Environmental Human Rights

Power, Ethics and Law

Jan Hancock

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781138722422
• eBook ISBN: 9781351758390
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2003. Environmental Human Rights redefines the political, ethical and legal relationships between the environment and human rights to claim the human rights to an environment free from toxic pollution and to natural resources. Through a focus on the operational dynamics of social power, this compelling book details how global capitalism subjugates concerns of human security and environmental protection to the values of allocative efficiency and economic growth. The capacity of social power to construct ethical norms and to determine the efficacy of law is examined to explain how ethical and legal concepts have been selectively applied to accommodate existing patterns of production, consumption and exchange that cause environmental degradation and human rights violations. By looking at how environmental values have been systematically excluded from the human rights discourse, the book claims that human rights politics and law has been constructed on double standards to accommodate the destructive forces of capitalism.

Chapter 1
Rationality, Epistemology and Environmental Human Rights

Capitalism has been the expression of economic rationality finally set free of all restraint.

-Andre Gorz

Introduction

Different forms of rationality are analyzed in this chapter since these constitute the epistemological frameworks within which all political claims are evaluated, including claims to environmental human rights. The singular faculty of reason is thereby differentiated from plural conceptualizations of rationality. In particular, this chapter juxtaposes ecological with economic rationality to illustrate (i) that the criterion constituting what is deemed rational is fundamentally disputed rather than being universally accepted and (ii) how the particular epistemological assumptions of the analyst either justifies or rejects the existence of environmental human rights. Whereas ecological rationality will be argued to approve of the human rights to an environment free of toxic pollution and to environmental resources, the logic of economic rationality will be demonstrated to reject these same rights.

Attention then turns to examine the process by which specific forms of rationality become dominant or subjugated in society. Specifically, the dominance of a form of rationality is argued to be a function of power relations. Power operates in part through the normalization, legitimization and institutionalization of the interests of powerful social groups in political and economic structures (Schaap, 2000). The dominance of economic rationality in world politics will be argued to normalize the systematic violation of the claimed environmental human rights. Corporations and the beneficiaries of global capitalism will be identified as constituting the powerful social group whose commercial interests are served by current patterns of environmental human rights violations. This conclusion is made through a method of analyzing trends in corporate production techniques and lobbying records that provides evidence for both the continued tolerance of toxic pollution and unregulated access to natural resources.

The Philosophy of Human Rights

The question ‘are environmental human rights justifiable in political philosophy?’ can be answered either affirmatively or negatively, depending upon the epistemological position adopted by the analyst. For example, basic rights theorists such as Shue, Vincent and Galtung justify human rights in terms of the conditions required for biological survival (Shue, 1980; Vincent, 1986; Galtung, 1994). From this basis, there is a logical compulsion to recognize environmental conditions as a component of human rights. Galtung acknowledges this claim in explaining that ‘there is a high need for livelihood, for which an ecologically stable environment with a high level of biodiversity is a necessary condition’ (Galtung, 1994).

The notion that all humans have rights to the requirements of survival has been questioned by negative rights theorists who argue, typically on the basis of liberal political theory, that human rights must instead reflect autonomy values, allowing the individual to be free of interference from others. Ingram typifies this approach with the claim that ‘the best scheme of rights, is one that protects the autonomy interests of citizens’ (Ingram, 1994). This approach views the arbitrary interference with the individual by a third party as a violation of the rights of that individual since the individual is considered to be the subject, source and the object of ethical considerations. Forms of social relations must therefore be consented to by individuals, or else will constitute arbitrariness and an unjust intervention of privacy and personal rights to liberty, with liberty being defined in terms of autonomy (Cranston, 1967; Hart, 1984; Merrills, 1996).

Numerous other methods of conceptualizing human rights have been suggested. Campbell for example defines rights in terms of contract, power and interest theories (Campbell, 1983). Some political analysts question the existence of any human rights because rights are seen as culturally specific and socially constructed rather than universal in character (Kausican, 1993). Marxists typically deny that human nature can be identified and abstracted into a universal or essential form since human nature is instead perceived as a structural function of historical processes and social conditioning (McLellan, 1977). A notion of rights derived solely from the fact that people are human is problematic for Marxists since, for such theorists, the economic relations of the societies within which they have been conditioned construct the consciousness of human beings. Utilitarian and consequentialist theorists question the ontological primacy of a political focus on rights, instead suggesting aggregate good as the central criteria of justice (Parekh, 1973; Long, 1977). Still other theorists claim a mutual compatibility between utilitarianism and human rights by arguing that overall social happiness is best achieved through the recognition of individual or group rights (Gray, 1983).

Bauer argues that to validate human rights it is not necessary to agree on their foundation so long as the constitutive norms of the rights can be established (Bauer, 1995). Through a consequentialist focus, Kuhonta claims that human rights are justified in Asia not because of their intrinsic self evidence, but because they promote positive and beneficial values such as public spiritedness (Kuhonta, 1995). For these two theorists, the apparent absence of any philosophical basis for universal rights therefore poses no real problems for recognizing human rights, since rights can be validated by criterion independent of their intrinsic self-evidence.

The Multiformity of Rationality

The philosophical argument as to the existence or otherwise of a basis for human rights has been extensively discussed, reflecting the nature of human rights as an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956). The purpose of this chapter is neither to advance nor refute claims to environmental human rights on grounds of political philosophy, since such an endeavor is necessarily a reflection of the particular philosophical paradigm utilized by the author. Instead, the purpose is to understand how separate forms of rationality suggest different criterion by which to evaluate rights claims.

The argument presented in this chapter is that the criterion of rationality is not a universal constant, but rather that it can assume a multiplicity of forms, only one of which constitutes the assumptions of the epistemological paradigm finally employed by an individual to make judgments. The discussion is therefore moved beyond the question of ‘can environmental human rights be philosophically justified?’ onto the more fundamental level of ‘what criterion of different manifestations of rationality support environmental human rights and which condone violations of environmental human rights?’. An epistemological analysis of competing theories of rationality is useful since these conceptualizations provide the criterion by which claims to universal human rights are understood and evaluated.

Bartlett explains that the concept of rationality is multi-dimensional. Each manifestation of rationality has its own order of measurement and comparison of values that are made intelligible through the presence of a central governing principle (Bartlett, 1986). Gorz and Dryzek accompany Bartlett in re-interpreting environmental politics to identify separate manifestations of rationality (Gorz, 1988; Dryzek, 1990). These aforementioned theorists bring their own nuanced perspectives to the topic of understanding the construction of paradigms of rationality. It is not the purpose here to critique or evaluate the points of contention raised by these theorists. Rather the endeavor is more focused. It is to introduce and differentiate two particular forms of rationality, (i) economic rationality and (ii) ecological rationality. Judgments regarding the justification of environmental human rights will then be demonstrated to be a function of the particular epistemological paradigm assumed by the analyst. These two particular manifestations of rationality have been chosen since economic rationality constitutes the dominant form of rationality in the capitalist political economy and ecological rationality constitutes an alternative epistemological paradigm by which to make critical comparisons. Ecological rationality is used in this research to refer to a type of rationality based upon a central concern for all forms of life. It is a rationality that assumes the interconnectedness of all living systems within a wider cosmology centered on respect for life as the unifying underlying principle (Naess, 1973; Bartlett, 1986). This underlying principle determines that ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’ (Leopold, 1949; Sessions and Naess, 1991).

There is an array of approaches within the subject of economics, with evident nuances between the contending perspectives. Economic rationality is therefore defined here as the dominant neo-classical model that broadly advocates the market as a method to achieve the desired goal of allocative efficiency (Gorz, 1973; Gorz, 1988; Gowdy, 1999). Allocative efficiency is the allocation of resources to maximize Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respecting conditions of Pareto efficiency (Gowdy, 1999). An allocation is Pareto-efficient ‘if it is impossible to move to another allocation which would make some people better off and nobody worse off (Begg et al, 1987). Allocative efficiency therefore articulates the interests of the opulent, since the market mechanism is endorsed as providing entitlement to resources irrespective of need. The market mechanism makes no differentiation between consumption of luxury and essential goods, since allocation is decided by monetary transactions alone. That is to say, paying for a good provides both sufficient and necessary grounds for entitlement to that resource.¹ Pareto-efficiency furthermore benefits the opulent since redistributive policies that make the rich worse off are deemed illegitimate, even though they could benefit a majority.

Following from the centrality of the market, value is defined in monetary terms according to the logic of economic rationality. Economic rationality relies upon a methodology of positivism, empiricism and cost-benefit analysis to commodify products (including natural resources) and to leave it to the market to determine the subsequent value and allocation of goods. In terms of the individual, a lifestyle of possessive individualism and consumerism is presumed to be an axiomatic and universal feature of human nature. Modern polities promote the desire to consume since people tend to be accorded social status by virtue of the products that they possess (Daly and Cobb, 1994; Edwards, 2000). Rational decisions are largely reduced to instrumental tasks of maximizing personal wealth, private possessions and the consumption of goods and services. This conception of individual identity is typically universalized or normalized’ and vital processes of identity formation and of becoming an individual are subsequently omitted as useful issues to be researched (Penttinen, 2000). The definition of economic rationality given above necessarily excludes marginalized approaches within the discipline of economics such as ecological and Marxist economists, who reject the centrality of the market principle and the values of possessive individualism upon which it is predicated (Deane, 1978).

Paradigms of rationality have associated value systems. Value systems refer to the relative importance assigned to competing and conflicting values such as ecological protection, care for the vulnerable, human rights, economic growth and materialistic desires. Individuals use value systems to make judgments and calculate rational actions. The prioritization of materialistic values over ecological integrity in capitalist societies is incomprehensible to cultures whose value systems are instead based upon a paradigm of ecological rationality. For example the indigenous U’wa nation in Colombia, fighting corporate plans to drill oil on their traditional lands, declared that:

we are left with no alternative other than to continue fighting on the side of the sky and earth and spirits or else disappear when the irrationality of the invader violates the most sacred of our laws …. Our words should be a warning that reunites us again as one family in order to ensure our future in harmony with the whole universe, or they will be one more voice that prophesises the destruction of life because of the absurd disposition of the white man (Cobaria et al1998).

Here the decision to drill for oil is seen as ‘irrational’ because the form of rationality employed by the U’wa interprets the incommensurate value system of economic rationality as an ‘absurd disposition’ in much the same way that most neo-classical economists would dismiss the stated cosmology of the U’wa nation. This conflict between economic and ecological rationality was expressed by the native American leader, Rolling Thunder, who explained to non-native Americans that:

Too many people don’t know that when they harm the earth they harm themselves, nor do they realize that when they harm themselves they harm the earth …. It’s not very easy for you people to understand these things because understanding is not knowing the kind of facts that your books and teachers talk about. I can tell you that understanding begins with love and respect…. Such respect means that we never stop realizing and never neglect to carry out our obligations to ourselves and our environment (quoted in Drengson, 1980, p. 236).

This quote demonstrates notions of respect, tolerance and obligations to otherness that would be discredited as unquantifiable, normative and, for both of these reasons, as irrational from the perspective of economic rationality. Ecological rationality conflicts with economic rationality since harmony with nature is contrasted with dominance over nature; nature is imbued with intrinsic worth rather than valued in monetary terms specified by the market and basic limited material goals are contrasted with the twin aspirations of luxury consumption and unlimited economic growth (Naess, 1997). Whereas human and non-human animals alike have, according to the paradigm of ecological rationality, axiomatic rights to an environment free of toxic pollution and to the environmental resources required to satisfy basic needs, these same rights are dismissed as irrelevant by the focus of economic rationality on allocative efficiency.

Economic rationality dominates and underpins the capitalist world order. Sagoff observes that pronouncements that nature is sacred or that greed is detrimental to the individual and society appear judgmental and even embarrassing in modern societies (Sagoff, 1997). In order to influence the policy making process it is necessary to use prudential or economic reasons, rather than ethical or spiritual arguments (Sagoff, 1997). For environmental protection policies to be implemented in a capitalist system it is therefore necessary to rationalize such projects in economic terms, for example, that greater energy efficiency reduces production costs, and it is this agenda that environmental economics now covers as an academic discipline. Possible measures to protect the environment that conflict with efficiency are invariably rejected by policy-makers as too costly or impractical. Most devastating from the ecological focus on habitat preservation is the continued reliance on fossil fuels as an energy source supported by a focus on economic efficiency. Economic rationality dictates it inefficient to invest in non-polluting forms of energy and deems it appropriate to instead risk long-term climatic instability and the resultant habitat changes and threats to biodiversity because of a singular focus on economic criteria. Continuing reliance on fossil fuels reflects not only the supremacy of economic rationality in policy-making circles but also the unlimited ecological damage that the modern discipline of economics is willing to endorse when such destruction leads to the efficient allocation of resources.

Social Power and the Construction of Rationality

Dominant forms of rationality are therefore more a reflection of the culture within which they are constructed, rather than being universal in character. To account for the dominance of economic rationality and to refute its claims to objectivity or neutrality it is necessary to investigate the process by which this particular manifestation of rationality became established.

Dominant epistemological paradigms have a propensity to be both self-legitimizing and self-perpetuating (Foucault, 1994a). The appropriateness of academic questions and agendas are invariably judged according to criteria specified by the dominant epistemological paradigm that have been internalized and normalized by the theorists educated and conditioned within that framework. Applying this process to economic rationality operating in a capitalist world, Opschoor points out that:

Present day economic science is busy meticulously researching the way that markets work, and the situations in which they maximize individuals’ satisfaction of needs, given their incomes and preferences. Economic science - at least the neo-classical mainstream - has thus developed itself into a theory which confirms the system and legitimizes the market mechanism (Opschoor, 1994, p. 195).

The assumptions of neo-classical economics therefore constitute the criteria for the validification of its own form of rationality and the criteria by which subjugated epistemological paradigms are simultaneously discredited. Such criteria relate, for example, to the desired values of positivism, empiricism and a self-legitimizing definition of objectivity as the search for allocative efficiency and economic growth. The outcome of this process of epistemological agenda setting is to limit mainstream academic discourse within the increasingly narrow confines specified by the logic of economic rationality. This logic, along with its associated values, has been elevated to the highest status, while alternatives are viewed as either inferior forms of knowledge or as non-knowledge (Banuri and Marglin, 1993). Through this process, reason itself has become the mere instrument of an all-inclusive e...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Rationality, Epistemology and Environmental Human Rights
• 2 Structural Power and Environmental Human Rights
• 3 Social Demands for Environmental Human Rights
• 4 The Formal Response to Environmental Human Rights Claims
• 5 The Human Right to an Environment Free from Toxic Pollution
• 6 The Human Right to Natural Resources
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index