naturalise this ghostly life as covarying parts of the body, as affects that properly belong to me, to a brain that is also âmy brainâ (or âour brainâ as Catherine Malabou puts it in What Should We Do with Our Brain?).9 These âmysteriousâ correlates are explained both within âourâ mindâbody background and as a background to any viable (non-monistic) explanation. As such, they are rendered immanent equally as a physical, albeit disregarded, part of our material world and as a logical necessity when explaining the âhard problemsâ of the mindâbody relation. The material medium becomes the spiritual medium.
The last time the question of materialism came to such prominence in French thought was in Bergsonâs era at the turn on the twentieth century, and his attempt to materialise spirit (including the practice of philosophical thinking) and spiritualise matter, via his conception of images, remains a powerful resource when looking at the resurgence of materialism and naturalism in contemporary Continental thought. For the notions of spirit, spectrality, ghosts, and animate matter (vitalism) are closely connected to many ideas operating within the new materialism, be it in the concept of inter-theoretical reduction, the mindâbrain problem, contingency, conceptual rigour and consistency, as well as the ontology of objects.
mathematical-materialism: the thought of absolute contingency
We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.10
Outside of Marxist theories of production, it is probably the materialism born from contingency, from the clinamen,11 the swerve, that has been the element colouring the materialism of Continental thought more than any other. This is the very French materialism of material-indeterminacy (rather than the Anglo-Saxon determinist materialism of Newtonian mechanics, which prevailed at least up until the rise of theories of quantum indeterminancy such as Roger Penroseâs). Alain Badiou, with his theory of the event, is one inheritor of this line of thought, turning the cast of dice into an emblem of the event âbecause this gesture symbolizes the event in general; that is, that which is purely hazardous, and which cannot be inferred from the situation [...