Between Lausanne and Geneva

International Conferences and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Abraham Ben-Zvi

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367003678
• eBook ISBN: 9780429710247
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica mediorientale

This book analyzes the concept of an international conference as referred to by the major parties involved to resolve at least one facet of the Arab-Israel predicament. The restrictive type of conference has proved to be effective in resolving or stabilizing certain elements of the conflict.

Chapter I. A Theoretical Framework: Presentation and Implementation

In recent years the Israeli and American public arenas have witnessed an incessant debate over the extent to which an international conference could set in motion an effective process of regional accommodation. The central objective of this study is to elucidate the positions of the major involved parties¹ on this issue, as they have evolved since late 1984, and the various patterns by which such an international conference could be implemented.

On the regional level, the work will focus on the perceptions and preferences of Jordan, the PLO, Syria, Egypt, and Israel. These in large part were shaped in the wake of King Hussein's initiative of February 1985 — the trigger event that precipitated the entire diplomatic drive. On the global level, the analysis will concentrate on the positions of the two superpowers. On both levels, this reconstruction of images and policies will seek to identify not only the predispositions that determined the parties' initial peace strategies, but also the possible impact of the operational, external environment in modifying at least some of their initial tactics and strategies. Ultimately we shall inquire to what extent the players in the unfolding drama were prepared to set aside, adjust or even abandon their preliminary views regarding the desired procedures and mechanisms for defusing the protracted Arab-Israel predicament, in light of changing circumstances and opportunities for accelerating the peacemaking process.

Our analysis will focus primarily on the positions articulated in the course of the period 1985-1988. But it will also allude to and assess several earlier initiatives to mitigate the Arab-Israel dispute through the convocation of an international conference. On occasion, multilateral efforts will be juxtaposed with less ambitious trilateral processes and initiatives. Particular emphasis in this respect will be placed upon President Carter's ill-fated attempt in 1977 to convene the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. In view of the basic continuity and compatibility between the initial positions taken by some of the actors (such as Syria and the PLO) in the 1977 episode and earlier, and those of the 1985 initiative, such a juxtaposition is essential for identifying the longstanding parameters that consistently delimited margins of deviation. In cases, such as that of the US, where a more significant change in the basic approach toward the idea of an international conference appears to have taken place over the years, this comparative perspective may prove useful for distinguishing between certain competing, and occasionally incompatible foreign policy orientations, from which divergent peace strategies were delineated.

The issue of the international conference has precipitated a welter of public statements since it surfaced with much saliency in 1985 as a concrete option. Yet an examination of the various facets of the question confronts the observer with several clusters of difficulties.

In the first place, any attempt to identify reliably the positions of at least several of the prospective participants in the conference at any given juncture along the unfolding diplomatic process, is impeded by a plethora of confusing background noise. This screen of ambivalence is inherent in the desire of actors like the Soviet Union and Jordan to convey different, and occasionally even incompatible messages to different constituencies on the domestic, regional and global levels. Thus the Soviet wish to project to the US and Israel an image of moderation and constructiveness (necessary to allay fears of Soviet obstructionism during the conference) conflicts with its concurrent desire to convey an image of resolve — if not intransigence — to its radical regional clients and proxies. This ambiguity is a constant source of difficulty in trying to diagnose actual preferences and positions and thus to distinguish between the declarative and the real.

But there is also a more fundamental source for these inconsistencies and contradictions. Essentially, the various parties involved — directly or indirectly — in the Arab-Israel dispute envisage fundamentally different models of the international conference they wish to attend. Although using similar terms and rhetoric, they advocate in fact widely-divergent structures and processes for the conference; these they view as essential for promoting the specific nature of the settlement sought (or, at the very least, for torpedoing any undesired solution). In other words, not only do some of the protagonists, or their patrons, tend to present their views in an ambivalent or contradictory manner; they actually adhere to incompatible definitions of the very nature, composition, responsibilities and power of the machinery envisaged for shaping the parameters of a settlement.

This divergence regarding the "rules of the game" according to which the conference is to function covers an entire spectrum. At its minimalist extreme, the plenary of the conference is characterized as merely a cover or prelude to the actual phase of negotiations. Depicted as but a formalistic-ritualistic opening event, and designed essentially to legitimize direct bilateral processes of bargaining in the form of subcommittees as well as to discuss in a non-binding fashion such general problems as economic development, this vision was shared by the Reagan administration and Israeli Foreign Minister (and former prime minister) Shimon Peres. It rules out a priori the possibility that the conference would "intrude in the negotiations, impose solutions or veto what had been agreed bilaterally." As Secretary of State Shultz further observed:

The wrong kind of conference should never be convened. The U.S. will not attend that kind of conference. No sovereign state would agree to attend the kind of conference that would pressure to pass judgement on issues of national security. The conference we support launches a series of bilateral negotiations....We will not permit a conference to become authoritative or plenipotentiary, or to pass judgments on the negotiations, or to exceed its jurisdiction as agreed by the parties.²

In sharp contrast to this delimited, highly constrained type, there exists at the other extreme of the spectrum a maximalist perception of the conference. Supported primarily by Syria and the PLO (and to a somewhat lesser extent by the Soviet Union), this approach envisages the plenary as a powerful organ, capable of interfering continuously in the work of the various subcommittees, and irrevocably committed to a set of narrow and fixed parameters that in fact comprise the basic components of the settlement advocated. Far from constituting the corridor or "vehicle to get negotiations started,"³ this maximalist variant of the conference underscores the role of the plenary as a whole, or of certain powers comprising it (rather than the bilateral subcommittees), in translating into concrete and — above all — binding provisions, a variety of pre-existing principles and parameters. In the words of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat: "Any action that gives impetus to the peace process must pass through an effective international conference, where all the parties concerned, including the PLO, are represented on an equal footing." It should not be "merely a conference of reconciliation, but a conference of arbitration."⁴

Thus in juxtaposition with the minimalist model, which is predicated upon the premise that the "forum itself cannot impose solutions or cancel agreements that are achieved between the sides" (being but a "formal, international opening meeting, following which negotiations would begin between the sides"),⁵ the maximalist vision is closely patterened on a fundamentally different cluster of expectations. These guarantee that "the conference [be] of an arbitral nature," empowered with "the right to issue resolutions,"⁶ with the two superpowers (or a united, cohesive Arab coalition) providing the forceful impetus for progress.

Along this spectrum and between these two extremes, lie the specific and occasionally dynamic positions of the other potential participants in the international conference: the Soviet approach, which insisted on a preliminary superpower understanding on the parameters of peace and incorporated several dimensions of the maximalist and coercive model; and the Jordanian posture, which shifted from initial advocacy of the maximalist model toward acceptance, in April 1987, of the basic logic inherent in the minimalist variant of the conference.

The fundamental differences between these dichotomous images of the international conference reflect the irreconcilable objectives of at least some of the protagonists regarding the nature of the agreement sought.⁷ Yet the models of the conference are both predicated upon the notion that, at least in the opening phase of the conference as well as in the final stage of ratifying agreements, the presence of the two superpowers is inevitable. The minimalist model assigns to the five permanent members of the Security Council (including the US and the Soviet Union) the largely symbolic function of providing auspices and legitimacy for actual bilateral negotiating processes, while the maximalist type aspires to convert the powers' ritualistic presence into an effective role of arbitration and even enforcement. Yet both approaches view the entire notion of an international conference as inextricably related to some form of superpower presence, however delimited.

In this respect, the two divergent concepts of a Middle East peace conference differ from certain other multilateral peace designs, which either excluded or set severe formal limits (which on occasion even exceeded those recommended by advocates of the minimalist type) upon the very involvement of at least some of the central powers. For example, at the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1922-1923 the American delegation was granted full representative status, but was barred in advance from taking part in the actual negotiations or assuming any obligations such as the signing of the consequent treaty. Relegated to the status of "a mere observer,"⁸ it therefore did not play any significant role in either the shaping or the implementation of the peace treaties. (This peripheral role reflected prevailing isolationist sentiments in the US, and as such differed sharply from the major American role in the shaping of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919.) The role assigned to the Soviet delegation in the conference was even more marginal. Notwithstanding the direct Soviet interest in the future of Asia Minor, it was invited to participate only in the discussions on the Straits Question. On other issues it was excluded altogether, even as an observer.⁹

This category of qualifying or exclusionist conferences approximates certain variants of the minimalist model in downgrading the role of global actors in the peacemaking process. In contrast, there exists a diametrically opposite category of peace conferences. It too is premised on a hierarchial notion of a clear-cut "division of labor" among its various participants. Yet here it is an altogether different form of stratification that determines the actual role and relative status of each of the participants. Specifically, in sharp contrast to the marginal role (at best) that the qualifying or exclusionist model envisages for at least several of the global or regional powers (in some cases, such as that of the American participation at the Lausanne Peace Conference, these limitations were largely self-imposed), this model is based on the assumption that the display of unity and harmony among all or most central regional or global entities constitutes the key for effectively defining and implementing the parameters of a settlement. Thus in this design, the powerful demonstration of big power cohesion and resolve is the impetus for setting in motion a successful multilateral peace drive. And the local adversaries — or at least several of the actors most directly involved in the conflict — are reduced to impotence and ultimately compelled to acquiesce in the face of a determined coalition.

This coercive, hierarchical paradigm approximates the maximalist model in incorporating the ingredients of an imposed settlement. Instances of its application abound. Thus, in the wake of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, all the major European powers, acting jointly, prevented the Turks from pressing their victory to a conclusion. The peace treaty, which was signed in December 1897, provided that Turkey relinquish its territorial gains and agree to make Crete an autonomous province.¹⁰ Similarly, feeling acutely threatened in the wake of the Japanese victory over China in 1895, the Russian government approached the major European powers and suggested joint diplomatic intervention to prevent Japan from maximizing its territorial gains in the war. The intervention bore fruit. Even though initially, in the draft treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, Japan had secured Chinese acquiescence to its demand for control over all of Liaotung, it was now — before the treaty was signed — forced to accept a demand jointly presented by Russia, Germany and France to refrain from annexing the Liaotung territory.¹¹

Thus in both the Turkish and Japanese cases the victors, neither of whom enjoyed great power support, were prevented from retaining their full territorial gains. In the course of the multilateral peacemaking stage that followed hostilities, they were confronted with a powerful, coercive coalition comprising all or most of the major powers, that was adamant in its refusal to recognize any serious infringement of the local balance of power.¹² The outcome of this recurrent pattern of big power intervention amounted to an imposed settlement, whose provisions reflected the essential concerns of most major powers operating on the international scene.

This pattern of authoritative — occasionally coercive — peace conference is predicated upon the notion of great power unity as the prerequisite for effectively implementing the desired shaping of the peace settlement. A variant of this model can be seen in the 1913 London Conference. Seeking to settle the disputes arising from the Second Balkan War, all the major European powers agreed "to demand that Montenegro recognize Albania's right to Scutari and withdraw her forces from that port." This demand, accompanied by an explicit threat issued by Austria-Hungary to intervene militarily, ultimately compelled Montenegro to evacuate Scutari.¹³ Similarly, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, it was an agreement by all the great powers to recognize the claims of the representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia to self-determination, that paved the way to the subsequent decisions regarding the specific delineation of their boundaries.

As this historical review clearly indicates, the unanimity in approach and the determination to forge "a working coalition" enabled the great powers to convert the multilateral peace forum into an effective mechanism for jointly dictating — or at least defining — the terms of the treaty. In the absence of such an understanding on the parameters of the settlement envisaged, mere formal participation in the conference by all or most of the major regional or global powers could not in itself guarantee that it would be patterned on the premises of the coercive or maximalist model.

Notwithstanding these instances where big power unity provided the impetus for conflict resolution along predetermined lines, we cannot ignore the possibility that such preliminary agreements would not be honored by any of the major actors in the course of the conference. The cases of the San Francisco Conference of 1951, which negotiated the Japanese peace treaty, the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, and the Tashkent Conference of 1966, all suggest that initial superpower or big power understandings on matters of procedure and substance may well recede into the background in the course of the negotiations.¹⁴ Not only are these agreements open to divergent interpretations, but they are subject to deviation and fluctuation in accord with the political and military dynamics of the situation. The initial, agreed-upon design of the format of the conference should not be viewed, therefore, as fixed, but as a fragile construct, that cannot always remain totally isolated from the realities of a highly dynamic environment.

Moving from the global to the regional setting — indeed, to the cont...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Summary
• Chapter I. A Theoretical Framework: Presentation and Implementation
• Chapter II. In Pursuit of the 'Geneva Option': A Juxtaposition, 1985-1988 and Beyond
• Chapter III. Conclusions and Postscript
• Appendices
• Notes