Debating the Iran-Iraq War in Contemporary Iran
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Debating the Iran-Iraq War in Contemporary Iran

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eBook - ePub

Debating the Iran-Iraq War in Contemporary Iran

About this book

The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) is a cornerstone of the Islamic Republic of Iran's existence. It entrenched the newly established regime and provided the means for its consolidation of power in the country following the 1979 Revolution. Officially recognized as the "War of Sacred Defense", the Iranian government has been careful to control public discourse and cultural representation concerning the war since the since wartime. Nearly 30 years since the war's end, however, debates around the war and its aftermath are still very much alive in Iran today. This volume uncovers what some of those debates mean, nearly 30 years since the war's end.

The chapters in this volume take a fresh look at the far-reaching legacies of the Iran-Iraq War in Iran today – a war that dominated the first decade of the Islamic Republic's existence. The chapters examine the political, social and cultural ramifications of the war and the wide range of debates that surround it.

The chapters in this book were originally published in Middle East Critique.

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Yes, you can access Debating the Iran-Iraq War in Contemporary Iran by Narges Bajoghli, Amir Moosavi, Narges Bajoghli,Amir Moosavi in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in History & Military & Maritime History. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.

Information

Publisher
Routledge
Year
2019
eBook ISBN
9781351050579
Edition
1

‘Battling Truths: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War in the Islamic Republic of Iran’

Debates around the war with Iraq (1980–1988) and its aftermath are very much alive in Iran today. What do these debates mean nearly 30 years since the war’s end? A cornerstone of its existence, the Iran-Iraq War entrenched the newly established Islamic Republic and provided the means for its consolidation of power in the country. Officially recognized as the ‘War of Sacred Defense’ (defa-ye moqaddas), the Iranian government’s narrative of the war has been one framed by the martyrdom of the third Shi’i Muslim Imam, Husayn, at Karbala: A war of righteous victimhood led by selfless heroes and martyrs.
Since wartime, cultural producers from various political and social positions have been at the forefront of debates about defining and representing the war for the majority of Iranians, who are now too young to remember the conflict, as 70 percent of the population is under the age of 35. While much state-sponsored cultural production continues to promote a version of the wartime narrative, some pro-regime cultural producers and intellectuals, many of them veterans, advocate for more dynamic understandings of the war. These actors seek to move away from the propaganda efforts of the 1980s and to create more critical understandings of this formative period in the regime’s history. Of course, voices of opposition to the ways in which the war was carried out and its aftermath have grown since its conclusion in 1988 and continue to play a large role in the political landscape of the Islamic Republic.
Concurrently, veterans and ordinary citizens contend with the psychological consequences of the Iran-Iraq War, one of the longest conventional wars of the twentieth century. Beyond the horrendous effects of chemical weapons, posttraumatic stress disorder also afflicts many veterans of the conflict. Moreover, in recent years, articles have leaked about suicide among veterans, and the state has faced harsh criticisms for its treatment of them. Intellectuals, filmmakers and writers increasingly have to tackle these issues. As all of these debates demonstrate, despite the fact that the war ended more than 28 years ago, it remains an open canvas on which are staged dynamic discussions about the Islamic Republic, what it stands for, and how it will continue.
The articles in the special theme section of this journal aim to take a fresh look at the legacy of the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath. Specifically, the articles are based on extensive fieldwork in Iran related to the legacies of the war, and they seek to push past the narrative of the war that the Islamic Republic has monopolized. The issue includes contributions from Kaveh Ehsani, who offers an overview of the legacies of the war today and the discussions that have been silenced about the war in the country. Ehsani’s article also explores the war from the perspective of those from Khuzestan, where the war began and where some of the bloodiest battles took place. Eric Lob’s article examines the legacies of the Jehad-e Sazandegi [Construction Jehad] in Iran’s rural development projects, including during the war with Iraq. A pioneering organization in post-revolutionary Iran, Jehad-e Sazandegi played a significant role during the war and post-war years, yet it has remained understudied. Lob’s article, based on his ethnographic fieldwork with members of the organization, especially its war veterans who have formed a veteran’s organization, The Trench Builders without Trenches, offers a crucial historical assessment of this organization and the men who were a part of it.
Amir Moosavi examines the constraints of representing the war in the short stories of Ahmad Dehqan, a prolific war veteran-author who has made the war the subject of his writings. Narges Bajoghli explores how pro-regime media producers in Iran today use the framework of the war to put forth contemporary understandings of masculinity and citizenship. Her article builds on her ethnographic fieldwork in Iran with pro-regime filmmakers, focusing specifically on the commercially successful film, The Outcasts (Ekhrajiha), directed by the former head of Ansar-e Hezbollah, Masoud Dehnamaki.
Narges Bajoghli and Amir Moosavi

War and Resentment: Critical Reflections on the Legacies of the Iran-Iraq War

KAVEH EHSANI
ABSTRACT During the challenging transitional period after the 1979 revolution, the Iran-Iraq War helped the Islamic Republic to consolidate its hold on power by creating new institutions of coercion and governance, mobilizing popular support, and eliminating domestic rivals. Despite the state becoming entrenched, the political elite and Iranian society both remain highly divided over the legacy of the war and the nature and the direction of the post-revolution and post-war project. The popular aspirations that were unleashed during the revolution were incorporated into the war experience, but they remain unfulfilled and are a major factor that shape public culture and political practices. This discontent is compounded by the shortcomings of authoritarian and ill-conceived post-war reconstruction, especially in war-torn regions. The imposition of an official interpretation of the ‘Sacred Defense’ effectively silences plural experiences of the war and alternative and more critical analyses of it. As a result, instead of acting as a unifying experience that reinforces state hegemony, the legacy of the war is a widespread resentment that affects public culture and political attitudes. This article investigates the conflicted legacies of the Iran-Iraq War by using case studies from historical and ethnographic research, as well as professional experiences (Much of the analysis in this article is based on the author’s academic research and professional experience in Iran during extended intervals since 1989. These include ethnographic research and professional work as a regional planner on post-war reconstruction in rural Khuzestan; ongoing historical and ethnographic research on the refinery city of Abadan; urban research and consulting collaboration with the Tehran City Council and other urban institutions; and ongoing editorial collaboration with the journal Goftogu in Tehran).
The Iran-Iraq War (IIW) (1980–1988) played a pivotal role in the consolidation of the Islamic Republic at a crucial time after the 1979 Revolution. When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, the fledgling Islamic Republic was facing the dual challenge of a simmering civil war against its domestic rivals, as well as a hostile international environment. On the morrow of the revolution, few would have predicted that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his supporters were capable of overcoming these challenges, which were further compounded by devastations of the war. Over the next decade the economy descended into deep crisis as a result of capital flight, international sanctions, and the drastic collapse of oil revenues after 1986. By the time the ceasefire was declared in 1988, the war had caused 600,000 Iranian casualties,1 and a staggering $1.2 trillion of economic damages at current rates.2
The war provided a rallying cry for the mobilization of a divided population, and the elimination of the new regime’s domestic rivals, including liberals, nationalists, the left, ethnic autonomists, and other Islamists. It provided the context for the accelerated purges and re-organization of existing institutions such as the army, key ministries in charge of security and the economy (agriculture, heavy industries, planning and budget). The war also prompted the state to develop further its own parallel institutions of coercion and governance, such as the Revolutionary Guards (Sepah-e Pasdaran, or IRGC), the Basij militia, and the Construction Jihad (Jahad-e Sazandegi). New foundations were set up, such as the Foundation for the Deprived (Bonyad-e Mostaz’afan), Martyr’s Foundation (Bonyad-e Shahid), Housing Foundation (Bonyad-e Maskan), and the Imam’s Aid Committee (Komite-ye Emdad-e Emam) to provide welfare and a safety net to the needy and other significant segments of the population, but also to mobilize political support by fostering clientelism.3
The state also moved to monopolize the discursive representation of the war. A vast culture industry was set up to frame the war as a ‘Sacred Defense’ and to memorialize and extoll its virtues through public art, murals, organized funerals of fallen soldiers, renaming of public spaces and streets, war cinema, (censored) mass media, and the dedication of the two available official television channels to war propaganda. The monopolization of the representations of the war has continued after the ceasefire with military and state-funded publishing houses, research centers, and journals that publish an apparently endless stream of memoirs, literature, films, oral histories, and military and geopolitical studies that present a narrow and exclusive representation of the war experience.4 Thus, the IIW has played a major role in shaping contemporary Iranian society and polity. However, it has not succeeded in becoming a unifying symbol of collective experience. Rather, it has become a source of shared, individualized resentment. This article intends to raise some critical questions about the deeply contradictory aspects of this impact and the manner in which they are addressed in public discourse and analytical literature about the war.

How Wars Shape States and States Shape Societies

Major wars provide the opportunity for state formation and social restructuring, and the IIW was no different in that regard. Since the 1980s, the pivotal role played by warfare in shaping modern states has become a topic of considerable historical and theoretical re-evaluation.5 In a now classic essay, Charles Tilly outlined how warfare historically has played this role through performing several key functions6: Wars allow victorious rulers to enhance their nationalist credentials by defeating external enemies, but also by neutralizing or eliminating domestic rivals; in wartime states gain exceptional leeway to impose control over culture by framing a uniform and militarized narrative of the ‘self’ and ‘the other’; officially sanctioned ideology can serve to mobilize and unify the core population around a common historical narrative, shared religion, dominant language, or territory. Warfare also can serve as a catalyst for enhancing crucial state capacities, including, among others, the consolidation of permanent militaries, the development of strong institutions of governance for tax extraction, policing, security, surveillance, record keeping, redistributive social welfare policies, and economic planning on a national scale. Hakan Yavuz’s observation is now widely shared among scholars of the topic: ‘…wars may be the most effective means to homogenize populations and thus consolidate state authority … through wars the states create conditions that help to construct and mobilize nationalistic sentiments and enhance in-group cohesion.’7
This state-centric model provides valuable insights for understanding the impact of the IIW. Indeed, much of the academic writings on post-revolution Iran resort to some version of this analytical framework and highlight the role of state institutions and ruling elites when it comes to analyzing the topic.8 However, there are several shortcomings in this model that need to be addressed. First, the assumption that ‘the state’ is a discreet sphere that can homogenize populations or shape a unitary and malleable society in wartime through exceptional institutions is more illusory (what Timothy Mitchell calls a ‘state effect’9) than an unambiguous fact. Indeed, what has characterized post-revolution Iran never has been the unity of the state, ruling political elites, or ‘society’, but their deep fragmentation and lack of consensus. The IIW momentarily papered over these divisions over the nature of the social project, but the handling of the war and its aftermath has played a major role in intensifying this fragmentation. Social histories of wars reveal that social classes and organized groups equally use the wartime conditions to demand and obtain significant and lasting social concessions from states and ruling establishments.10
Second, military conflicts do not occur in a vacuum, but within specific contexts. In particular, popular mobilization for war in revolutionary societies does not depend on patriotism alone, but also on the utopian urges to change the world and build a new one.11 Social revolutions transform established norms and hierarchies, and dismantle or reconfigure institutions, including the laws, property relations, and other key apparatuses of the state itself. Under these circumstances the unleashing of collective aspirations and utopian imaginaries cannot be ignored by new ruling elites, even when a major war is being fought against an external enemy.12 In this process the expectations of a highly politicized society, coupled with the institutional vacuum created by the overthrow of the ancient regime, create situations where ‘the social’ ends up shaping ‘the political’, as much as the other way around. In post-revolution Iran state institutions have been severely limited in their ability to address and manage the ever changing social expectations of discontented segments of society such as refugees, people living in war-torn regions, workers, the urban poor, women, the current young generation born or raised in wartime, dissidents, etc. whose revolutionary aspirations have been affected by the war and its consequences.
Third, wars are by nature plural experiences. Soldiers, workers, civilians, refugees, families of survivors, war profiteers, children, dissenters, and women live through radically different experiences of the war that seldom can fit into the same narrative. The continued imposition by the ruling establishment of the dominant narrative of ‘Sacred Defense’ as the universal and legitimate version of the war aims to silence alternative experiences and dissenting perspectives. Not surprisingly, the general population does not recognize their own experiences in this official narrative. As a result of this silencing, the overarching legacy of the IIW is a not a sense of collective patriotic accomplishment an...

Table of contents

  1. Cover
  2. Half Title
  3. Title Page
  4. Copyright Page
  5. Table of Contents
  6. Citation Information
  7. Notes on Contributors
  8. 1 ‘Battling Truths: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War in the Islamic Republic of Iran’
  9. 2 War and Resentment: Critical Reflections on the Legacies of the Iran-Iraq War
  10. 3 Development, Mobilization and War: The Iranian Construction Jehad, Construction Mobilization and Trench Builders Association (1979–2013)
  11. 4 Dark Corners and the Limits of Ahmad Dehqan’s War Front Fiction
  12. 5 The Outcasts: The Start of ‘New Entertainment’ in Pro-Regime Filmmaking in the Islamic Republic of Iran
  13. 6 Inventions of the Iran – Iraq War
  14. Index