INTRODUCTION
Guatemalaâs genocide trial and the nexus of racism and counterinsurgency
Elizabeth Oglesby and Diane M. Nelson
An elderly man sits accused in a cavernous courtroom in Guatemala City wearing noise-blocking headphones. Before him are three Guatemalan judges, two of them women, from the Special Tribunal for High Risk Cases, a special court set up to deal with high-profile human rights and organized crime cases.1 Behind him sits an array of âinterested partiesââjournalists, international observers, activists, retired military, survivors of massacre and starvation, ambassadors, Nobel laureates. During his long career, the accused had risen through the ranks of the Guatemalan army. He ran for president with a centre-left party in 1974 but was denied his win. As de facto head of state following a March 1982 military coup, he proffered fiery, sermonesque oratory with apocalyptic promises of both salvation and devastation, while troops under his command were massacring entire villages in the majority indigenous Guatemalan countryside. He served as leader of the national congress, a position that kept prosecution at bay and from whence he launched several failed presidential campaigns after Guatemalaâs âreturn to democracyâ in 1986 (following more than three decades of nearly unbroken military rule). He is General JosĂ© EfraĂn RĂos Montt, and he is on trial for genocide and crimes against humanity. Beside him sits his former military intelligence chief, JosĂ© Mauricio RodrĂguez SĂĄnchez, accused of the same crimes.
An elderly woman takes the stand. Her slender body is covered in the resplendent colours of Guatemalan indigenous site-specific clothing. Her face is shrouded, and the judge asks reporters to refrain from publishing her name. She is one of nearly a hundred survivors from the Maya-Ixil region of the northern Guatemalan highlands who have come to the capital to testify in this unprecedented forum about army atrocities against Ixil villagers between March 1982 and August 1983. (The Ixil are one of twenty-two Maya ethno-linguistic groups in Guatemala. Indigenous people comprise about half the countryâs population; see Olson and Falla and Vanthuyne, in this special issue.) This was the period of RĂos Monttâs reign as de facto head of state, and it is the geographic and temporal focus of the charges. Ten women testify specifically about sexual violence during the war, covering their faces in the courtroom because of the social stigma still attached to these crimes.
Survivors speak of things they had spoken of before, to anthropologists and human rights investigators, Catholic Church and United Nations truth commission staffers, and lawyers working for more than a decade to prepare the genocide case. The soldiers came. They killed. They burned. They raped. The army slaughtered people and animals, laid waste to cornfields and smashed household and religious objects. Massacre survivors fled and hid in the mountains; over one million people were displaced throughout the country. There were more losses in this exodus as the elderly collapsed and children starved or fell victim to disease, while the army bombed them. These testimonies are replete with loss and infused with many kinds of translations: translations from Maya-Ixil and Maya-Kâicheâ to Spanish, as well as the efforts, sometimes pained, to reduce traumatic events and immense sorrow into the exact parameters of the courtroom setting. One by one, the survivors come forward. This time, after thirty years, they are telling their story to someone who might do something about it.
For seven and a half weeks in 2013, national and international attention was riveted on the courtroom in Guatemala City as the history of army repression was aired. Guatemalan television, radio, print and social media delivered non-stop coverage. Although numerous charges were bundled into this case, it became known in Guatemala and abroad as âthe genocide trialâ or the âRĂos Montt trialâ.2
In fact, the charges against RĂos Montt and RodrĂguez SĂĄnchez were but a piece of a wider effort to prosecute Guatemalaâs grave war crimes. As Brett, Burt and Ross describe in this special issue, it took decades to prepare the ground for this and other trials, including fighting amnesty laws and both legal and extra-judicial forms of impunity, and creating the institutional and juridical structures able to carry it out. It also meant years of grassroots organizing by and among survivors in different parts of the country, as Falla and Vanthuyne address, to overcome the terror of reprisals and the horror and shame at what occurred.3 Guatemalan human rights organizations such as the Center for Legal Action on Human Rights (CALDH) and the Association for Justice and Reconciliation (AJR) acted as civil parties in the trial, with a seat at the prosecution table, following years of heartrendingly slow work with victims and within the legal system to push the case forward. Partly due to the recent opening of possibilities to prosecute human rights cases, the Guatemalan Public Ministry had a snap legal team under the direction of Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey, a human rights activist and scholar appointed by Guatemalaâs centre-left president in 2010. Also essential were the extraordinary labours by international legal teams and other support networks, as Gregoire and Hamilton describe.
The information yielded during the trial was not new; the general patterns of this violence were already known. Following peace accords in 1996 that ended a thirty-six-year armed conflict between the Guatemalan state and leftist insurgents, two major truth commission projects had provided a comprehensive account of war crimes; these were the Roman Catholic Churchâs Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI) report in 1998 and the investigation of the United Nations Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH, Guatemalaâs âtruth commissionâ mandated in the peace accords) in 1999. Yet, unlike South Africaâs Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Guatemalaâs truth commission did not include public hearings, and few Guatemalans read its multi-volume final report.4 Nor does the public have access to the 8,000 testimonies compiled by the CEH. They are locked in a United Nations vault in New York City for fifty years. Several trials prior to 2013 had given the public a chance to watch and hear testimony on specific war crimes (such as the killing of Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack and the Dos Erres massacre, discussed by Vela Castañeda in this special issue), but the genocide trial was the first time the armyâs entire counterinsurgency strategy was laid out in public hearings in such graphic detail. Moreover, it was the first time in Guatemala that a former head of state was on trial for human rights crimes, and international observers were also transfixed. As Marcie Mersky, from the International Center for Transitional Justice, notes, âIt is the first time that a former head of state is being tried for genocide in a credible national court, by the national authorities, in a country where the alleged crimes took placeâ.5
During a period of nearly two months, the prosecution presented a mosaic of evidence arguing that the armyâs actions amounted to genocide and crimes against humanity. Nearly one hundred Ixil survivors testified; just over half were men. Most came from villages surrounding Nebaj, the largest of the three Ixil towns in northern Guatemala, with smaller numbers coming from rural areas around the towns of Chajul and Cotzal. The youngest witness was thirty-three years old, and the oldest eighty-seven. Three quarters of the Ixil witnesses who testified in the genocide trial were over eighteen in 1982, when the crimes were committed, while one quarter were children or adolescents at the time of the genocide. Two thirds of the testimonies were given in the Ixil language, with translation provided by the court. Twenty-five per cent of the testimonies were in Spanish, three per cent were in the Maya-Kâicheâ language and the rest were a mixture of Spanish and Ixil, or Spanish and Kâicheâ. Most of the testimonies lasted between twenty and forty minutes.6
In addition to the survivors, expert witnesses included several dozen Guatemalan forensic anthropologists who described the exhumation of massacre victims, the slow, careful work to reveal bones in mass graves and the scientific rigour of determining gender, approximate age and circumstances of death. The anthropologistsâ photographs corroborated the testimonies: they showed skeletons of pregnant women with tiny foetal bones in their bellies, as well as the remains of victims of all ages with their skulls smashed or with evidence of having been shot, garrotted or hacked to death with machetes. Many had their hands tied behind their back when they were killed. US statistician Patrick Ball, director of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, testified that from April 1982 to July 1983 in the majority Ixil municipalities of Chajul, Cotzal and Nebaj, the army killed 5.5 per cent of the indigenous population and 0.7 per cent of the non-indigenous population. Ball concluded that the murder rates of an identifiable group in Guatemala during this period were comparable to acknowledged genocides such as Rwanda and Srebrenica.7 (Nelson addresses the production of these legal facts in her contribution.) Other social scientists testified on the psychological effects of the repression and its long-term impact on the social fabric of indigenous community life, as well as the deleterious impact of the armyâs âwar of reconstructionâ that forced villagers to form paramilitary âcivil patrolsâ and resettled the displaced into army-controlled âmodel villagesâ (strategic hamlets).8 The prosecution also introduced Operation Sofia, a 350-page cache of military communiquĂ©s from the Ixil region dating from September 1982, which show that the armyâs actions were not excesses but part of a carefully conceived counterinsurgency strategy that targeted rural, indigenous populations as an âinternal enemyâ of the state. Prosecutors argued that RĂos Montt and RodrĂguez SanchĂ©z were aware of what was happening and were, in fact, culpable for these crimes, since the military documents demonstrated that the chain of command led directly to the two generals.
The defence, for its part, expended very little energy on refuting the charges. Instead, the defence team focused on throwing wrenches into the gears of the legal system through what prosecutors called âmalicious litigationâ in the form of amparos, a legal instrument that allows parties to a court case to file motions for the protection of their constitutional rights. Under Guatemalan law, these amparos are not limited to the appeals process, but can be filed at any point during the case and can be applied to virtually any aspect of the law. In recent years, abuse of the amparos has become a key mechanism of impunity for grave human rights crimes in Guatemala. At any one time, there are thousands of unresolved amparos gumming up the courts and stalling cases.
A second strategy of the defence was to encourage opposition to the trial within Guatemala. This meant that events inside the courtroom were only the tip of the iceberg of a complex political dynamic. Disgruntled military officers and their relatives launched an aggressive campaign to present the trial as destabilizing peace and reconciliation. A shadowy group made up of these Cold War remnants, calling itself the Foundation Against Terrorism (FTC), used intimidation through the media and street protests to recode the trialâs significance back into the regnant militaryâs dominant narrative, accusing prosecutors, witnesses and human rights advocates of being the very âterroristsâ from which the army claimed to have saved the nation during the thirty-six-year war.
As Brett and Burt address in their contributions to this issue, the FTC launched direct personal attacks against Guatemalan Attorney General Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey, as well as against other members of the prosecutorial team, the broader Guatemalan human rights community and international allies. A (pricey) twenty-page insert in the major Guatemalan daily newspapers during the trial, for example, paid for by the FTC, proclaimed the genocide trial a âfarceâ spearheaded by a âMarxist conspiracyâ of âguerrillas turned human rights activistsâ in tandem with âtraitorsâ within the Catholic Church (a reference to the role that progressive Christian activists inspired by Liberation Theology played within the Guatemalan revolutionary movement). Another FTC broadsheet published in the national press, entitled âThe Faces of Infamyâ, was simply a collage of photos of individual prosecutors and activists. This was a chilling echo of the days when death squads ran rampant in Guatemala and often distributed anonymous leaflets with the photos of those about to be targeted for assassination, a history that Vrana outlines in her contribution.
As opinion pieces for and against the genocide trial filled the Guatemalan newspapers, duelling hashtags spread across social media: #sihubogenocidio (Yes, there was genocide) and #nohubogenocidio (No, there wasnât genocide). Similar slogans appeared as graffiti, mainly in the capital but also in some rural areas heavily affected during the war, as the trialâs proponents and opponents took to the streets.
On 10 May 2013, the three-judge panel delivered its verdict to a packed courtroom. The judges found RĂos Montt guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced him to eighty years in prison, the maximum penalty under Guatemalan law. They absolved RodrĂguez SĂĄnchez, rejecting the prosecutionâs claim that military intelligence was part of the operational chain of command. As police led RĂos Montt away to jail, rights activists in the audience erupted into cheers, tears and embraces. âHere, we just want to be humanâ, a lone voice rang out wit...