UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia

Peacekeepers' Views on the Limits and Possibilities of the United Nation in a Civil War-Like Conflict

Wolfgang Biermann, Martin Vadset

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781138387089
• eBook ISBN: 9780429760952
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Internationale Beziehungen

First published in 1998, this volume is a record, both by detailed statistical analysis and by personal account, of lessons learned. These lessons are only useful if they are shared to ensure that they are not relearned the hard way. Any soldier or statesman who is involved in Peacekeeping Operations and anyone involved in the future of peacekeeping in the United Nations would be well advised to use this exceptionally insightful and informative work as one of their essential reference books. It contains a rich store of analysis and sober conclusions that makes it an indispensable guide and should serve as a source of inspiration and reflection, but even more it should serve to provide guidance for future action. Biermann and Vadset have made a major contribution to the analysis of UN field operations and an important source book for the study of UN and NATO operations.

Part One
Introduction

1 About this Book

HÅKAN WIBERG^*

The editors of the present book, Dr Wolfgang Biermann and Lt. Gen. (retd.) Martin Vadset, first met in Bonn in Spring 1993 at an international hearing on the former Yugoslavia.¹ The discussion there on use of force by NATO and the UN revealed a wide gap between the 'cautious' approach common to military officers and the interventionist arguments of several politicians and academics. To put it baldly, the traditional justification for political control over the military was put into question by the heated debate, where 'calm generals' tried to tame 'wild politicians', rather than the other way around. Part of the background for this debate was the vast increase of UN operations after the end of the Cold War – often accompanied by unrealistically high expectations.

Both Biermann and Vadset have a professional background in issues of peace and conflict resolution – the former as an international security adviser to the SPD, the Social Democrat Party of Germany, and the latter as a Norwegian general in several UN peacekeeping operations. This common interest led them to conceive a research project on a key issue concerning UN operations: the applicability and possible modifications of peacekeeping principles, procedures and mediation techniques in the 'new' type of conflicts – civil wars, and especially those with ethnic aspects. In 1994, they received a two-year research grant from COPRI for this project, now named the Danish-Norwegian Research Project (DANORP).

The present book is the main result of this project, studying what peacekeepers perceive as the lessons learned from their experience. While the wars in the former Yugoslavia have served as the main 'area of reference', the book also covers some aspects of peacekeeping in Somalia, Cambodia and the Middle East. It combines different methods of research by collecting and analysing data, including:

• - Open-ended interviews with top-level civilian and military practitioners (Chapters 2 and 3)
• - Two international workshops, held in Oslo in 1995 and in Copenhagen in 1996, where lessons learned were discussed by UNPROFOR commanders (Chapters 4 and 5)
• - A questionnaire survey covering several hundreds of UNPROFOR officers from several countries (Chapter 6).

In addition to the analysis carried out by the two main researchers, a major part of the book (Part Three) provides a forum where prominent military and civilian staff sum up specific lessons learned from the operations in the former Yugoslavia. Their experiences provide a major input into the conceptual discussion of future UN peacekeeping.

This accords with the practical aims of the book. By giving voice to the experiences of leading practitioners, it attempts to bridge a deep gap between abstract models and political ambitions on the one side, and empirical realities on the other. The book is not intended to compete with the mushrooming literature on the former Yugoslavia, which ranges between superb scholarship and partisan calls-to-arms. By focusing on the application of peacekeeping principles in conflicts with elements of civil wars, it aims at supplementing that literature – and having a broader scope than it.

The conceptual point of departure of the book is the evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), as portrayed in An Agenda for Peace of the UN Secretary-General of June 1992 and in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of January 1995.² In the latter work, the Secretary-General re-emphasizes respect for traditional peacekeeping principles as a major key to success in a UN PKO: consent of the parties to the operation, impartiality of the peacekeepers vis-à-vis the parties and the use of force by peacekeepers in self-defence only. These principles are likewise reflected in the NATO doctrine for operations to support the UN, named 'Peace Support Operations'.³

Experience has shown that, to the extent the more 'robust' NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR) has been able to implement its mandate, it has been by behaving much like a traditional PKO, depending on the consent and willingness of the parties to co-operate and comply.

Bluntly put, the policy choices that actors in the international community may wish for political or moral reasons to have when intervening in conflicts with elements of civil war is one thing, but real, feasible options in these situations tend to be far more limited. Identifying criteria of practicability and feasibility for UN mandates is a challenging task, not only for academic research, but also for political and military decision makers who wish to avoid counterproductive actions.

To do precisely this has been the major challenge of the present book: finding ways to utilize and to systematize the accumulated knowledge of UN personnel in order to identify political and operational 'secrets of success' and 'reasons for failure'. The book's combination of quantitative and qualitative methods makes it unique in offering a comprehensive picture, based on solid practical experience, of the challenges peacekeepers face when operating in civil wars and similar conflicts. It provides rich insights in defining 'practicability tests' that should be applied in future both to public demands and proposed mandates for peacekeeping operations.

^* Prof. Håkan Wiberg is Director of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI).

Notes

1 Biermann, Wolfgang (ed.), Internationale Anhörung zur Praxis der UN-Blauhelme, von der Projektgruppe 'Internationale Politik' des SPD-Parteivorstandes am 25. März 1993 in Bonn, Frieden und Abrüstung, Nr. 2/1993 (Juni).

2 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1996', in: An Agenda for Peace, 2nd edition, United Nations: New York, 1995, p. 5ff.

3 Bi-MNC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, 11 December 1995, PfP unclassified, p. 12ff.

2 From Stoltenberg–Owen to Dayton

INTERVIEW WITH THORVALD STOLTENBERG ABOUT PEACEKEEPING PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY^*

WB: Ambassador Stoltenberg, our research project is investigating the viability of UN peacekeeping as a means for the United Nations to intervene in conflicts, demanding co-operation and co-responsibility by the parties involved to solve the conflict. We see peacekeeping as distinct from enforcement. The latter normally requires the intervening force to occupy an area against the will of at least one party and take over full responsibility for imposing a solution on them.

We would like to discuss with you one of the central questions raised in this book: are the three UN principles of peacekeeping – consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force by the peacekeepers other than in self-defence – realistic guidelines for today's peacekeeping operations also under civil war circumstances like those you experienced in the former Yugoslavia? What do these principles mean for a UN mediator? How far were these principles violated? Did they make your work more complicated?

TS: My answer is simple. These key principles were the basis for the UN peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia. The problem was that, more and more, public reaction, public relations, media, and then politicians around the world, pressed for actions by the UN peacekeeping force which were not in accordance with these peacekeeping principles. One of many problems during the whole operation was that the United Nations were constantly criticized for not undertaking offensive military action which the UN did not have a mandate for. The UN peacekeepers, young people, were not sent to Yugoslavia by their families, by their parliaments as combat forces.

I learned when I was young that war is too dangerous to leave to the generals. I tried to live according to that rule when I was Defence Minister. But I must admit I learned in the former Yugoslavia those who really adhered to these principles were not so much the politicians, but definitely the generals. Thanks to the generals, the UN peacekeeping forces lived up to the UN principles.

WB: There were in fact a number of Security Council resolutions with reference to Chapter VII, which you can interpret as not being in accordance with these principles.

TS: This situation shows that the politicians did not take this mandate and its principles the same way the generals on the ground did. And one more 'lesson learned': the fewer people governments had on the ground, the more courageous statements they gave, demanding that 'you must undertake military action'. American and German politicians were in the forefront of demanding more military actions while they had not a single young woman or man as a UN soldier on the ground. The French and the British were called cowards. But they had thousands of their own people there. That's why I hope that, in the future, members of the Security Council will be obliged to provide personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. When you do have personnel on the ground, your statements as a politician are much more balanced and responsible than when you do not have your own people on the ground and can afford 'courage' on behalf of other people, other nations' young people.

WB: What does this mean in the face of the atrocities which took place? The demand to 'do something' – to undertake an offensive enforcement operation – is based on the assumption that you can do something to stop the war, to stop the atrocities. The question is whether this argument is valid, or illusionary?

TS: No, I don't think it's illusionary. But I also don't think it's realistic. Both Lord Owen and myself contacted several governments, and as far as I recall, only the Turks and the Iranians were ready to send combat forces. No other governments were ready to do that, because I think the decision to risk lives is left to national governments – to the nation state – rather than to moral attitudes. We may not like it, but that's the fact.

And then, there is another angle. You can discuss the shift to bombing that eventually came in Autumn 1994. Did it really promote peace? I think that it turned out the wrong way. One consequence was the hostage taking of UN personnel, with another bombing in May 1995 and subsequent hostage taking.

Then, the second step: the next day, representatives of those governments and organizations that had hostages being taken – as far as I recall, 370 hostages – were at the door of President Milosevic, and asked him to help them to get these hostages well-returned. He said he would do his best, but he could not promise success. He managed to get those hostages back. But who was the real winner? Milosevic. He strengthened his position more than ever. And later he was the key player in all subsequent negotiations. But that was not the intent of the bombing.

On the other hand, there is no doubt the Croatian attack on the Serbs in Croatia in Sector West, Krajina, facilitated the negotiations that led up to the Dayton Agreement. The result was a weaker Serb party. That made it easier to get an agreement. Now, you may ask: is this the right way to get peace? And is it right to accept a war to get this peace? This can be discussed as a moral issue, but there is no doubt this made the eventual Dayton Agreement easier to achieve.

Then the third point: what is impartiality? It is not impartiality to massacre, to rape, to take hostages; but it is impartiality aimed at the final peace agreement, because a peace imposed on one of the parties could not be a solid agreement for a lasting peace.

WB: I would agree that peace against one party is not sustainable. But doesn't this contradict what you said earlier about (in my words) the 'peace benefits' of the Croat attack because it helped Dayton. The September '95 bombing of Serb positions is also often argued to be a military contribution to peace. One can also hear the view that, with the Holbrooke Plan, the Serbs had already in August '95 been promised what they wanted: the de facto recognition of Srpska, a Serb w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• About the authors and editors
• Boxes, figures and tables
• List of abbreviations
• Preface and acknowledgements
• Foreword
• Maps
• PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
• PART TWO: FIELD EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
• PART THREE: MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC VIEWS
• PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
• Annex Participants at DANORP UN Commanders' Workshops 1995/1996
• Bibliography