Lobbying in the European Commission

The case of air transport

Dinos Kyrou

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429805073
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 2000, this volume examines the role of industry representation in the EU in the case of the air transport industry. Air transport has contributed to areas including member state interdependence, national defence in foreign policy considerations and national identity in terms of 'flag carrier' airlines. Dinos Kyrou looks at specific case studies concerning aspects of integration of the air transport sector within the European Union. These case studies – an examination of a European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive and the attempt by the Commission to formulate a Proposal for a Council Regulation – are stages in the process of policy formulation which are aimed at enhancing the liberalisation which was completed de jure in 1992. In both cases, the increasing prominence of the Competition Directorate of the European Commission (DGIV) has been evident. Kyrou's question is whether this reflects a restoration or a creation of pride and self.

1 The Theoretical and Historical Considerations of Interest Representation

This Chapter is divided into three Sections.

Section 1 will review the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism. This is in order that a modified version of the theory, neo-liberal intergovernmentalism, can be applied to the workings of the European Commission in the case studies of the formulation of a Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on airport ground-handling, and the attempted formulation of a Commission Proposal on slot-allocation. These case studies are, essentially, examinations of elite and non-elite air transport interest representation. Section 1 also examines ‘two level game theory’, ‘elite accommodation theory’, and ‘reverse state strength’ theory, all of which are applied to the two case studies.

Section 2 will establish working definitions of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ interests. Such definitions are necessary for accurate examinations of the relative successes of elite and non-elite air transport interests. Subsequently, Sections 1 and 2 set out the background for the application of Hypothesis Number 1.

Section 3 on the other hand examines theories of interest group decision making to provide the background to Hypothesis Number 2. Primarily, this section examines the theory that elites may not only dominate policy formulation within the state, but may also dominate the behaviour and actions of interest groups. Section 3 also examines how elite interests may manipulate interest group representation for their own advantage. Such ‘interest group manipulation’ features prominently in the examined case studies.

1. Liberal intergovernmentalism - extending the boundaries of intergovernmentalism

As discussed in the Introduction, liberal intergovernmentalism incorporates aspects of neo-functionalism. Neo-functionalists maintain that states can no longer be considered to be the central actors in the international system. Furthermore, trans-national policy making bodies, such as the European Commission and European Parliament, have shifted the focus of decision making away from individual states. Subsequently, states are no longer seen to be some form of ultimate policy making unit (Haas, 1961, pp.366-392; 1971, p.6; Nye, 1968; Puchala, 1972, pp.267-285; Schmitter and Streeck, 1994, pp. 169-187). Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), at the Council of Ministers is an example of the diminishing power of the state. As Sbragia argues:

With QMV each state needs to search for allies, whether or not it likes the Commission’s Proposals....The Member-States, as a collectivity, are still central to the decision-making process, but not all the states will necessarily be central all the time. The veto made each one central, while the use of majorities changes the focus to coalitions and away from states acting individually.¹

On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism ascertains that it is the ‘elite actors’ within a state which substantially influence a state’s position on a particular issue. The state subsequently represents the elite actors at the inter-state, or (as in the case of the EU), the inter-Member State level.

Moravcsik argues that whilst the state is of prime importance in international negotiations, it is the domestic interests within the state that influence its negotiating position. Liberal intergovernmentalism encapsulates both ‘national preference’ theories (which originate in the intergovernmentalist school), and interdependence theories (which originate in the functionalist / neo-functionalist school).²

Interstate policy goals are defined by domestic criteria and are a response to shifting pressures from domestic societal groups whose preferences are channelled through political institutions. The key determinants of the goals of the state are the identity of its important societal groups (or ‘elite’ interests), the nature of their interests and their

relative influence on domestic policy, argues Moravcsik.³ For example, in the course of the bargaining that led to the Single European Act, Member Sates formulated their approach according to their own domestic policy concerns. The net result was a ‘trade off of preferences between the Member States, as they attempted to satisfy their own domestic interests.⁴

‘Two level game ‘ theory

Like Moravcsik, Putnam claims that it is the domestic interests that influence a state’s position on a particular issue, as domestic interests must be appeased for a government to retain political power.

At the international level, governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign policy developments.⁵

However, Putnam also promotes the theory that inter-state negotiation is a ‘two level game’. Level 1 is the negotiation between states on a particular issue, for example, the negotiation between the Member States of the European Union on air transport. Level 2 is the contact between the state and its domestic interests concerning the particular issue, for example between the French government and Air France.

Therefore, the domestic game (Level 2), may determine the range of possible agreements between states that can be ratified; this is described by Putnam as a ‘win set’. Level 2 can also be utilised by the state in order to achieve the desired outcome at Level 1, often by the ‘controlled exchange of partial information’. Subsequently, domestic pressures (Level 2 pressures), may well be ‘exaggerated’ by the state (acting at Level 1), in order to accomplish this.⁶

‘Elite accommodation ‘ theory

Hix argues that a ‘cartel of elites’ exists in Member States, where certain actors maintain an increased importance in relation to other actors. A government must satisfy this cartel if it is to maintain its own political survival. Such a situation is described as an ‘elite accommodation’; the views of the elites carry a far higher proportion of influence than those outside this cartel.⁷ Hix also argues that comparative politics present the most relevant framework for the study of EU politics and bargain making, as opposed to ‘traditional international relations approaches’.⁸ Hix criticises integration theories for their concentration on the ‘formality and objectivity of integration’ (such as EC law), and states that comparisons should be made with models of domestic government. Hix argues that the political relevance of an issue (i.e. the possible effect a particular policy may have on the popularity of the Member States’ governments), presents a more accurate indicator of EC policy making, than what may be generally considered to be in the ‘national interests’ of Member States.⁹

Reverse, ‘state strength ‘, negotiation theory

Huelshoff argues that interests can be ‘Co-operative’, or ‘Competitive’ in a policy area.¹⁰ The former category, as the terminology indicates, are interests that are co-operative in that their views do not oppose one another. However, the interests may not necessarily be ‘working together’. For example, the views of British Airways and the major UK airport operator, BAA, on ‘slot-allocation’ are very similar. Therefore the two firms are Cooperative despite the fact they may not be jointly presenting their views to policy formulators. However, the views of London City Airport and British Airways on slot-allocation are diametrically opposite; therefore, their interests are Competitive.¹¹ In Chapter 5 we find that the German airport interests in regard to the issue of ground-handling were highly Cooperative, giving them a particular advantage in negotiations.

Whether interests are Co-operative or Competitive plays a deterministic role on the amount of effective pressure that they can apply to their government. Co-operative interest representation results in the state being in an increased position of vulnerability at the domestic level. This domestic vulnerability is reversed into strength at the inter-state level of negotiation, as the state has less ‘room for manoeuvre’. The weakness of the state domestically (because of the strong position of Co-operative interests), results in a reduced amount of flexibility for the state when in inter-state negotiations. Subsequently, the state becomes ‘locked’ into a position (resulting from the relatively strong domestic interest representation), and cannot easily alter its bargaining position. Conversely, if its domestic interests are Competitive, the state will be less vulnerable at the national level. However, at the inter-state level the state will have greater flexibility in its negotiations. This flexibility results in the state being in a weaker position in relation to the other states.

There also exist additional factors which may influence a state’s weaknesses or strengths in inter-state policy negotiation, argues Huelshoff.¹² States with centralised institutions and majority governments are characterised as strong states at the national level. States that are federations, those with a tradition of an independent judiciary and minority governments are categorised as weak at the national level. Because of their respective institutional compositions, weak states are more vulnerable than strong states to influence from their domestic interests. As a result, weak states are usually in a relatively stronger bargaining position at the Council of Ministers than states that are strong at the domestic level.¹³ Utilising Huelshoff s definition, the UK is classified as a strong state (in relation to interest groups), whilst Germany (a federation), is weaker in its relationship with interest groups. If correct, it would be the case that at the Council of Ministers the UK is in a relatively weak position to make its wishes prevail than Germany (as the bargaining strength is reversed at the inter-Member State level).¹⁴

Table 1.1 Summary of Huelshoff s theory

Domestic Interests		Domestic Government	Negotiating Position of State
Co-operative	⇒	Weak ⇒	Strong
Co-operative	⇒	Strong ⇒	Moderate
Competitive	⇒	Weak ⇒	Moderate
Competitive	⇒	Strong ⇒	Weak

Summary of liberal intergovernmentalist arguments

The liberal intergovernmentalist argues that an EU Member State’s, bargaining behaviour changes according to the perceived result of accommodating various domestic interests. This suggests a more complex and dynamic set of political benefit / cost calculations than has traditionally been considered. Lindberg’s assertion, ‘getting the politics right may take precedence over getting the economics right’,¹⁵ may result in a situation where state policy formulation is largely a political calculation. The above theories are based upon the assumption that domestic policy is of prime importance in the formulation of EC policy. Subsequently, the theories are a challenge to the neo-functionalist tradition. However, the examinations in which Moravcsik defined liberal intergovernmentalism were examinations of inter-Member State negotiations leading to the formulation of the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union.¹⁶ Both pieces of policy formulation required unanimity by the Member States of the EU. Moravcsik has not necessarily shown whether his theory would work in a Qualified Majority Vote situation.

The case studies contained within this book attempt to ascertain if the liberal intergovernmentalism described by Moravcsik is applicable to policy Proposals that were, and are, ultimately to be decided by Qualified Majority Vote. The case studies also reflect upon elite accommodation and differing effects of Co-operative and Competitive interests. In sum, the key test is whether the properties that comprise liberal intergovernmentalism extend to the actions of the European Commission, in a neo-liberal intergovernmentalism form.

2. Elite and non-elite interests

Domestically, firms strive to achieve a situation where business risk and uncertainty are reduced by the establishment of a relationship with the policy formulator.¹⁷ This ‘traditional national approach’ is thought to have provided effective access, via the host state, to the Council of Ministers for the formulation of EC legislation (Greenwood, Grote, Ronit, 1992, p.8).¹⁸ Certain firms have been relatively successful in establishing such relationships with policy formulators in order to reduce business uncertainty. Such firms are described by Moravcsik et al as ‘elites’. However, although hypothesising on the role of eli...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Abbreviations
• Preface & Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The Theoretical and Historical Considerations of Interest Representation
• 2 The Changes to Treaty Provisions and the Development of DGIV
• 3 The Legislative Background to EU Air Transport Policy
• 4 EU Air Transport Interest Groups
• 5 The Positions of the Interest Groups
• 6 Commission Response to the Interest Representation of the Air Transport Industry
• Conclusion
• Bibliography