The National Liberation Struggle in South Africa

A Case Study of the United Democratic Front, 1983-87

Gregory F. Houston

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429810718
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1999, this volume follows the interactions between the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had adopted more revolutionary strategies after their banning in 1960, over the period 1983-87. Only a few studies of the UDF have aimed to link revolutionary developments in 1980s South Africa with theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics. This volume focuses on the relation between revolutionary theory, praxis and the formation, aims, policies and practices of the UDF. Houston argues that the formulation of the UDF met certain strategic and tactical requirement of Lenin and Gramsci's theories of revolutionary strategy, repositioning the UDF as becoming a Leninist vanguard party, with its affiliate membership operating largely underground. The volume features 6 detailed maps of the Cape Town area, the Republic of South Africa in the 1980s, the Johannesburg area, the Durban area, the Pretoria area and the Northern Transvaal.

1

Introduction

The banning of the South African black opposition — the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) — in 1960 and the repression of African trade unions thereafter discouraged most forms of African organisation during the 1960s. After they were banned, the ANC and the PAC adopted revolutionary strategies aiming at the radical transformation of South African society through, among other things, armed struggle. The subsequent clampdown on political organisations led to the arrest and imprisonment of some of their leaders, such as Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobukwe. The ANC and the PAC then established missions-in- exile, leaving an organisational vacuum in the country which was partly filled by the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) during the 1970s.

However, the 1976 Soweto revolt and state repression — arrests, detention, torture, trials, and deaths in detention — ultimately led to the destruction of the organisational base of the BCM. At the same time, from the late 1960s, there was a slow revival of African trade unions and emergence of new unions. Most of these unions confined themselves to economic struggles at the place of production and avoided political issues. The late 1970s introduced a revival of black opposition as the popular class struggles evolved from the co-ordinated national mass struggles of the 1950s and early 1960s to one of combined trade union struggles, student struggles and community struggles against apartheid.¹

Popular struggles in the form of strikes and community-based protest developed into a combined assault on the system of domination and exploitation in South Africa. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in August 1983 introduced a new challenge to white minority rule. This organisation provided a national ‘political form’ to popular struggles and filled the institutional vacuum created by the banning of the ANC and PAC, and the destruction of the BCM.

A large number of journal articles, book-chapters and books have been published on the UDF and township politics during the 1980s. However, most studies of the UDF tend to focus on the formation, structure, strategies and policies, leadership and membership, and activities of the United Front without relating these to theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics or to the development of revolutionary strategy in South Africa (Barrell, 1984; Collinge, 1986; De la Harpe and Manson, 1983; Lodge and Nasson, 1991; Marx, 1992; Murray, 1987).

Firstly, only a few studies of the UDF attempt to draw a link between revolutionary developments within South Africa during the 1980s and theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics. For example, Karl von Holdt (1990) argued that the period of the 1980s was a ‘concrete elaboration in practice, of Gramsci’s schematic concept of war of position’. This strategy, according to Von Holdt, involved a struggle ‘to establish ideological and organisational leadership in institutions of civil society’ by ‘building a broader and broader alliance in opposition to the ruling class, and seeking to establish the leadership of the working class party over this alliance’.

Von Holdt argues that this strategy involved: the creation of powerful, militant mass organisations in the townships, factories and schools, with the aim of constantly challenging oppression and exploitation, and building people’s power; establishing a multi-class, non-racial united front under the hegemony of the ANC; extending the influence of the front into many spheres, such as sports, culture, education, etc.; building an even broader anti-apartheid alliance in order to isolate and weaken the regime; and encouraging divisions in the ruling bloc.

Similarly, Mark Orkin (1995, pp. 533-4) pointed out that the UDF strategy conformed to three of Gramsci’s central requirements for a revolutionary movement in its struggle for hegemony. These are the need ‘to begin with the concrete particulars of people’s everyday lives’ (which was done by focusing on rent and education issues), the need to be ‘prepared to seek durable alliances that transcend a class base’ (which the UDF did by gathering organisations ‘under the broad Charterist rubric of non-racial democracy’), and the need to ‘transform the particular, often economic, demands of interest groups into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant system’ (which the UDF did in its popular campaigns which ‘systematically sought to unite participants in the expression of national political demands’). Orkin adds, however, that the UDF fell short of the Gramscian model in its declining phase. In this view, under state repression, the UDF failed to conform to Gramsci’s model of mass politics when it was forced to change in its operations from a mass movement to a party.

Neither of these authors set out to prove their arguments through a detailed analysis of black opposition politics in the 1980s. The central problem investigated in this study is the relation between revolutionary theory and praxis, and the formation, aims, policies and practices of the UDF. It is argued that the formation of the UDF and revolutionary developments thereafter met certain strategic and tactical requirements of Lenin and Gramsci’s theories of revolutionary strategy. This poses serious questions about the theoretical basis and main elements of the united-front strategy, the relationship between Lenin and Gramsci’s theories of revolutionary strategy and tactics and the strategy and tactics of the ANC-led alliance, and the relationship between revolutionary strategy and tactics and opposition politics in the country during the 1980s.

It is argued that the formation of the UDF, and revolutionary developments thereafter, conformed to the strategic and tactical requirements of a Leninist/Gramscian model of revolutionary praxis in the following way: the general drive to establish mass-based community organisations (increasing the complexity of civil society by establishing mass organisations); the formation of the UDF (creating a historical bloc in opposition to the ruling bloc during the phase of democratic struggle); and the development and spread of a common national political culture leading to a universalistic political challenge of the apartheid system (the expansion and spread of revolutionary consciousness).

Secondly, most studies of the UDF viewed the Front as a protest movement which arose purely in response to internal material and political grievances, or in response to an externally-led conspiracy. The former approach focuses on the material and political grievances which gave rise to mass mobilisation and protest while ignoring the relationship between the intentions and activities of the ANC-led revolutionary alliance, and mass protest and organisation. In other words, this approach underplays the role of the revolutionary strategy and tactics of the ANC-led alliance in the formation, nature, and activities of the UDF and its affiliates. The latter approach focuses on the link between ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) publications in which they called for mass protest, the formation of township organisations, ungovernability and the establishment of ‘people’s power’ (Seekings, 1991, pp. 296-7), and the activities of the UDF and community organisations within the country. This approach reduces internal political protest to an externally led conspiracy without taking into account the material and political grievances, which gave, rise to mass organisation and protest.

However, Mike Hough (1989, pp. 389-410), in an analysis of township revolt between 1984 and 1988, identifies the factors underlying unrest as political and socio-economic factors as well as the attempts by the ANC/SACP alliance to ‘integrate unrest as part of the revolutionary process’. For Hough, ‘it would be futile to diagnose the present unrest in South Africa only as a well co-ordinated attempt to create ungovernability and chaos in the townships’. Instead, ‘it is important to analyse township conditions within the wider structure of South African society’. Hough proceeds to list a number of political and socio-economic conditions including unemployment, the educational system, economic recession and inflation, mobilisation by activists in political organisations, feelings of relative deprivation, overcrowding in townships, opposition to local authorities, inadequate policing, urban reforms, rapid urbanisation, etc.

On the other hand, the government and its partners tended to view the UDF as a front for the banned ANC. In this view, the two organisations had the same revolutionary objectives. The government, senior security force officers, and leaders of Indian and coloured political parties participating in the apartheid government and Inkatha’s Chief Buthelezi made such accusations.²

Douglas McClure (1989, pp. 411-35) argued that the township revolt of the mid-1980s can be traced to the attempts of the ANC/SACP alliance to reconstitute itself within the country. According to McClure this was done by targeting, penetrating and manipulating ‘a well-developed series of front groups and individuals’. McClure gives the impression that community organisations were manipulated by the revolutionary alliance and that township revolt became highly organised and co-ordinated from mid-1985. According to McClure, the UDF was ‘invented’ to give co-ordination to the various ‘front groups’. He draws attention to the close ties in leadership, symbols and political slogans of the internal and external groupings.

Finally, Howard Barrell (1990) investigates the relationship between changes in the strategy and tactics of the ANC-led revolutionary alliance during the late 1970s and the formation of the UDF. In this view, the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary alliance were among the most important factors underlying the formation of the UDF and the events of the 1980s.

This study combines these approaches by looking at the role of the strategy and tactics of the ANC-led alliance as well as material and political grievances in generating popular protest and organisation to explain the emergence, nature, role and activities of the UDF and its affiliates. It is argued that these two elements were the main factors underlying revolutionary developments during the 1980s.

The UDF was an alliance of a broad range of autonomous organisations of differing class origins and with differing political and ideological agendas which came together having identified a common cause — opposition to the apartheid system of domination and exploitation. The investigation of the relation between revolutionary theory and praxis, and the emergence and proliferation of community organisations poses another set of questions. More particularly, what was the role played by community organisations in the struggle against apartheid?

The emphasis in Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ on the importance of the political and ideological struggle to promote and expand revolutionary consciousness sets it apart from other models of revolutionary strategy and reflects the most significant achievement of popular resistance during the 1980s. It is argued that the UDF-led opposition to apartheid resulted in the organisational and ideological penetration of the Front into virtually every sector of black civil society. The major forces behind the increasing political and ideological leadership of the UDF were the affiliated student and youth organisations, trade unions, civic associations, and women’s organisations. These organisations played a central role in mass mobilisation and organisation as well as the spread of revolutionary consciousness throughout black civil society.

Here the stress is on: mobilising and organising people around the concrete particulars of their everyday lives (rent increases, bus-fare increases, education issues, women’s issues, etc.); uniting the separate currents of protest into a single stream; and, most importantly, transforming the ‘particular, often economic, demands of interest groups into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant system’. This results in the spread of a revolutionary consciousness.

The people’s war strategy of the ANC-led revolutionary alliance also focused attention on the mobilisation and organisation of the working class, women, the rural masses, and the youth and students, and the formation of civic organisations.³ The objective was to mobilise various forces in the country to participate in the liberation struggle.

It becomes important, then, to examine how revolutionary consciousness was promoted and expanded, leading to the increasing participation of various forces in the liberation struggle. One way of approaching this is to look at the history of selected affiliates of the UDF. Here the focus is on their formation and structures, principles and objectives, and membership and activities, and changes in these in order to demonstrate the shift towards the UDF. Another aspect of this approach is to look at the role they played in achieving both mass mobilisation and organisation, and the spread of revolutionary consciousness (in particular, the mobilisation of people to actively resist apartheid). It is here that the analysis of the history of these organisations demonstrates the manner in which the masses were mobilised and organised to actively resist apartheid, resulting in a universalistic political challenge of the apartheid system.

It is argued, firstly, that some community organisations experienced significant changes in their structures, leadership and membership, aims and objectives, and in their strategies and activities. These changes demonstrated a marked shift towards (and led to their affiliation with) the UDF. They subsequently adopted the strategies and tactics of the UDF political tradition, leading to the transformation of their activities into a political challenge of the apartheid system. The shift towards the UDF was also apparent in the mobilisation and organisation of people in many parts of the country through newly formed UDF-aligned organisations.

Secondly, these organisations played a hegemony-building role by promoting mass mobilisation and organisation, and developing and facilitating the spread of a national political culture based on resistance to white minority rule. Thus, it is through these organisations that the particular, often economic, demands of interest groups were transformed into a universalistic political challenge of the dominant apartheid system.

Although it is difficult to estimate the extent of politicisation achieved through these organisations, the aim is to demonstrate that these organisations mobilised and organised large sectors of black civil society and were able to draw people into a highly politicised challenge against the apartheid system. This analysis also reveals the type of democratic organisations, which were emerging during the course of the struggle: their structures, membership and practices.

The UDF only formally disbanded in 1991. The period 1983-87 was chosen because it represents a period of the most heightened activity of the UDF at local, regional and national levels. By the end of 1987 many UDF affiliates had been weakened by repression during the state of emergency and large numbers of UDF leaders remained in detention throughout 1988. The momentum of local resistance diminished once local organisations were crushed. Thus, the period from 1988 provides relatively little insight into the activities of local affiliates of the Front.

In addition, on February 22, 1988 the government imposed restrictions on 18 organisations, including the UDF and 14 of its affiliates. These organisations were prohibited from engaging in a wide range of political activities such as encouraging boycott campaigns and could only act to preserve their assets, perform certain administrative duties or take legal advice or judicial steps. The UDF underwent a revival in 1989 when it joined with COSATU (in the Mass Democratic Movement — MDM) civil disobedience campaign against government-controlled hospitals and schools. However, the emphasis was on national campaigns of the MDM (with the main organisational base provided by trade unions) rather than on actions which involved local UDF affiliates.

More important, however, was the effect of state repression on the structure and activities of the UDF. Firstly, it resulted in the transformation of the Front from a mass organisation to a political party. The detention of leaders, mass arrests, the banning of meetings, etc., resulted in the centralisation of decision making and the transformation of the UDF into a vanguard party. Secondly, state repression and counter-mobilisation resulted in the virtual destruction of local affiliates and forced many UDF activities underground. These changes brought to an end the period of resistance which corresponded to the Leninist/Gramscian model of revolutionary strategy and tactics. Instead, the UDF became a Leninist vanguard party, with its affiliate membership operating largely underground.

Notes

1 Popular class struggles are defined as all those struggles which challenge the structure of racial and capitalist exploitation and domination. National mass struggles are defined as all those struggles which involve the masses on a national scale and which challenge the structure of apartheid and economic exploitation and political domination.

2 See, for example, South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), (1984), Survey of Race Relations, p. 20. (Hereafter Survey of Race Relations), State vs Ramgobin and others, State vs Mayekiso and others ‘Buthelezi hits out at UDF for “Media politics”, Rand Daily Mail, 22 October 1984.

3 The focus here is not on the question of whether or not these organisations had a conscious intent upon following ANC strategy, nor the extent of ANC influence over and/or participation in the formation, nature and activities of these organisations. Rather, it is on the extent to which they acquired a revolutionary consciousness.

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The United Front and Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics in South Africa

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first focuses on the unite...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations and Glossary
• Maps
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The United Front and Revolutionary Strategy and Tactics in South Africa
• 3 Popular Struggles and the Growth of Community Organisations, 1960 to 1983
• 4 The Formation, Policies and Aims, and Strategy and Tactics of the United Democratic Front
• 5 Membership of the United Democratic Front
• 6 Student and Youth Organisations
• 7 Trade Union Organisations
• 8 Civic Organisations
• 9 Women’s Organisations
• 10 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index