1 Social Fragmentation, Social Exclusion, and Urban Governance: An Introduction
HANS THOR ANDERSEN AND RONALD VAN KEMPEN
Introduction
Current waves of social transformation have produced greater inequality, not only socially, but also spatially. In many Western European cities, spatial divisions between the rich and the poor, between nationals and immigrants (and their descendants), between those 'excluded' and those 'included' are now on top of the policy agenda. In many cities, the processes dividing these groups continue, resulting in an increasing segregation index or at least in figures that do not decline (see, e.g., Musterd et al., 1998; Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1998). Segregation shows up in new and sometimes growing concentrations of deprived groups in specific neighbourhoods.
In the past, the very existence of deprived groups was seen as a consequence of economic cycles and was linked to unemployment. Nowadays, deprivation is often explained in terms of 'exclusion' and 'marginalization'. Society is becoming fragmented. The fault line runs between the employed, educated and well-paid middle class, on the one hand, and a number of socially marginalized groups - among them the long-term unemployed, immigrants (primarily from Third-World countries) and single mothers. These marginalized groups tend to concentrate in certain inner-city districts and/or housing estates on the urban fringe. Although the European situation is not (yet) comparable to the American setting, deprived neighbourhoods are a reality in Europe. (See, among many others, Kesteloot (2000) for Belgium; Kovacs (1998) for Hungary; Giffinger (1998) for Austria; Friedrichs (1998a) for Germany; Social-departementet (1998) for Sweden; Madanipour et al. (1998); and Khakee et al. (1999).)
The division of cities into areas of included and excluded citizens is the essential element in the concept of 'the dual city' (cf. Castells and Mollenkopf, 1991). It is the keystone of the growing literature on segregation in cities, its causes and its consequences (Fainstein et al., 1992; O'Loughlin and Friedrichs, 1996; Musterd and Ostendorf, 1998; Van Kempen and Özüekren, 1998; Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000). New forms of political action that involve a wider range of actors - public authorities, associations, private business and citizens - have emerged to deal with the problems resulting from these patterns of fragmentation. The new modes of urban policy are often placed under the heading of urban governance. That term suggests a broader-based involvement of relevant partners. It implies inclusion of local public authorities (government) as well as actors representing private business and voluntary organizations. In general, governance is assumed to be a more efficient way of tackling multiple social problems at the scale of an individual city.
How to explain the process of urban segregation? Its antecedents lie in the intricate interaction between the preferences and constraints of individual households, the supply of dwellings within neighbourhoods, cities and regions, and the formal and informal allocation models. But identifying the root cause does not explain the way this process has branched out. More than ever, broad social, economic, demographic, cultural and political developments seem to contribute to segregation processes. Among these macro-level developments (or megatrends), globalization stands out as the main influence on urban development, spatial configurations and city life.
Globalization is a blanket concept. It covers economic restructuring, social transformation, movement of capital and people, and new values and norms that spread around the world. Specifically, the emergence of a global market, the shifting location of production and services (including the diffusion of the new information technology), and the consequent social gains and damages are generally seen as the basic components of the concept. Indeed, they are seen as important causes of the present thrust toward urban transformation.
Probably, the most important aspect of globalization is the current compression of time and space. Capital has become so mobile, it is almost non-territorial, allowing its handlers to exploit the most suitable mix of cost and opportunities wherever they are (Beauregard and Haila, 2000). The liberalization of finance and trade have made production capital footloose, which has encouraged the further deregulation of the market despite its social costs (Harvey, 1989; Bauman, 1998). In its more 'pure' or orthodox versions, globalization would entail the removal of minimum wages, labour safety, security standards and the like, in order to free firms from additional costs and thus make them more competitive. This has, of course, a tremendous impact on welfare distribution. Income inequality will rise sharply in many cities as public welfare services are reduced. This neo-liberal version, hitherto the predominant one, has been characterized as 'primitive globalization' (Sites, 2000).
Perhaps globalization can best be understood as a set of ideas and processes (Kelly, 1999; Short and Kim, 1999) that transform the nature, extent and intensity of social interaction on a global scale but also within countries, cities and even neighbourhoods. These transformations almost inevitably lead to conflicts. As will be argued in chapter 2, the overriding issue in West European urban politics is how to maintain the delicate balance between economic competitiveness and social cohesion. This question of balance and the need to find a new political formula to bridge the gap between economic development and social well-being form the point of departure for the chapters in this volume. Any economic changes will have geographical and social repercussions, including implications for the terms and conditions of politics. The social changes that have taken place throughout the 1990s may well seem to be dramatic and to play a decisive role in modern history.
However, they are not without their predecessors. During the last two centuries, Europe has undergone several structural changes: the first round of industrialization in the 19th century; the shift from heavy manufacturing, such as steel and coal, to light manufacturing; the growth of the service sector; the increasing role of the computer in manufacturing and other industries; and lately a massive process of de-industrialization, complemented by an enormous expansion of public services, research activities, the culture industry, the media and the communication business. Each of these changes produced new forms of social institutions and relations. Consequently, Europe is now faced with the residualization of social housing, the privatization of former public services, and the decline of public welfare provisions and schemes for early retirement.
Cities have always had their problems, of course. Many of their problems have to do with poor economic performance (relative to the rest of the country or the metropolitan region), concentration of unemployment - especially of the long-term unemployed -, traffic congestion and accessibility bottlenecks, environmental degradation (pollution of air, ground and water), a deteriorating housing stock, crime and safety concerns, and concentrations of marginalized groups. These problems have been and still are concentrated in specific parts of a city.
Recent unfavourable developments in Western European cities with respect to social transformations were set off by a series of economic restructuring interventions in manufacturing and the services in the early 1970s. In just over a decade, West European cities lost a major share of their employment in heavy industry; this was followed by a swift transformation of service-related industries. As a consequence, most cities have passed through a frenetic phase of functional transformation, particularly of their core and inner-city areas, but the changes have also affected suburban areas.
Coinciding with changes in the labour market, the urban transformation has led to rising levels of segregation and concentration among vulnerable groups. Hence, different social groups are separated not only spatially, but according to living standards, life experiences, and expectations. Marginalized groups are concentrated on large estates at the edge of the city and in poor-quality housing in certain inner-city areas. They are isolated from other social groups. There is reason to believe that their relations with other groups will turn into separate visions and images of the locality and society in general (Goldsmith, 2000).
As mentioned above, the changes are not due to just one factor, although globalization is sometimes singled out as the overall cause. The demographic changes - more elderly persons, fewer children and young people, more ethnic diversity - in combination with rising levels of affluence and changes in rates of labour-market participation have widened the gap between family households with two incomes and single households without any income. The industrial restructuring and the associated different adjustment in the required qualifications for employees has led to further differentiation, both in welfare conditions and in wages. The elimination of many unskilled jobs during the last two decades is one of the most painful results. All in all, these changes appear to have led to more inequality in cities, particularly when studied in a spatial perspective, which puts the trend toward more segregation in the spotlight.
The existence of megatrends is undeniable, but their direct effects are sometimes hard to trace. Moreover, their impact will differ between locations. Globalization is a case in point. Its effects on social exclusion and social fragmentation, for example, may be different in different places and for different categories of people. For one thing, the influence of globalization on exclusion and fragmentation depends on the economic structure of the city and its region (economies that are more locally oriented are less influenced). It depends on the role of the state (if the state is still influential, it is less affected by outside forces). And it depends on the skills of individuals living in the area (those who can adapt easily to the demands of new jobs and employers are less vulnerable). Any generalizations from megatrends to individual behaviour and attitudes should be scrutinized carefully (see also Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000).
This also implies that cities can do something about their situation. They should not be seen as puppets dancing to the tune of outside forces, like globalization, European policies, and all kinds of economic, demographic, social, technological and political developments (cf. Beauregard and Haila, 2000). Local policy can make the difference between success or failure (see also Chesire, 1999).
The important question is: How should cities act? Porter (1998; cited in Begg, 1999) states that old distinctions between laissez-faire and intervention are obsolete. Laissez-faire does not exist any more, at least not in the Western world. Local governments should act. They should do something to make city life not only bearable but even attractive to residents and companies alike. Duffy (1995) states that policy should provide the building blocks with which the business sector can build. And when business flourishes, employment rises - and urban problems may decline.
Perhaps, the biggest challenge is to formulate policies that foster increasing productivity, that give a city a competitive edge, but at the same time devote attention to social and environmental issues. Fighting social exclusion, preventing social fragmentation, and promoting social cohesion may be as important as attracting new employment opportunities to the cities (see chapter 8 by Friedrichs in this volume). In numerous urban policy initiatives around the world, the ambition to integrate economic, ecological, and social aspects is explicit.
The form of the policy is no less important. It is increasingly clear that the role of central and local governments is declining or at least changing. It is becoming more normal to establish coalitions between different parties, not only between different tiers of government but also between government, the private sector, and voluntary associations. This devolution of power is partly the result of a general tendency among Western European welfare states to step back. But it may also be a consequence of the idea that too much top-down government is not good for a city. Those who are directly involved should be heard. They should actively participate in formulating ideas and carrying out new policies. Urban governance is the new catchword, signifying a new way of governing. Governance distinguishes itself from traditional forms of government by including actors not only from the public sector, but also from the private and the voluntary sectors. The actors are engaged in partnerships and other kinds of networks that are more or less autonomous with respect to the state. The partners are willing to get involved because they think that they will maximize their benefits individually as well as collectively.
The Aim of the Book
This book is not about all of the urban problems in Western Europe. Rather, it highlights a number of issues detectable in our cities that are related to the general problems of social fragmentation, social cohesion, and social exclusion. Furthermore, the chapters in this book consider whether or not policy, and especially policy developed under the new forms of governance, can be expected to solve these problems.
More specifically, we are searching for answers to the following questions:
- How are social fragmentation, social cohesion, social exclusion, and urban governance theoretically linked to each other?
- What are the essential characteristics of social exclusion, and what are its causes?
- Which role can urban governance play in combating social exclusion and social fragmentation? Under which circumstances can urban governance replace or complement existing local government? Which role could partnerships play here? Which groups stand to profit from new forms of governance and which do not?
- How can aspects of social exclusion and social fragmentation be mapped in different European cities? Which processes of spatial segregation occur in different places?
- What kinds of policy are implemented in order to combat social exclusion and social fragmentation in different European cities?
- How successful are these policies? Should they be targeted to specific groups or limited areas?
- What can be said about the future with regard to social fragmentation, exclusion, and cohesion? What will be the role of urban governance? Specifically, can (new) forms of governance foster social cohesion?
The Organization of the Book
Most of the chapters in this book do not focus on only one of the questions mentioned above. Instead, they consider the relations between one or several of these questions, linking them to the ongoing discussions of social change and new forms of urban governance. The identification of theoretical and empirical relations between social fragmentation, social exclusion and urban governance is the central theme running through the book (see chapter 2). Closely associated with this theme is, of course, the desire to find out which kinds of partnerships (as a specific form of governance) have proved to be successful and to discover if deprived ne...